MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On December 1, 2005, Plaintiffs Michael and Rebecca Siegel filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois a purported nationwide class action complaint against Defendants Shell Oil Company, BP Corporation North America, Inc., Citgo Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company and Exxon Mobil Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants removed the case based on the grant of federal jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) and then moved jointly to dismiss the complaint. The Court granted that motion without prejudice, finding that many of Plaintiffs’ averments of fraud failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”). (R. 74-1, Order of July 26, 2006.)
Plaintiffs since have filed an amended complaint, alleging, as they did in the original complaint, (1) that Defendants are liable under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (the “Consumer Fraud Act”), 815 ILCS 505/1, et. seq., and the Illinois common law doctrines of unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy, and (2) that Defеndants are liable to the purported class under the consumer fraud statutes and common law of various other states. (R. 77-1, Am. Compl.) Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint (the “Complaint”), arguing that Plaintiffs’ averments of fraud still fail to satisfy Rule 9(b). Defendants also urge dismissal under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), arguing that for various reasons the Complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted. The Court grants Defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part. As explained below, Plaintiffs have in large measure failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, but their Complaint nonetheless states a claim for relief.
BACKGROUND
I. The Parties
Plaintiffs Michael and Rebecca Siegel are citizens of Illinois and residents of Cook County, Illinois who purchased gasoline from the various Defendants. (R. 77-I, Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 11.) Defendants Shell Oil Company (“Shell”), BP Corporation North America, Inc. (“BP”), Marathon Oil Company (“Marathon”), Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”), and Citgo Petrоleum Corporation (“Citgo”) are entities that use agents, employees, dealers, distributors, brokers, affiliates and/or subsidiaries to sell, market, advertise and distribute gasoline to consumers in the State of Illinois and throughout the United States. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-16,18.)
II. Factual Allegations
The Complaint alleges the following facts. Defendants dominate the market for gasoline in the United States and control a substantial portion of the nation’s gasoline supply. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendants have used their market dominance in concert to increase the price of gasoline to *1037 consumers by (1) controlling inventory, production, and exports, (2) limiting supply, (3) restricting purchase, (4) using “zone pricing,” (5) falsely advertising the scarceness of gasoline, and (6) excessively marking up the price between gasoline and crude oil prices — actions that have caused both the price and demand for gasoline to remain artificially high, and the supply artificially low. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 23.)
In part, Defendants are able to create these artificial prices because they can gauge the current level of production by monitoring the crude oil sales and published reports of the volume of crude oil going into each refinery. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Because they share common storage tanks and pipeline schedules, each refiner can quickly determine the movement of gasoline, level of import or export, and existing inventory levels. (Id.) Defendants keep the level of gasoline inventories in storage tanks as low as possible to maximize price, but just high enough to avoid an unexpected disruption of flow into storage that “draws the inventory down.” (Id. at ¶ 25.)
Defendants also have used their market dominance to create constant increases and decreases in production (resulting in price spikes and “just-in-time inventories”) and to “tread on national emergencies” by using events such as Hurricanes Katrina to artificially raise prices. (Id. at ¶¶21, 22; see also id. at ¶ 25 (further alleging that “just-in-time inventories” is industry terminology for the practice of maintaining low levels of inventory).) For example, during peak usage periods, Defendant Shell decreased production at its Bakersfield California refinery and, at times, was producing far less than the site’s capacity. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Shell also announced plans to close the Bakersfield refinery, which has achieved “world-class performance” two years in a row and has the largest profits per gallon of any Shell refinery in the nation. (Id.) Amid protests that the closure was intended to inflate gasoline prices by decreasing supply, the California Attorney General effectively forced Shell to find a buyer for the refinery, which is still in use today. (Id.) Shell employees have reportedly claimed that Shell lied and led people to believe that it limited refinery production or sought to close the refinery due to inadequate supply of crude oil, and internаl Shell documents repeatedly show that operations at the refinery were running well and that Shell was capitalizing on high profit margins. (Id.)
