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Shugart v. State
32 S.W.3d 355
Tex. App.
2000
Check Treatment

*1 (cit 544, (Tex.Crim.App.1991) Arsdall, 673, v. 475 U.S. ing Delaware Van 1438, 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. McDaniel, 181;

(1986)); Kes 3 S.W.3d at (Tex. 290, 293

terson pet.). Bearing

App.—Dallas mind, to review the

assumption in we are (1) in five factors:

error connection with testimony importance of the witness’ (2) case; whether the

the State’s (3) cumulative; presence or ab corroborating or contra

sence of evidence

dicting of the witness (4) points; of cross-

material the extent (5) permitted; otherwise

examination strength

the overall of the State’s case. Finally, light assumption

Id. factors, connection to the five

the error’s harm

we are to determine the error was Id.; Tex. beyond

less a reasonable doubt.

R.App. 44.2(a). P. assuming

Even that the cross-examina-

tion of Nellie would establish that Loredo falsely abusing

had been accused of his I

youngest daughter, beyond would find

reasonable doubt that the error exclud-

ing did contribute to this evidence punishment.

Loredo’s conviction or Id.

Thus, I would find the error harmless. I there was

Because would find

error, harmless, I but that was concur judgment.

the court’s SHUGART, Appellant,

Shawn Texas, Appellee. STATE

No. 10-98-206-CR. Texas, Appeals

Court of

Waco. 25, 2000.

Oct. *3 Reaves, West, appellant. M.

Walter Unit, Debottis, Special Gina M. Pros. Huntsville, appellee. *4 DAVIS,

Before Chief Justice Justice VANCE, and Justice GRAY. OPINION VANCE, Justice. charged with two Shugart

Shawn deadly with a aggravated counts of assault of a weapon possession and one count of See deadly weapon penal a institution. (Vernon 22.02, §§ 46.10 Ann. Tex.Pen.Code 1994). jury, a which The case was tried to one, finding of count a finding made no two, a guilty” “guilty” “not on count and did not finding Shugart on count three. punishment. jury elect to have the assess years’ him ten The Court sentenced imprisonment. asserting four appeals, He two claims issues for review. His first legally and fac- assert that the evidence is a tually insufficient to sustain verdict penal possession deadly weapon of a a shows that institution because the evidence superficial, there injuries inflicted were conduct were no threats or other assertive and weapon, of the accompanying the use weapon testimony that the there was no inflicting purpose of designed for the third bodily injury or death. His serious the court and fourth issues assert testimony concerning in excluding erred by Shugart the contents of a letter written an instruction by refusing and to submit af- will necessity. on the defense of We firm judgment.

FACTS relationship with Shugart maintained a co-inmate, inWhile Reynaldo Delarosa. obviously weak as to guilt is so room,” approached proof Dela- “day deter jury’s in the rosa, erupted. confidence argument and an Delarosa undermine although mination, proof guilt, him away, Shugart approached but walked alone, out greatly slapped him. then taken again adequate and weap- by contrary proof. Johnson weighed with a homemade stabbed Delarosa 1, (Tex.Crim.App.2000) as a metal was described on. rod, length, inches in approximately (citing four Mata (Vance, pet.) point (Tex.App. on one end with a

sharpened to —Waco An- our re J., concurring)). performing around the other end. wrapped cloth When Sessions, inmate, view, the fact Ricky attempted to due deference to give other we intervene, him and weight struck with finder’s assessment weapon as well. Delarosa and Ses- of the evidence. Id. at 13. We credibility injuries. factually treated for minor insufficient sions were both will find the evidence chest, injuries to his necessary prevent Delarosa’s were manifest only where ear injuries were to his and injustice. Sessions’ Although injuries were not life

