130 Pa. 76 | Pa. | 1889
At the trial the defendant submitted six points, which fairly and fully presented its theory of this case, and these points, being separately answered, were all affirmed by the court without qualification. Nor is there any assignment of error to the general charge, or to any portion of it. The only matters complained of arise upon the answers of the court to the points submitted by the plaintiff’s counsel. These points, it must be confessed, are very inaptly drawn. It may be remarked, generally, that the hypothesis upon which these several points were framed, respectively, in view of the evidence is wholly inadequate to support the conclusions which are sought to be drawn. Every point of law submitted for the determination of the court should be reasonably consistent with the evidence, and in such comprehensive manner that the deduction made therefrom, notwithstanding the force of the other evidence in the cause, is the logical, legal conclusion from the facts assumed. Each point submitted is to be taken as a distinct, independent proposition ; and the answer to it maybe a simple affirmation or negation of it, or, the answer may be accompanied with such qualification as is requisite to a correct exposition of the law. When a case comes before us for review, we cannot assume any fact not covered by the hypothesis set forth in the point, except such as is embraced by necessary implication. If this were not so, the court might, in some cases, affirm the points on both sides; and, whilst in the answers on one side or the other, the true rule might be given, the jury would be allowed to grope in the dark in search of it, with equal chances to arrive at a wrong or á right result. In such case the assumption of certain facts that are not stated would, if known, show the correct rulings on both sides; but the misleading tendency is such as to be manifest error. If we apply these well-established rules of practice to the instructions given to the jury in this case, we cannot avoid the conclusion that they were misleading to the jwy-
In affirming the defendant’s first, second, and third points, the court instructed the jury: (1) If they should find that the plaintiff’s agent, Sweet, referred the directors to the furniture in the DuBois and Coder school-houses, as specimens of the plaintiff’s manufacture, and agreed that if, upon examination
In the plaintiff’s sixth point the court was requested to instruct the jury as follows: “ That if the jury find, from the evidence, that the agreement of purchase offered in evidence in this case was read over in the presence and hearing of the board of directors of the defendant corporation before signing, and was understood by them, and no objection was made by any one thereto as it was so read and signed, then said agreement is to be taken as the agreement between plaintiff and defendant corporation, and the verdict of the jury should be for the amount so agreed to be paid in favor of the plaintiff.” To this the court answered: “ Affirmed, unless the jury further find, from the evidence in the case, the facts as contained in defendant’s first, second and third points.” But suppose the jury should fail to find the facts contained in the first, second and third points of the defendant, and should find, as assumed in the point, that the written agreement was the only agreement subsisting between the parties, does it follow as a matter of law, in view of the evidence, that the verdict of the jury should be for the amount so agreed to be paid in favor of the plaintiff ? Can it be affirmed that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict upon the proof of the written contract alone, without evidence of a delivery in pursuance of that contract, or, if there was a delivery, without evidence of the kind and quality of the desks delivered, or of a refusal on the part of the defendant to receive the furniture when it was delivered? There was, in fact, evidence upon all these points, not only of delivery, and of the kind or quality of the desks delivered, but also of a refusal on the part of the defendant to receive the desks after delivery; but this evidence was for the jury, not for the court. The hypothesis of the point was not sufficiently comprehensive, and it should have been refused; or, if affirmed, it should have been further qualified.
The answers to the plaintiff’s fourth and fifth points are open to similar criticism. The fourth is directed to the question of delivery alone, whilst the fifth is upon the effect of Temple’s refusal to receive the furniture on its arrival at Brockwayville. But in neither of them is it assumed, as part of the hypothetical statment of facts, that the furniture delivered, or the furni
The thirteenth point of the plaintiff is open to the same objection. The matters of fact assumed therein do not justify the conclusion which, by an absolute affirmation, the jury was permitted to draw therefrom.
It is undoubtedly true, when the agreement is to make and deliver an article to the satisfaction of the person for whom it is made, the latter, acting in good faith, and not from mere caprice, may refuse to accept if, for any reason, it is really-not satisfactory to him: Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291; Seeley v. Welles, 120 Pa. 69. But when the refusal to receive is made before an actual, bona fide inspection of the article, or before an opportunity is had to judge of its quality or merits, no such rule could obtain; for it would be impossible, in such a case, to decide whether the article is satisfactory or not.
The agreement between the parties was in writing; and, as a general rule, where parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking, was reduced to writing; and all oral testimony of a previous colloquium between the parties, or of conversations or declarations at the time when it was completed, or afterwards,— as it would tend, in many instances, to substitute a new and dif
The judgment is reserved and a venire facias de novo awarded.