Likewise, in August 2006, Defendant BP shut down half of the nation’s largest oil field/pipeline, which accounts for eight percent of U.S. oil output, after an inspection revealed a small pipeline leak. (Id. at ¶ 4.) By reducing supply, the shutdown increased gasoline prices and boosted Defendants’ profits. (Id.) In addition, the pipeline shutdown was preventable, in that BP knowingly allowed the pipeline to corrode and leak, rather than reinvest in adequate maintenance. (Id.) The U.S. Department of Transportation has reported that it has not received a reasonable explanation of why BP had not cleaned the pipeline in years, noting that another Alaskan pipeline is cleaned every two weeks. (Id.) Several present and former BP employees have stated publicly that “they were tоld to cut back on maintenance of the pipeline and falsify records regarding same.” (Id.)
As a result of such conduct, the gas industry has in recent years achieved record-high profits. In 1999, U.S. oil refiners made 22.8 cents per gallon of gasoline refined from crude oil. By 2004, they were making 40.8 cents for every gallon refined — a price that escalated even higher to 99 cents on each gallon sold in 2005. (Id. at ¶ 34; see also id. at ¶ 33 (further alleging that, since 1999, the average margin of refinery charges has increased by 85 percent while, in the previous seven years *1038 that margin increased by only 20 percent).) The increase in price per barrel yielded profits to the gas industry of more than $25 billion in the July-September quarter of 2005, the quarter in which the price of crude oil hit $70.00 a barrel and gasoline surged to record levels after the disruption of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. (Id. at ¶ 24.) On November 2, 2005, in response the release of these quarterly profits, Bill O’Reilly, host of The O’Reilly Factor, interviewed formеr Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. When asked, “[d]o you think that major oil companies price gouged the American public?” Richardson responded, “I do believe so, Bill. There’s no correlation right now between $3 at the gasoline pump and the price per barrel in the international market. If it were $3, which it is now or close to it, it should be $90 per barrel on the international market and it’s $65. So the economies don’t work. I do believe that there’s price gouging.” (Id. (excerpting an additional exchange to the same effect).) Regarding Defendants specifically, (1) Shell reported earnings of $7.32 billion in the second quarter of 2006, up 40 percent from the previous year, (id at ¶ 12); (2) BP recorded a 30 percent increase in profits to $7.3 billion in the second quarter of 2006 compared to the second quarter of 2005, (id. at ¶ 13); (3) Marathon’s second quarter 2006 profits more than doubled due to strong gasoline prices and almost double refining margins, (id. at ¶ 14); and (4) Exxon’s second quarter 2006 profits increased 36 percent to $10.36 billion, the second largest quarterly profit ever for a publicly traded company. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
In sum, beginning the first date that Defendants placed their gasoline into the stream of commerce and continuing through the present, Defendants, individually and jointly, have “engaged in misrepresentations, unlawful schemes and courses of conduct ... that induced Plaintiffs and the Class to purchase gasoline ... [by] illegally and artificially restraining trade and increasing the price of gasoline to consumers by controlling inventory ...” and by “falsely advertising the scarceness of gasoline and excessive mark up between gasoline and crude prices ...” (Id. at ¶ 55 (quoting Nichols, Donald A., Economic Outlook for Late 2005 and 2006, Strong Growth with a Bit of Inflation Fed by the Katrina Boom).) Further, Defendants intended for Plaintiffs to purchase Defendants’ gasoline in reliance upon Defendants’ unfair and/or deceptive acts in the marketing and sale of their gas. (Id. at ¶ 65; see also id. at ¶¶ 17, 56 (further alleging that each of the Defendаnts caused artificially inflated gasoline prices to be listed and gasoline to be provided for sale to Plaintiffs at each of their agent’s respective gas stations).) Plaintiffs have periodically purchased several gallons of gasoline in each of the Defendants’ Chicago area gas stations at the artificially inflated prices advertised by the Defendants at the pumps and store signs of Defendants’ gas stations. (Id. at ¶ 56; see also id. at ¶ 57 (citing examples of Plaintiffs’ gasoline purchases).)