chest. threatening, the nurses who treated Ses- Application Standards and Delarosa testified that such sions *5 “deadly charge defined The court’s injury. bodily weapon could cause serious for “anything adapted made or weapon” as inflicting death or serious purpose the OF THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY its or that the manner of bodily injury, issues, Shugart asserts In his first two capable causing use is use or intended legally factually the evidence is bodily injury.” death or serious Serious weapon insufficient establish the injury bodily injury bodily was defined as possessed “deadly weapon,” was a where death or that “creates a substantial risk of weapon there is no evidence the was de- death, dis- permanent serious causes signed bodily to inflict death or serious the im- protracted loss or figurement, injury, injuries the actually inflicted bodily any pairment of the function were serious. organ.” member or Legal Sufficiency Standard Legally The Evidence is Sufficient determining In whether the evi legally support sufficient to the dence is weapon argues that his verdict, light we view the evidence in the and so could was intended for self-defense verdict, asking most favorable to the designed to inflict seri “manifestly” not be whether rational trier of fact could a matter bodily injury ous as of law. Tex. (Vernon have found the essential elements of the 1.07(a)(17)(A) § Pen.Code Ann. beyond crime a reasonable Weight 1994). doubt. However, (A), its by “[s]ubsection State, (Tex. 621, man v. 975 624 S.W.2d deadly weapon clear describes a language, State, Crim.App.1998); Lane v. 933 S.W.2d by characteristics.” McCain physical its 504, (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 507 (citing (Tex.Crim. Jack 497, State, 502 v. 22 S.W.3d 307, 318-19, Virginia, son v. 99 reason, 443 U.S. the Court of App.2000). For this 2788-89, 2781, S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 560 rejected theory the Appeals Criminal has State, 590, (1979)); deadly weapon object can be that an Westfall ref'd). 1998, (Tex.App. pet. 595 for reasons other under subsection this —Waco Id. Be characteristics. physical than its Sufficiency Factual Standard characteristics of physical it is the cause object the determination an which control conducting a factual-sufficien (A), motivation be review, the whether a subsection cy we must ask neutral ie., object, whether evidence, hind the of an of all both for and creation review the in- person weapon created the against finding, demonstrates that the the who the deploy offensively tends to it “shank,” or defensive- the term commonly used to de ly to inflict bodily death or serious injury, stabbing scribe “homemade devices” used does not control the classification of State, the weapons in prison. Berry See object deadly weapon. as a id. An See (Tex.App.—Waco object manifestly designed, which is made pet.). Viewing light it in the most adapted purpose inflicting for the verdict, we find the evi favorable bodily injury death or serious in self-de- justify finding legally dence sufficient deadly weapon fense is a under subsection “manifestly designed, that the device (A). claim Shugart’s intended that items made, purpose of inflict adapted for the deadly weapons self-defense cannot be bodily injury.” ing death or serious rejected has been the Court of Criminal Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620. Appeals and does not establish a basis that, suggests if there is even finding the evidence legally insufficient. weapon evidence that was made or Shugart also asserts that because adapted to bodily injury, cause serious not, fact, weapon did inflict death or fact that it could injury not cause such bodily injury, imperative serious it was finding should bar a it a deadly capability that the State establish However, previously, weapon. as stated it bodily injury to cause serious object verify necessary is not or that in a man displayed it was or used death, capable causing either really showing ner an intent to use to cause or in the the manner of its actual use injury. death or He cites bodily serious manner of its intended use. Id. (Tex. Garza v. 695 S.W.2d 726 Delarosa, The nurse who treated App.—Dallas, 1985), aff'd, 725 Winters, weap Shannon testified that However, (Tex.Crim.App.1987). in Thom injury to possibly on could cause serious as v. Appeals Court of Criminal *6 ear, eye if the and could cause death established that may prove the State that penetrate used to the arteries in the neck. object an is a deadly weapon “by adducing Hawkins, Katy the nurse who treated Ses was, fact, sufficient evidence that it in Krischke, sions, similarly. testified Carl made, adapted for ‘manifestly designed, responded when guards one of the who inflicting death or serious purpose the Sessions, and attacked Delarosa Shugart ade injury[.]’ If the evidence is bodily serious seen inmates that he had testified quate sufficient purpose, for such then is like the one Shu- ly injured weapons with object weapon. to deadly establish the as a Shugart’s and that he believed gart had proof No required.” other is Thomas bodily weapon have caused serious could (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). injury. fight in the most favorable Viewed specifically, More the Court states verdict, legally is suffi the evidence necessary verify that “it not to that the is weapon that the support finding to cient death, object really capable causing was was, or intended in the manner of its use either in the manner of its actual use or use, death or serious capable causing the manner of its intended use.” Id. injury. bodily Ann. Tex.Pen.Code Here, the evidence establishes 1.07(a)(17)(B). § through testimony of Eunice the officers Cole, Buster, Brian that and Carl Krischke Factually The Evidence is Sufficient by Shugart the device used was a metal rod, sharp Shugart advances two theories ice-pick type weapon,” “like an factually a cloth establish that the evidence was point ened to a on one end with support deadly-weapon insufficient to wrapped around the other end use as First, the evi Shugart asserts speculated that the metal element. handle. Cole weapon implying that the was de spring sort of out dence originally rod was some outweighs the only for self-defense signed invokes description of a This night light. it” when he was first “manifestly” that he “didn’t feel showing it was de- evidence statement, bodily injury. As indi- Shugart inflict serious In his signed stabbed. above, whether creation established we not intend to kill Delaro- cated that he did by a weapon desire of the was motivated sa, get his “attention.” only but wanted the focus of the for self-defense is not not Delarosa testified he did also tending to and estab- inquiry, hurt him. think that intended to this motivation could overwhelm lish injuries were in the chest. to Delarosa physical charac- showing the evidence However, evidence, de- was other there object. of the teristics Tex.Pen.Code Ann. above, indicated that the tailed which both McCain, 1.07(a)(17)(A); § S.W.3d at bodily injury, serious weapon could cause 502. injury likely it was to cause such most that the evi Shugart also claims ears, against eyes, used the victim’s factually is insufficient show that dence neck, had and that other inmates been weapon object deadly was a seriously injured by weapons similar “like” (B) inju because “based subsection the one used. Given that inflicted, statement and [Shugart]’s ries head, specifically targeted Sessions’ which finding testimony, Delarosa’s ears, neck, jury and eyes, includes the weapon indicating was used in a manner justified finding that he used his bodily injury an intent to cause serious capa- in which it a manner great preponder against weight bodily injury. of causing ble serious However, ance of the evidence.” “[t]he provision’s plain language does not require reasons, reject we must Shu- For these actually the actor intend death or that the evidence is factu- gart’s assertions bodily object serious an is a injury; deadly Johnson, at ally insufficient. weapon if the a use actor intends Shugart’s issues one two are with- object capable in which it would be out merit. death causing bodily injury. or serious placement ‘capable’ the word in the provision enables statute to cover con EVIDENCE EXCLUDED force, duct that deadly threatens even if Shugart complains his third issue that actually the actor has intention of using *7 McNeill, Terry a friend with whom Shu- McCain, deadly force.” 22 S.W.3d at 503. prison, gart corresponded from was not Thus, Shugart’s that argument the evi to to the testify allowed as contents factually support dence is to a insufficient had him. Shugart several written to letters that he cause finding intended to death or The not to trial. brought letters were bodily misplaced.1 injury serious is attempted testify McNeill to that Moreover, the evidence is sufficient a expressed Delarosa fear of because support jury’s finding that Shugart he had from threatening letter received capable used the in a maimer Delarosa, the court sustained but causing bodily injury. serious The evi- objection testimony this was State’s injuries dence showed that to both hearsay. “threatening from letter” superficial; Delarosa Sessions were fact, Delarosa was admitted into Delarosa that he testified suffered from pain the assault and Sessions said evidence. 1997, 886, recognize argument pet Shugart's (Tex.App.

