Shoutell Richardson v. Jackson Public School DistrictShoutell Richardson v. Jackson Public School District
LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Shoutell Richardson served as the principal of Van Winkle Elementary School in Hinds County.1 Richardson’s employment was terminated following her absences from work on approximately eighty-nine days for various reasons. Richardson requested a hearing before the school board, which upheld her termination. She subsequently petitioned for review in the Hinds County Chancery Court, additionally attempting to have that petition serve as a complaint alleging several federal causes of action. The chancery court was given
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Shoutell Richardson was employed by the Jackson Public School District (JPSD) as the principal of Van Winkle Elementary School. She suffered from a “seizure condition and related medical conditions,” none of which are documented or confirmed by any medical records in the record on appeal.2 This condition allegedly caused her to miss numerous days of work over the 2021-2022 school year.
¶3. On February 1, 2022, Richardson received “a formal letter of reprimand” stating that her “continuous absenteeism ha[d] become quite problematic,” and “improvement [wa]s needed with being present at work.” She was “demoted” from principal to a curriculum supervisory position on the same day. Richardson’s attendance did not improve. Her employment was terminated on June 1, 2022.
¶4. Over the course of the 2021-2022 school year, Richardson missed approximately eighty-nine days of work. The number of absences exceeded Richardson’s allotted Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) time and both her paid and unpaid leave time. Richardson
¶5. On October 26, 2022, Richardson filed a petition for review of her termination in the Hinds County Chancery Court and a formal complaint against JPSD. Richardson alleged breach of contract, FMLA interference and discrimination, and FMLA retaliation. Additionally, she alleged discrimination, retaliation under the Federal Rehabilitation Act (FRA), and a failure to accommodate.3 JPSD filed an answer to Richardson’s complaint on March 24, 2023.
¶6. On July 25, 2023, Richardson filed an amended complaint requesting a jury trial “on all issues so triable” and adding a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On January 12, 2024, JPSD filed a motion to strike Richardson’s amended complaint. The court denied the motion and accepted Richardson’s amended complaint. On September 23, 2024, JPSD filed a motion to dismiss Richardson’s amended complaint, reasoning it was “in substance[,] an improper attempt to file a complaint against JPS[D.]”
¶7. On June 3, 2025, JPSD filed an amended motion to dismiss, attaching Richardson’s
¶8. The chancellor entered an order dismissing Richardson’s amended complaint with prejudice on June 10, 2025. Of note, the record the chancery court reviewed did not include the transcript of or exhibits from Richardson’s hearing before the school board. Curiously, however, the chancellor’s order noted that “the stated reasons for Richardson’s termination are supported by substantial evidence adduced at the termination hearing[.]” (Emphasis added). The chancellor also recounted certain pieces of evidence allegedly presented to the school board. Again, none of this was in the record on appeal to the chancery court.
¶9. On June 17, 2025, Richardson appealed. She designated the record on appeal to the supreme court as “all clerk’s papers, trial transcripts and exhibits filed, taken or offered in this case.” JPSD filed its reply brief on November 14, 2025. On November 26, 2025, Richardson filed a motion to strike materials submitted by JPSD that were not part of the record on appeal. Specifically, those materials were record excerpts that “were never presented to the chancery court” and were “not in the record on appeal as designated by the parties under MRAP Rule 10.” Richardson contended that portions of JPSD’s brief should
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. Under
DISCUSSION
I. Record Deficiencies
¶11. First, we discuss the deficiencies in the record presented to both this Court and the chancery court. To do so, we must identify which procedural rules apply to appeals from an administrative agency (e.g., a school board) to a chancery court.
a. Relevant Rules
¶13. When a circuit court is sitting as an appellate court for cases decided in county court, the
¶14. In Fields v. City of Clarksdale, 27 So. 3d 464 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), Fields, a fire department captain, was terminated from his position by the city’s mayor and board of commissioners after allegations of insubordination arose against him. Id. at 465 (¶2). Fields appealed the decision to the proper authority, the Clarksdale Civil Service Commission, which upheld his termination. Id. at 465-66 (¶¶3-4). Then, Fields filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court (but did not pay the associated costs) and requested that the Commission provide the hearing transcript to the circuit court. Id. at 466 (¶5). The Commission informed him that he was to pay the costs of the transcript, and he filed a motion approximately two-and-a-half weeks later requesting that the city cover the costs instead. Id. The circuit court held a hearing and dismissed Fields’s appeal with prejudice, finding that he “waited too long to request the assistance of the court in securing a transcript[.]” Id.
¶16. As for chancery-court-specific appeals, our courts have previously held:
There is not a large body of detailed rules governing procedure when the chancery (or circuit) court sits in an appellate capacity reviewing an action of a state agency. Rather than adopt a lengthy set of rules for that situation, the Mississippi Supreme Court has said that the reviewing court may, when appropriate, refer to the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure for guidance.
