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Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp
526 F.3d 1353
11th Cir.
2008
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*4 Background I. KRAVITCH, Before DUBINA and 60,- COOGLER,* comprises Lake Belt South Florida’s District Judges, Circuit just of wetlands east of Ever- 000 acres Judge. * Alabama, sitting by designation. Coogler, L. Scott United States Honorable Judge District of District for the Northern glades EIS, National Park and northwest of Also after the the Corps received Miami. The own a metropolitan Miners regarding information the Northwest Well- portion of the Lake Belt substantial County’s field—Miami-Dade primary In wish to mine their lands. the late drinking source of water —and the Pennsu- 1990s, urging, at the Miners’ the Corps co wetlands. The information showed that investigated propriety issuing 50- the Northwest Wellfield was far more vul- 15,800 year CWA to mine acres of mining-related nerable to contamination the Lake Belt. In the Corps issued than was known at the time Impact a draft Environmental Statement approved The information (“EIS”) NEPA, pursuant to which recog- that property showed values had risen in proposed project’s negative nized the envi- area, the Pennsuco mitiga- such that the impacts. public ronmental took contemplated tion by the purchasing EIS — draft, critics, comment on the includ- public wetlands for conservation to replace ing multiple agencies, federal raised seri- destroyed Lake Belt wetlands-—was no environmental, technical, legal ous longer economically feasible. Nonetheless, concerns. issued a the Corps responded to the following year largely final EIS the follow- *5 overwhelming criticism and new informa- ing the draft In the final EIS. EIS the by limiting tion permits, issuing the a new Corps noted that environmental effects public notice suggesting 10-year permits mitigated by placing special per- could be 5,000 covering only acres. This limited mit conditions on the Miners. For exam- criticism, proposal heavy also received in- ple, suggested permit one con- condition cluding the same regarding FWS criticism templated percentage mining profits impact the on the wood Respond- stork. purchase be used to wetlands in the ing concerns, to Corps FWS’s the drafted area, adjacent “Pennsuco” to the Lake (“BA”) biological assessment concluding Belt, public conservation. that the Lake Belt mining would have no EIS, After issuing Corps the final the effect on the wood stork because the wood “public released a CWA notice” that formerly foraged storks that in the Lake planned mining permits. to issue the Part Belt area had shifted In locations. Corps the notice indicated that accepted the FWS BA Corps’s engage would not in ESA “formal consul- in Corps’s concurred “no effect” find- tation” with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife ing. (“FWS”) Service because the Corps deter- The Appellees requested issuing permits mined that would have (“SEIS”) supplemental draft a EIS to ad- any species protected by no effect on criticisms, dress the new information and public ESA. The and several federal permits. and then reevaluate the agencies heavily The public criticized the no- granted 10-year permits In instead particular, tice. the FWS refused to (“ROD”). in a final Record Corps’s concur in of Decision “no effect” determi- nation The ROD described the because FWS concluded that criticisms new information, mining might have a detrimental but in the end found that the impact on the ESA-protected mining plan wood stork. The more-limited would have no FWS requested significant therefore that formal already consulta- effects not discussed in begin tion between Corps. FWS and the the EIS.1 21,000 recognized impact 1. The EIS on the environmental resources of the significant region”; have acres "will an irreversible the ROD concluded that the ROD, II. Jurisdiction Appellees Shortly after against chal- brought this suit Putting jurisdic aside the other inter- The Miners lenging asserted, conclude that grounds we tional all parties vened, eventually over “injunction” jurisdiction we have The court summary judgment. 1292(a)(1). moved for an § For under 28 U.S.C. case sum- motions for Appellees’ granted appealable pursuant order their 1292(a)(1), several claims and clear and under mary judgment on it must be a court, other the district voluntary to dismiss their standable directive from motions through contempt must to it be enforceable “REMANDED court then claims. The all give and it some or proceedings, must development, [Corps] [but] for further com sought relief of the substantive purpose jurisdiction for retained Army Corps plaint. Alabama DE appropriate remedy.” determining Cir. Eng’rs, Judg- (hereinafter “Summary at 2005). district court’s Remedies Or Order”). After the court entered ment clear, contains enforceable directives der moved dismiss judgment, com