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Rule 8
“A complaint’s ability to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge inevitably turns on its ability to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — the general rules of pleading a claim for relief.”
Lekas v. Briley,
II. Rule 9(b)
Rule 9(b) “effectively carves out an exception to the otherwise generally liberal pleading requirements under the Federal Rules.”
Graue Mill Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
This heightened pleading standard applies to all “averments of fraud,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), regardless of whether those averments pertain to a “cause of action” for fraud.
See Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
But because Rule 9(b) only excises deficient averments of fraud from a complaint (and does not provide an independent basis for dismissal), failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) does not necessarily sound a death knell.
Id.
(“Where averments of fraud are made in a claim in which fraud is not an element, an inadequate averment of fraud does not mean that no claim has been stated.”);
see also Lachmund,
ANALYSIS
I. Certain Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint Fail to Satisfy Rule 9(b)’s Pleading Requirements
The Complaint contains several “averments of fraud” that do not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Because “Rule 9(b) is strictly construed
*1041
[and] applies to fraud and mistake and nothing else,”
Venrock,
In this regard, courts generally have held that the periphery of Rule 9(b) lies at the distinction between intentional fraudulent misrepresentations and negligent misrepresentations.
1
The difference between the two, of course, is the level of intent or
scienter. See, e.g., Fluke v. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 02-CV-8385,
Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes multiple “averments of fraud” that are subject to Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements. Plaintiffs, for example, allege that Defendants intentionally misrepresented and misled Plaintiffs and the purported class to purchase gas at inflated prices:
• “Defendants used Hurricane Katrina as a false pretext for boosting prices at the pumps and their own profits, which they subsequently lowered, after the emergency, аt a deliberately and artificially slow pace in order to pocket yet more profits.” (R. 77-1, Am. Compl. at ¶ 31.)
• “Using increases such as the price of crude oil and Hurricane Katrina as a pretext, the Defendants have periodically caused the price of gasoline to increase dramatically but also to artificially drop back down much more slowly (i.e., in the aftermath of Katrina or when the price of crude drops), in order to pocket additional profits.” (Id. at ¶ 32.)
• “Yet, the Defendants remained true to form and used the market increase in crude oil as an excuse to radically and disproportionally increase the price of refined gasoline and their own profits from refining crude into gasoline.” (Id. at 1Í 35.)
• “Defendants’ deceptive acts and/or practices were committed with wilful and wanton injury to consumers, namely Plaintiffs and the Class.” (Id. at ¶ 66.)
• “The Defendants have each unscrupulously gouged Plaintiffs and the Class by causing gasoline prices at the pump of their respective agents’ gasoline stations to be artificially inflated in unprecedented proportions ... inclusive of the aftermath of emergencies prompting increases in the price of crude oil such as Hurricane Katrina, which, as intended by each of the Defendants, have lifted the Defendants’ bottom-line profits to new heights.” (Id. at ¶ 73.)
*1043 Each of these statements, and others in the Complaint, alleges that Defendants made intentional deceptive misrepresenta tions — e.g., by “deliberately” or “unscrupulously” using Hurricane Katrina “as an excuse” or “false pretext” (id. ¶¶ 31, 32, 35, 63, 73), by “intending] for Plaintiffs” to rely upon “deceptive acts,” (id. at ¶ 65), by “wilfully” employing “deceptive acts” to inflict injury (id. at ¶ 66), by “conspiring” to “falsely advertise” (id. at ¶ 1), by lying to cover up profit margins (id. at ¶ 3), and by falsifying records to cover up the reasons for a pipeline shut down (id. at ¶ 4)— in order to artificially inflate the price of gasoline. These allegations thus are effectively “averments of fraud” that are subject tо Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement.
Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged any of the particulars surrounding these aver-ments of fraud. As to each, the Complaint wholly fails
2
to indicate one or more of the following: (1) “the identity of the person making the misrepresentation” (the “who”),
3
(2) the “content of the misrepresentation” (the “what”), (3) “the time” the misrepresentation occurred (the “when”), (4) “the place” of the misrepresentation (the “where”), or (5) the “method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff’ (the “how”).
