*4
O’SCANNLÁIN, Circuit Judges.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This case arises under the Employ
ee Retirement
Security
Income
Act of
(ERISA),
as amended by the Retire
ment Equity
(“REA”).
Act of 1984
REA was designed
protect
the financial
security of ex-spouses and dependants af
ter divorce.
Boggs
v. Boggs, 520 U.S.
833, 845,
117 S.Ct.
STANDARD OF REVIEW quires all plans to include anti-assignment Standing is a provisions. question of 1056(d)(1) law re See § 29 U.S.C. viewed de novo. Int’l, See (1990). Schultz v. PLM “beneficiary.” See 29 U.S.C. ERISA provision Further, preemption ERISA’s 1056(d)(3)(J); 520 U.S. Boggs, also § see super- provides
specifically (so holding). More- 1754 117 at S.Ct. employee regarding law any state cedes define an over, careful to Congress was 1144(a) § 29 plans. benefit spouse, former “any as payee” “alternate preemption (1985). ERISA’s light of par- a child, dependent of or other spouse, ques anti-assignment provisions, by a domestic recognized ticipant who is pre initially arose whether tion right a to receive having order relations domestic entering from state courts vented of, payable all, the benefits portion or a garnish sought relations orders partici- to such respect under the alimony or enforce retirement benefits 1056(d)(3)(E). § “These 29 U.S.C. pant.” generally obligations. See support child REA’s to one of are essential provisions Bank Tenneeo, Virginia First v. Inc. en- give is to which purposes, central Cir.1983). Tidewater, F.2d and de- spouse to the protection hanced addressing this is of courts majority of divorce or in the event children pendent prevent that ERISA did concluded sue ” Boggs, 520 U.S. separation.... See, e.g., Operating assignments. 117 S.Ct. F.2d Zamborsky, 650 etc. v. Engineers’, 1056(d), § According to 29 Ü.S.C. Stone, (9th Cir.1981); 196, 198 Stone order re court’s state (9th Cir.1980) that a (holding rights is property lating spousal standing bring has spouse former the exis recognizes QDRO if it “creates or proper community a state claim to enforce to ... payee’s right an tence of alternative division). ty the benefits portion all or receive uncertainty con- any Congress resolved 29 U.S.C. plan. payable” courts authority of state cerning the 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). under the qualify To and to af- dissolutions marital adjudicate must statute, a marital dissolution benefits, when pension plan fect ERISA specify: Act of Equity Retirement enacted (i) mailing last known and the the name (codified 98-397, 98 Stat. Pub.L. (if any) participant address 417). The REA 26 U.S.C. amended mailing address and the name exception an creating amended ERISA by the payee covered each alternate state anti-assignment provisions its order, *7 (commonly relations orders” “domestic (ii) par- percentage amount or orders) that dissolution known as marital by paid to be benefits ticipant’s do- “qualified aof the requirements meet or payee, such alternate plan to each 29 or See QDRO. order” relations mestic amount or in which such the manner 1056(d)(3)(A). § U.S.C. determined, to be percentage period (iii) or payments the number specifi QDRO excеption was applies, such order to which secu the financial protect cally enacted ap- (iv) order to which such plan each Ablamis, 937 F.2d See rity ex-spouses. plies. (so creating In holding). 1453 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)-(iv)(emphasis mechanism, § careful Congress was 29 U.S.C. added).4 primarily requirements under These payee an “alternate provide that by the i.e., designated order,” payee that the ensure relations qualified domestic legitimate order is a relations an is to be considered ex-spouse, an payee an (3) "payment of benefits prohibi- general three includes 4. ERISA also alter- QDRO. paid another require to be may required which are tions for (1) previously "any type form of or another order provide: payee plan nate under provided benefit, [QDRO].” option, 29 U.S.C. any not otherwise or be a determined to (de- (2) benefits plan”; 6(d)(3 (i)-(iii). "increased )(D) under the § 105 value)”; or actuarial the basis of termined on 1150 alternate payee and that the domestic rela spouse’s benefits”); ERISA] Plan see also
