SIERRA CLUB еt al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF HAYWARD, Defendant and Respondent; Y. CHARLES SODA et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
S.F. No. 24201
Supreme Court of California
Feb. 9, 1981
28 Cal. 3d 840
Julie E. McDonald and Laurens H. Silver for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Nicholas C. Arguimbau, E. Clement Shute, Jr., Mark I. Weinberger and Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
John W. Scanlon, City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
Berliner, Cohen & Biagini and Jeffrey P. Widman for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
OPINION
MOSK, J.—In this administrative mandamus proceeding (
Sierra Club contends that the findings made by the city council are not supported by substantial evidence, and that they do not support the
I
The Sodas own a 2,300-acre cattle ranch in the foothills rising along the eastern edge of the City of Hayward. Until 1979, 600 acres of the land were part of an agricultural preserve created by Hayward in 1969, and were subject to a Williamson Act agreement that restricted the land to agricultural use or compatible uses for 10 years. Because the agreement had been annually renewed since 1969, the 10-year restriction had not begun to lapse.
In January 1978 the Sodas petitioned the city for cancellation of their land preservation agreement as to a 93-acre parcel of their ranch. In the same month, Ponderosa Homes (Ponderosa) filed with the city a zone change application requesting that the 93-acre parcel be rezoned from “agricultural” to “planned development” so as to enable Ponderosa to build thereon an upper-middle income residential subdivision. The city planning commission denied Ponderosa‘s application, and Ponderosa appealed to the city council. Early in 1979, thе city council considered both the zone change application and the cancellation request.
The Williamson Act authorizes approval of a cancellation request only if the relevant agency finds “(a) That the cancellation is not inconsistent with the purposes of [the act]; and [¶] (b) That cancellation is in the public interest.” (
After holding public hearings as required by statute (
“The Council hereby determines that the partial cancellation of the ... Land Conservation Agreement is not inconsistent with the purposes of the California Land Conservation Act of 1965 and is in the public interest by reason of the following:
“Removal of this relatively small area from the agricultural preserve will not jeopardize the continued use of the remaining lands in the preserve for grazing purposes;
“Potential conversion to subdivision development by persons other than applicants [i.e., by Ponderosa] is neither premature nor unnecessary; such development would be of benefit to urban dwellers requiring housing accommodations as an orderly extension of contiguous residential subdivisions;
“Potential retention within the subject land and dedication to the City of Hayward as open space of an area in excess of 30 acres will contribute to the esthetic, physical, and open space environment of adjacent property owners and of the City as a whole.” (Hayward City Council Res. No. 79-012 C.S.)
II
The city raises a preliminary objection to our consideration of the case. It contends that its decision to cancel the contract is legislative in nature and is therefore reviewable only in an ordinary mandamus action (
Firmly established precedent, however, compels a different conclusion. We have repeatedly held that administrative mandamus is appropriate “for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer ....” (
We reach the question whether the city council abused its discretion in cancelling the land preservation agreement. A comprehensive answer must begin with an analysis of the Williamson Act and its purposes.
The Williamson Act was the Legislature‘s response to two alarming phenomena observed in California: (1) the rapid and virtually irreversible loss of agricultural land to residential and other developed uses (see Falasco, Preserving California‘s Agricultural Green, prepared for Sen. Com. on Governmental Organization (1976) p. 59; Land, Unraveling the Rurban Fringe: A Proposal for the Implementation of Proposition Three (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 421, 422-424 (hereinafter Unraveling the Rurban Fringe); Fellmeth, The Politics of Land (1973) pp. xv, 29), and (2) the disorderly patterns of suburban development3 that mar the landscape, require extension of municipal services to remote residential enclaves, and interfere with agricultural activities (see
To combat the problem, the Legislature passed the Williamson Act on the basis of the following findings:
“(a) That the preservation of a maximum amount of the limited supply of agricultural land is necessary to the conservation of the state‘s
“(b) That the discouragement of premature and unnecessary conversion of agricultural land to urban uses is a matter of public interest and will be of benefit to urban dwellers themselves in that it will discourage discontiguous urban development patterns which unnecessarily increase the costs of community services to community residents.