requested Sierra Club its relating to formal moot the claims ESA (issuing DE 103-04 See 387 at plaint. with the FWS because consultation Miners);. DE at 53 specific orders subsequently engaged Corps and FWS injunctive relief amended (requesting to the Lake formal consultation related the court stated: complaint). example, For effect the wood stork— permits’ Belt words, devegetating, de other all sought. Appellees ESA relief scraping, blasting, and har mucking, followed the court’s otherwise vesting aquifer from the of limestone *6 began on an judgment, and work SEIS 60-day range] in immedi stop [the must raised. address the issues the court had (no p.m. ately than Tues later 5:00 day, July 17, 2007). The court denied the motion to dismiss supple- a Order” and entered “Remedies 103; see also id. at 103-04 DE 387 at Summary Judgment menting the Order (ordering activity specif- cessation of other 372; DE DE addressing remedies. mining company). ic to each Sierra Club The held that the must court express district court’s decla- points vacated, stayed of but the vacatur some issuing injunction, it not an ration that was of its permits pending Corps’s release n. this is DE 387 at 31 but we conclude stayed the court Specifically, SEIS. con- an instance where substance should mining any permits licensing vacatur of over The district court issued trol form. “60-day range” of North- outside the specificity of such and breadth commands appealed. west Wellfield.2 The Miners litigant that no would dare violate them. commands, not instead appeal, choosing The did If the had violated the Miners judg- comply with the district court’s court have initiated con- the district could appear appeal tempt proceedings, ment and to in this as ami- and it is not clear to us accept you that the court would “But said cus curiae. mining impact quality significant have on the of could because the more-limited a issue im- impact environment” other than the significant "will a on the human not have pacts in the EIS. quality discussed of the human environment.” AR 614 81; ("AR” at 1028 at 113 refers to the AR record, with 60-day range administrative filed the district area which 2. The is the from 19). only plausible reading seepage groundwater court at reach the North- DE can aquifer days. mining "will west Wellfield’s within 60 of ROD is that the limited injunction” “In A. Judgments Underlying Injunc- defense. wasn’t short, tion adage: adhere to the time-tested we duck, duck, quacks like a if it walks like First, we precisely must determine duck, and looks like a then it’s duck.” which judgments we must address. The Indus., Indus., Inc., BMC Inc. v. Barth four claims Sierra Club’s com- amended (11th Cir.1998) 160 F.3d plaint on which the granted district court J.). (Tjoflat, were, summary judgment short: an against APA-CWA claim Corps, be- jurisdic- accept pendent furthermore We Corps erroneously cause the held that no grant of sum- tion over the district court’s practicable existed, alternatives because mary judgment. Holdings Like Cable improperly pro- balanced the Cooke, Battlefield, Inc. v. ject’s detriments, benefits and and because (11th Cir.1985), summary judg- failed a public hearing, to hold in- grant provided ment the basis for the (Claim I); against an ESA claim junction. “Consequently, prop- we cannot Corps, Corps’s because the BA erroneous- erly jurisdiction exercise our under ly concluded that the would have 1292(a)(1) reviewing without also stork, impact endangered no on the wood grant partial summary judgment.” Id. (Claim III); an against APA-ESA claim concurring Corps’s FWS for no III. Merits Discussion (Claim determination, IV); impact and an Summary Judgment Order and its against Corps, APA-NEPA claim be- together Remedies Order supplemental cause the EIS failed meet NEPA’s re- span pages containing 617 footnotes. (Claim V). quirements, After the district 73; DE DE 387. We commend the dis- granted summary judgment, court but be- judge thorough analysis, trict for his but Order, fore the court issued the Remedies the Orders must be vacated and the case and FWS undertook ESA for- grant remanded because he failed to mal consultation —the relief Sierra contemplated the level deference requested for III It Club Claims and IV. Though portions the APA. other improper was therefore for the district *7 correct, analysis may district court’s be rely judgments court to on those Claims’ may support finding and alone a that the crafting remedy; a the claims were arbitrary capricious acted in an and Thus, rely moot.3 the district court could manner, district that the court made clear only judgments on its on Claims I and V— remanded to the because of the judgments APA-NEPA APA-CWA and Corps’s injunc- “cumulative effect” of the errors. against issuing the the —in DE judg- 73 at 183-84. On remand the district tion. We therefore review those Corps’s court review the environ- ments. should analysis using proper

