10 Kan. 383 | Kan. | 1872
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The petition in the court below shows among other things that Abraham Brown was administrator de bonis non of the estate of Thomas C. Shoemaker, deceased; that on April 13th 1870 said Brown submitted to the probate court of Leavenworth county a report for final settlement of said estate; that said report showed that the said estate owed and was indebted to said Brown to the amount of $2,775.27.; that said report was approved and confirmed in all things by the probate court, in words as follows, to-wit:
“ On reading and filing the foregoing report and accompanying vouchers, and being fully advised in the premises, and having duly examined the same and proof of the publication of the notice of final settlement, as required by law, which is by the court approved, and it appearing that the said estate has been fully and finally settled and debts paid, Ordered, that the same be approved and the said administrator de bonis non be discharged from any further attendance upon this court as such administrator
And said petition further shows that lots 9 and 12, in block 18, in Leavenworth city; Kansas, is the only property real or personal now belonging to said estate, or that did belong to said estate when said settlement was made; that the title to said property has descended to said Laura J. Shoemaker, Elizabeth Shoemaker, Charles P. Shoemaker, and Jennie C, Shoemaker, who are the heirs-at-law of said Thomas C. Shoemaker deceased; that one Tennessee Brown claims to have some interest in said property, and the plaintiff below, Abraham Brown, prays that said property be sold to satisfy his said claim against said estate. The defendants below (plaintiffs in error) demurred to this petition on the grounds, first that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action; second, that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court overruled this demurrer, and the defendants below now bring the case to this court.
“Sec. 1. There shall be in each county organized for judicial purposes a district court which shall be a court of record, and shall have general original jurisdiction of all matters, both civil and criminal (not otherwise provided by law,) and jurisdiction in cases of appeal and error from all inferior courts and tribunals, and shall have a general supervision and control of all such inferior courts and tribunals, to prevent and correct errors and abuses.” (Gen. Stat., 304.)
This statute is certainly broad enough to give to the district courts full chancery and common-law jurisdiction. (See also, •Comp. Laws, 454, §§ 1 and 2.) And unless such jurisdiction is taken away by some other statute, we suppose the district courts may exercise the whole of it. We would read said statute as follows: The district court “shall have general ■original jurisdiction of all matters both civil and criminal, [where] not otherwise provided by law.” The plaintiffs in error would read it as follows: The district courts “shall have general original jurisdiction of all matters both civil and criminal [where such matters are] not otherwise provided [for] by law [by giving the jurisdiction of such matters to some other court.”] Or in other words, The district courts “shall have general original jurisdiction” of such matters only as may he left after giving the other courts their respective jurisdictions. We do not think that this reading of the plaintiffs in error is correct. Probate courts have jurisdiction ■over all claims against the estate of a deceased person; (Gen. Stat., 449, § 87;) and yet it is not unfrequent for parties to sue administrators in the district court on such claims. “A mortgage may be foreclosed in the district court, although
“Sec. 1. The probate courts shall be courts of record, .and within their respective counties shall have original jurisdiction: * * * Third, To direct and control the official acts of executors and administrators, settle their accounts and order the distribution of estates; * * * Seventh, To have and exercise the jurisdiction and authority provided by law respecting executors and administrators, and the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.”. (Gen. Stat., 313, .314, §1. See also Gen. Stat., 454, §§114,115, 119, 120.)
The mere giving of jurisdiction to one court does not show, that it must be exercised exclusively by that court. The constitution gives to the supreme court original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, and habeas corpms, (art. 3, § 3,) and also gives to the probate courts original jurisdiction in habeas corpus; (art. 3, §8;) but still it has never been supposed that either of these courts had exclusive original jurisdiction in any one of these matters, for the legislature has given such jurisdiction also to the district courts: Gen. .Stat., 759, §§652, 653; page 766, §688; page 762, §662;