1. We S.W.2d is 892 —Waco State, supported by holding 810, a ref'd); line of cases that if the 874 814 Lockett v. S.W.2d injury, evidence does actual not show then 1994, ref’d). (Tex.App. pet. In our —Dallas be actor’s there must evidence of the intent to view, holdings do not survive McCain. these See, State, injury. e.g., Bailey cause 7 State, (Tex.Crim. 22 S.W.3d McCain v. 497 721, (Tex.App. Corpus S.W.3d 724 Christi — App.2000). 1999, State, pet. granted); Wade v. 951 362

Although 803(3) court did not rule on ments is found in Rule of the Rules objection the State’s that this was not the of Evidence: statements expressing the best of Shugart’s evidence statements con then-existing declarant’s state of mind are letter, tained in the the State nevertheless 803(3). admissible. Such statements urges position this appeal. on It is well are relevant where self-defense is an issue established that when a trial court’s ruling State, 927, the case. Buhl v. 960 S.W.2d on the admission of evidence is correct for ref'd). 1998, 932 (Tex.App. pet. —Waco reason, although wrong a or insuffi State, In Buhl v. we simple stated a cient given reason is admissibility, its comment that the defendant said he ruling was appeal. must be sustained on afraid of State, the victim would 42, See be admissible Sewell v. 629 S.W.2d 45 1982); Rule 803 (Tex.Crim.App. Op.] because his fear [Panel Miles v. would State, 790, appear 488 to be a (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d 792 statement of his then- 1972); State, Spann 128, 130 existing emotional condition. Id. at 933. (Tex.Crim.App.1969). appel type testimony This rule of This is the which Shu- late review applies also when the gart court attempted to elicit from McNeill. excludes evidence Buhl, which the defendant of we found that the sought defense fers into evidence. See Weatherred v. elicit explanation further of the reason for State, 323, 975 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.Crim.App. fear, ie., Buhl’s that it was caused 1998) (If the trial court’s decision to ex previously pulling gun victim’s on him. clude any theory evidence is correct on Id. We found that the court acted within case, applicable law including Rule its discretion to exclude this further testi- 403, sustained.); it will be Prys see also mony prove because was offered to (Tex.Crim. tash v. truth of a fact the declarant remembered App.1999); Smith v. believed, ie., pulled that the victim must, (Tex.Crim.App.1995). We Buhl, him in gun past. on Id. Unlike therefore, determine whether the evidence where the of the statement that .relevance properly was excluded under either theory. upon Buhl was afraid hinged the truthful- 1)

It Shugart’s contention that: ness his assertion that the victim had excluded testimony him, went to his of pulled gun state the relevance of and, mind ultimately, to the issue of self- Shugart’s fear on a dependent was letter 2) defense; and the best rule already from Delarosa which evi- apply does not type this of evidence. dence. testimony Because McNeill’s 803,1002.2 See Tex.R.Evid. would have been limited to the fact that Delarosa, expressed Shugart had fear of argument We first address the testimony his inadmissible as improperly the court excluded this hearsay. hearsay. which *8 attempted to elicit would be We next consider the State’s

considered hearsay under Rule of Evi argument that properly the evidence was exception dence 801 if no hearsay to the excludable on the of the best evi basis applies. rule An See id. 801. out-of-court Ap dence rule. The Court Criminal statement during prove offered trial to peals has considered the rationale behind truth of the matter asserted is inadmissi Englund the best rule. In ble unless the statement falls within one of State, the Court considered four reasons exceptions hearsay to the rule. Id. 801(d), why the hearsay exception 802. The which common-law best-evidence rule Shugart applicable claims is to his state- existed: referencing any

2. We authority assume that the State is The State failed to cite its in Rule of Evidence 1002 when it claims response to this issue. this evidence was the "best evidence.” whether to determine (1) entire record documents is often The nature of on slight a influence more than more error had words are “of that the exact such find that it at If we Id. the verdict. average importance, particularly than af- the error did, in- conclude that we must operative dispositive the case of way in such a rights fected the defendant’s slight variation ... where struments If we have new trial. Id. great require difference as to may of words mean the out- its effect on doubts about grave rights. come, find that the error we should (2) parol evidence—whether Secondary Id. Other- a new trial. require as to such to copies susceptible testimony or —is wise, error. disregard the we should The error. both human and mechanical therefore, rule, probability enhances the jury to hear wanted the Shugart accuracy. expressed had McNeill that from (3) promotes prevention rule The inmate. and another fear of Delarosa to parties fraud because it allows that Shu- based on a note That fear was any documents for defects examine note Delarosa. That from gart received alterations, to dampens any desire and states, in It into evidence. was admitted contents of color as to the full: documents, testimony is sub- since Fuck You Chavalon ject immediate corroboration. Me And Just Leve (4) may appearance original Alone Not I’m authenticity furnish information as to its Here No lacking in a significance may be Hope IMore handwriting, paper and copy, such as You Die Or the like. Real Sick Get 64, 67-68 Englund v. Big And I AGot (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The Rule was clear- Surprise For You3 apply attempts where ly intended to one duplicate rely use a or to on one’s recollec- the threat Thus, jury was aware of original tion rather than use an when about of the fear which was the basis impor- the document itself is language of Addi- would have testified. which McNeill requiring tant. None of these reasons Shugart’s tionally, Delarosa testified original of a document can be con- ex- testimony, Delarosa behalf. In his justify testi- strued to exclusion verbal the note jury that he wrote plained offer the mony require threatening with the intent of question Thus, evidence. exclusion letter itself into from which the Shugart. This is evidence improper. on this basis was likewise fear if it Shugart’s have inferred jury could theory. believed his self-defense exclusion of However, present at the time of those by Rule governed non-constitutional error 44.2(b). the incident testified Appellate Procedure Fowler during question. the incident (Tex.App.— aggressor 864-65 Delarosa, (Tex. they began 1997) approached He aff'd, 991 Waco away and then walked argue. Delarosa applying the test Crim.App.1999). 44.2(b), Eunice Cole. Shu- talking to Officer began Rule our “harmless error” under Delarosa, slapped up then went gart the error primary is what effect question *9 had, him, pulled out the homemade and then had, upon the reasonably may have it. Delarosa with weapon and stabbed at must view jury’s decision. Id. 865. We intervene, attempted to error, isolation, in relation to When Sessions not in but the light In of him as well. the stabbed Id. review proceeding. the entire We original. Spelling punctuation as in 3. and