mental level of B. Review Standard of deference, again determine whether any provides judicial the cumulative effect of errors re- The APA for re quires vacating Corps’s like agency view of decisions say any summary judgment exception 3. This is not to defendants are to dismissal—a extraordinary remedy judgment underlying vacated entitled to the of vaca- must be before judgments against generally tur of the ESA claims can be dismissed. See U.S. FWS, P’ship, Though, Bancorp Mortgage v. Bonner Mall an issue we do not reach. Co. out, 18, 386, point "summary 233 as the Miners there is no 513 U.S. (1994). 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d mootness, judgment exception" a there is 1360 additional changes, agency Min- or the receives permits to the grant CWA

decision situation, agency dur- decisions information. Corps’s and the NEPA ers review- NEPA determi- process. “The must make an additional ing permitting set wheth- agency shall ... hold unlawful must determine ing court nation: action, findings, conclu- create, agency changes or information aside er the arbitrary, capricious, ... reveals, quality sions found of significant effects discretion, not in or otherwise an of abuse previously the human environment not found to with- [or be] with law accordance Natural Res. considered. Marsh Or. by required procedure of out observance 1851, Council, 374, 360, 490 109 S.Ct. U.S. 706(2). § standard “[T]his 5 U.S.C. law.” 1859, (1989); 40 377 see also 104 L.Ed.2d Ani- exceedingly Fund is deferential.” 1502.9(c)(1). new, significant § If for C.F.R. (11th Rice, mals, Inc. v. shown, agency pre- must are effects Cir.1996). role to ensure The court’s is 1502.9(c)(1). § 40 C.F.R. pare SEIS. to a conclu- agency came rational is proposed to the action change When sion, own investigation “not to conduct its measure,” however, “minimizing judgment its own and substitute required to agency automatically “is not Pre- agency’s decision.” administrative analysis.” redo the entire environmental Endangered History, Areas Cobb’s serve of Army Eng’rs, Club v. Sierra (“PEACH”) Army Corps v. U.S. Inc. Cir.2002). This F.3d (11th Cir.1996). 1242, 1246 Eng’rs, 87 F.3d minimizing measure’s effects is because usually will fall within on the environment NEPA C. analysis. scope original NEPA procedures NEPA establishes (holding realignment id. that road See must agency a federal follow before impact within minimize environmental was any agency initially taking action. EIS). scope original to be must determine whether action NEPA that an requires “major ac taken constitutes a Federal follow it does not agency procedure; is, “significantly af an action tion”—that any “If the particular mandate result. fecting quality of the human environ pro environmental effects of the adverse 4332(C); see ment.” U.S.C. adequately action posed identified (“Major § 1508.18 reinforces but C.F.R. evaluated, agency is not constrained meaning independent not have a does deciding from other values NEPA ”). .... If the deter significantly agency outweigh environmental costs.” Rob “major activity that a proposed mines is Council, Valley ertson v. Methow Citizens action,” agency must discuss Federal 1835, 1846, 104 350, 109 S.Ct. 490 U.S. issues in a detailed statement —the certain *8 (1989). Moreover, agen an L.Ed.2d 351 hand, agen Id. if the EIS. On the other cy’s only NEPA decisions reviewed activity is cy proposed that a determines highly stan under APA’s deferential action,” “major pro must not a Federal it Id.; Transp. Pub. Citi Dep’t dard. “finding significant impact” a of no duce zen, 752, 763, 2204, 541 U.S. 124 S.Ct. (“FONSI”), “briefly present a document 2213, (2004); 159 L.Ed.2d 60 Vt. Yankee why an action ... will not ing the reasons Corp. v. Res. Nuclear Power Natural significant on human have a effect Def. Inc., 519, Council, 548, 98 S.Ct. 435 U.S. environment.” 40 C.F.R. 1508.13. (1978). 1197, 1214,55 L.Ed.2d 460 cases, agency after an some Here, Corps EIS, originally studied publishes a or an but before FONSI taken, issuing any propriety 50-year action is action the proposed

1361 issuing A only found that court can Because find a federal “major permits would be a Federal agency’s attempted those compliance NEPA in action,” it 614. Af- prepared an EIS. AR it adequate where is arbitrary, capricious, objec- severe specifically, ter or an abuse discretion violation of the criticism— regarding possible tions contamination Yankee, APA. Vt. 435 at U.S. 98 possible Northwest of the Wellfield S.Ct. 1197. This standard requires sub effect on protected detrimental wood only stantial deference to the agency, not Corps adopted minimizing stork —the a reviewing when decisions like evi what it permits’ measure: reduced the duration dence find to credible and whether issue years and acre- permits’ to 10 limited the EIS, a reviewing FONSI or but also when minimizing After age. adopting the meas- drafting decisions like how much discus information, receiving the new ure sion on topic, to include each how FONSI, a at Corps issued AR 1028 necessary much data is fully address 50-year read as an addendum the best each The district issue. court here fre EIS, rejecting the notion that the new quently condemned on actions based change project information and were disagreement, simple rather than on based that an SEIS was required. such Three a finding that the actions violated the NEPA issues were before the therefore APA’s deferential standard.4 (1) Corps’s court: district whether the de- Moreover, NEPA is procedur 10-year permits termination that al, setting forth no substantive limits significant have no would effect outside the Robertson, agency decision-making. arbitrary, scope original EIS was at Simply put, S.Ct. 1835. discretion, capricious, or an abuse of AR agency taking whether the federal up ends (environmental containing assessment “major Federal action” at has issue (2) FONSI); Corps’s Corps’s whether the do nothing to with NEPA compliance; determination that new re- information requires NEPA that fol agency contamination garding of the Northwest process low a certain in deciding whether Wellfield and effects on the stork did wood case, action. take the Id. In this arbitrary, necessitate an not SEIS was discretion, violate NEPA if would not noted capricious, or abuse of AR EIS (3) 1028; 50-year permit granting whether that would result requirements, met NEPA’s AR 614. permanent, EIS irreversible destruction of E.g., groundwater (holding permit 'reasonably DE 73 at 65 that conditions be enforce- adequately” regulation contamination was not in [a “studied able’—found unrelated to id. at data”); NEPA]”); (rejecting Corps's was without "sufficient inter- id. ("Corps recognized pretation at drawing should have data and con- different id. at 91 clusions); (dismissing Corps’s it lacked essential ... should miti- information and gation appears” been more to [wellfield have conservative as conclusion because "it risks.”); id. at 69 (holding enough contamination] Pennsuco wetlands will be available id. at reports mitigation); (holding reliance on technical 92-93 information); id. twenty years "more than rendered its sufficient old” failed to disclose (rejecting Corps’s finding wellfield contamination discussion inade- at 100-01 recognizes economically quate; alternative "[e]ven non-scientist "no action” was not feasible); id. poses problem ever-changing assump- (making at 101 n. 174 *9 id. at support contrary ecosystem”); of South to world Florida’s tions to conclusions conclusions); id. at 104 (stating Corps Corps’s (criticizing that "it the 70 was error for to brief”); id. id. at paid [seepage]”); "exceedingly so little 112 have attention to discussion as (holding Corps's by ap- 72 (stating upon at too "reliance the discussion "far that NEPA, reports vague compliance subjected to be in ... plicant-supplied with and its must be open-endedness scrutiny”). requirement special violates the that to 1362 permits.5 the Substantive issues Everglades, but the tioned entire

the Florida permits to the and what grant out- like whether that economic benefits Corps decided adopt to are irrele- mitigation im- conditions negative environmental weighed that following compliance. vant to NEPA run might That decision pact. capricious highlights the court’s passage district duty imposed by a different afoul of places substan- flawed belief that NEPA statute, duty any not but it would violate limits on action: tive federal id. 350-51, 109 by at imposed NEPA. Cf. (“[I]t fifty not permits would have violated If these had been issued as