tions order does not increase payment 1056(d)(3)(E) § 29 U.S.C. (defining an “al- burden on the plan or mandate the assign ternate payee” “any spouse, former ment of previously benefits assigned child, spouse, or other dependent of par- another ticipant 29 whо recognized by a domestic (H)(i). 1056(d)(3)(B), Indeed, pur “[t]he order as having a right to receive pose all, [of the specificity requirements] of, or a portion is to payable benefits reduce the expense of plans respect ERISA partici- sparing plan pant”). administrators grief they experience when because of uncertainty addition, In the Marital Dissolu concerning the identity the beneficiary tion Order awards family residence to they pay the wrong person, arguably Stewart and sets forth its address. The the wrong person, and are sued by a rival Order further states the percentage Metropolitan claimant.” Ins. Co. v. Life (“one-half benefits to paid to Stewart Wheaton, (7th 1080, 1084 42 Cir.1994) F.3d interest”), community period af (citing Carland v. Metropolitan Ins. Life (from fected by the Order the date of
Co., 1114, (10th Cir.), 1120 cert. marriage through the date of separation denied, 502 1020, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 116 (“1-1-88”) “[p]ursuant Brown, to In re 15 (1991)) added). L.Ed.2d 761 (emphasis 838, 841-43, Cal.3d 126 Cal.Rptr. (1976)”(en P.2d 561 banc)),
B. The Marital
and the plan to
Dissolution Order is
which
applies
a Valid
(“Thorpe Holding
Plan”).
Company PS
The Marital Dissolu
case,
present
there is absolutely
tion Order also states the exact number of
no “uncertainty concerning the identity of
shares in the Plan that constitute the com
the beneficiary” under the Marital Dissolu-
munity property
(“17,295.47”)
tion Order. The Order clearly identifies
the value of each
share as of March
Stewart as the
payee”
“alternate
because
(“$9.70”).
The Marital Dissolution
provides
for her entitlement as Nielsen’s
Order therefore satisfies the
require
four
ex-spouse to one-half of the community
ments of QDRO
under ERISA.5
property interest
in his
plan. See
Hawkins
Commissioner
Nevertheless, the district court
Revenue,
Internal
summarily ruled that the Marital Dissolu
Cir.1996) (deeming the ex-spouse of an tion Order
was not a
on the
“
participant an
‘alternate
grounds that it did “not contain the alter
payee’ because the [marital settlement]
(Plaintiffs)
payee’s
nate
mailing address,
Agreement gives
right
her the
to receive
nor
period
to which such order ap
‘all,
of,’
or a portion
[the participant
plies.” The court—and the
ap-
dissent —
suggests
The dissent
that because Stewart
actions,
California law
malpractice
see
has
malpractice
filed a
against
340.6,
action
Cal.Code Civ. Pro.
nothing
else.
*8
attorneys
divorce
alleging their failure "to
6. The dissent states
the
that Marital
'Qualified
Dissolu-
prepare a
Domestic Relations Or-
’’
QDRO
tion Order
qualify
does not
part
as a
in
der’
she
that
has conceded that the Marital
because it fails to specify Nielsen’s last known
Dissolution Order is not a valid
Stew-
mailing
plan
addrеss as the
participant. De-
complaint
art's
malpractice
in her
action con-
fendants did not raise this issue in its sum-
conclusory
tains
allegations having no bind-
mary
motion;
judgment
nor did the district
ing effect on the resolution of the issues in
court rule on it or
purported
include the
-
this case. Whether the Marital Dissolution
absence of
mailing
Nielsen’s last known
ad-
QDRO
Order in this case
a
constitutes
valid
dress as a basis for its
general
decision. As a
under ERISA is a question of law for this
rule, we do "not consider an
passed
issue not
to determine de
suspect,
novo. We
upon below.” Dodd v.