364 evidence, plies this it is doubtful that McNeill’s Legislature “to all unless the offenses specifically could have had than a has more it from them.” excluded Spakes, 913 slight (emphasis influence on the Id. S.W.2d at 598 add verdict. Issue ed). At least two other appeals three is without merit. courts of

have addressed this issue and held that the necessity apply defense can to the offense NECESSITY possession of of a deadly weapon penal in a issue, In Shugart proposes his last State, institution. Gonzales v. 972 S.W.2d that the court in failing erred to submit an 877, 1998) (Tex.App. 879 rev’d —Texarkana necessity jury. instruction on He (Tex. grounds, on other 994 S.W.2d 170 asserts that there was Dela- Crim.App.1999); State, Rivera v. 948 rosa had threatened him and that he 365, (Tex.App. S.W.2d 370 —Beaumont safety, justifying feared his thus such 1997, pet.). join no Following Spakes, we an instruction. our sister courts and hold that the defense prosecution It is a defense to necessity may of be available for the of justified by otherwise criminal conduct is possession deadly weapon fense of of a in a 1) necessity if: reasonably penal the actor be institution. We now address wheth lieves that the conduct immediately is nec er the court should have instructed the 2) harm; essary to avoid on it. jury imminent the harm sought clearly to be avoided is great Shugart offered evidence that er than sought prevented the harm to be he was afraid of a Delarosa because of 3) violated; by the statute a legislative and note he received from him. con We must purpose justification to exclude the sider whether this evidence shows the plainly claimed for the conduct does not “desirability urgency avoiding and the of State, appear. 135, Rios v. 1 S.W.3d 137 clearly outweigh harm ... the harm ref'd) 1999, (Tex.App. Tyler pet. (citing — sought prevented by pro to be the law (Vernon 1994)). § 9.22 Ann. Tex.Pen.Code scribing the conduct....” Tex.Pen.Code 9.22(2). statute, necessity §

We first address whether the By Legis this Ann. may apply defense pos sought protect the offense of lature all and inmates session a deadly weapon penal employees present in the institution. State, Rios, January Appellant institution. In v. 1 at has Tyler S.W.3d not indeed, shown how safety, Court found that the defense not his own individual, safety any clearly one out available for this offense. It stated: weighs safety in of numerous other legislative purpose “[T]he of the statute is employees Institutional mates mutually exclusive with the ne defense of Division Department of the Texas of Crim cessity. ... possess To allow inmates to inal Justice. deadly weapons circumstances pose significant safety would threat Furthermore, to warrant order alike, prison personnel inmates and necessity, plea justification based on seriously would security undermine the specifically admit to the defendant must State, penal January institutions.” v. 811 State, the offense. Allen v. 971 S.W.2d 631, 1991, (Tex.App. Tyler S.W.2d 634 — 715, 720 (Tex.App. [14th Dist.] —Houston ref'd). However, pet. Tyler Court has 1998, State, pet.); no Auston v. since holding light reconsidered this of 141, (Tex.App. 145 [14th Dist.] —Houston opinion of Criminal Appeals Court 1994, pet.); Pentycuff (Tex. 597, Spakes S.W.2d 528-29 (Tex.App.—Waco Rios, Crim.App.1996). at See ref'd). pet. necessity instruction 137, n. 1. required unless there was evidence offense, Spakes, Ap- from the admitting Court Criminal accused peals necessity ap- claiming justification held that the defense and henceforth

