34 W. Va. 17 | W. Va. | 1890
On tlie 9tli day of August, 1856, one Joseph Shuttle-worth, who was a resident of the county of Monongalia, and the owner of considerable real estate and personal property located therein, and had a family consisting of seven daughters and two sons, made a deed to his two sons, Jesse Slmttleworth and Samuel T. Shuttleworth, for three tracts of land, containing in the aggregate three hundred
On the 19th day of October, 1886, the said widow of Joseph Shuttleworth having departed this life, Louisa Shuttleworth, being the only daughter of said Joseph remaining unmarried, filed her bill in this cause against said Jesse and Samuel Shuttleworth, in which she alleged, that by reason of the clause aforesaid in said deed of Joseph Shuttleworth to said defendants she was entitled to remain upon said land, and have a home thereon, for so long as she should live and remain single and unmarried ; and that the true and proper construction of said clause
The defendant, Samuel T. Shuttleworth, appeared at rules and filed his demurrer and answer to the plaintiff’s bill; and afterwards Jesse Shuttleworth also filed his answer to the plaintiff's bill. Several depositions were taken in the cause, and on the 17th day of June, 1887, a decree
At the next term of said court, it appearing that said defendants had declined and refused to furnish the plaintiff an}'' support in accordance with the above-mentioned decree, the court appointed commissioners to go upon the land, and lay off by metes and bounds, and assign to said plaintiff, so much thereof as would, in their judgment, be sufficient for the reasonable and comfortable support of the plaintiff during her natural life, or so long as she should remain unmarried; and, said commissioners having at a subsequent term made a report of the partition made by them, exceptions were indorsed thereon by the defendants, and subsequently the said court overruled said exceptions, and confirmed the report of said commissioners, which partitioned and assigned to plaintiff forty eight acres of said lands, including the mansion-house, during her lifetime, or so long as she should remain unmarried — from which decrees the defendants applied for and obtained an appeal to this Court.
The action of the court below in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill presents for our consideration the question whether said plaintiff by her bill has shown her
Now the question is whether the plaintiff was entitled to anything more under said clause in said deed, which is made part of her bill, than she admits she already had and enjoyed, to wit: “She was remaining upon said land, and had a home thereon,” occupying her father’s mansion-house. Did a proper construction of said clause in said deed entitle her to demand and obtain more than she already had? The contention of the plaintiff* is that the language used in said deed would entitle her not only to a residence on said land, but also to a comfortable support and maintenance out of said land.
That such was not the intention of the grantor in said deed is apparent from the fact that the possession of said lands was given to said defendants, by the terms of said deed, on the death of their father and mother, only reserving the right to any unmarried daughter or daughters of the grantor to remain upon said land, and have a home thereon. The absolute fee simple with covenants of general warranty was conferred on the grantees by said deed, subject only to the life-estate of the grantor and his wife, and the right reserved to any unmarried daughter or daughters to remain and have a home thereon, while they ‘remained single. The consideration to be paid by the grantees appears on the face of said deed to be love and
If the other six daughters had remained single, they would have been entitled to precisely the same, under the provisions of said deed, that the plaintiff in this case would be entitled to, and if they were all allowed what the plaintiff claims, and what the court seems to have awarded her, they would have been allowed three hundred and thirty six acres out of the three hundred and sixty seven deeded to defendants, to use and occupy during their lives, if they remained single so long, and the grantees in said deed would have had but thirty one acres left to divide between them.
A party, however, may be entitled to a home on a tract of land, and not be entitled to a support and maintenance out of the land, or may be entitled to a support and maintenance from a farm or tract of land, and have no right or claim to a home on the same. The expression “have a home on said land,” as used in this deed, to my mind does not include the right to support and maintenance therefrom. In the case of Snodgrass v. Wolf, 11 W. Va. 158, this Court held, that in construing a deed “ words and expressions of common use are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary significations, unless a contrary intention clearly appears from the context;” and in Washburn on Neal Property (vol. 3, p. 350)
The court below therefore erred in over-ruling, the demurrer filed by the defendants and in decreeing the plaintiff the relief prayed for; and, for the reasons hereinbefore indicated, the decrees complained of must be reversed, and this Court proceed ing to render such decree, as should have been rendered by the court below, it is ordered that the defendent’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill be sustained, and the plaintiff’s bill be dismissed; and the plaintiff'must pay the costs of this appeal and the costs in the Circuit Court.
Reversed. Dismissed.