County,
Hood River
59
moreover, that Stewart’s
motivation
swift-
852,
(9th
1995)
(quotation
863
Cir.
marks
ly filing
malpractice
the
springs
action
from
omitted);
and citation
see also United States v.
the applicable
Elias,
statute of
870,
limitations under
1990) (stat-
874
Cir.
ing that
generally
we
do not consider docu-
and alter-
the participant
address of
ing
any
that
defendants
agreed with
parently
plan administrator
payee
nate
the
language
precise
in the
arguable defect
if
inde-
that address
its
precluded
has reason
know
relations order”
a “domestic
under ERISA.
the order.
pendently
a
as
designation
of the
history
the
law and
case
Relevant
Sess.,
575,
re-
Cong.,
98th
2d
No.
S.Rep.
strongly suggests
provisions
2547,
U.S.C.C.A.N., at
in 1984
printed
in
mistaken
badly
court was
the district
added).
(еmphasis
2566
over substance.
exalting form
Moreover,
ruled
courts
have
the
liberally interpreted
have
on this issue
Mailing Address Is
1. Stewart’s
QDRO in
a valid
requirement
address
Sufficiently
in the
Provided
plan
[to]
an “aid
purpose as
light of its
Order
Dissolution
Marital
locating
identifying
administrators
Dissolution Order
The Marital
QDRO.” Tolstad
payees
alternate
the
be
is to
awarded
states
(N.D.
668,
Tolstad,
673
527 N.W.2d
for the
address
residence. The
family
the
1995). Thus,
where the address
in the Marital
stated
family
residence
ad
plan
is “known
the
payee
alternate
Ave
Michigan
as 8109
Order
Dissolution
“has
administrator
plan
or the
ministrator”
Thus,
Whittier,
Nielsen
nue,
California.
...
from
independently
to know
reason
also as
ex-husband—and
as Stewart’s
him,”
the ad
readily
sources
available
fiduciary
Stew
Plan trustee
—knew
QDRO satisfied.
requirement for
dress
the
he executed
because
address
art’s
374,
Stinner,
A.2d
Pa.
Stinner v.
in
that is
Agreement
Marital Settlement
denied,
109 S.Ct.
492 U.S.
cert.
Or
Dissolution
the Marital
into
corporated
(1989);
In re
accord
3245,
Accordingly, may be requirements specificity Dissolution Order ERISA’s] Marital finding that the to which all period relaxed, in this area seem “the to determine cases failed aas purposes qualifying (citing of latitude.” applies,” degree [it] allow some is mistaken. 992-93)). Marsh, under Hawkins, valid at 86 F.3d ERISA, QDRO under as a valid qualify To a divorce de held that the Sixth Circuit meet cer must order a domestic cree, partici that the simply which stated met has been That criteria tain criteria. two- were to receive two children pant’s specificity more require To in this case. in life participant’s of the third’s “ ‘would requires itself than the statute with “substantially complied policy surance provi of the purpose .[ERISA] defeat 422. 119 F.3d at requirements.” ERISA’s ”’ Insurance Metropolitan ... sion Life mailing children’s “current Although the Marsh, 422 Cir. 119 F.3d v. Co. order, in the were not included addresses” 1085).7 Wheaton, 1997) at F.3d (quoting “the address provided decree the divorce custody they were mother whose Law Case 3. Relevant Thus, to the Sixth according Id. placed.” Boggs held Court Supreme was Circuit, requirement ERISA’s address designed QDRO provisions were ERISA’s Wheaton, at id.; 42 F.3d accord met. See rights community property protect same). also The decrеe (holding pen- in ERISA like Stewart ex-spouses Life Insurance Metropolitan identified at 117 S.Ct. 520 U.S. sions. See policy to issuing the ERISA company one of are essential provisions “These un- that requirement so applied, which it give which is purposes, REA’s central Moreover, met. See id. der ERISA was and de- protection spouse enhanced regard- clear very “the because decree or divorce in the event children