“(c) That in a rapidly urbanizing society agricultural lands have a definite public value as open space, and the preservation in agricultural production of such lands, the use of which may be limited under the provisions of this chapter, constitutes an important physical, social, esthetic and economic asset to existing or pending urban or metropolitan developments.” (
The act empowers local governments to establish “agricultural preserves” consisting of lands devoted to agricultural uses and other uses compatible therewith. (
The above-described nonrenewal procedure is the “intended and general vehicle for contract termination.” (Land Use Research Group (U.C. Davis), Measures for Strengthening the California Land Conservation Act: An Economic and Legal Analysis, Rep. to the Assem. Select Com. on Open Space Lands (1974) p. 63.) The Legislature recognized that in rare instances unforeseen events might require the release of land from its contractual restriction before that restriction lapses by its own terms. The Legislature declared, however, that cancellation of Williamson Act contracts is permissible “only when the continued dedication of land under such contracts to agricultural use is neither necessary nor desirable for the purposes of [the act].” (Italics added;
Not only do existing authorities unanimously support a narrow application of the cancellаtion provisions, an analysis of the effect of lenient construction shows that “easily available cancellation will render the Act ineffective as a land-use control device.” (Land Use Research Group, op. cit. supra, at p. 73.) The act is intended to preserve open space land. But if those with an eye toward developing such land within a few years are allowed to enroll in contracts, enjoy the tax benefits during their short holding period, then cancel and commence construction on a showing that the land is ripe for needed housing, the act would simply function as a tax shelter for real estate speculators. The Legislature‘s findings clearly spell out its intent, and nowhere among them appears a motivation to subsidize those who would subdivide. On the contrary, the overwhelming theme of the legislation is the need to preserve undeveloped lands in the face of development pressures.
Furthermore, apparently in response to criticism of the cancellation provisions as inviting abuse of the act (Land Use Research Group, op. cit. supra, at p. 73; Fellmeth, op. cit. supra, at pp. 41-42), in 1978 the Legislature reaffirmed its resolve to make cancellation the exception to the general rule of termination by nonrenewal. In addition to a cancellation fee, which had accompanied cancellation since the inception of the act (
In short, we harbor no doubt that the Legislature intended cancellation to be approved only in the most extraordinary circumstances. Having in mind the structure of the act and the Legislature‘s plain declaration of purpose, we look next to the details of the cancellation provisions to determine more precisely the nature of those circumstances.
We start with the statute‘s requirement of a finding that the cancellation is “not inconsistent with the purposes of” the act. (
Substantial evidence does appear in the record to support the council‘s findings that the land was a logical site for the extension of suburban development, that dedication of 30 acres of the site to open space use was consistent with the purposes of the act, and that development of the parcel would not seriously jeopardize nearby agricultural uses. We do not believe, however, that the evidence supporting those findings is sufficient to sustain the ultimate determination of consistency with the purposes of the act. We have seen that the Legislature intended nonrenewal as the ordinary contract termination method; no evidence appears in the record to demonstrate that compliance with the nonrenewal process would have interfered with the city‘s orderly development or defeated any other purpose served by cancellation. It is inconsistent with the purposes of the act to allow abrupt cancellation if nonrenewal would accomplish the same objective. Therefore, there must be substantial evidence that awaiting the normal termination of the contract would fail to serve the purposes that purport to justify cancellation.
Furthermore, if the parties are able to predict generally when the land will be ripe for development, the purposes of the act are defeated if the owner is nonetheless allowed to continually renew his contract and extend his commitment year after year, then cancel whenever development becomes most profitable. In this case, the evidence shows that both parties to the agreement knew or should have known in 1969 that the subject land would soon be ripe for development, yet both continued to renew the agreement year after year until the zone change application in 1978.7 The city planning department report of November 30, 1978, reveals that the planning department and planning commission both recommended in 1969 that the parcel for which cancellation is now proposed not be included in the agricultural preserve; according to the report, “The Commission made this recommendation because the
Finally, it is the purpose of the act to extend tax benefits to those who voluntarily subject their land to “enforceable restrictions.” (
For the above reasons, we hold that cancellation is inconsistent with the purposes of the act if the objectives to be served by cancellation should have been predicted and served by nonrenewal at an earlier time, or if such objectives can be served by nonrenewal now. Although the city took into consideration the statutory purposes of preserving open space and achieving orderly development, as we think it must, it did not consider the Legislature‘s intent to limit cancellation to the extraordinary cases in which nonrenewal is inappropriate.