S.Ct. 1835 Service, comply- in- year permits, if the after the Court would have NEPA Forest the directed procedural prerequi- permits validated the ing with the Act’s (rather deny permits to the sites, than had that to be decided benefits the case for further Sandy simply remanding at skiing derived from downhill have Such a conclusion would study). use justified special the issuance of a Butte (and required NEPA been under notwithstanding per- of 15 permit, loss CWA) significant because of the adverse cent, percent, percent 50 or even 100 miti- Corps’ effects insufficient may Other the mule deer herd. statutes analyses. gation other obli- impose environmental substantive agencies, on NEPA gations federal but added). (emphasis at 106 NEPA DE 73 merely prohibits than uninformed —rather can never to provide grounds for a court (footnote agency action.” omit- agency’s direct federal substantive deci- unwise' — ted)). sion. NEPA erro- analysis opinion

The district court’s offer no as to whether We Corps’s to neously Corps complied during on the decision NEPA focuses with however, granting must, major process. take the Federal We permitting action — miti- adequacy of the and re- permits vacate district court’s orders —and for the issues decided gation measures on which the condi- mand NEPA to be E.g., (criticizing Corps’s stroyed, mitigation DE deci- then re- 73 at 69 for that loss is grant permits, sion and the lack of quired” requirement); id. at substantive —a conditions); protections at 77 placed as id. (”[T]he Corps’ permitting partic- 96 decision— ("The by underlying Court is troubled (em- satisfy ularly the EIS—does not NEPA.” Corps' suggests theme of the ROD which that added)); ("[T]he phasis permits id. at 103 designed have to be at issue been environmentally prefer- ... are issued not the fifty year mining plan.”); extended to full Thus, Corps' .... deci- able alternative (stating incorrectly "Corps id. at that was NEPA.”); compliance sion was not in with id. NEPA, required, attempt to first to avoid (expressing at 104-05 dissatisfaction that the impacts and to minimize [EIS-discussed] then allow intends to for full unavoidable, and, finally, whatever was years); (stating erroneously id. at 109 that mitigate any adverse affect”—substantive Corps’ purposes analysis, "for of the NEPA incorrectly requirements); (stating at id. impacts important environmental are more "Mitigation interpreted that ... has been ones, than economic economic and so- [sic] require replacement functional value impacts importance lesser than cial have wetlands, is, there be no net should ecological purely impacts”); or environmental values”); (deciding id. loss of wetland at 90 ("[Miners' id. at 112-13 losses can- economic] "Corps’ decisions counter [sic] runs justification possible, for the even not evidence”); (expressing to the id. at 91 con- probable, effects deleterious environmental mitigation adequacy cern about of Pennsuco by mining.”); (speculat- id. at caused (“The plan); id. at record the Court before ing takings litigation costly "created a suggests comply did with EIS, specter may spurred ... which have preparing issuing NEPA in nor added)); of wetlands permits." (stating destruction of hundreds acres (emphasis id. at 95 unnecessarily”). going be de- "[i]f the wetlands *10 Indeed, by the district court in the first instance mind. predet- the court made its grant Corps because the court failed to ermination of the explicit ultimate issue in its proper level of deference and conclusion: because recognize the court failed to NEPA’s limit- however, Regardless, of whether new operation procedural, ed rather than may studies soon Aqui- indicate that the substantive, agencies. command to federal fer is being harmed mining remand, activities, On the district court should ad- or that the groundwater seep- eye age minimized, dress the issues with an toward the effects can be or if even proper probing analysis APA standard a more deferential reveals that limited, truly there procedural practicable NEPA’s are no scope. envi- ronmentally preferable alternatives D. CWA in mining precious resource, this unchanged. Court’s conclusion would be pervasive The same lack of deference infects the district court’s APA-CWA anal- words, DE 73 at 183. other no matter ysis.6 analysis, concluded, As with its NEPA what and no matter conclusion, court failed view what evidence supported the CWA claims that the court would have through mining the deferential lens of the APA.7 banned be- cause of own its conclusion that judgment mining claim CWA-APA Id. at the Lake Belt is a bad thing. also is vacated. 184- 85. The grant deny discretion to or CWA IV. Conclusion however, permits, given is first to federal agencies, not federal courts. prede- district court seems to have issue, termined the answer to the ultimate Again, opinion we offer no as to that concluding per- should not whether with complied NEPA Belt, mit analyzed the Lake or during the CWA the permitting proc the permitting process with that answer in ess.8 We instead remand to the district reject argument 6. We (rejecting the Miners’ Corps’s at 150 conclusion that no apply APA Corps's perform practicable does not to the alternatives for limestone exist that, result, ance concluding of its CWAduties and as a and instead that “[t]he adminis- that, indeed, sovereign the United States has not clearly waived trative record establishes immunity sources”); Corps. as to the ("Corps In Bennett v. there are other id. at 154 1154, Spear, 520 judgment analysis 117 S.Ct. made a clear error of in the (1997), Supreme practicable L.Ed.2d 281 Court re alternatives under the CWA context, due, jected argument this part, agency’s in the ESA id. at to the reliance on a 117 S.Ct. study independently and the relevant statuto that should have been ry language verified.”); in the (disagreeing ESA is almost identical to id. at 157 with analogous portion Compare Corps's mining per- of the CWA. determination that the 1540(g)(1)(ESA), § contrary 16 U.S.C. public with 33 U.S.C. mits would not be to the 1365(a)(CWA). Moreover, interest); (holding Corps’s the United id. at 162 decision persuasively argues public States hearing required its amicus brief was not was an discretion). sovereign immunity that the APA waives abuse of Corps CWAdecisions. disagreement Judge 8.Our with Kravitch is E.g., (reaching “opposite exceedingly DE 73 at 142 con- narrow. The district court’s evidence”); judgment clusion” based on "record at id. is based on dozens of individual (criticizing appears holdings, injunction resting upon because “it as is the quickly judgment. Judge too suggests dismissed alter- Kravitch Belt”); mining’ native by affirming of 'no in the Lake id. at a handful of individual hold- (“Corps assumptions, ings holdings opinion made several ad- does not — adequately explained judgment none are in the ROD or dress—this Court can affirm the record”); injunction entirety; disagree. elsewhere in the administrative id. in their we *11 record, have might in first and well different questions those the five answer court to Thus, after instance, the standard and the applying proper terms conditions. Order, judgment, nothing was more The APA-CWA Remedies there review.9 the Remedies judgment, APA-NEPA and in the court with re- be done district to vacated, and case is remand- are Order spect to these with proceedings ed further consistent Second, the also correct that majority is opinion. this Endangered Act claim Species was and REMANDED. VACATED by the with the Corps’ mooted consultation Unlike ma- Fish Wildlife Service. KRAVITCH, concurring Judge, Circuit however, I we should re- jority, believe part dissenting part: appeal mining on this whether solve agree of the ma- Although I with much vacatur of the companies entitled to I must dissent jority’s opinion, respectfully reject- judgment. district court ESA agree I judgment. Specifically, from its motion to ESA claim as ed a vacate the jurisdiction, the Endan- that we have moot, and there is no reason to believe the mooted, and gered Species Act claim was then. equities changed have since Be- analysis district NEPA court’s issue, I I would would cause reach But I would affirm was erroneous. companies are not hold disposition the Clean district court’s leading to vacatur. As the entitled Su- claim, as Water Act well as its remedial clear, case vacatur of preme Court makes decisions. appeal on judgment equitable is an reme- dy, predominant equitable consid-

