278 A.2d 116 | D.C. | 1971
Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of possessing narcotics in violation of D.C. Code 1967, § 33-402.
Originally, appellant had been charged with possession of the implements of a crime as well as with possession of narcot
Shortly after the plea was entered, the Supreme Court decided several cases concerning the effect of guilty pleas in post-conviction hearings.
“That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant’s lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing.” McMann v. Richardson, supra at 770, 90 S.Ct. at 1448. Absent any showing that appellant was induced to plead guilty solely because of advice given by counsel that an appeal would lie to review the denial of the motion to suppress, we hold that there was no “manifest injustice” and therefore it was not error to deny the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the judge who originally accepted the guilty plea failed to comply with GS Crim. Rule 11 (see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed.2d 418 (1969)), nor that the plea was not made intelligently or voluntarily.
Affirmed.
. Appellant was sentenced to 90 days, which sentence has already been served.
. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).