pendent ” children] [the two percentage ing added). (emphasis Id. separation .... accordance receive” should ERISA’s recognized that have also We ques- any further requirements, ERISA’s because were enacted QDRO provisions had the administrator tions concerning in- ... concerned with “Congress was chil- between proceeds division by women suffered might be equities gov- easily resolved could dren of divorce or victims who are economic at 422 Id. principles. law erning state these determined separation” and 1085). Finally, Wheaton, 42 F.3d at (citing necessary protect “[t]o provisions were did decree Ablamis, the fact despite F.2d at their interests.” peri- payments the “number specify it still applies,” order which such ods for reason, courts other circuit For ERISA be- QDRO under qualified the criteria construed liberally have contribution сause, defined like Nielsen’s quali- will relations order a domestic which payment one contemplated plan, policy Marsh, See, 119 F.3d e.g., fy as Circuit, the To the Sixth id. in full. See 1080; also Wheaton, see 415; 42 F.3d information”; “no essential lacked decree & DONALD P. HOGOBOOM WILLIAM to be.” [it] what intended [was] “it clear KING, FAM. PRAC. CAL. GUIDE: B. valid constituted 1998) Id. It therefore ¶ (The Group Rutter LAW 10:465.1b id. ERISA. over under (“While disagreement is some there followed, have not easily courts clearly and course, that is domestic relations 7. Of require- specificity [ERISA's] potential hesitated find all to answer sufficiently detailed the decree despite fact pre- ments satisfied implementation is .the questions its regarding interpretation.... modicum for some required under calls detail is not But ferred. administrator 1119-20; position for an Carland, default 935 F.2d at ERISA. See .., would interpretation] Wheaton, 991-94; regard to such Hawkins, [with at plan’s mandates.” and the Williams, 1084; be to follow ERISA F.Supp.2d at 960 omitted)). (citations can be (“As long as a formula within *11 Similarly, Wheaton, in the Seventh Cir- with shoals which the modern state-fed- cuit held that divorce decree that failed eral law of employee benefits abounds. explicitly to the name which the Id. at 1085. order pertained, and failed to specify how Like the divorce decree in Wheaton proceeds the were to be divided between Marsh, the Marital Dissolution in payees, nevertheless, suffi- was present the “clearly case contains in- cient qualify as a because there specified formation in the statute that a was ambiguity no as to dispense how to plan administrator would need to make an proceeds plan. See id. ERISA Id. at 1416. Both informed decision.” at case, In 1084. decree divorce Nielsen and Carpenter were aware of the simply referred to the plan at issue “the information for proper needed alloca- life insurance which is presently carried tion of Thus, benefits. the evil through Id. at employer.” his/her QDRO’s seek remedy “litigation- — In so holding, the court stated: fomenting ambiguities as to who the bene-
It
ficiaries designated
asking
by
is
much
too
divorce
domestic rela-
decree
are” —is
lawyers
absent
in
case. tions
id. at
judges to
expect
them
added).
1084 (emphasis
to dot
i
every
and cross every t
in
formulating divorce decrees that have
In questioning
Wheaton,
the holding8 in
implications.
ERISA
Ideally, every do-
the dissent states
“persuaded
that it
by
mestic
lawyer
relations
should be con-
the careful discussion and analysis of
ERISA,
with
versant
but it is unrealistic Wheaton
by
offered
the Tenth
in
Circuit
to expect all of them to be.
doWe
not Hawkins v. Commissioner
Internal
think Congress meant to ask
impos-
Revenue,
(10th
Cir.1996).”