First, majority that we agree I with the mootness is brought eration is whether the jurisdiction over the Sum- appellate have by party seeking appellate about re- Judgment and Orders. mary Remedies view, below, by party by or is, substance, prevailing latter order both happenstance. Bancorp Mortgage injunction, by explained for the reasons 18, 25, P’ship, Mall order, v. Bonner 513 U.S. majority, and a final because Co. (1994). 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 any mining permits response 115 S.Ct. new issued when a moot particular, to court’s and remand case becomes the district vacatur voluntary appellant, on a action of an vaea- would be based different administra- review, “[ejven proper court itself if standard in the first The district noted instance. enough two of the on one or defects were require [to their own to remand of this matter case 9. The Miners move to have the reas- Corps], these ir- the cumulative effect of signed on We have no to remand. reason regularities makes it that further envi- clear well-respected judge believe that district analysis should have been conduct- ronmental assigned whom this case is will not be able necessary.” Summary is ed and remand apply proper review standard of Judgment at 184. the district Order Because Furthermore, remand. one element many "irregularities” based on court found reassign a case on decision whether to re- analysis proposition flawed with which —a reassignment would mand is "whether entail agrees Judge Kravitch court did not —the duplication proportion waste and out of properly effect” when know "cumulative gains reassignment.” realized from United remedy. entering judgment crafting Torkington, States v. 874 F.2d divining than whether the district Rather Cir.1989) White, (citing United States judgment enter the court would same (11th Cir.1988)). On re- injunction given only mand, of its vast a handful reassignment would entail substantial previous holdings, we course duplication think the better judge another waste and because judgment is to vacate the and remand for with the would need become familiar mas- issues, applying record. district court to address the sive *12 by deny sought the vacatur the expressly at See id. appropriate. not typically is tur equity mining companies. rule does 26, 386. This 115 S.Ct. party moots aggrieved when

