11 Colo. App. 432 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1898
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
The verdict and judgment in favor of the city might perhaps be upheld if the parties to this litigation had undertaken to proceed under the statute to obtain a reference to determine the disputed questions of fact, or if they had attempted to enter into a common-law or statutory arbitration to reach the same result. So far as we are able to gather from the record what the parties did neither resulted in a reference nor in an arbitration. The proceeding was one wholly foreign to the statute and unlike most cases where the parties have attempted to settle their disputes through the labors of arbitrators. It might also be possible that the same end could be reached if the city was not wholly concluded by what its
Therein the authority of the city to make the improvement and its responsibility for the resulting damage was determined. The opinion was rendered at the April term, 1894. The present suit was tried and the proceedings which are attacked were taken after that decision was handed down, and we must presume that it was because of it that the city authorities concluded since it had been adjudged by the highest judicial tribunal of the state that the municipality must respond for damages sustained by contiguous property by reason of the construction of this improvement, that it was needless to litigate the question as to the city’s liability and the easiest and least expensive method for the determination of this question was a reference of the matter to persons who might be selected who should view the property and decide the controversy. At all events we are able to see in this case and in that opinion enough to lead us to the conclusion that this course was taken because thereby the liability of the cily was established. However the fact may he, it is enough for the purposes of this case to say that acting under sufficient authority, whether general or specific, the attorney representing the city in the suit pending in the district court, did make the stipulation contained in the statement of facts. As we read it the stipulation admits of but one construction, and this construction compels us to reverse the judgment. Under it the question of damages was referred to two men under the order of the court made in pursuance of it. They were not referees neither were they arbitrators either under statutory provisions or the common law. This however does not affect the finality of their decision, nor can it he held that their
We are quite of opinion that this element of consent found in the stipulation and in the giving of the instructions and the failure to except or object to any of them, or to except to the report, or to object to it when it was filed, determines all these matters against the city which eannot now be heard to complain. Farrington v. Hamblin, 12 Wend. 212; Yates v. Russell, 17 Johnson, 461; Harpending v. Munson et al., 91 N. Y. 650; Flatter v. McDermitt, 25 Ind. 326; Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 615.
It seems to be an almost universal principle from the very early times that wherever parties to an action consent to dispense with certain forms of procedure, or with the legal qualifications of the. tribunal selected to try it, or to refer the matter to a jury or to any persons by them selected to hear and determine, the proceedings will bind the consenting parties, and irregularities will not be available for the purpose of attacking the result. As Lord Coke puts it, in the case cited in the 17th Johnson, “ the consent of the parties shall alter the form and course of the law.” The agreement is regarded as entirely obligatory, and a change of convictions or a belief that the judgment is too large, the finding too great, or that it ought to have been the other way, are not matters which may be urged by the consenting party nor thereon is he permitted to base an attack on the judgment, the finding and report.
The city has built up a very elaborate argument on the proposition that the course of these commissioners was not according to the common law and did not follow the statutory course of arbitration. If we concede this, it does not entitle the city to a trial of the question whether or not there was damage, unless the report be first set aside. The city consented to the method, granted the authority, and must be
The judgment entered on the verdict of the jury will therefore be reversed and the cause sent back for a new trial in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring.
I agree with my brother judges in their conclusion that the judgment of the district court should be reversed. I cannot concur, however, in their views as to the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court whereby it was submitted to two commissioners to assess and determine the damages, if any, sustained by the premises of plaintiff, nor as to the force and effect of the report and findings of such commissioners.
Conceding it to be true as a general proposition, that it is within the general powers of an attorney at law to submit the suit of his client to arbitration or reference, it does not always necessarily follow that the official attorney of a municipal corporation is invested with such authority. It may be
“ The city attorney be and he is hereby authorized and instructed to have commissioners appointed by the court or judge in which such suits are pending, for the purpose of assessing or determining the damages sustained by such propérty, and for that purpose may by stipulation with plaintiffs, waiving right to jury or otherwise, procure in such or any such case order or orders of court for the appointment of such commissioners.”
This action was to recover damages on account of private property being damaged by the construction of a public improvement for public use. Article 2, section 15 of the constitution provides, “ That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascertained by a board of
I am not shaken in this conclusion by the fact that this proceeding or suit was not instituted nor prosecuted under the special provisions of the eminent domain act; that it was a suit begun by the party damaged, after the injuries had been suffered, and not by the city for the purpose of condemnation. It makes no difference in the principle. The constitution does not restrict the method provided for the ascertainment of such damages to any particular form of action, nor does the statute. The constitution also provides that where property is sought to be taken for a public use, the proprietary rights of the owner therein shall not be divested until the compensation shall be paid to him, or into court for his use. Such provision, however, does not extend to the damage of property for public use. In such case, it would in many instances be manifestly impossible to determine the damage until after the contemplated improvement had been constructed, and the alleged injuries inflicted. Denver & S. F. R. Co. v. Domke, 11 Colo. 255. In such case, the suit would usually be begun by the injured party, and that fact should not defeat the method prescribed by law for the ascertainment of the damages in such cases. It seems to me that the same constitutional and statutory provision should apply whether the proceeding was inaugurated by the party claiming to have suffered damage, or by the party seeking to enforce its right of eminent domain.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the action of the trial court in submitting to two commissioners the question of the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff in the manner in which it did, was irregular and wholly unauthorized, as was also the procedure therein, and that the report of the commissioners should have no legal or binding force or effect whatever.