F.3d 982
A
sible, not the literally, but the humanly, more careful reading
Hawkins,
howev-
impossible, or to
a suit
legal
make
for
er,
persuaded
should have
the dissent that
malpractice
the sole recourse
of an
Hawkins
actually
in
militates
favor of our
ERISA beneficiary harmed by a law-
interpretation
of ERISA’s specificity re-
yer’s failure to navigate the
quirements
treacherous
QDRO.9
for a valid
8. The dissent
portion
describes the
of the
implications.
Ideally, every domes-
opinion
Wheaton
on
relywe
which
as "dicta.”
tic
lawyer
relations
should
conversant
A “supporting ground
holding
ERISA,
[a]
for
[in a
but
expect
unrealistic to
case] ...
fairly
cannot be
cast as dicta.” Ex-
all of them to be. We do not
Con-
think
port
Industries,
Group
Inc.,
gress
meant
impossible,
to ask the
Reef
(9th Cir.1995)
1471-72
(citing
literally,
Black’s
humanly,
but the
impossible, or to
Law Dictionary,
ed.1990)
(defining
make a
legal
suit
malpractice
for
sole
"dictum” as "an observation or remark ...
recourse of an ERISA beneficiary harmed
not necessarily involved
case or
essen-
lawyer’s
navigate
failure to
the treach-
determination”)).
tial to its
Wheaton held
erous shoals with which the
state-
modem
that a divorce decree that failed to name the
federal law employee
benefits.
plan to
applied,
which it
specify
how and
Id. It
misleading
is thus
best
the dissent
proceeds
when the
were to be divided be-
suggest
any part
quoted
of the above
payees,
tween alternate
and to explicitly
passage
state
in Wheaton was dicta.
mailing
"current
address” of the alternate
payees,
1084-85,
42 F.3d at
As a district
recently
nonetheless
observed
In re
"specific
Williams,
enough to
purposes,”
serve ERISA
As the
that
provided
disa
in Hawkins
agreement
in Hawkins
out,
Tenth Circuit
the
do
Circuit—as
Seventh
ex-spouse
the
with
the
greed
in
that
the decision
the extent
we—to
Million Dol-
of One
“[c]ash
to receive
is
eliminating
]
suggest[
to
“seems
Wheaton
of the
share
...
from Husband’s
lars
requirements]
QDRO specificity
[ERISA’s
Hawkins,
Pension
D.D.S.
Arthur C.
at
86 F.3d
in some cases.”
altogether
Plan,”
Arthur “shall immediate-
and that
con
particularly
was
The Tenth Circuit
possession
take
of
to
ly
[Glenda]
allow
“be
requirements not
ERISA’s
that
cerned
by this
[to her]
transferred
property
the
ad
conducting [an]
of
in favor
disregarded
Agreement.”
the
into “whether
subjective inquiry”
hoc
Like
agreement).
the
(quoting
Id. at
par
of
aware
the
was
administrator
plan
here,
Order
Dissolution
the Marital
Nevertheless,
Id.
intentions.”
ties’ ‘true’
“cur-
provide
decree failed
Hawkins
recognized
in Hawkins
Tenth Circuit
participant
mailing
rent
addresses”
QDRO
of
focus’
‘primary
that “the
(let
zip
their
payee
alone
and the
‘pen
alienation
to allow
exception [is]
much
places
code,
the dissent
on which
en
spouses [seek]
when
benefits
plan
sion
”
in
“the
out
detail
spell
or to
support
emphasis)
orders.’
of domestic
forcement
Col
to which
period
v. Lanier
Mackey
payments
(quoting
number
Id. at 988
Inc.,
Serv.,
486 U.S.
for
Agency
provided
&
It also
lection
applies.”
the order
100 L.Ed.2d
838-39,
S.Ct.
her
ex-spouse
pay
participant
Thus,
rejected
Circuit
(1988)).
the Tenth
itself.
plan
pension, not
in his
share
specific
reading of the
“unduly narrow”
an
held the
Nevertheless,
Circuit
the Tenth
QDROs,10noting
ity requirements
at 990-
QDRO. See id.
be a valid
decree to
frus
potential
“has the
reading
purpose
congressional
important
trate this
Hawkins, Marsh,
in
Accordingly,
light
unreasonably
it
by making
difficult
Wheaton,
Marital
clear that the
qualify
relations orders
domestic
in
case constitutes
this
Dissolution
added).
