3 Pa. Super. 448 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1897
Opinion by
The questions of law raised in this and the next succeeding case post p. 452, do not appear to have been decided by the Supreme Court of our state, at least not in the precise form in which they are now presented. The question in this case is, whether it is a defense to an action on a fire insurance policy to allege and prove that the building was burned by the insured while insane. The position of the defendant’s counsel is well stated in their own language thus: “ The law will read into every contract of fire insurance, an undertaking that the assured will observe the ordinary legal duty of good faith towards the insurer, and his neglect of that duty would be a tort founded upon contract. The legal duty which the insurance contract imposed upon the assured in this case was that he should not himself destroy by fire the property insured; for such destruction would be a wrong committed by himself upon the insurer.” If such a provision had been expressly included in the contract there would still be room for argument that the parties contemplated only an intentional destruction of the building by the insured. But while the insurance company was careful to specify in great detail the circumstances under which the policy should become void, and also the circumstances under which it should not be liable for loss, the destruction of the building by the insured was not one of them. Nor was it necessary to stipulate that the company should not be liable for the wilful destruction of the building by the insured. The parties are presumed to have contracted with reference to the principles of natural justice and well settled law, which forbid a man to avail himself of his own turpitude in a suit, or to contract for indemnity against his own fraud. The contract of fire insurance is a contract of
This doctrine is sustained by a long line of decisions, among which are our cases : Am. Ins. Co. v. Insley, 7 Pa. 223; Phœnix Fire Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 51 Pa. 143 ; Cumberland Valley Mutual Prot. Co. v. Douglas, 58 Pa. 419; Lebanon Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 106. Pa. 28. Stating the argument of the defendant’s counsel in a little different form it may be summarized thus : There is an implied undertaking on the part of the assured to observe good faith toward the insurer; for the insured to burn his own building is a breach of that duty, and a fraud upon the insurer; to permit him to recover for a loss occasioned by his own wrongful act would be in violation of an implied condition of the policy. The fallacy of this argument consists in assuming that what would be a fraudulent act if committed by a sane person is so in a person incapable of fraudulent intent and of resisting insane impulse. When an insane person burns his own building, what legal wrong does he commit? Certainly none for which he is punishable criminally, and none for whicli he is responsible civilly unless it be a breach of duty arising out of contract. But as well might you say that negligence of the insured is a breach of duty owed to the insurer as that an insane act is. No rule or principle of public policy forbids one to covenant for indemnity against loss by fire consequent upon either; and why a condition should be implied excepting one, and not the other, from the risk is not plain. The general rule is that
Much stress was laid in the argument on the law relative to the civil liability of insane persons for their torts. As will be shown in the next case post p. 452, a man may be held civilly liable for his torts although he may be criminally and morally irresponsible. But this liability arises out of considerations which deprive the legal principle of all applicability to the present question. The argument is based on the assumption that the act of burning the building was a wrong to the insurer. But this begs the whole question. It was not a wrong in law if
Judgment affirmed.