85 Ct. Cl. 331 | Ct. Cl. | 1937
delivered the opinion of the court:
The Jurisdictional Act, under which this suit was instituted, was approved March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1349. It conferred jurisdiction upon this court, with right of appeal to the Supreme Court by either party, to hear, examine, adjudicate, and render judgment in any and all legal and equitable claims which the Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River Reservation in the State of Wyoming might have against the United States arising under or growing out of the Treaty of July 3,1868, or arising under or growing out of any subsequent treaty or agreement between said Shoshone Tribe and the United States or any subsequent act of Congress affecting the tribe which claims have not heretofore been determined and adjudicated upon their merits by this court or the Supreme Court. In section 3 it was provided that “In said suit the court shall also hear, examine, and adjudicate any claims which the United States may have against said tribe, but any payment, including gratuities which the United States may have made to said tribe, shall not operate as an estoppel but may be pleaded as an offset in such suit: Provided, however, That the United States may interpose to such suit or action any and all pleas of defense, affirmative and negative, legal and equitable,
The questions now involved in this case are (1) the value on March 19,1878, of the property rights of the plaintiff in and to one-half of a reservation of 2,343,540 acres of land, known as the Shoshone - or Wind River Reservation, in the State of Wyoming taken by the government on the date mentioned for the Northern Arapahoe Tribe of Indians; (2) the amount to be added to such value necessary to the award of just compensation.
The property taken by the government consisted of a one-half undivided interest in the entire reservation, or 1,171,770 acres. For this plaintiff contends for a value of $1.75 an acre, or $2,050,597.50 on March 19, 1878, and an additional amount as a part of just compensation at the rate of 7 percent per annum to date of payment. As further damages plaintiff contends for an allowance of 87y2 cents an acre to the remainder of the reservation on the ground that the Arapahoes were placed on and given the most valuable portion. From the total of these amounts plaintiff deducts the total allowable disbursements made by the government for the benefit of plaintiff tribe from 1878 to June 30, 1934, the date on ivhich the evidence of accounting between the government and the plaintiff tribe ended, and asks judgment for the balance, which it computes as $13,923,509.57, as follows:
Reasonable value of a one-half undivided interest_$2, 050', 597. 50
Damages to remaining one-half interest at 87% cents 1, 025, 298. 75
Additional amount measured by interest at 7 percent per annum- 12, 703,451. 51
Total of other amounts allowed by Court_ 100,395.49
15, 879, 743.25
Less offset- 1,956, 233. 68
Balance due to date of judgment. 13, 923, 509. 57
The nature of the Indian title has been discussed in many cases. In Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the court said, “* * * Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been considered in the government. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present right of possession.”
Again, in Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 746 (1835), it was said:
Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its conclusive enjoyment in their own w’ay and for their own purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals. * * *
* * * it is enough to consider it as a settled principle that their right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites.
In Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 244 (1872), the court held as follows:
Throughout, the Indians, as tribes or nations, have been considered as distinct, independent communities,*363 retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, subject to the conditions imposed by the discoverers of the continent, which excluded them from intercourse with any other government than that of the first discoverer of the particular section claimed. They could sell to the government of the discoverer, but they could not sell to any other governments or their subjects, as the government of the discoverer acquired, by virtue of their discovery, the exclusive preemption right to purchase, and the right to exclude the subjects of all other governments, and even their own, from acquiring title to the lands.
Enough has already been remarked to show that the lands conveyed to the United States by the treaty were held by the Cherokees under their original title, acquired by immemorial possession, commencing ages before the New World was known to civilized man. Unmistakably their title was absolute, subject only to the preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the successors of Great Britain, and the right also on their part as such successors of the discoverer to prohibit the sale of the land to any other governments or their subjects, and to exclude all other governments from any interference in their affairs.