(emphasis
at 991
QDROs.” Id.
law, which is
QDRO as a matter
valid
pre
Instead,
stated that
Circuit
Tenth
Holding and its
Thorpe
on
binding
child
spouse or
plan participant’s
cluding
basis,
Stew-
we conclude that
Plan. On
support
receiving intended
“from
this action to
bring
standing to
art has
the particular
simply because
payments
payee
an alternate
rights as
her
enforce
language
track the
failed to
decree
divorce
ERISA.
under
though the criteria
even
statute
”
in substance
was
the statute
satisfied
IV.
Congress
an “undesirable result”
(citing
approval
with
Id.
not intend.
did
BASIS
ALTERNATE
STEWART’S
1085).
agree.
We
Wheaton,
at
42 F.3d
FOR STANDING
the mari-
principles
these
applying
the Mari
assuming that
Even
into
incorporated
agreement
tal settlement
aas
qualify
Order does
tal
Hawkins,
in
at issue
divorce decree
bring
standing
has
still
QDRO, Stewart
the divorce
held
Circuit
the Tenth
of this
unique facts
under the
this action
necessary
“clearly specifies
decree
Nielsen,
Carpenter,
because
case
valid
constitute a
by law to
required
facts”
their
failing to meet
Holding,
993-94,
Thorpe
despite deficiencies
id.
general rule
exception to the
an
stitutes
the "distributee” for
lawyers literally to mimic
statuto-
tions
purposes is
tax
agree-
drafting these
language
ry
when
Hawkins,
A
at 987.
participant. See
at 990.
Id.
ments."
defined
the tax code is
under
valid
ERISA.
as that under
nearly
terms
recognizes
distri-
identical
tax code
10. The federal
id.;
414(p)(l)-(3),
§
compare 26 U.S.C.
following
See
divorce
pension funds
butions
(K).
1056(d)(3)(C)(i)-(iv),
(8),
29 U.S.C.
con-
valid
payee
an alternate
fiduciary
ERISA,
duties under
denied her
tion.”
1056(d)(3)(G)(ii).
the opportunity to
obtain a valid
Moreover, while the order’s status as a
protect
rights
to and community QDRO is being determined,
ad
property
interest
Nielsen’s
ministrator
required
to hold and sepa
the ERISA Plan. We have held that a
rately account for amounts that would be
state court domestic relations order that
payable to the alternate payee if and when
distributes the community property share
the order is
determined to be a
*13
of an
pension
ERISA
plan
an
to
ex-spouse
§
29
1056(d)(3)(H)(i).11
U.S.C.
Should the
gives
ex-spouse
“the right to
a
obtain
plan administratоr determine that an or
proper QDRO.”
Gendreau,
Gendreau v.
der does not qualify
as a
the bene
(9th
122
Cir.1997)
F.3d
818
(holding ficiary or alternate payee may appeal the
ex-spouse’s
an
community property
plan administrator’s decision to a “court of
her husband’s ERISA
”
competent jurisdiction
under 29 U.S.C.
plan “was established
state
law
§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(i)
added).
