Case Information
*1
T HE U TAH C OURT OF A PPEALS
R ALPH S IEBACH AND M URIEL S IEBACH , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
B RIGHAM Y OUNG U NIVERSITY , Defendant and Appellee.
Opinion No. 20140317-CA Filed October 8, 2015 Fourth District Court, Provo Department The Honorable Fred D. Howard The Honorable David N. Mortensen No. 130400674
Florence M. Vincent, Spencer H. Reed, and Mark A. Flores, Attorneys for Appellants Robert S. Clark, Laura G. Kennedy, Nathanael D. Paynter, and Stephen M. Craig, Attorneys for Appellee
J UDGE J OHN A. P EARCE authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN and K ATE A. T OOMEY concurred.
PEARCE, Judge: Ralph and Muriel Siebach (the Siebachs) sued Brigham
Young University (BYU), seeking, among other forms of relief, the return of charitable donations they had given to BYU. The district court determined that the Siebachs lacked standing to pursue their claims and dismissed their Amended Complaint with prejudice. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND ¶2 The Siebachs have donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to BYU over the past several decades. The Siebachs’ son, Dr. James L. Siebach (Son), was employed as a philosophy professor at BYU. In 1990, Son asked BYU to establish a research account that would be known as the Rhetorical Studies Account (the RSA). The RSA was to be used exclusively to fund academic research in philosophy at BYU. BYU created the RSA and designated it as a restricted
account for ‚Research; Hiring; [and] promotion of any & all aspects of philosophical studies.‛ The RSA was to be funded primarily by private donations. Son was the only person authorized to spend the RSA funds. In the following years, the Siebachs and other donors—three corporations and at least four individuals—contributed approximately $425,000 to the RSA with the understanding that the money would be used to fund Son’s research. In April 2009, BYU began an audit of the RSA. BYU did
not inform the Siebachs or the other donors of the audit. In July 2009, BYU froze the RSA and issued an interim report concluding that the Siebachs’ contributions to the account had violated federal tax laws. The interim report also stated that BYU’s audit indicated ‚a significant level of purchases made from the RSA without adequate control or supervision.‛ The interim report concluded that the RSA had been utilized in a 1. Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite the background facts as alleged in the Siebachs’ Amended Complaint. Brown v. Division of Water Rights of Dep’t of Nat. Res. , 2010 UT 14, ¶ 16, 228 P.3d 747 (stating that a claim will survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing if the claim’s ‚allegations, taken as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, satisfy the requirements of our standing test‛).
manner that ‚failed to comply with university policies and procedures,‛ and directed that all future expenditures from the RSA conform to ‚approved research areas.‛ BYU did not provide the interim report, or communicate its results, to the Siebachs or any other donor. On September 9, 2009, BYU accepted an additional
$50,000 contribution from the Siebachs. Upon receipt of the donation, BYU unfroze the RSA, deposited the Siebachs’ contribution, and then refroze the RSA. On or about September 17, 2009, BYU removed Son as the person authorized to access the RSA. BYU did not inform the Siebachs that it had frozen the RSA or removed Son’s authorization to access the RSA. BYU issued its final audit report in December 2011. The report concluded that the Siebachs had ‚a personal interest in making donations to benefit [Son] financially, which conflicts with their avowed charitable interest in supporting the exempt educational purpose of [BYU].‛ The report also opined that the Siebachs’ ‚intention was to make a gift for a private use rather than for a public benefit,‛ that BYU ‚was being used merely as a ‘conduit’ to funnel funds to [Son] from his parents and avoid tax liabilities,‛ and that if the Siebachs donated the funds with the restriction that they only be used by Son, ‚it would have been seen as an effort to use [BYU] as a conduit for a personal gift in violation of the Internal Revenue Code and *BYU’s+ policy and established practice.‛ The final report acknowledged BYU’s own negligence in failing to enforce university policies regarding the RSA. The report also documented various inappropriate uses of the RSA funds, including personal travel, the purchase of approximately $81,000 in personal items, and other expenditures that ‚were of doubtful value or no value‛ to BYU.