Sears,
II. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim for Relief
A. The Complaint’s Remaining Allegations Satisfy Rule 8
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ Complaint states a claim for relief under the Consumer Fraud Act and for unjust enrichment.
4
The Consumer Fraud Act prohibits both “unfair” and “deceptive” prac
*1044
tices, but neither claim
requires
proof of an intentional misrepresentation.
5
Nor does unjust enrichment.
See, e.g., Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of City of Chicago v. Municipal Employees’, Officers’, and Officials’ Annuity and Ben. Fund of Chicago,
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states claims for relief under any of these theories because facts consistent with the remaining allegations could yield liability. In short, the remaining allegations assert, among other things, that Defendants (1) controlled the nation’s gasoline supply (R. 77-1, PL’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 23), (2) purposefully limited that supply by maintaining low inventory levels
{id.
at ¶ 25), (3) decreased production both during peak usage periods and distribution disruptions,
{id.
at ¶¶ 21, 22, 25), thereby achieving larger profits than they would have otherwise achieved. Based on theses allegations, the Court cannot conclude “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
6
Centers v. Mortgage, Inc.,
398 F.3d
*1045
930, 933 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson,
*1046 B. Defendants Have Not Established That Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim Fails as a Matter of Law
Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ gas purchases constitute “contracts” that bar a claim for unjust enrichment. Illinois courts have held that “where there is a specific contract that governs the relationship of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application.”
Guinn v. Hoskins Chevrolet,
III. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the Consumer Fraud Act Are Not Barred
Defendants argue, in the alternative, that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails because Plaintiffs allegedly cannot bring an antitrust theory under other legal theories. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot bring their alleged claim under the Consumer Fraud Act in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in
Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp.,
In
Laughlin,
the Illinois Supreme Court' considered whether plaintiffs, various third-party health insurance payors, could pursue an action under the Consumer Fraud Act for a hospital’s “price discrimination”
10
where the Illinois antitrust statute (unlike its federal counterpart) specifically excluded price discrimination from its scope.
Id.
at 381,
The defendants ... argue that the Consumer Fraud Act was not intended as an additional enforcement mechanism of the antitrust legislation ... The defendants say that the dominating legislative intention was to protect consumers and others against various species of fraud and deceit. The defendants have the correct understanding of the Consumer Fraud Act’s intendment. There is no indication that the legislature intended that the Consumer Fraud Act be an additional antitrust enforcement mechanism. The language of the Act shows that its reach was to be limited to conduct that defrauds or deceives consumers or others. The title of the Act is consistent with its content. The Consumer Fraud Act states it was enacted to “protect consumers and borrowers and businessmen against fraud, unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Further indication that this is a statute directed against fraud and not one designed to be an additional antitrust enforcement mechanism is that every one of the specifically prohibited acts set out in the *1048 Act describes a situation where a buyer is being harmed by overreaching or fraudulent conduct ....
* * *
It is significant too that interpreting the Consumer Fraud Act as the plaintiffs urge would not only conflict with the intendment of the Act itself, but would also conflict with what we have decided on this appeal was the legislative intention regarding prohibitions against Robinson-Patman-type activities. As discussed above, the legislature in the Antitrust Act declined to include provisions against price discrimination because the legislature found that inclusion of such prohibitions would be undesirable. To construe the Consumer Fraud Act to give a cause of action for discriminatory pricing that the legislature refused to give under the Antitrust Act would be incongruous. Legislation is designed to be consistent. It would be inconsistent to provide that the very conduct which is not sufficient to state a cause of action under the Antitrust Act is sufficient to state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.
Laughlin v. Evanston Hospital,
IV. The Voluntary Payment Does Not Provide a Basis for Dismissal at This Stage of the Litigation
Defendants next contend that dismissal is appropriate because the voluntary payment doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ asserted claim. Generally stated, the voluntary payment doctrine is the “rule [] that in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake of fact money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, with full knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered unless the payment was made under circumstances amounting to compulsion.”