because Next, I turn to the National Environ- conduct, he by his own appeal his Again, agree Act I Policy claims. mental review but right appellate his abandons majority although the the district with preclu- that the any argument also forfeits the correct NEPA standard of court cited him against judgment the effect of sive review, substantially wrong applied ought to be erased. procedural one. district court did find The claim. Here, mooted the ESA Corps permitting process, faults with Order deter- Summary Judgment The may basis to those faults sufficient of its Corps was dereliction mined the violated NEPA. conclude Species Act Endangered under duties proce- But the district court’s evaluation about the with FWS by failing to consult compliance is so intertwined dural NEPA mining on wood of the instant effects critique Corps’ with a substantive in this deter- Corps acquiesced The stork. for a simply impossible that it is decision the consultation by undertaking mination separate court to harmless from reviewing party it a by the ESA. Were required prejudicial errors. Corps could not obtain appeal, NEPA errors are Yet the district court’s the claim. it mooted because vacatur Because I be- judgment. not fatal to its Granted, not the mining companies, correctly deter- lieve the district court requesting va- parties now are Corps, violated Clean mined plaintiffs, their against But as catur. I permitting process, in the Water Act those of the better than equities are no the district affirm on that basis would they from decision benefit Corps, whose vacating judgment court’s brought plaintiffs The defending. ma- Thus, dissent from the respectfully I part, to force litigation, contrary. Although to the jority’s decision won, They obtain- the ESA. comply with court made some misstate- the district Corps then summary judgment. The ing analysis, I in its believe ments of law CWA rather obligations procedural fulfilled its rec- error and that the they are harmless entitles the Equity here. than seek review to affirm the a sufficient basis ord contains judgment, with to maintain their plaintiffs affirm the district I would judgment.1 prevailing party effect preclusive claim be- of the CWA disposition court’s See, Mor- accompany e.g., it. which status (i) failing to by erred cause Director, Citi- v. District illo-Cedron alterna- practical apply presumption Svcs., 452 F.3d zenship Immigration (ii) the Larsen Cir.2006) by relying on (11th tives and (discussing pre- 1257 practical status). an absence report I to establish Accordingly, would vailing party (remand by reliance on warranted id. at 1363 majority, I do not believe the 1. Unlike Moreover, the cumulative Report). Larsen "cumulative” court’s statement about district alternative hold- was itself an compels error statement the conclusion error Corps’ errors ing: effect of the the cumulative every court committed error the district if” one or two such remand "even warranted prejudicial. The district court elsewhere was error not. The cumulative independently defects would multiple, that there were stated upon which to too thin a reed summary judgment. statement is grounds for sufficient logically Flowers, See, of otherwise that dozens conclude e.g., Club v. Sierra indepen- (five (S.D.Fla.2006) holdings in fact are not independent in- F.Supp.2d dent, EIS); accordingly we cannot affirm inadequacies in the dependent NEPA support judgment grounds (remand sufficient by failure to warranted id. at 1356 alternatives); opinion. notwithstanding error in the practical apply presumption of Cir.1994) (deter- undertaking indepen- alternatives without accuracy.2 mining project purpose dent verification of its is “central” to practicable analysis). alternatives pertinent regulations prohibit CWA Corps has discretion to characterize the granting prac- if “there is a project’s purpose in basic the first in- proposed discharge tical alternative to the stance, including accept whether to or re- *13 impact which would have less adverse ject applicant’s characterization of that aquatic ecosystem, long so as the alter- purpose. In doing, so must significant native does not have other ad- applicant’s goals take the purposes consequences.” verse environmental 40 into account. Louisiana Federa- 230.10(a). Wildlife § C.F.R. A presumption York, (5th 1044, v. tion 761 F.2d 1048 environmentally practical, preferable alter- Cir.1985). But “an applicant cannot define “activity natives exist if the arises associat- project a in preclude order to the existence ed with a discharge proposed which is for any of alternative sites and thus make require a [wetland] does not access or practicable appear what is impracticable.” proximity siting to or within the [wetland] Sylvester Army v. U.S. Engi- (ie. question in purpose to fulfill its basic (9th neers, 407, Cir.1989). 882 F.2d 409 If dependent).” is not water 40 C.F.R. applicant so Corps adopted did and the 230.10(a)(3). § presumption applicant’s pro- characterization of the practical, environmentally preferable alter- ject’s purpose, would have applies natives exist until proponent abused its discretion. discharge “clearly oth- demonstrate^] Further, erwise.” practical Id all alter- words, In other question spe is how discharge natives to in pre- wetlands are cifically project’s to construe the basic sumed to impact, have less adverse unless Decision, purpose. In its Record of clearly demonstrated otherwise. Id Corps stated that the basic purpose of this Thus, presumption applies, where the limestone,” project is to “extract but the permit applicant pro- bears the burden of project purpose overall is to provide “con “detailed, clear, viding in- convincing struction-grade limestone from Miami proving formation that an alternative with County.” Dade In language of the impact less adverse impracticable.” is regulation, “activity associated with Flowers, Greater Yellowstone v. Coalition the discharge,” mining, limestone does not Cir.2004).3 359 F.3d 1269 Fur- require “siting within the [wetland] ther, such provided by per- information question to fulfill its purpose,” basic ex mit applicant must independently be veri- tracting limestone. See 40 C.F.R. fied Corps. Id 230.10(a)(3). § mining Limestone in gen language Given the regulation, of the eral water-dependent. is not