In United States v. Cook, supra (1873), on which counsel for defendant rely, the controversy concerned the ownership ■of logs cut from the Oneida Indian Reservation in Wisconsin by a member of the tribe for the sole purpose of sale. In Bolding, as had always been held, and as was clearly stated in Holden v. Joy, supra, that the Indians in possession of a reservation had only a right of occupancy in the land, that the fee is in the United States, and that the Government had the power to manage the property and affairs of the tribe, the court decided that the members of the Oneida Tribe had no right to cut the timber on the land solely for the purpose of sale; that to do so was waste as in the case of the cutting of timber by a trespasser; and that the United States as the owner of the fee became the owner of the logs. In reaching its conclusion, the court said that “The right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as that of the United States to the fee.” Page 593. And further, that—
This right of use and occupancy by the Indians is unlimited. They may exercise it at their discretion. If the lands in a state of nature are not in a condition*364 for profitable use, they may be made so. If desired for the purposes of agriculture, they may. be cleared of their timber to such an extent as may be reasonable under the circumstances. The timber taken- off by the Indians in such clearing may be sold by them. . But to justify any cutting of the timber, except for use upon the premises, as timber or its product, it must be done in good faith for the improvement of the land. The improvement must be the principal thing, and the cutting of the timber the incident only. Any cutting beyond this would be waste and unauthorized.
The timber, while standing, is a part of the realty, and it can only be sold as the land could be. The land cannot be sold, by the Indians, and consequently the timber, until rightfully severed, cannot be. It can be rightfully severed for the purpose of improving the land, or the better adapting it to convenient occupation, but for no other purpose. When rightfully severed it is no longer a part of the land, and there is no restriction upon its sale. Its severance under such circumstances is, in effect, only a legitimate use of the land.
In that case two points were.decided: first, it was decided by analogy to the law relating to the respective rights of life-tenant and remainder-man, that the Indians have no right to cut the timber on an Indian reservation for the purpose of sale only; that to do so is waste, and that the title to timber so cut vests in the United States as the owner of the fee or “ultimate domain”; second, that the Indians have an exclusive right of use and occupancy of tmlimited duration, and the right to cut the standing timber during the whole period of such occupancy not only for use upon the premises but “for the purpose of improving the land or the better adapting it to convenient occupation”; also the right to sell all timber cut for the latter purpose. It is clear therefore that this decision did not hold that the government had the right to cut or dispose of the timber on Indian Reservations, or to sell Indian lands for its own use and benefit without accounting therefor to the Indian tribe. When a reservation is definitely set apart for an Indian tribe by treaty or statute, the Government has only the right and power to control and manage the property and affairs of the Indians in good faith for their betterment,
Power to control and manage the property and affairs of Indians in good faith for their betterment and welfare may be exerted in many ways and at times even in derogation of the provisions of a treaty. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 564, 565, 566. The power does not extend so far as to enable the Government “to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation * * *; for that ‘would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation.’ ” United States v. Creek Nation, supra, p. 110, 113; * * *.
Government counsel argue here that United States v. Cook, supra, decided that the interest of the Indians in the reservation lands and timber thereon is that of a life-tenant and no more. In that case the court did say that “What a tenant for life may do upon the lands of a remainder-man the Indians may do upon their reservations, but no more.” But in thus comparing the position of the Indian with that of a life-tenant for the purpose of stating what the Indians may or may not do on their reservations, we think the court did not intend definitely to hold that the interest of the Indians in the lands of their reservations is only that of a tenant for life. Such a holding would have been in conflict with the statement of the court after reviewing prior cases concerning the nature of Indian title, that the Indians have the right of use and occupancy of unlimited duration. We think also that the contention of counsel for defendant is inconsistent with the holding of the Supreme Court in the case at bar — that the power of the government to control and manage the property and affairs of the Indians in good faith for their betterment and welfare does not extend so far as to enable the government to give the land to others or to appropriate them to its own purposes.
