19 N.Y.S. 749 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
In March, 1890, judgments in favor of a large number of people were entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of Hew York against Louis Bosenberg and Ismar Baker, and at the same time?
It is claimed upon the part of the appellant that the defendant, by his appointment as receiver of the assets and effects of Bosenberg & Baker, became entitled to this fund, in the absence of any prior lien attaching thereto on behalf of the sheriff. This is undoubtedly true, and the only question involved' is whether a prior lien did not attach in favor of the sheriff by virtue of the execution held by him. The claim that no such lien did attach in favor of the sheriff is urged upon the ground that the only method by which the sheriff, acting under an execution, can acquire a lien upon or interest in the judgment debtor’s equity in property pledged to a third person as security for money advanced, is that pointed out in section 1412 of the Code. What that section has to do with the question of lien it is impossible for us to imagine. It relates entirely to the method in which a sale may be had of the interest of the judgment debtor in personal property lawfully pledged. Section 1405 of the Code seems to dispose of the whole question, it appearing that the goods and chattels of a judgment debtor not exempt by express provision of law from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, and his other personal property which is expressly declared by law to be subject to levy by virtue of an execution, are, when situated within the jurisdiction of the officer to whom an execution against property is delivered, bound by the execution from the time of the delivery thereof to the proper officer to be executed, but not before.' Therefore the interest of the pledgor in the goods in the hands of Wilmerding, Morris & Mitchell became bound by the executions the moment that they came into the hands of the sheriff, without any levy being made. If Wilmerding, Morris & Mitchell sold the goods, and there was a surplus in their hands belonging to the judgment debtor, the executions attached to this surplus in precisely the same manner, and therefore the sheriff was entitled to take it under the executions as so much money. It is difficult to see how, by the appointment of a receiver in aid of an execution, the lien of a prior execution upon the property of the judgment debtor can be overruled. Certainly such