B.
The act also requires a finding that cancellation is “in the public interest.” (
Inasmuch as a decision that cancellation is in the public interest reflеcts the conclusion that continued restriction is contrary to the public interest, the criteria for originally restricting the use of the land seem equally relevant to cancellation. Thus, preservation of land in agricultural production is of paramount importance. In providing for cancellation, however, the Legislature recognized the relevance of other interests as well.
The government‘s decision to enter such an agreement is a conclusion to bestow tax benefits on the landowner in return for the achievement of a specific goal—preservation of open space land. In making that decision, normally the only concern is whether the government will achieve the declared purposes in return for the revenues it will forego. But in providing for cancellation, the Legislature appears to have entertained the possibility that other public concerns—e.g., housing, needed services, environmental protection through developed uses, economic growth or employment—could conflict with the interests in open space. Otherwise, it would be difficult to conceive of any instance in which cancellation would be appropriate. But because the act is explicitly and unequivocally protective of the open space objectives, it must be shown that they are substantially outweighed by other public concerns before cancellation can be deemed “in the public interest.”
In this case, the record discloses a need for additional upper-income housing of the proposed type in the Hayward area. It also discloses,
C.
Next we discuss the requirement that before an alternative use of the restricted land is considered, the decision-maker must determine there is “no proximate, noncontracted land suitable for the use to which it is proposed the contracted land be put.” (
We are first asked whether an explicit finding regarding such proximate alternative sites is required. The answer is dictated by our holding in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506 (hereinafter Topanga). There, a local planning commission granted а zoning variance on the basis of certain features of the applicant‘s property rendering it unattractive for the type of development for which it was zoned. But state law authorizes zoning variances only upon a showing of “special circumstances” distinguishing the subject property from surrounding parcels (
The problem we faced in Topanga recurs here: we are left without a basis for determining whether the administrators strayed from the statutorily created pathway from evidence to ultimate conclusion. The Williamson Act allows the local agency to consider alternative uses of the restricted land only if it first determines that suitable nonrestricted sites are unavailable. The city admittedly considered an alternative use, subdivision construction, in cancelling the contract. We must therefore determine whether it fulfilled the statutory prerequisite of considering proximate alternative sites.
In some cases, an agency‘s fulfillment of statutory prerequisites may be obvious to the reviewing court from the record of the agency proceedings, and no formal findings may be necessary. If the agency is required to hold public hearings, for instance, the record will generally reveal whether it has done so. But in this case we do not know, and cannot ascertain from a review of the evidence, whether or not the city council complied with the statutory prerequisite. That it did in fact consider the proposed use of the restricted property is no proof that it had previously looked for and failed to find proximate alternative sites for that use. Nor is the presenсe in the record of scattered and contradictory evidence that alternative sites are unavailable10 sufficient to satisfy us that the council made a deliberate determination of the issue. Indeed, even the existence of substantial evidence to support a necessary determination would not compel a conclusion that the determination was in fact made. The substantial evidence test compels courts only to sustain existing findings supported by such evidence, not to hypothesize new findings. (See, e.g., Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 124, 131-132.) Because the council failed to confirm that it considered alternative uses only after determining that proximate alternative sites were unavailable, we conclude that the findings it did make were insufficient to support its conclusions.
