129 Iowa 244 | Iowa | 1906
By chapter 37, page 19, Acts 28th General Assembly (Code Supp. 1902, title 6, chapter 3a), the use of voting machines at all state, county, city, town, and township elections was authorized; and by the act boards of supervisors and councils of cities and incorporated towns were empowered to purchase and order the use of voting machines at all such elections. A commission to consist of three persons, to be appointed by the Governor, is provided for by the act, which shall examine all machines offered, and in respect thereto shall “ make report to the Secretary of State upon the capacity of the said machine to register the' will of voters, its- accuracy and efficiency, and with respect to its mechanical perfections and imperfections. Their report shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State and shall state whether in their opinion the kind of machine so examined can be safely used by such voters at elections under the conditions prescribed by this act. If the report states that the machine can be so used, it shall be deemed approved by the commissioners, and machines of its kind may be adopted for use at elections as herein provided.” There is then set forth in the act provisions as to the construction of the machine which may be approved, thus: “ A voting machine approved by the state board . must be so constructed as to provide facilities for voting for the candidates of at least seven different parties, must permit a voter to vote for any person for any office although not nominated as a candidate by any party, and must permit voting in absolute secrecy,” etc.
It is conceded that a board of commissioners was regularly appointed and qualified under said act; further, that prior to the contracts in question the board was called upon to and did examine the “ Universal Voting Machine,” and
As already stated, the plaintiff brings this action in his capacity as a voter and as a taxpayer of the city and county, and he alleges that the action is on behalf of all other voters and taxpayers who may desire to join him therein. The matters of contention as presented by him all have relation to the mechanical construction of the machine in question, and the adaptability thereof to .the required purposes of a voting machine. And it seems to be the theory of the action that because of alleged faults and imperfections in the machine plaintiff, as a voter, will be deprived of the right to cast his ballot as he may desire, and to have the same counted as intended to be cast, and that as a taxpayer he will suffer loss and damage, in that he will be compelled to contribute to the payment of such alleged imperfect machines, and other expenditures incident to the attempted use thereof.
Aside from the records introduced, all of the evidence taken upon the trial was that of two witnesses claiming to be voting machine experts, one an employé of the Universal Company, and the other an employé of a rival machine company. As might be expected, they are hopelessly in • conflict in respect of many points, and, in the view we take of the case, it is wholly unnecessary for us to sift the evidence out and attempt to reach a conclusion as to the merits of the various points thus made the subject of controversy. To again recur thereto, it will be remembered that plaintiff claims no rights, except as a voter and a taxpayer. If, therefore, he is entitled to any relief, at the hands of a court of equity, it must be because the threatened invasion of such matters of right, one or both, are properly cognizable in equity, and, this being established, that substantial grounds to apprehend irreparable injury have been made to appear.
Affirmed.