King v. First Capital Financial Servs. Corp.,
The reason [for] the rule ... and its propriety[] are quite obvious when applied to a case of payment on a mere demand of money unaccompanied with any power or authority to enforce such demand, except by a suit at law. In such case, if the party would resist an unjust demand, he must do so at the threshold. The parties treat with each other on equal terms, and if litigation is intended by the one of whom the money is demanded, it should precede payment. When the person making the payment can only be reached by a proceеding at law, he is bound to make his defense in the first instance, and he cannot postpone the litigation by paying the demand in silence or under a reservation of the right to litigate the claim[] and afterward sue to recover the amount paid.
Smith,
Defendants’ argument that the voluntary payment doctrine warrants dismissal is unavailing. Affirmative defenses like the voluntary payment doctrine,
see Harris,
CONCLUSION
The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in part. As noted above, the Motion is granted to the extent that certain averments of fraud fail to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. It is denied to the extent it sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief.
Notes
. The Seventh Circuit has held that Rule 9(b) applies to intentional fraudulent misrepresen
tations
— see,
e.g., United States ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance-Chicago,
. The Court must look to the Complaint as a whole in determining whether Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 9(b).
See Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins.,
. As the above excerpts reflect, Plaintiffs' Complaint, with rare exception (see id. at ¶¶ 3, 4), fails to identify the particular Defendant who made the alleged misrepresentations at issue.
. Defendants also urge dismissal on account of purported deficiencies in the scope of the purported class, such as Plaintiffs ability to represent the claims of non-Illinois residents under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. This is a "standing” argument, but it is an argument that pertains to standing under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23, not standing in the Article III sense.
See
1 Newberg on Class Actions § 1:2 n. 11 ("Individual case or controversy standing is distinct from and narrower than common issues and typicality of claims tests under Rule 23.”). Because Defendants’ argument does not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court declines to address the argument at this juncture and will instead address it on Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
See also Mutchka v. Harris,
. A claim for "deceptive” business practices under the Consumer Fraud Act does not require proof of intent to deceive or proof of an intentional misrepresentation.
See Capiccioni v. Brennan Naperville, Inc.,
. In several instances, Defendants support their arguments for dismissal by citing Illinois cases that address whether state court complaints had adequately pleaded claims under Illinois’ more rigorous fact-pleading standard. (R. 82-1, Defs.’ Motion at 11-14.) Each cited case takes issue with a state court plaintiff's failure to plead a particular element.
{See, e.g., id.
at 11 (citing Illinois state cases and arguing that Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead a "deception” or “proximate cause”).) These cases are in-apposite. "[T]his suit is in federal rather than state court .... [and] [w]hen state and federal practice differ, federal rules adopted under the Rules Enabling Act prevail. This means, in particular, that when federal courts entertain claims under state law ... it is not necessary to plead facts matching elements of legal theories.”
Christensen v. County of Boone, Illinois,
. The Court is mindful that Ill. Admin Code tit. 14, § 465.30 describes situations in which the sale of “petroleum products” constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice:
(a) It shall be an unfair or deceptive act or prаctice, during any market emergency, for any petroleum-related business to sell or offer to sell any petroleum product for an amount that represents an unconscionably high price.
(b) A price is unconscionably high if:
(1) the amount charged represents a gross disparity between the price of the petroleum product and:
(A) the price at which the same product was sold or offered for sale by the petroleum-related business in the usual course of business immediately prior to the onset of the market emergency, or
(B) the price at which the same or similar petroleum product is readily obtainable by other buyers in the trade area; and
(2) the disparity is not substantially attributable to increased prices charged by the petroleum-related business suppliers or increased costs due to an abnormal market disruption.
The Court, however, declines to address at this stage whether or to what extent this administrative code section impacts the merits of this case because the parties have not yet fully briefed this issue and because it is not essential to resolving Defendants’ Motion.