Moreover, judicial vigilance is needed to prevent frustration of the land preservation goals of the Williamson Act. Just as in Topanga superficial judicial review could have subverted the decision-making structure of the zoning variance scheme, and thereby rendered meaningless applicable state and local legislation prescribing variance requirements (Topanga, at p. 517), so here could it completely emasculate the rigorous requirements that must be met to justify cancellation of a land preservation contract.11
In addition to their disagreement over the necessity of findings, the parties dispute the correct application of the words “proximate” and “use” as they are employed in the second paragraph of
We believe “proximate” should be construed in the same manner courts have construed the similar word “adjacent“; that is, to effectuate “the legislative intent and spirit of the act, though a literal or different construction may be possible.” (Bakersfield Community Hosp. v. Department of Health (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d 183, 199 [142 Cal.Rptr. 773], citing Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) Thus courts have found locations up to seven and one-half miles apart “adjacent” for the purposes of a particular statutory scheme. (Orо Madre Unified Sch. Dist. v. Amador County Bd. of Education (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 408 [87 Cal.Rptr. 250].)
The purposes of the Williamson Act require that “proximate” not be construed to unreasonably limit the search for suitable noncontracted land. It would serve no purpose of the act to reject unrestricted property perfectly suited to fill the needs addressed by the proposal simply because that property is not in the immediate vicinity of the restricted land. In fact, under some circumstances land several miles from the proposed development site may be near enough to serve the same purposes. We therefore hold that “proximate” property means property close enough to the restricted parcel to serve as a practical alternative for the proposed use.
To conclude, we hold that an explicit finding is needed on the issue of proximate alternative sites and that the decision-maker should apply the words “proximate” and “use” in the manner described above.
D.
One provision of
IV
In adopting the Williamson Act, the Legislature attempted to safeguard for the citizens of our state a legacy of rich and scenic land. California‘s agricultural industry is not only a vital part of the statе‘s economy, it is a crucial source of nourishment for the entire nation, supplying 25 percent of all table foods and 40 percent of all fresh produce consumed by Americans. (Falasco, op. cit. supra, p. 51.) Unspoiled agricultural lands near cities provide not just food, but also a welcome scenic respite from the cluttered urban landscape.
Although the Williamson Act has been criticized as not reaching far enough to protect our agricultural heritage (id. at p. 65; Fellmeth, op. cit. supra, at pp. 41-42), it has also been generally recognized as an important first step in that direction. (Fellmeth, op. cit. supra, at p. 42; Unraveling the Rurban Fringe, supra, at p. 433; Preliminary Rep. of the Joint Com. on Open Space Land, supra, at p. 11.) To insure that
Manifestly we cannot and should not attempt to catalogue all the hypothetical circumstances in which cancellation would be appropriate. But we can give guidance to local governments in matters properly before us as to the correct interpretation of the statutory provisions they must apply. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Hayward City Council incorrectly applied the cancellation provisions of the Williamson Act in the case at bar.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the superior court with directions to issue a writ of mandamus requiring respondent to vacate its cancellation of the Williamson Act agreement. The superior court is further authorized to award plaintiffs trial and appellate attorneys’ fees if it determines that this case “has conferred a significant benefit ... on the general public or a large class of persons” and that “the ... burden of private enforcement [is] such as to make the award appropriate.” (
Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., concurred.
RICHARDSON, J.—I respectfully dissent. The City Council of Hayward did not abuse its discretion in cancelling the agreement in question.
REQUIRED FINDINGS
What are the required findings in such a case?
In order to make the specified findings, then, the council must look to the “purpose of this chapter” and the “public interest” referred to therein. (
What did the council find? As the majority must acknowledge (ante, p. 848), the council did make the findings which were explicitly required by the statute to warrant its order of cancellation. It expressly found that the partial cancellation sought by real parties “is not inconsistent with the purposes of the California Land Conservation Act of 1965 and is in the public interest ....” (Hayward City Council Res. No. 79-012 C.S.) Moreover, the council specifically related those findings to the legislative purpose and public interest enunciated in the statute. On the basis of the record before it, the council determined that the removal of the “relatively small area” from the agricultural preserve would not jeopardize the agricultural use of surrounding lands, that the proposed subdivision development “is neither premature nor unnecessary” and would serve the public interest in providing required “housing accommodations as an orderly extension of contiguous residential subdivision,” and thаt the proposed dedication of 30 of the 93 acres to the City of Hayward as an open space “will contribute to the esthetic, physical, and open space environment of ... the City as a whole.”