National Cf. correct statement of project’s Norton, “basic Federation v. Wildlife purpose” (D.D.C.2004). affects presumption whether the F.Supp.2d n. practicable applies, alternatives securing Neither does supply limestone thus the extent of applicant’s burden. from South Florida require project Whistler, See Nat’l wetlands, Federation v. be situated in as there are other Wildlife foregoing implies, agree As the I also many opportunities with 3. This court has not had 230.10(a)(3). majority’s reasoning interpret 40 C.F.R. In our Administra- so, only case to have done tive Fund Procedure Act Animals sovereign waives federal Rice, (11th Cir.1996), immunity concerning challenges to CWA appears the record was clear that no feasible § 404 alternatives existed. lands, literally but where it cannot located in south deposits of limestone done elsewhere. only mining particular It is Florida.4 project require that would limestone course, mining Of limestone has to occur be situated wetlands. deposits where limestone are. So if the only deposits Lake Belt contained the court concluded that The district Florida, perhaps south then a conclusion of mining Corps, following the lead water-dependency justified. would be But project’s purpose construed the companies, assuming even that limestone sources from artificially narrow fashion to avoid in an other states and nations are irrelevant to alternatives, practical presumption analysis, the alternatives it is conceded I thereby abusing agree. its discretion. deposits there are limestone else- effectively pro- construed the my view, where south Florida. this lime- ject’s purpose basic *14 issue, regard- water-dependency ends the out from underneath these wetlands. stone deposits less of whether other are inac- construed, water-depen- a conclusion of So quality. cessible or of inferior dency site-specif- But such a is inevitable. project’s purpose simply formulated the as project’s purpose could ic formulation of limestone, extracting securing or as a lime- every permit no doubt be formulated Plainly, stone from Florida. supply south application, acceptance and routine such potential there are alternative sites to emasculate the wet- formulations would achieve If purposes.5 these those alterna- lands-protecting presumption, defeating its infeasible, mining companies tives are Moreover, purpose. site-specific such a should able to make their case that project’s purpose formulation of a basic practical, environmentally there are no Corps’ for- appears inconsistent with preferable they alternatives. But should in project purposes mulation of other higher have to proof bear the burden of simple examples cases. Two illustrate the necessary to presumption rebut applicant an seeks to build point. When my In practical doing. alternatives so docks, project’s houses with boat his basic view, Corps’ apply pre- failure to housing, which need not purpose is to build summary sumption judgment warranted (The occur on wetlands. boat docks are against it on the CWA claim. purpose.) incidental to the basic Shoreline (D.Md.1983), Marsh, F.Supp. 169 Assoc. v. Regardless presumption of whether the (4th Cir.1984). 725 F.2d 677 applies, I would also hold that the aff 'd. contrast, project’s purpose when a basic relying Report erred on the Larsen dock, is to build a boat it is water- practical establish the absence of alterna- Whistler, dependent. 27 F.3d at 1345-46. independent tives without verification. study project water-dependent simply Report prepared A is not The Larsen was a by mining industry, it on and applicant because an asks to do wet- a consultant to the countries, mining companies 4. The contend these other states and an alternative whose fea- are not of limestone sibility parties dispute sharply. sites feasible sources The min- they because are underneath either the Ever- ing companies utilizing contend that such areas, glades urban or therefore cannot ultimately in more envi- sources would result be mined. But that contention addresses degradation min- ronmental than instant presumption practical whether the alterna- ing plan. Again, argument ad- I believe this rebutted, ap- tives has been not whether presumption non- dresses whether the plies. environmentally wetlands alternatives will be rebutted, preferable has been not whether the course, imported 5. Of limestone could also be applies. presumption from other areas in Florida as well as other rely challenged submis agency to on such upon relied source primary it was the practical undertaking no some form of concluding that sions without Corps in in the Lake or evaluation. independent existed verification alternatives repeated Many require Belt. of its conclusions regulations own Corps’ Decision. in the Record of nearly verbatim much,6 its agency’s an failure to follow in the record that no indication There is is arbi regulations procedures own the infor- verified Corps independently See, e.g., Simmons trary capricious. Re- the Larsen mation or conclusions Block, Cir. Meanwhile, chal- appellees have port. 1986) (citation omitted). demand Courts biased, arguing that report as lenged the encourage not to independent verification self-serving underlying it is the data effort, duplication of but ensure officials, company by mining provided decision-making process is reliable Corps’ gleaned independent than from rather is afforded to the and that deference market for limestone evaluations of the expertise meaningfully is only where its products. ap adopt in the decision to implicated view, court, correctly my The district conclusions. plicant’s by relying on erred concluded course, retains its custom- Of Report undertaking the Larsen without ary determining scope discretion in reliability, of its independent verification *15 when depth independent and verification why, in explaining on the record or at least explaining why it inde- required, is or judgment, it considered the Re expert its unnecessary. For pendent verification is Corps port’s conclusions reliable. example, applicant-sub- in some cases an simply because it relies on does not err report may have indicia of reliabili- mitted by permit applicant. data submitted a corners, challenge four the ty within its or Hintz, See, e.g., Friends the Earth v. may be credible. accuracy to its not Cir.1986). (9th