The plaintiff is a Rhode Island corporation operating as a common carrier for hire a line of motor omnibuses between Worcester and West Warren through the towns of Leicester and Spencer. It has complied with all the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159A and of c. 159B, the latter of which was inserted by St. 1934, c. 264.
A shoe manufacturing corporation in Spencer, having about twenty employees who lived in Worcester, contracted with the defendant to transport them daily in his motor omnibus from Worcester to Spencer and return. The defendant has been transporting them under his contract ever since April 15, 1935. He receives and leaves passengers at five points in Worcester. His route is substantially that of the plaintiff between Worcester and Spencer. The defendant is paid nine dollars a day by the shoe manufacturing corporation, and the ride costs the employees nothing. None except employees are carried. The defendant has not obtained any certificate of public convenience under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159A, § 7, nor any license from local authorities under § 1; but he has a permit under § 8 and a license under § 9, issued by the department of public utilities.
The facts appeared in a master’s report which was confirmed. The final decree enjoined the defendant “from operating any motor vehicle between the town of Spencer and the city of Worcester for the transportation of passengers for hire unless and until the said defendant has complied with the provisions of” G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159A. The defendant appealed.
Doubtless'at common law the defendant was not a common carrier of passengers. Houle v. Lewonis, 245 Mass. 254. Haddad v. Griffin, 247 Mass. 369. Dion v. Drapeau, 254 Mass. 186, 188. Commonwealth v. Boston & Maine Transportation Co. 282 Mass. 345, 349. Guinevan v. Checker Taxi Co. 289 Mass. 295. See also Goodman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 295 Mass. 330, 334. He contends that the title of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159A indicates that its requirements apply only to “Common Carriers of Passengers by Motor Vehicle,” and not to private carriers of passengers.
The acts of the defendant constitute the operation of a motor vehicle upon a public way in a “city or town . . . for transporting passengers for hire as a business between fixed and regular termini,” prohibited by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 159A, § 1, unless the conditions imposed by that chapter are satisfied. It is unimportant that the hire is paid by one not a passenger. Dion v. Drapeau, 254 Mass. 186. The defendant has not qualified himself under that chapter, and is violating the statute to the injury of the plaintiff. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Deister, 253 Mass. 178.
The validity of the statute upon which the bill and the
Decree affirmed with costs.