365 First, the testimony must be evaluated. the because offense having committed 15,1996. Sec- August State, occurred altercation 902 Maldonado other facts. See already testimony had 1995, ond, following the (Tex.App. Paso S.W.2d —El Delarosa, the victim from the of- been elicited admit Shugart did not pet.). (also “Rosy”): as know merit. is without fense. Issue four threats making had been Q. y’all So of the no merit Having found hap- this before night the to each other the judgment. we affirm presented, issues you? hadn’t pened, concurring. GRAY Justice Yes, A. sir. fact, him a note and Q. you wrote In GRAY, Justice, concurring. this night him the before it to gave objected re- the The State you? didn’t happened, from contents of two letters garding the Yes, A. sir. on the basis that Terry McNeil you what has been Q. I to show want evidence” testimony violated the “best

the 1 or D-l Exhibit marked Defendant’s court hearsay. The trial rule and was recognize partic- you you and ask hearsay objection the expressly sustained ular document? appeal, the evidence. On and excluded Yes, sir. A. that exclusion was error. contends appeal, the reply Shugart’s issue document, particular Q. What is that argues that exclusion again State Mi-.Delarosa? theory correct. has either a threat. it’s like guess A. I tried —I the trial court his dis- shown that abused mad, you I him. was I tried to threaten excluding the evidence. cretion know. objection correct that could State is either docu- Q. particular Is this right. All proper ground for exclusion of

be handwriting? your ment in opinion majority Because the evidence. Yes, A. sir. erred, but the trial court determines that that it was harmless and affirms holds * * n conviction, respectfully I concur in the re- opinion. reasoning sult but not the of their wrong. I Q. me if read this Correct non.” Tell you, “Fuck says, It Shavnon OF REVIEW STANDARD means. Is non jury what Shavnon or exclusion of evidence Spanish The admission that a term? trial court’s sound is committed to the young- meaning like the A. It’s v. Alvara City discretion. Brownsville ster. (Tex.1995); do, 750, 758 See just All “And Q. Youngster. right. (Tex. 568, 574 Kelly v. I’m not here no more. me alone. leave standard, Crim.App.1992). Applying this I get got real sick and hope you I die or trial determine whether

we must that correct? surprise you.” Is biga of rea ruling was “within the zone court’s Yes, A. sir. disagreement.” sonable Rachal particular this Q. night before So (Tex.Crim.App.1996). place, you gave that took incident is that correct? Shugart; Shawn AND THE OFFER THE TESTIMONY Yes, sir. A. why trial court fully To understand testi- Now, specific we must review to allow Shu- did not err when he refused in the bill that was offered mony of McNeil testimony of the contents to introduce gart in- inmate, The offered exceptions. to another of letters written content, following: context, cluded well as the *11 Q. I you want to ask you this: Did Based on this state of the record there any type receive correspondence or are several observations that are notewor- letters from Shawn thy. that ex- Shugart prepared The dates the let- pressed any fears which he regard- had ters sent to McNeil are not established. ing some inmates? One of the letters referenced another doc- ument that testimony established had

A. Yes. been delivered to Shugart night before Q. you exactly Would tell the Court the altercation. The testimony does not what you remember about the letters? establish that either prepared letter was that, you And before you answer don’t prior August 1996 altercation. anymore, have the letters you? do Additionally, does not estab- A. No. anything lish more than Terry McNeil no Q. did say What the letters about longer had the hap- letters. What had any which might fears he have had pened to the letters or where the letters about inmates in TDC? were at the of trial was not shown time. A. I separate remember two things. require and would specu- the trial court to The first one I remember he he said late. feared two inmates and he had written someone, prison some official sys- BEST EVIDENCE tem or in prison. objection The “best prop- evidence” is a Q. you Do you know about when re- er basis for exclusion oral particular ceived that communication or prove the contents of the letters. Rule letter, Terry? provides prove “To the content of a Well, mean, A. I I really don’t know writing, recording, photograph, or for sure. original writing, recording, photograph or Q. inWas it 1996? required except provided as otherwise

