277 P. 519 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1929
November 15, 1923, appellants signed the document set forth below and handed it, together with the $2,500 mentioned therein as a deposit, to respondent Evans-Ferguson Corporation (as agent for respondent California Trust Company), which thereupon executed an *652 acceptance of the offer contained therein. The document in question reads as follows:
"Wilshire-Fairfax Tract.
Evans-Ferguson Corporation W.H. Elwell Sole Agents Tract Manager 508-9-10 California Bank Building Office at Phones: 824-507 Wilshire Blvd. Metropolitan 2372 Fairfax Ave. Los Angeles, California. Phones: 56489.
"Los Angeles, California, 11-15, 1923.
"To California Trust Company.
"I hand you herewith my check for $2500.00 and request that you reserve for me that piece or parcel of land which it is proposed shall be known as lot 22 23 block 44, Tract No. 7555, and which tract is to be designated by you as Wilshire-Fairfax Tract.
"It is my understanding that the map of said tract has not yet been recorded, but that the same will be submitted for approval to the city of Los Angeles, and will be recorded as soon as approved by Evans-Ferguson Corporation and necessary officials and that you cannot sell or offer said land for sale in accordance with said maps until it is so recorded.
"It is my wish to purchase from you the lot aforesaid, provided the map or plat thereof is recorded. In the event that the map is recorded, I hereby offer to purchase the same from you upon the following terms, towit:
"Purchase price $25,000.00, payable as follows:
"$2500.00 now deposited with this reservation, to be applied on account of the cash payment, and the balance, $5833.33, on or before recording of map, $8333.34 on or before August 15, 1924, $8333.33 on or before May 15, 1925; all deferred payments to bear interest from date of this receipt at the rate of seven per cent per annum, payable quarterly, at 300 California Bank Building, Los Angeles, and all payments to be made to the California Trust Company.
"It is agreed that the purchase, if made, shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:
"(1) Subject to reservations, restrictions, conditions and/or easements, etc., over and upon said property.
"(2) The owner reserves the right to grade and improve said property in accordance with its plan of improvements *653 of the tract of which said property is a part, and either to remove soil from said lot or to place additional soil thereon.
"(3) The owner at its option to furnish either (a) a contract of sale on terms, or (b) a good and sufficient deed conveying the property to the buyer, together with a guarantee of title showing the record title to be free and clear from incumbrance except . . . and conditions, restrictions, rights-of-way and reservations as hereinbefore provided. In case a sale be made on terms, the buyer to execute (a) a trust deed and note in the usual form adopted by the owner, or (b) at the owner's option, a contract of sale in the usual form adopted by the owner, upon the complete satisfaction of which the owner shall furnish a deed and guarantee as above specified.
"I agree that there are no promises, verbal understandings or agreements except as in this application set forth, and that any contract or deed hereinafter executed by me for the above property will supersede and merge this receipt.
"The owner reserves the right to return the above money to the undersigned at any time before a contract of sale is signed by the undersigned and approved by the owners.
"ROBERT H. ORGAN, "JAMES H. SHORTELL, "Address 7026 Melrose Ave. "(Both married) Undivided half interest.
"The undersigned hereby accepts the deposit above mentioned, subject to all the conditions contained in the foregoing application.
"EVANS-FERGUSON CORPORATION, "By W.H. ELWELL.
"SHORTELL ORGAN J.D. WEST.
GHZ."