Adams v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., 854 So. 2d 7, 9-10 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So. 2d 430, 432 (¶3) (Miss. 2000); Am. Investors Inc. v. King, 733 So. 2d 830, 832 (¶4) (Miss. 1999)). Like Fields, Richardson is similarly appealing an agency decision. In accordance with Adams, we find that this is an
b. Application
¶17. The record before the chancery court was wholly inadequate; admittedly, it is a mystery to this Court why both parties seemingly assented to move forward without requesting a court order to supplement the record before the chancery court when the deficiency was noticed.
The parties shall designate the content of the record pursuant to this rule, and the record shall consist of designated papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and in all cases a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court.
¶18. Even further, “[p]ursuant to
¶19. Returning to Fields, a process should have occurred, but it did not. In Fields, the terminated employee cited the following rule in support of his position:
An appeal may be dismissed upon motion of a party or on motion of the appropriate appellate court (i) when the court determines that there is an obvious failure to prosecute an appeal; or (ii) when a party fails to comply substantially with these rules. When either court, on its own motion or on motion of a party, determines that dismissal may be warranted under this Rule 2(a)(2), the clerk of the Supreme Court shall give written notice to the party in default, apprising the party of the nature of the deficiency. If the party in default fails to correct the deficiency within fourteen (14) days after notification, the appeal shall be dismissed by the clerk of the Supreme Court. The attorney for the party in default has the burden to correct promptly any deficiency or to see that the default is corrected by the appropriate official.
Fields, 27 So. 3d at 467 (¶8) (quoting
¶20. We find the same to be true in Richardson’s case. The record filed on appeal with the chancery court was not a complete record and, therefore, did not comply with the statutory requirements for a review in the chancery court. Neither party filed the transcript of the testimony before the school board or the exhibits. JPSD attached a few pages of the transcribed testimony before the school board to its response to Richardson’s motion to dismiss. That is not the record on appeal, and that is hardly sufficient for appellate review. Here, the chancery court should have noted the deficiencies in the record and acted in accordance with Fields, 27 So. 3d at 467 (¶8), and
¶21. As for this Court, we decline to address the merits of Richardson’s appeal at this stage with an incomplete record:
It is a well settled rule that this Court will only consider facts found within the trial record. This Court does not rely on assertions made in briefs, but only on facts preserved within a record certified by law[.] The record on appeal must show such portions of the record of the trial court as are necessary for a consideration of the questions presented[.] Therefore, before we can address the merits of an appeal, we must have a complete record of the evidence presented, the rulings made, and the basis for the trial court’s decision.
Home Sols. of Miss. LLC v. Ridge, 301 So. 3d 670, 676 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Pennington v. Dillard Supply Inc., 858 So. 2d 902, 903 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)). The lack of a complete record presented to the chancery court requires reversal and remand. On remand, the issue of the record on appeal should be addressed by the chancery court, which should inform Richardson of the record’s deficiency and permit her the opportunity to cure this deficiency.8 After the record is complete, the
II. Impermissible Causes of Action
¶22. As stated previously, Richardson combined her petition for appellate review in the chancery court with a litany of additional and legally separate causes of actions.9 Most of those claims were federal causes of action: FMLA interference, FMLA discrimination, FMLA retaliation, FRA failure to accommodate, FRA discrimination, FRA retaliation, ADA failure to accommodate, ADA discrimination, and ADA retaliation. Richardson also brought a breach of contract claim under Mississippi law.
¶23. “An[] employee aggrieved by a final decision of the school board is entitled to judicial review[.]”
An appeal may be taken by such employee to the chancery court of the judicial district in which the school district is located, by filing a petition with the clerk of that court and executing and filing bond payable to the school board with sufficient sureties, in the penalty of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), conditioned upon the payment of all of the costs of appeal, within twenty (20) days of the receipt of the final decision of the board.
The scope of review of the chancery court in such cases shall be limited to a review of the record made before the school board or hearing officer to
determine if the action of the school board is unlawful for the reason that it was:
- Not supported by any substantial evidence;
- Arbitrary or capricious; or
- In violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee.