In 834-35 Nonetheless, Corps’ the discretion is deed, frequently be the applicant an will unbounded; reviewing a court must be develop an only party with incentive to a agency satisfied that the made reasoned Moreover, applicant the such data. since conclusory place A decision to decision. seeking discretionary to benefit is obtain reliance on contested data submit- decisive government, appropriate it is for from the reasoned, by party ted an interested is not developing the data it to bear the cost of deserves no deference. Yet and therefore justify proposal. But necessary to its happened that to be what here. appears reflect, information the cases also when clear, express I view on the To be no by party “spe an interested is submitted accuracy Report. of the Larsen Neither cifically credibly challenged as inaccu and equipped court is this court nor the district rate, independent duty an to Corps the has question; Corps to that the is. The decide Fornell, investigate.” Van Abbema v. may scrupulous well and Report Larsen be Cir.1986); F.2d see also Coalition, Corps explained fair. But for all the has 359 F.3d at heater Yellowstone record, hired-gun it is a classic arbitrary capricious It and for an the is analy- regula- contemplate specifically, Corps’ tions alternatives 6. More NEPA provide Corps requires will sis in NEPA documents also tions make clear that when EIS, practicable analysis un- applicant basis for alternatives to submit data for an 230.10(a)(4). § CWA. 40 C.F.R. In “independently evaluate the information der the must words, verify any duty information by applicant be re- other submitted and shall typically by party will sponsible accuracy.” submitted an interested its 40 C.F.R. 1506.5(a). Moreover, Corps’ regula- under both statutes. be the same courts, painted mining companies’ over with thin that the expert report desired rigor.7 plaintiffs remedy Because raise veneer of of remand without vacatur is with- arguments, by unaddressed in reviewing equity powers non-frivolous court’s under Corps, Report that the Larsen is bi- the APA.8 But in deciding whether industry, vacatur, ased in favor of the remand appropriate without it is primary Report because that was the basis equities consider the balance of and the Corps justified finding its upon which interest, public along magnitude with the exist, practical agree that no I alternatives agency’s errors the likelihood with the district court that the acted See, they can e.g., be cured. Central arbitrarily capriciously concluding Co., Further, Me. Power 252 F.3d at 48. exist, practical that no alternatives and the district court received extensive evi- granting my thus in In view mining poses dence that a threat of con- should, minimum, explain at a taminating Miami’s drinking supply water why on the record the conclusions about apparently with benzene—evidence that by Report alternatives reached the Larsen was not available to or by considered reliable, if believes them to Corps during permitting process. It so, why Corps adopted be them. legal was not error to receive this evidence Independent verification because once mining companies re- preferable may required would be quested relief from typical APA reme- circumstances, although I need not vacatur, dy plaintiffs were entitled reach issue because the has prove public interest militated an explanation made neither nor an inves- against such I relief. Nor do discern clear tigation. error in the judge’s thorough district weighing of the evidence to conclude short, I would affirm the district mining contributed to the benzene contam- grant summary judgment court’s *16 ination, a in signifi- conclusion which relied Having Clean Water Act claim. deter- part credibility cant determinations we unlawfully mined that were See, position e.g., are not in a to disturb. issued, I would also conclude that the dis- NERAIDA, 586, Fischer v. 508 F.3d trict court did not abuse its discretion in S/Y (11th Cir.2007) (citations omitted) (i) decisions, 592 namely its remedial vacat- (clear (ii) error standard and deference to ing permits, refusing stay credibility appeal). determinations on Be- portion its vacatur order as to a mining agency area closest to Miami’s Northwest cause vacatur of unlawful action is agree, ordinary remedy,9 I as have most other APA Wellfield. because Cir.2000); noting during permitting 7. It is worth Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Bab process, agencies bitt, 1392, (9th 1995). officials from other federal 58 F.3d 1406 Cir. But Park Lar- such as National Service noted SEC, 452, Checkosky see v. 23 F.3d 490-93 alignment mining sen’s financial with the (D.C.Cir.1994) (separate opinion Randolph, of (albeit companies expressed informally) Train, Veneman, J.); Milk Inc. v. 310 F.3d independent the view that an evaluation L, 747, (Sentelle, (D.C.Cir.2002) 757-58 dis helpful. would be (both senting.) arguing practice is unlaw ful). See, SEC, e.g., 8. Chamber Commerce v. 443 of 890, (D.C.Cir.2006); F.3d 908 Central Me. 9. See, e.g., Mining Army v. Nat’l Ass'n U.S. FERC, 34, (1st Power Co. v. Engineers, 145 F.3d Cir.2001); Org. v. Nat’l. Veterans’Advocates (D.C.Cir.1998) (vacatur "ordinary re is the Sec’y Affairs, 260 F.3d Veterans (Fed.Cir.2001); agency sult” under the APA for unlawful ac 1380-81 Central and S.W. Services, EPA, tion). v. Inc. F.3d record evidence significant there was peri- during the remand

continued interest, I contrary public to the

od is remedi- district court’s hold that the

would abuse of discre- not an

al decisions were

tion. per- I believe

Accordingly, because of the Clean in violation

mits were issued Acts Procedure and Administrative

Water subsequent deci- court’s

and the district discretion, I its remedial

sions were within judgment. from the

respectfully dissent McCANN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Georgia TILLMAN, Haley, Michael David

Jack Bounds,

Turner, Mobile Melissa Board,

County Defendants- Personnel

Appellees. 07-11743.

No. Appeals,

United States Court

Eleventh Circuit.

9,May

Case Details

Case Name: Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: May 9, 2008
Citation: 526 F.3d 1353
Docket Number: 07-13297
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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