60 Conn. App. 362 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2000
Opinion
The plaintiff, Jane Short, appeals from the decision of the workers’ compensation review board (board) affirming the workers’ compensation commissioner’s (commissioner) award in favor of her employer, the defendant Connecticut Bank & Trust Company (employer). The sole issue is whether the employer is entitled to a credit, known as a moratorium, against its obligation to pay future workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the net proceeds from the settlement of the plaintiffs third party personal injury action. The plaintiff asserts that the employer waived its right to a moratorium by its release agreement with the third party tortfeasors.
We are called upon to construe whether the release executed by the employer, Travelers, and the third party defendants was intended to waive the moratorium that
The inteipretation of these contract provisions is guided by well established principles of contract law. “A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Issler v. Issler, 250 Conn. 226, 235, 737 A.2d 383 (1999).
The plaintiff also asserts that because there was no agreement between the parties as to a moratorium, the commissioner improperly created an agreement to the effect that a moratorium existed. This claim fails for two reasons. First, the commissioner did not “make a contract” between the employer and the plaintiff. He interpreted the language of the release and concluded that nothing in that language constituted a waiver of the employer’s right to a moratorium. Second, the employer’s right to a moratorium is created by § 31-293, and not by agreement. We conclude, on the basis of the language of the contract, that the parties intended to release the third party tortfeasors, but that they had no intent to waive the employer’s right to a moratorium.
In light of our resolution of the waiver claim, it is not necessary for us to discuss whether reversing the decision of the board would result in a “double recov
The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiff also raised three other issues: (1) “Whether the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to interpret and determine the terms of the private settlement, agreement entered into by the parlies in relation to the third party action as well as the terms, if any, relating to the existence of and application of a moratorium”; (2) “Since the amount of the settlement in the third party action did not exceed the amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid, and since the workers’ compensation insurer accepted monies from that settlement, which were less than the outstanding liens, whether the commissioner erred in concluding that there would be a moratorium in the absence of a written agreement previously approved by the commissioner so providing”; and (3) “Whether the trial commissioner erred in finding that no evidence was submitted contemplating a full release of [the employer’s] claimed credit.” At oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that similar claims to those raised here were resolved adversely to her position in Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 406, 408, 750 A.2d 1098 (2000). We reject the claims on the basis of Schiano and see no need to address them further.
General Statutes § 31-293 (a) provides: “When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (tí) of section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury, the injured employee may claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter, but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of the injured employee against such person, but the injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for the injury; and any employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to the injured employee. If the employee, the employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund brings an action against such person, he shall immediately notify the others, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of the action and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and the others may join as parties plaintiff in the action within thirty days after such notification, and, if the others fail to join as parties plaintiff, their right of action against such person shall abate. In any case in which an employee brings an action against a party other than an employer who failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, in accordance with the provisions of this section, and the employer is a party defendant in the action, the employer may join as a party plaintiff in the action. The bringing of any action against an employer shall not constitute notice to the employer within the meaning of this section. If the employer and the employee join as parties plaintiff in the action and any damages are recovered, the damages shall be so apportioned that the claim of the employer, as defined in this section, shall take precedence over that of the injured employee in the proceeds of the recovery, after the deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by the employee in effecting the recovery. The rendition of a
The full text of the release is as follows: “Travelers Insurance and Connecticut Bank & Trust Company, for and in consideration of the sum of $13,333.33 (Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Three and 33/100 Dollars) to be paid by, or on behalf of Hi-Ho Maintenance and D’Addario Industries release and forever discharge Hi-Ho Maintenance and D’Addario Industries, their heirs, executors and administrators, of any and all actions, suits, claims, demands and rights which they may have against them, their heirs, executors and administrators, as a result of Travelers Insurance’s and Connecticut Bank & Trust Company’s payment of Workers’ Compensation benefits with regard to the matter, Jane Short v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Company, Worker’s Compensation Commission, Fourth District, File Number 400005087.
“Specifically, the undersigned release any rights which they may have to recover Workers’ Compensation benefits paid to Jane Short in connection with her April 29, 1991 work related left hip injury.”
In requesting that we reverse the board’s decision, the plaintiff briefed her claim that “a holding that the [employer] is not entitled to any type of credit for proceeds received by the [plaintiff] is not contradictory to the public policy against double recovery.”