In March, 1924, appellants were at their request released from their "obligations" under this agreement and the deposit returned to them, less, however, the sum of $516.25, which was retained, over their protest, as accrued interest on deferred payments. The present action is for recovery of that amount. Respondents plead and the trial court found that appellants had agreed to pay the $516.25 for the privilege of being relieved from their obligation to purchase, and had accepted the return of the balance of the deposit ($1,983.72) and the release as an accord and satisfaction. *654
The grounds upon which the appellants base their contention that the judgment against them was erroneous and should be reversed are thus stated in their opening brief:
"There was no accord and satisfaction, for the reason that there was no honest dispute upon which, under the law, an accord and satisfaction can be predicated, because under the contract of deposit defendants, if they agreed to the rescission, or mutually rescinded, were not entitled to deduct any sums of money whatsoever, as interest or otherwise, for the reason that (a) the contract under which the deposit was made was void for want of mutuality in that the owner could cancel same at any time; (b) the voucher check which was cashed by the plaintiffs did not show an acceptance by them of a lesser amount in full satisfaction of the larger amount due under the contract, but showed clearly on its face that the lesser amount was being sent `less interest'; and (c) that the contract was void, because by statutes of 1907, page 290, the selling of lots by reference to an unrecorded map is prohibited, and the vendee may recover the money paid on such a contract."
[1] An accord is thus defined: "An accord is an agreement
to accept in extinguishment of an obligation something different from or less than that to which the person agreeing to accept is entitled." (Civ. Code, sec.
That an accord must be based upon a valid new consideration has been held repeatedly. (Deland v. Hiett,
[2] Release from or cancellation of an illegal or void contract can never be a valid consideration, since the party "released" has neither been accorded a right which he did not already possess nor excused from the performance of any act which he could have been compelled to perform. The principle is thus stated in Page on Contracts: "While the parties to a contract may make such terms and select such consideration as they choose, the consideration selected must be the forbearance or acquisition of some legal right. If they select something which is not a legal right, the acquisition or forbearance of it constitutes no consideration, though the parties may believe otherwise. . . . If the forbearance is of what the promisee has no legal right to do . . . no consideration exists" (sec. 301). "The promise must be such as to offer a legal right or the forbearance of a legal right to which the promissor would not otherwise have been entitled" (Id., sec. 302). "Modification or abandonment of an illegal contract by mutual agreement cannot be a lawful consideration for a new contract based on such original contract, even if there is some additional consideration" (Id., sec. 512).
This brings us to the question of the validity of the agreement of November 15, 1923. That it must be construed as an offer on the part of appellants to buy and on that of respondents to sell lots by reference to an unrecorded map seems too plain to require any extended discussion. We have here a document requesting the reservation for the signers of two lots described only by reference to an unrecorded map, and which they state they desire to purchase at a specified price and on terms which are fully set forth, including a down payment or deposit of $2,500. It provides the time and amount of deferred payments and for interest thereon from the date of the instrument, payable quarterly; it has all the earmarks of an offer to buy, which, upon its acceptance by the Evans-Ferguson Corporation, became an agreement of sale, conditional, it is true, upon the actual recording of the map, but nevertheless such an *656 agreement as comes clearly within the purview of section 8 of the statute relating to sales or offers of sale of lots by reference to unrecorded maps. The statement as to the understanding on the part of appellants that the map had not been recorded and that respondents could not "sell or offer for sale said land in accordance with said map until it is so recorded" may have been incorporated in the agreement in a vain attempt to take it out of the statute, but if so, the ostrich of invalidity has not succeeded in concealing itself by hiding its head in the sands of verbosity.
[3] The act above referred to requires the preparation and recording of maps of tracts laid out into lots for purpose of sale. Section 8 is as follows: "No person shall sell or offer for sale any lot or parcel of land, by reference to any map or plat, unless such map or plat has been made, certified, indorsed, acknowledged and filed in all respects as provided in this act, or was filed or recorded prior to the taking effect of this act and in accordance with the laws in force at the time it was so filed or recorded, and no person shall sell or offer for sale any lot or parcel of land by reference to any map or plat other than such recorded map or plat or true and correct copy thereof." The next section provides: "Every person who violates any of the provisions of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor . . ." (Stats. 1907, p. 290; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 4574.) It has been held repeatedly that an agreement violative of this statute is void. (King v. Johnson,
In Smith v. Bach,
The rule announced by both the supreme court and the district court of appeal was reaffirmed by the former in the very recent case of White v. Jacobs, supra. In that case the trial court had given judgment on the pleadings in an action wherein it was sought to recover a deposit made on a contract for the sale of lots by reference to unrecorded maps. Affirming this judgment, the court held: "This being so, and the sole defense of the said defendants to the third count or cause of action being the defense that the plaintiff knew at the time of entering into the agreement therein set forth that the map therein referred to was an unrecorded map, it follows that, if the defendants' averments in that regard constituted no defense, the trial court acted correctly in granting the motion of the plaintiff for a judgment against said defendants on the pleadings. In the case of Smith
v. Bach,
In Krause v. Marine Trust Savings Bank, supra, we find this language: "The purchase price of the lot, which was paid pursuant to this void executory contract, was therefore withoutconsideration, and hence was a proper claim for repayment inthis action for rescission." The statement just quoted would seem to conclusively answer respondents' contention that appellant may not be heard to claim rescission of a void and hence legally nonexistent contract.