2. The Siebachs contend that BYU’s conclusions and its characterization of ‚unlawful motives‛ are ‚wholly inaccurate.‛ ¶7 The Siebachs eventually became aware of the audit and apparently made their disagreement and displeasure with the audit’s conclusions known to BYU. BYU offered to return any unspent funds in the RSA that could be attributed to the Siebachs. However, the Siebachs and BYU could not agree on the precise amount to be refunded. Eventually, BYU offered to return approximately $114,000 to the Siebachs. The Siebachs directed BYU to return that amount but announced that the $114,000 was ‚less than should be transferred and that they were not waiving any and all claims to the remaining balance BYU promised and is obligated to transfer.‛ The Siebachs also demanded that BYU return, with interest, the entire $50,000 donation they had made in 2009. BYU responded by conditioning the return of money on the agreement of all donors to the RSA and a waiver of further claims by all donors, including the Siebachs. The Siebachs were unwilling or unable to satisfy BYU’s conditions, and BYU did not refund any portion of the unspent funds to the Siebachs. In 2013, the Siebachs filed suit against BYU, seeking an
accounting of their donations to the RSA, a declaratory judgment that BYU should be required to use the RSA funds in accordance with the Siebachs’ donative intent, and the return of funds. The Siebachs’ complaint included claims of breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, accounting, breach of contract, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, revocation of gift, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent management of the donated funds. The district court dismissed the Siebachs’ Amended
Complaint with prejudice, concluding that they lacked standing to assert their claims. The district court reasoned that, under the general common-law rule, a donor who has made a completed 3. BYU also apparently raised its proposed refund amount to approximately $124,000.
gift to a charitable institution lacks standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of the gift and that, in most circumstances, it is only a state’s attorney general who has standing to bring such an action. The district court concluded that the Utah Legislature ‚implicitly adopted the common law rule‛ when it enacted the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act. The district court further concluded that all of the Siebachs’ claims amounted to attempts to enforce their donative intent, observing that it ‚*could not+ comprehend a scenario where the conditions identified by the Siebachs may not be considered terms of a charitable gift, or where the alleged bad acts may not be viewed as failures in complying with the terms of a gift.‛ Accordingly, the district court dismissed the Amended Complaint for lack of standing. Before the district court entered a final written dismissal
order, the Siebachs filed a motion to reconsider, which BYU opposed. The district court issued its final written order without ruling on the motion to reconsider. The Siebachs filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the district court granted the Siebachs’ motion to reconsider in part and reinstated their breach of contract claim relating to BYU’s offer to return the unspent portion of their RSA donations. BYU objected that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its final order in light of the Siebachs’ appeal. The district court agreed and voided its order reconsidering and reinstating the Siebachs’ breach of contract claim. The Siebachs filed another notice of appeal. A week after the district court entered its original final order of dismissal, the Siebachs moved to disqualify the assigned judge, Judge Howard, arguing that the judge enjoyed personal and professional relationships with BYU that created a conflict of interest. The motion to disqualify alleged that BYU employed Judge Howard’s daughter, a BYU law student, as a legal-writing assistant. The motion also identified three BYU employees who had ‚disclosed a close relationship‛ with Judge Howard. The presiding judge, Judge Mortensen, reviewed the motion to disqualify and denied it, concluding that the motion was not timely and that the grounds asserted did not mandate disqualification of Judge Howard. The Siebachs then filed another notice of appeal. Thus, the Siebachs take this appeal from the district court’s order of dismissal, its order voiding the reconsideration order, and Judge Mortensen’s denial of the disqualification motion.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶12 The Siebachs argue that the district court erred when it
concluded that they lacked standing and dismissed their claims
with prejudice. ‚The issue of whether a party has standing is
primarily a question of law, which we review for correctness.‛
R.P. v. K.S.W.
, 2014 UT App 38, ¶ 4, 320 P.3d 1084. When we
evaluate standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we must treat
the allegations contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.
See Brown
v. Division of Water Rights of Dep’t of Nat. Res.
,
denying their motion to disqualify Judge Howard. We review
the denial of a motion to disqualify a judge ‚for correctness.‛
In re C.C.
,
when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its
final order after they filed their notice of appeal from that order.
Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law, which we review under a correction of error
standard.
Garver v. Rosenberg
,
ANALYSIS
I. Donor Standing to Enforce the Terms of a Charitable Gift
A. Standing Under the Common-Law Rule
The district court, applying general common-law
principles, concluded that the Siebachs lacked standing to
pursue their claims. ‚At common law, a donor who has made a
completed charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or
in trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms
of his or her gift or trust unless he or she had expressly reserved
the right to do so.‛
Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of
Bridgeport
,
general, and not the donor, has standing to enforce the terms of a
completed charitable gift.
Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis
Found.
, 2014 WY 32, ¶ 34 (‚At common law, only the attorney
general may enforce the terms of a charitable gift.‛);
see also Carl
J. Herzog Found., Inc.
,
generally precludes a donor from suing to enforce the terms of a
charitable gift. Instead, they argue—correctly—that no Utah
case has expressly applied the common-law rule of donor
standing. But it does not ineluctably follow that the district court
therefore erred in applying the common-law rule. Indeed, Utah
courts have consistently looked to the common law to resolve
questions of standing.
See, e.g.
,
Jones v. Barlow
, 2007 UT 20,
¶¶ 15–29,
legislation on the subject, the common law should not govern
the issue of donor standing. Nor do they articulate any reason
why Utah would be ill-served by the common-law donor-
4. At least one American jurisdiction has expanded the common-
law rule to permit donor standing in some circumstances.
Smithers v. St. Luke’s–Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr.
,
standing rule. In the absence of such argument, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Utah follows the common-law rule and that, under the rule, the Siebachs lack standing to enforce the terms of their charitable gifts to BYU. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing the Siebachs’ claims that sought to enforce their donative intent.
B. The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds
Act
Rather than directly attack the common-law rule, the
Siebachs focus much of their argument on the district court’s
conclusion that Utah’s Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) implicitly adopted the
common-law rule of donor standing.
See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 51-
8-101 to -604 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014). The district court
acknowledged that UPMIFA does not expressly address donor
5. The Siebachs argue that their claims should not have been
dismissed on standing grounds without an opportunity for them
to conduct discovery. However, the district court may grant a
motion to dismiss premised on a lack of standing so long as the
court treats the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint as true
and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Brown v. Division of Water Rights of Dep’t of Nat. Res.
,
The Siebachs also argue that the district court erred in dismissing their donative-intent claims with prejudice rather than without prejudice. We agree with BYU that this issue was not presented to the district court and was therefore not preserved for our review. See generally 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (‚*I+n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.‛ (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
standing, but the court observed that the uniform act that the
Utah Legislature used as the model for UPMIFA contains
prefatory language stating that ‚the attorney general continues
to be the protector both of the donor’s intent and of the public’s
interest in charitable funds.‛ Uniform Prudent Mgmt. of
Institutional Funds Act prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 2014).
The district court also referenced the Legislature’s instruction in
UPMIFA that, ‚[i]n applying and construing this uniform act,
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity
of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that
enact it.‛
See
Utah Code Ann. § 51-8-604 (LexisNexis 2010). The
district court then noted that other states that have enacted a
version of the uniform act have ‚interpreted [the uniform act’s+
silence on the standing issue as a continuation of the common
law doctrine regarding donors’ lack of standing to enforce gift
terms.‛
See, e.g.
,
Hardt v. Vitae Found., Inc.
,
because the district court ultimately relied on the common-law rule to determine that the Siebachs lacked standing. The district court may have overstated the Legislature’s intent when it concluded that UPMIFA ‚implicitly adopted the common law rule.‛ UPMIFA is silent on the question of donor standing. Nevertheless, UPMIFA appears to be entirely consistent with the common law on the issue of donor standing, and the two should be read harmoniously. Whether UPMIFA precludes the district court’s
application of the common-law donor-standing rule presents a
question of preemption. ‚Statutes ‘may preempt the common
law either by governing an area in so pervasive a manner that it
displaces the common law’ (field preemption) ‘or by directly
conflicting with the common law’ (conflict preemption).‛
R.P. v.
K.S.W.
,
precludes the Siebachs’ donative-intent claims disposes of the Siebachs’ other arguments that the district court misapplied UPMIFA to dismiss their claims. Because the common law, and not UPMIFA, governs the Siebachs’ standing, it is irrelevant whether the donated funds were ‚institutional funds‛ under UPMIFA. And the common-law rule applies to all of the Siebachs’ donations, whether or not those donations predated UPMIFA’s enactment in 2007. The Siebachs also argue that the district court’s dismissal
of their donative-intent claims violates the Utah Constitution’s open courts provision, which states,
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const. art. I, § 11. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted
the open courts provision to generally prohibit the abrogation of
an existing cause of action.