The case of Leavenworth, et al. R. R. co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 742 (1875), arose under the Treaty of June 2, 1825, between the United States and the Osage Tribe of Indians; that treaty (7 Stat. 240) reserved for the occupancy
As long ago as in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, this court said that the Indians are acknowledged to have the unquestionable right to the lands they occupy, until it shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to the Government; and, recently, United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591, that right was declared to be as sacred as the title of the United States to the fee. * * * This perpetual right of ooeupanoy, with the correlative obligation of the Government to enforce it, negatives the idea that Congress, even in the absence of any positive stipulation to protect the Osages, intended to grant their lands to a railroad company, either absolutely or cum ■onere. For all praetioal purposes, they owned it; as the actual right of possession, the only thing they deemed of value, was secured to them by Treaty until they should elect to surrender it to the United States. In the free exercise of their choice, they might hold it forever; and whatever changed this condition, or interfered with it, violated the guaranties under which they had lived. [Italics ours.]
If a transfer by the United States would convey only the naked fee, it goes without saying that the comflete equitable froferty toas in the Indians. The earlier and fundamental decisions make this plain. In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 544, 545, Chief Justice Marshall clearly states that the right asserted in behalf of the discovering European nations was merely a right, as against each other, which he defines as “the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.” As late as 1872 the Supreme Court said: “Unmistakably their title was absolute, subject only to the preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the successors of Great Britain, and the right * * * to prohibit the sale of the land to any other governments or their subjects” (Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 244). [Italics ours.]
The position of counsel for the government is that this opinion of the Attorney General did not rule on the question of the Indians’ rights in the natural resources of their reservations, but only expressed an inclination, as shown by the statement that “If it were necessary here to decide as between these opposing views I should incline strongly to the latter.” This position is based, we think, on an erroneous interpretation of what the opposing views were to which the Attorney General referred. They were not whether in 1924 the Indian tribes had a mere right to use and occupancy or the equivalent of a fee-simple title to their reservation, but, as shown in the same paragraph of the opinion, they were whether the Indians’ interest in the natural resources of their reservations was bestowed upon them by the grace of Congress or whether it was a preexisting right. P. 180. On either theory, the Indians at the time in question were the beneficial owners of these resources, and the Attorney General so held. Inasmuch as either theory supported his conclusion it was not necessary, as he said, to
Again in an opinion relating to the rights in standing timber on lands of the White Mountain Apache Indian Reservation, a reservation created by Executive Order, which had been subsequently included in a forest reservation proclaimed by the President under authority of an act of Congress, the Attorney General, 29 Ops. A. G., 239, 244, said:
From the character of the legislation so passed in review,1 there can be little doubt that in the mind and policy of Congress this reservation was not only a valid reservation set apart for the occupancy and enjoyment of the various tribes which have inhabited it from the beginning, and subject to be allotted in part to the individual members composing them, but was also devoted to them in its entirety in such a sense that no part of it should be taken from them without their consent or giving something in return by way of compensation. And, of course, no distinction here is to be taken between the land and the timber growing upon it and, presumably, constituting its chief vdhie. (U. S. v. Cook, 19 Wall. 691.) [Italics ours.]
The decisions cited establish, first, that the Indians have the right of possession and absolute use and occupancy in perpetuity until voluntary abandonment, subject to the power of the United States to control and manage the property and affairs of the Indians for their betterment and welfare, and that the beneficial incidents of this right of perpetual possession and absolute use and occupancy consist of the net value of the land, including any timber or
Acts of Congress relating to the disposition of Indian lands likewise recognize, we think, that the beneficial interest in the lands of an Indian reservation, including standing timber, mineral deposits, etc., belongs to the Indians.
Prior to the Act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. 582, 590), numerous acts of Congress relating to Indian lands dealt with each tribe separately. Prior to 1811 the disposition of Indian lands was handled by treaties and agreements made with the Indians by the executive department of the government subject to ratification by Congress. An examination and study of many cession agreements, made at very early dates in the history of the relationship between the Indian tribes and the government, disclose that scant consideration was given by the commissioners, acting on behalf of the government, to the actual value of the possessions of the Indians. As was said by this court in Blackfeet Indians v. United States, 81 C. Cls. 101, 136, that—
Few, if any, Indian treaties disclose a bargain and sale of the Indians’ lands upon the strict commercial basis observed in ordinary transfers of landed property. For this reason the court is firmly convinced that an established value applicable in all cases is not available to the parties as a precedent. Too many factors varying with respect to the case to be adjudicated enter into the issue to warrant the court in sustaining a fixed value upon the theory that the sum claimed is the same sum fixed in some prior litigation.