. In addition, Defendants urge dismissal of Plaintiffs' "unfair” practices claim because: (1) it fails to "allege that Defendants’ purported supply management and pricing practices ... violate any established statute or common law doctrine that would offend public policy,” (R. 82-1, Defs.’ Motion at 13 (internal quotation omitted)); (2) it "contains no allegations demonstrating that Defendants' challenged practices imposed a lack of meaningful choice or an unreasonable burden on the consumer that might satisfy the second unfairness element of immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct,”
(id.
at 14 (internal quotation omitted)); and (3) “Plaintiffs do not adequately plead a substantial injury to consumers,”
(id.).
As the Court explained in its previous Order, Rule 9(b) provides only a limited exception tо Rule 8’s notice pleading standard by requiring Plaintiffs to
plead the circumstances
underlying "averments of fraud” with particularity.
See Midwest Commerce Banking Co. v. Elkhart City Centre, 4
F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.1993) ("Rule 9(b) does not require that the complaint explain the plaintiff's theory of the case, but only that it state the misrepresentation, omission, or other action or inaction that the plaintiff claims was fraudulent.”);
see also Lachmund,
. The Court further notes that the Illinois Commercial Code, which governs sales contracts, expressly slates its provisions do not prohibit claims for unjust enrichment. 810 ILCS 5/1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this [Illinois Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including ... unjust enrichment ... shall supplement its provisions.”).
. The defendant hospital and one particular third-party payor had a contract that provided refunds to the payor under certain circumstances. The other third-party payors did not have a refund provision in their contracts with the defendant hospital.
Id.
at 378,
. The Laughlin court explained that the lack of a counterpart was deliberate:
The Clayton Act and its Robinson-Patman amendments specifically prohibiting price discrimination were enacted specifically because the Sherman Act and other preexisting antitrust statutes did not cover such practices____ Section 3 of the Illinois act closely follows section 1 of the Sherman Act, and section 11 provides for the use of Federal precedent in interpreting the language of our statute. Based on this construction, one readily concludes that our legislature intended that an allegation of price discrimination alone would not be actionable under section 3(2). The committee comments to the Illinois act are supportive of our holding:
"[I]t was not considered wise to incorporate all features of the comparable federal legislation. S.B. 116 is similar to the federal Sherman Act of 1890 and to some of the contemporary legislation of the several states. It was not deemed necessary or desirable to include measures comparable to the several substantive antitrust sections of the Clayton Act of 1914.” (Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par. 60-1 et seq., Commentary on the 1967 Illinois Antitrust Act, at 441 (Smith-Hurd 1977).)
See also People ex rel. Scott v. Sckwulst Building Center, Inc. (1982),89 Ill.2d 365 , 369,59 Ill.Dec. 911 ,432 N.E.2d 855 , and Curtis & Decker, The 1969 Amendments to the Illinois Antitrust Act, 58 Ill. BJ. 698, 700-01 (1970), in which the authors note: “[r]he act cover[s] the subject matter of the Sherman Act and contains no provision comparable to those of Sec. 2 of the Clayton Act. The omission of provisions going beyond the traditional areas of restraint of trade and monopoly and into the realms inhabited by the incipiency doctrine embodied in the Clayton Act was based on carеful consideration of State law experience, State and local needs, the type and frequency of complaints received and what might realistically be expected of state enforcement.”
Id.
at 386,
. Defendants point out that an intermediate state appellate court has interpreted Laugh-lin's holding to mean something broader than the Court’s reading here, that a complaint alleging an antitrust violation must be brought under the Illinois Antitrust Act rather than the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act:
In the case sub judice, ... plaintiff's claims as classic antitrust allegations dressed in Consumer Fraud Act clothing. Our review of both the original complaint and the proffered amended complaint reveals that they repeatedly charge defendants with agreeing and conspiring to "fix,” "maintain,” or "stabilize” the price of potash. Such allegations are a classic example of price-fixing first outlawed by Congress over 100 years ago under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and by dеfinition are covered by the Antitrust Act which is patterned on the Sherman Act. Thus, such allegations, pursuant to Laughlin, must be brought under the Antitrust Act and not the Consumer Fraud Act. Therefore, we find plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.
Gaebler v. New Mexico Potash Corp.,