¶24. In raising accompanying claims within her petition for appellate review, Richardson asserted that she was entitled to a jury trial and relief decided in the chancery court under the principle of pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction is invoked when a claim “arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the principal claim or, as others put it, out of a common nucleus of operative fact.” Re/Max Real Estate Partners Inc. v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709, 714 (¶27) (Miss. 2003) (quoting McDonald’s Corp. v. Robinson Indus. Inc., 592 So. 2d 927, 934 (Miss. 1991)). But in Lindsley, a chancery court had pendent jurisdiction “[b]ecause the chancery court ha[d] original jurisdiction” over “the pivotal claim by which the other claims will be measured and by which proper relief may be granted.” Id. Here, however, the chancery court had statutory appellate jurisdiction “limited to a review of the record” to “determine if the action of the school board [wa]s unlawful,” under three legal reasons. That appellate review is totally separate from the causes of action in Richardson’s operative complaint. A consideration of Richardson’s other federal claims would be well outside the chancery court’s explicit statutory scope of review in a school-board termination matter. Again, by statute, the chancery court is only permitted to a “limited” review the
¶25. Richardson’s inclusion of non-appellate claims shares some commonalities with the case of Falco Lime Inc. v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Vicksburg, 836 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 2002). Falco involved an appeal under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002), which stated, “Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors, or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may appeal” to the circuit court. Id. at 715-16 (¶16). The supreme court described the case as having a “hybrid quality,” as separate causes of action were incorporated within the appeal to circuit court. Id. at 720 (¶37). Ultimately, the supreme court held, “Where the circuit court finds before it a § 11-51-75 appeal that arises out of a common nucleus of operative fact with claims that would ordinarily be resolved by a trial de novo, the better procedure is to function first in its appellate capacity and hear the § 11-51-75 appeal based on the bill of exceptions, and then proceed to other claims (and the evidence related to them) only if the resolution of the appeal leaves them unresolved.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶26. But Falco is not exactly on point in this case. True, this case is an appeal with additional causes of action alleged just like Falco. But the statute discussed in Falco applies to cases being appealed to circuit court, not chancery court, and has since been amended.
¶27. It is important to note this Court is not deciding whether and to what extent the chancery court may or may not have jurisdiction as to each of the alleged federal court claims Richardson asserted in her direct appeal. This Court declines to address the merits of those claims at all because they are beyond the scope of review, and this Court is remanding due to an insufficient appellate review by the chancery court on an insufficient record on appeal. On remand, the chancery court can decide whether to dismiss or transfer those other causes of action and what effect, if any, the resolution of the appeal would have on them.10
III. Motion to Strike
¶28. Finally, we address Richardson’s motion to strike. In JPSD’s brief filed with this Court, “new” information was incorporated with its argument and by way of record excerpts. The record excerpts contained short, isolated exchanges from the transcript and exhibits not previously filed in the record on appeal in the chancery court.
¶29. The subject of “new” information on appeal has been discussed at length in our caselaw. The Mississippi Supreme Court has directed that “[b]eing an appellate court, we
¶30. Because we have no documentation showing that JPSD’s record excerpts were part of the record before the chancery court, this new information amounts to only assertions put forth in a brief in a response to a motion to strike and in the record excerpts. And “[a]n appellate court must decide each case by the facts shown in the record, not assertions in the brief.” In re Est. of Dabney, 69 So. 3d 71, 74 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Oakwood Homes Corp. v. Randall, 824 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (¶3) (Miss. 2002)).
¶31. Our position on Richardson’s motion can be best summarized by an excerpt from a case decided in 1929 by our supreme court:
The purpose of the record in an appellate court is to place before that court an exact reproduction, in so far as physically possible, of the material pleadings, proceedings, and evidence in the trial court, so that from the first or initial pleading, thence to and including the last judgment or decree made in the trial court, there may be officially exhibited to the appellate court everything, material to the appeal, that was before the court in the trial and which was considered and done, or which should have been considered and done by that court.
CONCLUSION
¶32. Richardson’s additional claims cannot be considered in the current action under “pendent jurisdiction.” Additionally, this Court grants Richardson’s motion to strike. Finally, under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, Richardson should have been informed of the deficiencies of her appeal and the record on appeal and given time to cure those deficiencies. The chancery court should have had the entire record from the school board hearing before performing its statutorily mandated review of the school board’s action. Therefore, the chancery court’s order is reversed, and this case is remanded to the chancery court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶33. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McCARTY, J. WILSON, P.J., AND McCARTY, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McDONALD, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶35. I write separately to clarify any suggestion by the majority that the chancery court, while exercising its limited appellate jurisdiction, has any legal authority, whether by statute or under Falco Lime Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg, 836 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 2002), to adjudicate the state and federal civil claims asserted by Richardson in her original and amended complaints. The chancery court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the Board’s action was unlawful because it was unsupported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, or violated a statutory or constitutional right. The statute does not transform the chancery court into a court of original jurisdiction for the adjudication of collateral state or federal law claims merely because those claims arise from the same
¶36. The statutory appeal process exists for a limited purpose: to provide judicial review of the governmental entity’s decision after completion of the administrative process. It is not a vehicle through which litigants may initiate independent causes of action or circumvent the procedural and jurisdictional requirements imposed by state and federal law.
¶37. I recognize that the majority opinion is “not deciding whether and to what extent the chancery court may or may not have jurisdiction as to each of the alleged state and federal claims Richardson asserted in her direct appeal.” I write simply to make clear that there is no circumstance in which the chancery court, acting solely pursuant to its statutory appellate authority under
¶38. Whether Richardson has fully exhausted her administrative remedies and satisfied all jurisdictional prerequisites for her state and federal claims is not before this Court. Assuming
¶39. Accordingly, while I fully agree that reversal and remand are required because of the incomplete record, I would further hold that the chancery court, acting pursuant to its limited statutory appellate jurisdiction under McCARTY, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.