In 1863 and 1891 Indian lands were sold at $1.25 and $2.50 an acre. Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians v. United States, 58 C. Cls. 302. The annual report of the Secretary of the Interior for 1879, Serial 1910, page 454,
Name Acres Amount
Cherokee- 80.07 100. 09
Sioux_ 12, 929.08 16,189. 34
Sac and Fox- 2, 398.15 8,140. 51
Ote and Hissouria_ 37, 777.20 73, 718. 05
Pawnee_ 30', 383. 66 40, 751.95
Osage ceded_ 15, 939. 00 112,114.98
Osage trust and diminished reserve- 205,709. 69 267,165. 22
Cherokee strip_ 30,400.73 38,001. 52
Winnebago- 40.00 120. 00
Shawnee absentee- 80. 00 200. 00
Total_ 335,737. 57 556, 501.66
The above tabulation, which embraces a large area of land in ten Indian reservations located in several states, shows an average sales price of approximately $1.65 an acre.
From 1871 many acts were passed by Congress dealing with reservation lands of various Indian tribes. The Act of February 6, 1871, 16 Stat. 404, sections 1-4, relating to the lands of the Stockbridge-Munsee Tribe of Indians in the State of Wisconsin, provided for an appraisement and the sale of a portion of their reservation, including timber, the net proceeds of such sales to be paid to or deposited to the credit of the Indians. No instance is cited where the government, through either the Executive or Legislative Departments, ever took a position or expressed a definite policy that the rights and interests of Indian tribes in and to reservations described and given to them by treaties, acts of Congress, or Executive Order were other than the rights and interest of a beneficial owner prior or subsequent to 1871. The established course of conduct has been that the Indians were entitled to all net proceeds from lands, timber, etc., not as a gratuity but as of right. In other words, the position of the government and the Indian tribes has ever been that the primary right of Indian tribes to the absolute and undisturbed use, occupancy, and possession of their reservations carried with it, as beneficial incidents, an interest in the lands, as such, and timber, etc., embraced within the reservation, and the right to have the net proceeds de
Without ascribing improper motives to the commissioners, the record at the very outset discloses an obvious and serious misconception of the Indians’ title to their lands, and the making of representations to the Indians, calculated to inspire fear, which had absolutely no basis in law or in fact.
Counsel for defendant also point to a statement in the former opinion of this court in the case at bar, 82 C. Cls. 23, where, in discussing the interest of Indian tribes in reserva
Most of the prior opinions in cases brought to recover the value of Indian lands appear to have proceeded, in the determination of the value of the property rights taken, on the principle that the value of the sole and absolute right of use and occupancy was the value of the land, without otherwise discussing the nature and extent of the Indian title or defining the beneficial incidents which attach to the primary right of absolute use and occupancy. Thus, in the case of The Ute Indians v. United States, 45 C. Cls. 440, the court, after referring to the provisions of section 3 of the Ute Agreement of June 15,1880 (21 Stat. 199), and quoting the Act of April 24,1820 (3 Stat. 566), which fixed the minimum price of public lands at $1.25 an acre, said, at pp. 462 and 463:
A similar question was involved in an appeal from this court to the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Blackfeather (155 U. S. 180; 28 C. Cl. 447). In commenting upon the obligation of the United States to expose the lands in question at public sale, Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
“In the absence of any proof of the actual value of these lands at this time, there would seem to be no method of estimation except by taking the price at which public lands were subject to be sold at private sale, namely, $1.25 per acre. Not only is there some presumption that the Government would not sell them for less than they were worth, but the very fact that at that time all public lands were subject to entry at $1.25 per acre would render it impossible to sell them at a greater price unless by reason of their peculiar location, abundant timber, or extraordinary fertility they were exceptionally valuable.” (Id. 191.) [Italics supplied.]