Scott v. Utah County
,
their argument that they qualified for an exception to the
common-law donor-standing rule because they possessed a
‚special interest‛ in enforcing their donative intent. Specifically,
the Siebachs argue that they have special-interest standing to
pursue their donative-intent claims because BYU’s offer to
return the unspent portion of the donations gave the Siebachs
‚some pecuniary interest‛ in the funds.
Warren v. Board of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.
,
enough to confer standing is whether the person is entitled to
receive a benefit under the [gift or] trust that is not merely the
benefit to which members of the public in general are entitled.‛
State ex rel. Nixon v. Hutcherson
, 96 S.W.3d 81, 84 (Mo. 2003)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Warren
,
retained a pecuniary interest in the donated funds after the gifts
were completed, such as by retaining an express reversionary
interest in the funds,
see
Goodwin,
Donor Standing to Enforce
Charitable Gifts
,
may not be enforceable in their own right. infra ¶¶ 38–41. But allegations of post-gift promises do not alter the conclusion that the Siebachs relinquished all pecuniary interest in the donated funds at the time they completed their gifts. We are not 6. In the related context of beneficiary standing to enforce the terms of a charitable trust, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that some courts have created a ‚narrow exception‛ to the donor-standing rule, allowing suits by beneficiaries ‚deemed to have a ‘special interest’ in the administration of a charitable trust.‛ In re United Effort Plan Trust , 2013 UT 5, ¶ 27, 296 P.3d 742 (citation omitted). However, the supreme court noted that it has ‚not yet recognized this ‘special interest’ exception‛ and that ‚the contours of the exception are ill- defined.‛ Id.
persuaded by the Siebachs’ attempt to bootstrap BYU’s alleged post-gift promises to return unspent funds into special-interest standing to enforce their original donative intent. [7] D. Traditional Standing The Siebachs argue that even if Utah recognizes the
common-law donor-standing rule, not all of their claims are barred by that rule. This argument appears to implicitly concede that some, if not most, of the Siebachs’ claims seek to enforce their ‚donative intent.‛ However, the Siebachs argue that their fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, as well as one of their breach of contract claims, are ‚independent from the donative intent claims and should not have been dismissed.‛ 1. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation The Siebachs claim that BYU induced their donations with false or misleading statements about how the funds would be used and managed. See generally Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (reciting the elements of fraud); Atkinson v. IHC Hosps., Inc. , 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990) (discussing negligent misrepresentation claims). The Siebachs emphasize that their fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims differ from their donative-intent claims because they are 7. As discussed below, this does not mean that the donor- standing rule prevents the Siebachs from bringing an action based upon a separate post-donation contract, should they be able to plead such a claim.
8. The Amended Complaint asserts two separate breach of contract claims, one based on an alleged contract formed at the time of the Siebachs’ gifts and one arising from BYU’s later promise to return unspent funds. The first breach of contract claim seeks to enforce the Siebachs’ donative intent and is therefore barred by the common-law donor-standing rule. based on BYU’s communications to the Siebachs to induce their donations rather than on the Siebachs’ communications to BYU limiting the use of the gifts. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the fraud and misrepresentation claims were barred by the donor-standing rule because BYU’s alleged ‚bad acts‛ could be viewed only as ‚failures in complying with the terms of a gift.‛ The Siebachs argue that the common-law donor-standing
doctrine ‚has not been applied to prevent donors from suing
charitable organizations for fraud‛ and assert that ‚*t+here is no
question that a donor may sue when a gift is induced by fraud.‛
As authority for these propositions, the Siebachs cite to cases
from Utah and other jurisdictions.
Lynch v. MacDonald
, 367
P.2d 464, 470 (Utah 1962);
Patterson v. Leonard
, 200 So. 759, 761
(Ala. 1941);
In re Estate of Saathoff
, 295 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Neb.
1980);
Camp St. Mary’s Ass’n of W. Ohio Conf. of the United
Methodist Church, Inc. v. Otterbein Homes
,
common-law donor-standing doctrine, much less hold that fraud and misrepresentation claims are categorically exempt from that doctrine. Nevertheless, these cases support the proposition that courts around the country have recognized the standing of donors to allege the fraudulent or negligent inducement of their donations. See also Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bos. , 867 N.E.2d 300, 311 (Mass. 2007) (stating, with regard to donors’ negligent misrepresentation claim, that ‚it is clear that the plaintiffs have alleged individual stakes in this dispute that 9. The district court did not cite—nor has BYU provided—any authority stating that the common-law donor-standing rule applies to inducement-based claims like fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
make them, and not the Attorney General, the parties to bring suit‛); Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi , 18 So. 3d 814, 831–32 (Miss. 2009) (allowing fraud claim by donors who alleged intentional misrepresentations in soliciting contributions for the rebuilding of a church).