A. It in August, approximately was these rules or law.” Tex.R.Evtd. August, give or take a week or two. Evidence of the of a contents document can be admitted if it meets one of the

Q. And did he mention names exceptions listed in Rule 1004 pro- which about who he was afraid of? vides: A. Rosy only is the name I remem- Admissibility Rule 1004. him of Other

ber mentioning. Evidence of Contents Well, Q. you any and did he send original required, other communication is not and other or letters that stat- particular writing, ed this the contents of a concerning or fear recording, photograph which had? is admissible he if: A. stating There was another one (a)

that he had received a saying letter All Originals Destroyed. Lost or —or note, whatever, Rosy stating from originals are lost have been de- he wished he was dead and he had a big stroyed, proponent unless the lost or surprise faith; and he took that as—that them in destroyed bad they was really after him. —he (b) Original Not Obtainable. No

Q. again, And do you know when he original can by any be obtained available particular got that letter? process procedure; judicial A. It -they weren’t—those two (c) Original No Outside the State. was— apart.. letters were not far Texas; original is located

Q. dates, you But far as can’t (d) Original Possession of Oppo- remember? original At an nent. a time when

A. exactly. party against Not the control of the “(2) offered, Secondary evidence—whether put on party whom *12 otherwise, susceptible notice, parol copies or by pleadings or —is and error. to both human mechanical subject content a of that the would be rule, therefore, proba- enhances The does hearing, party at proof and accuracy. bility of hearing; produce original not at the “(3) promotes prevention rule or The parties it to fraud allows the of because (e) writing, Collateral Matters. The any or documents for defects examine closely recording photograph is not alterations, to dampens any and it desire a controlling related to issue. of testimony as to the contents color Rule Tex.R.Evid. documents, any testimony is sub- since immediate Appeals ject The of Criminal has ex- to corroboration. Court plained “(4) the rational of the best evidence appearance original The of the They rule. have stated: au- to its may furnish information as significance may and be thenticity applicable; The best rule is evidence lacking copy, handwriting, in a such as if requires of a writ- the contents Weinstein, the like. M. paper and J. proved, ing are to be it must be Berger McLaughlin, & J. Weinstein’s possible, production, very of the writ- ¶ (1995). 1002[02] Evidence ing Ray, itself. B R. Evid., Tex.Law 946 Englund v. S.W.2d 67-68 (Texas 1563 Section Practice 3rd (Tex.Crim.App.1997). ed.1980). professed The of the purpose to production being documents rule attempted to Shugart appears have secure, hazards, the writing not at all original the absence account for of the (a). but the best of its obtainable evidence exception The ma- admission contents, if the document cannot as opinion testimony regard- holds the jority matter be practical produced, because of not ing the contents of the letter was destruction, loss, its from the or absence rea- prohibited by the common-law control, proponent’s majority opinion or the rule. court’s for the The sons production clearly of the is “The Rule intended original excused was concludes: apply attempts other evidence contents is re- where one to use its rely Ray, duplicate ceived. 3 R. or to on one’s recollection Evid., Tex.Law (Texas than use an when the lan- original Section 1571 Practice 3rd rather ed.1980). important. of the document is guage itself requiring of these reasons for None (Tex. Ortiz v. of a document can be construed original Crim.App.1983). testimony or justify exclusion of verbal also Appeals The Court Criminal has letter itself require that offer the explained the the rule reasons for which exactly That what the into evidence.” is developed They at sum- common-law. The requires. rule marized them follows: clearly implicates the second offers at least overlapping developed somewhat reasons “Four third reasons rule was justify a rule it could have been advanced to at this instance common-law. production original: preferring argued that the first and fourth also be applicable. reasons were “(1) The nature is often of documents majority opinion an that the exact are “of more The has elevated such words rule, de- importance, and used it to average particularly exception than language in- of the rule. operative dispositive stroy the case of the clear trial court majority opinion ... variation would have the slight struments where a has may opponent mean difference determine whether the great of words first excep- that the “collateral matters” rights.” shown not, applicable. tion If is the best- or believed unless it relates to the exe- cution, revocation, identification, proper ground evidence rule