The average price at which the lands within the Ute reservation were sold between the date of the agreement (1880) and June 30, 1908, was $1.68 per acre. Presumably the choicest lands were selected by the purchasers. The forest reservations were set apart at*375 different dates between 1891 and 1905. While it is doubtless true that considerable of the land within these forest reservations is quite Avaluadle, on the other hand, the official reports show, and it is a fact so well known as to come within judicial notice, that considerable portions of them are valueless and can never be sold at any price.
In view, therefore, of the law and the facts as stated, we have found the value of the lands thus set apart in forest reservations to be $1.25 per acre, amounting to $3,835,323.75 [covering 3,199,258 acres].
The title of the government in Indian lands, which has been designated as the “naked fee”, is a sovereign title. The government has no landlord from whom it holds the “fee.”
The interpretation of defendant’s counsel of the Indians’ “right of absolute use and occupancy” is too restricted. “A treaty with Indians must be construed not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 11. The right of occupancy is the real ownership. It is the full title, or as much title, as, under our conception, any other than the sovereign usually holds. After the Treaty of July 3, 1868, the government had no real ownership of the Shoshone Reservation, but only the right to control and manage the property and affairs of the Shoshone Indians for their betterment and welfare, and a possibility of acquiring an ownership of the reservation lands. As held by the court in California 7 Oregon Land Co. v. Worden, 85 Fed. 94, 96 (1898), after discussing United States v. Cook, supra. “For all purposes, therefore, save only that of private sale, the Indians were in fact the owners of these lands. And this right, title, or interest has never been surrendered by them.” Although Indians are under the protection of the general government, and are, of necessity, kept as a separate, subordinate, and independent people, United States v. Lariviere, 93 U. S. 188, and though dependent political communities, with whom the United States may deal only through treaties or Acts of Congress, Indians are in a dependent condition which cannot be put off without the consent of the United States, Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94; nevertheless, it was held by the
The next question concerns the value of a one-half interest in the lands of plaintiff taken for the Arapahoe Tribe. The contentions of the parties with reference to the value of a one-half interest in plaintiff’s reservation taken for the Northern Arapahoe Indians in 1878 have already been stated. Upon the whole record and in the light of conditions existing in March 1878, when a one-half interest in the reservation was taken, we are of opinion that the value of the property rights of plaintiff in and to one-half of their reservation, taking into consideration the fact that the portion of the reservation on which the Arapahoe Indians was placed, namely, the eastern portion, from which the plaintiff tribe was thereafter excluded, and which has subsequently been allotted in severalty to the Arapahoe Indians, was $1,581,-889.50, or at the rate of $1.35 an acre for 1,171,770 acres, being one-half of the Indian Reservation of 2,343,540 acres. The greater portion of the lands embraced within this reservation was very fertile and unusually well adapted to farming by reason of an adequate supply of water well situated for the use of irrigation purposes. The reservation also
Net income has been steadily derived from various sources on the reservation, and for the period from 1885 to 1927 net proceeds totaling $1,628,744.56 were derived from the reservation and deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the plaintiff and the Arapahoe tribes of Indians. This amount does not include any portion of the amounts paid for lands ceded. In 1872 plaintiff tribe ceded 700,642 acres of their reservation from which private parties had, without the consent of the government or plaintiff, mined gold to the value of $500,000. The consideration offered by the government’s commissioner appointed to negotiate for the cession, and included in the cession agreement, was $27,500. This government commissioner drove a hard bargain with the Indians, and he so stated in returning the cession agreement to the government. Obviously the consideration paid was inadequate, but, as stated in the previous opinion in this case, the agreement having been made and ratified, and the consideration paid, the matter is not now before the court. In making that agreement no consideration was given to the value of the property rights of the Indians or to the value of the land. The transaction is obviously of no value in the determination of the value of the property rights of plaintiff in one-half of the entire reservation taken in March 1878. Cession agreements of this character, negotiated and brought about in the manner in which the one in 1872 was obtained, are not helpful in arriving at the net value of Indian lands, for in most, if not all, of such agreements negotiated and obtained at an early date the lands were secured for an amount which the Indians could be induced to take rather than for an amount based upon what their property rights were really worth. Iowa Tribe of Indians v. United States,
The established prices at which the Federal Government sold agricultural, timber, and mineral lands in 1878 ranged from $1.25 an acre for desert land, tillable only under irrigation, to $20 an acre for coal lands. The lands embraced within the Shoshone Reservation, by reason of their peculiar location, abundant supply of water for irrigation purposes, and timber, and their extraordinary fertility, were especially valuable. As found by the Secretary of the Interior in 1878, “No part of the reservation can be considered valueless for all purposes.” The facts concerning the character and location of the lands in question, their productiveness and capabilities, and their yield of profits to the Indians have been set forth in detail in the findings and need not be repeated here.