[4] Respondents urge that "the parties having tried the case in the court below upon the theory that there had been a valid and existing contract between the parties, the appellants cannot on appeal be heard to advance the theory that no such contract existed." We have examined the authorities upon which they rely for support of this contention but find none of them in point in view of the state of the record in the case. The complaint alleged payment of the $2,500 deposit on the contract in question, which contract is set out in haec verba as an exhibit and by reference made a part of the pleading. It further alleges a mutual rescission, a return of a portion of the deposit and the refusal to return the balance. It was not necessary to allege that the contract was void. Its invalidity appeared upon its face, since it specifically stated that the map referred to therein had not been recorded. In Young v. Laguna Land etc.Co., supra, a similar contention was thus dealt with: "It is argued by appellants on this appeal that the invalidity of the contract by reason of the failure to record the map was not raised in the court below but that it was raised for the first time by respondent on this appeal. For this reason, it is argued, this court cannot consider the point. The question was raised by the plaintiffs in the amendment to their complaint, wherein they expressly alleged that the contract for the sale of this lot was made in reference to the map which was exhibited to the plaintiff Florence R. Young and which had been prepared for recordation at the date of said agreement but which was never recorded by said defendant at all. Thus, on the face of plaintiff's complaint, the contract was void and unenforceable." (Italics ours.)
[5] Appellants urge as another and distinct ground for their contention that the contract was void and hence *660
that there was a failure of consideration, the point that it was lacking in mutuality. This point, we think, is well taken. A brief analysis of the document in question demonstrates that it bound respondents to nothing. Under the last clause there is a reservation of the right in the owner of the property "to return the above money" at any time before a contract of sale is signed and approved by the owner, and the "acceptance" signed by the Evans-Ferguson Corporation is subject to this condition. As said in Stanton v. Singleton,
[6] The general rule is stated in 13 Corpus Juris, at page 337, supported by reference to a number of decisions, that where one party reserves the right of cancellation mutuality is absent. (See, also, Central Oil Co. v. Southern Refining Co.,
The case of Weber v. Hulbert,
[7] We are of the opinion that because the original agreement was void in law, and in addition thereto was entirely lacking in mutuality, there was no "obligation" on the part of appellants which could be extinguished, and no consideration for an agreement to accept something less than appellants were entitled to, and that as a matter of law *663
no accord and satisfaction was had. In expressing these views we are not unmindful of the rule laid down in Berger v. Lane,
In all of the cases which we have examined dealing with this subject it is to be noted that the legality and validity of the original agreement was unquestioned, the dispute settled by the accord being one as to the rights, duties and obligations of the parties thereunder. A dispute or contention as to the rights of parties under a valid legal contract, even though the contention of one of them be untenable or the result of a misconstruction of their agreement, may, under the rule laid down in such cases asBerger v. Lane, supra, be the proper subject of an accord. Where the original contract is void because contrary to express statutory law, an entirely different rule applies. In *664 Sierra Power Co. v. Universal Electric etc. Co., supra, at page 387 of 197 Cal. [
We are of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and it is so ordered.
Craig, Acting P.J., and Thompson (Ira F.), J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on May 31, 1929, and a petition by respondents to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on July 1, 1929.
All the Justices concurred. *665