Such conclusions were wholly proper. They reflect the considered judgment of the local entity, speaking through its duly elected officials, after careful review of competing considerations and the exercise of an informed discretion on matters within the prerogative of local government. In making these findings, the Hayward City Council acted in full recognition of, and obedience to, the Legislature‘s expressed concerns (
In reviewing the council‘s cancellation pursuant to these statutes, our next—and final—concern should be with the sufficiency of the record to support these findings. (
The majority finds reversible error in the council‘s failure to make formal findings as to the “considerations” set forth in the statute relat-
In contrast to Topanga, the statute before us does require certain precancellation findings. The Legislature in
After identifying the “public interests” which it is the purpose of the act to further, and acknowledging that the city council properly considered those interests in deciding to cancel the contract in question, the
Acknowledging that the Legislature “was primarily interested in the preservation of open space land and the orderly development of urban areas” (ante, p. 857, italics added), the majority then notes that the same criteria of open space preservation and orderly urban development govern both the initial entry of the parties into such agreements and their cancellation. (Ante, p. 857.) Finally, the majority concedes that the city did take into consideration “the statutory purposes of preserving open space and achieving orderly development ...” in cancelling the contract in question. (Ante, p. 855.) Where, then, does the majority find error? In the council‘s failure to “consider the Legislature‘s intent to limit cancellation to the extraordinary cases in which nonrenewal is inappropriate.” (Ante, p. 855.)
No such intent, however, appears anywhere in the legislation we are construing. In declaring that “there must be substantial evidence that awaiting the normal termination of the contract would fail to serve the purposes that purport to justify cancellation” (ante, p. 854), the majority makes the very error of which it accuses the council: it “thereby read[s] into the statute a refinement neither explicit nor implicit in its provisions.” (Ante, p. 856.) Similarly, it distorts the act in concluding that cancellation becomes inconsistent with its purposes “if the objectives to be served by cancellation should have been predicted and served by nonrenewal at an earlier time, or if such objectives can be served by nonrenewal now.” (Ante, p. 855.) Where is the authority for such a novel proposition? With due deference, I suggest that there is none.
The majority‘s conclusion that “the Legislature intended cancellation to be approved only in the most extraordinary circumstances” (ante, p. 853) is unsupportable. Equally unfounded is its assertion that unique “purposes” or “objectives” must be established to warrant cancellаtion. To the contrary, the purpose of the cancellation provision is expressly declared, quite simply and clearly, to be “to provide relief from the provisions of [land preservation] contracts ... when the continued dedication of land under such contracts to agricultural use is neither necessary nor desirable for the purposes of this chapter.” (
Neither do the statutory provisions for partial recapture of tax benefits enjoyed by the landowner upon cancellation of such a contract (see
The majority‘s error in thus judicially adding to the statutory requirements for cancellation stems from its focus on only one legislative purpose as being of “paramount importance,” namely, “the preservation of land in agricultural production. ...” (ante, p. 857), while ignoring the purpose of “orderly development” which it must recognize elsewhere (ante, p. 856).
Having selected the former goal as the more worthy, the majority then proceeds to adopt whatever canon of construction will be most expedient to support its reading of the Williamson Act. Thus it chooses to construe the cancellation provision of the act “narrowly” (ante, p. 864) in contrast to the “flexible approach” which it uses in ascertaining whether there is available other “proximate” land for the “use” intended for the land to be released upon cancellation. (Ante, p. 860.) Such obvious juggling of interpretive techniques makes readily apparent the majority‘s labored effort to “interpret” the act to achieve a result not intended by the Legislature. The issue, of course, is not whether the majority has thereby fashioned a better law. The salient point is that it is no part of our function of appellate review to legislate at all.