Prior to the controlling date in this case, a trusted representative of the government in its dealings with Indian tribes, with many years experience, and fully familiar with the reservations set apart for Indian tribes, reported'that the Shoshone Indians “are rich in valuable land”, and further stated, “I have visited many other reservations, but I have found none that excels or even equals the land in Big Wind, Little Wind, and Popo Agie Valleys.” He also described the lands embraced within this reservation as “the finest grazing west of the Missouri.” In arriving at the value on March 19, 1878, of the property rights of plaintiff tribe, which were taken on that date by the government for the Northern Arapahoe Tribe, we have taken into consideration and given due weight to the fact that the eastern portion of the reservation on which the Arapahoe Tribe was placed was the choicest portion and more valuable than the other farming and grazing lands of the reservation, and these lands were subsequently allotted to the Arapahoe Indians. The facts of record clearly support the net value of $1,581,889.50 for a
In addition to this value, plaintiff’s damages include an additional amount beyond the value of its property rights when taken by the government, which is necessary to the award of just compensation. The parties agree that such additional amount should be measured by interest at a reasonable rate on the value of the property rights taken in 1878 to the date of payment and from the total amount determined to be due at the date of judgment there should be deducted the total offset to which the government is held entitled. The government claims a total offset under its counterclaim of $2,141,070.75. In accordance with the findings and for the reasons therein stated, we have reduced the total of the defendant’s counterclaim to $1,956,233.68.
Plaintiff contends that the additional amount to be added to the value of the property in 1878 to make just compensation should be measured by interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum, which has been the statutory rate of interest in Wyoming since 1923. The statutory interest in that state was 12 percent prior to 1895 and 8 percent from that date until 1923.
The defendant insists upon the use of an interest rate of 5 percent, which we think, under all the circumstances, is reasonable and the rate that should be used in this case. Cf. United States v. Creek Nation, supra.
The field for investment by an Indian tribe was and is limited in the absence of an agreement to a deposit of the amount due the Indians in the Treasury of the United States and the payment thereon by the government of interest at the rate of 5 percent. The field for investment by citizens of funds received for property taken, and paid contemporaneously with the taking, is unlimited, and he is in a position and capable of taking full advantage of the local rate of interest. If, therefore, his money is not paid at the time of the taking, but later, the courts add to the value of his property at the time of taking an additional amount measured by interest, usually at 6 percent per annum, and, in some cases, a higher rate which he probably would have earned with his capital to the date of payment. We think a rate of 5 percent is reasonable between the parties here. The additional amount to which plaintiff is entitled to have added to the value of its property rights at the date of taking, computed as above to June 1, 1937, is $4,682,392.92. There is, therefore, due plaintiff on June 1, 1937, the total amount of $6,264,282.42 plus $100,395.49 (Finding 10), totaling $6,364,677.91.
Section 8 of the Act of March 3, 1927, under which this suit was brought, provides that the court shall hear, examine, and adjudicate any claims which the United States may have against plaintiff, that the government may plead as an offset against any amount determined to be due the tribe any payment made by the United States, including gratuities. The total payment, including gratuities made by the United States for the benefit of plaintiff, which we have
The legislation referred to was as follows: The general allotment act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, which was construed as validating (if there were any doubt) Indian reservations created by Executive order; and the Acts of February 20, 1893, 27 Stat. 469, and March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 894, providing that the net proceeds from the sale of parts of the White Mountain Apache Indian Reservation, including the proceeds from timber, coal, and mineral lands, shall be deposited in the Treasury for the use and benefit of the Indians occupying the Reservation.