¶33 The Utah Legislature has also treated the inducement of charitable donations differently from a charity’s obligation to manage donated funds in compliance with a donor’s expressed intentions. UPMIFA governs a charitable institution’s post- donation management of funds. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 51-8-101 to -604 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014). However, the Charitable Solicitations Act addresses the solicitation of funds by charitable institutions. id. §§ 13-22-1 to -23 (2013 & Supp. 2014). The Charitable Solicitations Act is aimed at preventing charitable fraud and prohibits the ‚making of any untrue statement of material fact‛ in connection with a charitable solicitation. See id. § 13-22-13(3) (2013); see also American Target Advert., Inc. v. Giani , 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (‚The *Charitable Solicitations+ Act’s general declarations and specific prohibitions clearly target fraud.‛). The Charitable Solicitations Act allows for the prosecution of charity fraud actions by the state of Utah, but also states—in the section of the Act making a violation a misdemeanor—that ‚*n+othing in this section precludes any person damaged as a result of a charitable solicitation from maintaining a civil action for damages or injunctive relief.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 13-22-4(2) (LexisNexis 2013). Thus, the Charitable Solicitations Act anticipates donors personally seeking damages when their donations are procured by fraud. We conclude that claims alleging the improper inducement
of a charitable donation are distinguishable from claims seeking
to enforce donative intent and that improper-inducement claims
do not fall within the common-law donor-standing rule. The
common-law rule is based on the precept that a donor
relinquishes his or her personal interest in an unrestricted
charitable gift once the gift is complete, and thereafter it becomes
the duty of the attorney general to vindicate the public interest in
ensuring that charitable organizations use donated funds
appropriately.
Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of
Bridgeport
,
2. BYU’s Alleged Promises to Return Unspent Funds ¶38 The Siebachs also argue that the district court erred by concluding that the common-law donor-standing rule deprived them of standing to pursue the breach of contract claim that was based on BYU’s alleged post-gift promises to return the unspent portion of their donations. We agree. The Siebachs allege that BYU breached an agreement to
return the unspent RSA funds that were attributable to their
donations. The Siebachs support this claim with allegations that
they requested that BYU return funds to them and that BYU, on
multiple occasions, offered to return a portion of the Siebachs’
donations. To the extent that these various offers and requests
created an enforceable agreement, that agreement did not
involve donative intent. Rather, it would represent the
settlement of an existing dispute between the parties. Settlement agreements are enforceable contracts.
See McKelvey v.
Hamilton
,
breach of contract claim on an independent ground.
Bailey
,
claims aimed at enforcing their donative intent. This includes their causes of action for accounting, declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract arising from the terms of their gifts, revocation of gift, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and negligent management of the donated funds. Each of these claims seeks to enforce the donative intent underlying the Siebachs’ gifts and can be prosecuted only by the attorney general. However, the Siebachs do have standing to pursue their fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, because those claims allege improper inducement of the gifts rather than BYU’s failure to use the gifts in accordance with the Siebachs’ intent. Similarly, the common-law donor-standing rule does not prevent the Siebachs from pressing a claim that BYU allegedly promised to return their unspent donations, because that claim seeks to enforce a separate post-gift promise rather than the terms of the gifts.
II. Denial of the Siebachs’ Motion to Recuse The Siebachs next argue that Presiding Judge Mortensen
erred when he denied their motion to disqualify Judge Howard. The Siebachs sought Judge Howard’s disqualification because BYU employed his daughter and because three BYU employees ‚disclosed a close relationship‛ with Judge Howard. Judge Mortensen denied the motion as untimely and also because it failed to set forth sufficient grounds for disqualification. We affirm Judge Mortensen’s ruling based on his conclusion that the Siebachs’ motion was untimely. [11] The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required the Siebachs to file their disqualification motion no later than twenty days after ‚the date on which [they] learn[ed] or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2013). The Siebachs asserted that their counsel learned of the factual basis for their disqualification motion on March 29, 2014. Judge Mortensen ruled that the Siebachs therefore should have filed their motion by April 18 and that the Siebachs’ April 21 motion was untimely. Judge Mortensen also ruled that ‚the majority of the information asserted in the affidavit in support of the motion to disqualify could have been learned long before March 29, 2014 through the exercise of reasonable diligence.‛ The Siebachs do not challenge those factual findings. Instead, they argue that the twenty-day filing period should have run from the date that their counsel verified the information about Judge Howard rather than the date upon which they learned that information. The Siebachs argue that this result necessarily flows from rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that every court filing certifies the filer’s ‚knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ,‛ that the filing has evidentiary support. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). The 11. Because we affirm on the basis of untimeliness, we do not address the substance of the arguments the motion raised and express no opinion on the merits of those arguments.