In unilaterally promulgating new findings requirements, the majority tightens a steel band around the statutory scheme. The Legislature described explicitly and exclusively its purposes in authorizing the agreements in question (
The impropriety of this judicial redrafting of the Williamson Act is made manifest when the majority applies one of its new judicial conditions to the facts before us. The majority recites that in 1969 the city‘s planning department noted that the land was “capable of being developed,” that in 1971 the city‘s plan map designated the parcel for “suburban residential use” and that the Mayor of Hayward did not feel ““that it should have gone in nine years ago,... because it was so clearly to me the next piece of land that would be developed ....” (Ante, p. 855.) On these facts the majority reasons, mistakenly in my opinion, that because some Hayward officials nine years earlier had recognized that the subject property was suitable for commercial development, the council therefore should not be permitted, belatedly, to acknowledge that fact and now withdraw the parcel from Williamson Act treatment. Rather, the majority concludes that the council must sit idly by for an additional extended period to permit the balance of the 10-year contract to run its course before the procedural handcuffs may be removed both from city officials and from property owners. In my view, such wooden and mechanical application of a statute defies logic, good community planning and common sense.
The fact that the city planner recommended nine years earlier that the subject property not be included in an agricultural preserve and that it be designated “suburban residential use” clearly establishes that its release in 1979 from Williamson Act control was neither premature nor inconsistent with the purposes of the act. For nine years the landowner had the benefit of favorable Williamson Act treatment. For the identical period the public had the full benefit of the green-belt agricultural preserve. The public now will also receive, free of cost, by outright dedication to the City of Hayward approximately one-third of the subject property for “open space environment.” A development plan, long anticipated, having fully maturеd, a municipality should have flexible authority and sufficient elbow room to accommodate both public and private interests to changing conditions.
The constraining procedural straightjacket into which the majority gratuitously locks California municipalities is not required by any provision or purpose of the Williamson Act. Certainly it is not compelled by
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The findings required by the statute (and made by the council) are fully supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (Id.,
There was additional testimony as to the unavailability of other proximate land for housing development of the type here contemplated—upper middle income. Further evidence established, as well, the uneconomic character of continuing the existing agricultural use of the land in question. The fact that there may have been some countervailing testimony offered on some of these matters, of course, does not demonstrate that the council‘s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether the administrative agency‘s findings are so supported, “the reviewing court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings and decision.” (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 514.)
The majority frankly admits that “Substantial evidence does appear in the record to support the council‘s findings that the land was a logical site for the extension of suburban development, that dedication of 30 acres of the site to open space was consistent with the purposes of the act, and that development of the parcel would not seriously jeopardize nearby agricultural uses.” (Ante, p. 854.) Nonetheless, my colleagues hold that such evidence does not support the council‘s ultimate finding of consistency with the purposes of the act. The majority so opines on the basis that “It is inconsistent with the purposes of the act to allow abrupt cancellation if nonrenewal would accomplish the same objective.” (Ibid.) As indicated, however, such an assertion lacks any precedential authority, misconstrues the legislative purpose of the act, and directly conflicts with its clear language.
The importance of California‘s agricultural industry to the state and nation cannot be disputed. That is not the issue before us. Its preservation is essential. It is disingenuous, however, for the majority to rely upon such generalities in interfering with the informed, considered decision of the Hayward City Council that cancellation of the agreement in question as to this property at this time will not adversely affect that laudable goal. We cannot presume that the council, as a responsible local agency, is insensitive either to agriculture or to esthetics. There is substantial evidence in the record as a whole supporting the findings of the council that, on the facts before it, such cancellation is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Williamson Act and is in the public interest. Because those findings in turn support the council‘s order of cancellation, no abuse of discretion appears and that should be the end of our inquiry.
The council‘s order should be affirmed.
Clark, J., concurred.
The petition of respondent City of Hayward and real party in interest Ponderosa Homes for a rehearing was denied March 26, 1981, and the judgment was modified to read as printed above. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Notes
| Fiscal Year | All Land (acres) | All Land (parcels) | Urban Prime Land (acres) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1972-1973 | 710 | 8 | 15 |
| 1973-1974 | 6,330 | 14 | 79 |
| 1974-1975 | 513 | 14 | 303 |
| 1975-1976 | 3,504 | 27 | 64 |
| 1976-1977 | 3,385 | 24 | 302 |
| 1977-1978 | 12,148 | 110 | 354 |
| 1978-1979 | 7,181 | 95 | 1,122 |