is not a terms of will. exceptions exclusion. The rule and its are declarant’s way. Upon proper built work the other objection applies propo- the rule unless the purpose of McNeil’s nent of the evidence establishes that the evidentiary argue to establish an basis to exception applicable. necessity that the awas for self- *13 only The trial court that erred he abused defense. The offered was his discretion in said he was afraid of Delarosa excluding the evidence. (“Rosy”) in There is no upon testimony, Based the the court could letters to McNeil. dispute that the of McNeil original have concluded the absence of the in being prove offered to that sufficiently had not been accounted for and they fact afraid of Delarosa. Thus were showing that the issue of his fear of Dela- out of court offered as evidence statements rosa was more than a collateral issue to his prove to the truth of the matter asserted. theory of having weapon for self defense. hearsay. The evidence is classic Of course not has shown that the trial court if it hearsay testimony quali- is admissible by abused his discretion determining exception fies as an to the rule which exception applicable. the is not of hear- requires otherwise the exclusion say. many exceptions. There are The HEARSAY party offering the hear- burden is on the hearsay objection The for a calls rela- excep- that an say statement to establish tively straight application forward applicable. tion is hearsay many excep- rule and one of its 803(3) Hearsay qualify exception tions. is defined as “... a state- To as an ment, If critical. by timing other than one made the declar- the of the statement is the alterca- ant while at the trial or the statement was made testifying hearing, before existing tion and was made as a then state prove offered evidence to of the truth n him”), 801(d). it of mind “I am afraid of (e.g. the matter asserted.” Tex.R.Evid. exception. would be as an admissible hearsay provides “Hearsay The rule However, if the was made statement except is not provided by admissible as after altercation, be an inad- the it would either statute or these or by rules other rules memory the condi- missible statement of prescribed pursuant statutory to authori- to the altercation prior tion that existed ty.” Shugart argues 802. Tex.R.Evid. him”) or would be (e.g. “I was afraid of to his statements the letters the alterca- after state of mind that existed exception McNeil were admissible as an to “I am (e.g. tion and therefore irrelevant hearsay argues the rule. He the him”). Only afraid of if the statement statements were admissible as a “state of altercation, prior fear-was made 803(3). exception.” mind Tex.R.Evid. would while under that fear operating then exceptions provides: Thus the statement be admissible. by not excluded following are timing, of specific as well as the wording, rule, hearsay though even the declarant of letters the statement made in the form (3) is as a witness: ... Then available analysis to McNeil are critical to Existing Mental, Emotional, Physi- admissibility. their cal Condition. A statement of the de- mind, record, it clear that existing upon then Based clarant’s state emotion, sensation, were made before physical condition whether the statements (such intent, motive, was not estab- plan, design, or after the altercation health), that the feeling, pain, bodily lished. At the evidence was mental best “approximately including memory but not statements were made statement prove August, or belief the fact or take a week or two.” give remembered could have period they when Thus July made extends from

been important More

September analysis, evidence does estab- in the letters were

lish that the statements prior to altercation.

made court

The trial was there able credibility the demeanor and

judge Shugart has not shown that the

witness. court abused his discretion exclud-

trial

ing the evidence.

NECESSITY majority the final

As the concludes *14 plea in order warrant a

paragraph,

justification necessity the based on defen-

dant must admit to the offense. admit the The trial

did not offense. court in- err to submit an refusing

did not majority necessity. opin-

struction on and purported holding

ion’s discussion necessity may

the defense of be available possession deadly

for the offense penal in a institution unneces- dicta, disposition

sary appeal, of this accordingly join I in that part do not opinion.

of the

OTHER ISSUES in the remaining parts

I concur

majority opinion expressly discussed

herein. Texas, Appellant, STATE SEPHUS, Appellee.

Julius

No. 10-98-338-CR. Texas, Appeals

Court

Waco.

Oct. 2000.

Dissenting of Justice Opinion Nov. 1,

Gray,

Case Details

Case Name: Shugart v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Oct 25, 2000
Citation: 32 S.W.3d 355
Docket Number: 10-98-206-CR
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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