12. Rule 63 was amended effective May 1, 2014, to provide for a twenty-one-day filing period. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B) & amendment notes (2015). The Siebachs did not argue below, nor do they argue on appeal, that the district court should have applied the amended rule in evaluating the timeliness of their disqualification motion.
Siebachs assert that their attorneys verified the information about Judge Howard on April 1, rendering their April 21 filing timely if the twenty days began to run on the date of verification. We see no support for the Siebachs’ argument in rule 63’s language. Rule 63’s clock begins to tick on the date that a party learns or should have learned of the grounds for disqualification, not on the date a party’s counsel verifies that counsel has, or is likely to have, evidentiary support for the allegations and factual contentions in the motion. Accordingly, reading rules 11 and 63 together, counsel should complete a reasonable inquiry into the grounds for disqualification within the time that rule 63 contemplates. Reading the rules as the Siebachs urge would undercut the policy behind the timely resolution of disqualification motions by allowing counsel a potentially unlimited time period to investigate before triggering rule 63’s deadline. In addition, Judge Mortensen ruled that the Siebachs
could have discovered the information about Judge Howard ‚long before March 29‛ if they had exercised ‚reasonable diligence.‛ This constitutes a separate and independent ground for Judge Mortensen’s ruling. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B)(iii) (calculating the time period for filing a disqualification motion from the date that a basis for the motion was discovered or should have been discovered ‚with the exercise of reasonable diligence‛). The Siebachs do not challenge this aspect of Judge Mortensen’s order.
13. The Siebachs do not argue that the twenty-day deadline provided their counsel with insufficient time to investigate the grounds underlying the disqualification motion. In this case, the Siebachs acknowledge that their attorneys took only three days to verify the information about Judge Howard, leaving them over two weeks to prepare and file a timely disqualification motion.
¶47 Rule 63 expressly allows a reviewing judge to ‚deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.‛ Id. R. 63(b)(3)(C). The Siebachs have not established that Judge Mortensen erred in concluding that their motion to disqualify was untimely, and we affirm the denial of their motion on that basis.
III. The Siebachs’ Motion to Reconsider Finally, the Siebachs argue that the district court erred
when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its dismissal order once the Siebachs had filed their notice of appeal. See Garver v. Rosenberg , 2014 UT 42, ¶ 10, 347 P.3d 380 (‚Once a notice of appeal is filed, jurisdiction transfers from the district court to the appellate court for most matters in the case.‛). We need not decide this question because it is moot. The relief the district court extended and then retracted on the Siebachs’ motion for reconsideration is included in the relief we grant the Siebachs on appeal—the reinstatement of their breach of contract claim based upon BYU’s alleged promises to return the Siebachs’ unspent donations. Thus, the Siebachs have already obtained the relief that we could grant if we were to agree with their jurisdictional argument, and we decline to address that now-mooted issue. State v. Black , 2015 UT 54, ¶ 10 (‚An issue becomes moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION We conclude that the common-law donor-standing rule
precludes the Siebachs from asserting causes of action seeking to enforce their donative intent, and we agree with the district court that most of the Siebachs’ claims are barred for that reason. We reject the Siebachs’ arguments that they have standing under the ‚special interest‛ exception to the common-law donor- standing rule. However, the Siebachs’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims do not seek to enforce their donative intent and thus fall outside the common-law rule. Similarly, the Siebachs’ breach of contract claim arising from BYU’s alleged promises to return unspent funds does not seek to enforce the Siebachs’ donative intent. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of those three claims and remand for further proceedings. We do not reach the Siebachs’ argument concerning their motion to reconsider, because our remand of the ruling dismissing the breach of contract claim moots that portion of the appeal. In all other respects, including Judge Mortensen’s denial of the Siebachs’ motion to disqualify Judge Howard, we affirm the district court.