(emphasis
the time of the divorce decree” and that
present case,
the
according
her husband could not
“right
defeat her
to
to the Summary Plan Description of the
obtain
proper QDRO”
and be paid her
Thorpe Holding Company Profit
community
Sharing
property
merely
share
by de-
Plan, Thorpe Holding Company
claring bankruptcy
appointed
before she
obtained
a “Committee”
proper QDRO).
plan
as the
Moreover,
administrator
ERISA as-
signs to
the
plan
discretionary authority
administrators the
fiduciary
“deter
duty to ensure
mine when
that an
how pay
and
alternate
payee’s
Participant
rights
protected.
are
his or her benefits
Accordingly, all
under the Plan” and to
plans
“interpret[
must
reasonable,
]
establish
the Plan
and
documents
procedures
written
adopt[ ]
determine the quali-
appropriate
for
rules
administer
fied status of a
order,
domestic
ing
the Plan.” And defendants Nielsen and
communicate
procedures
those
Carpenter
alternate
two of
were
four
desig
trustees
payees, and to administer the distribution
nated as Committee members. Under
of benefits
qualified
under such
ERISA,
orders.
Thorpe Holding Company’s Com
1056(d)(3)(G).
See 29
§
U.S.C.
mittee
ais
“fiduciary” of the ERISA Plan
because it exercises “discretionary
Specifically,
author
upon receipt
“any
of
domes-
ity or discretionary
tic
control
respecting
relations order” —such
as
Marital
management
plan
of such
...
Dissolution
[and]
discre
plan
case—a
ad-
tionary authority or
ministrator
discretionary
must “promptly
respon
notify the par-
sibility in
ticipant
any
and
other
of
administration
such
payee
plan.”
of
§
29
receipt
1002(21)(A)(i),(iii).
U.S.C.
such order”
Moreover,
and advise them
where,
plan’s
here,
procedures
“the
as
committee or
determining”
entity is
whether the
plan
is a
named as the
order
fiduciary,
corporate
§ 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)
added).
(emphasis
officers or trustees
carry
who
out
fidu
“[W]ithin a reasonable time
ciary
after
functions
receipt of
are themselves fiduciaries
order,
such
plan
and
administrator shall
cannot be shielded from liability by
determine whether
such order
company.
is a
Kayes
v.
Lum
Pacific
[QDRO] and notify the participant
Co.,
ber
(9th
1459-61
Cir.
each alternate payee of
1995)
[its] determina-
(rejeсting
Third
ap-
Circuit’s
provision
This
states that:
an escrow account
the amounts which
During any period in which the issue of
would have
payable
been
to the alternate
whether a domestic relations order
payee
is
during
period
if the order had
qualified domestic
being
relations
plan
been
qualified
determined
be a
(by
administrator,
determined
by a
relations order.
competent jurisdiction,
or other-
1056(d)(3)(H)(i)
29 U.S.C.
(emphasis add-
wise),
plan
administrator shall segre-
ed).
gate
separate
in a
account
in the
in or
See, e.g.,
fiduciary duties.
his
breaching’
officers
individual
relieves
proach
Walton,
F.Supp.
v.
unless Donovan
liability
fiduciaries
as
directors
(S.D.Fla.1985)
(holding
that U.S.C.
plan’s
as
named
entity
fiduciary
1105(a)
every
imposes
its
on
officially delegates
effectively
fiduciary
them).
duty to
an affirmative
fiduciary
duties
breaching
fiduciaries from
prevent other
ex-
only
Stewart’s
Thus Nielsen
jointly and
they are
their
which
duties
one of four
husband,
a trustee
he was
liable),12
nom. Brock
sub
severally
an
serving as
admin-
aff'd.
members
Committee
Cir.1986).
Walton,
was established under state law *15 (2) Plan, an award of her claimed in share Marital Dissolution Order. Stewart’s abil- her ex-husband’s Plan, and ity to enforce that interest against (3) appropriate relief for the Plan’s breach Plan depended on her ability present a of fiduciary duties. The threshold ques- QDRO. Nielsen, valid Carpenter, and tion, and the only question raised in this Thorpe Holding had the fiduciary duty appeal, is whether Stewart has standing to under ERISA to preserve “right Stewart’s bring these claims. Answering ques- to obtain a QDRO.” valid they If deter- tion requires determining whether Stew- mined that the Marital Dissolution Order art’s marital dissolution order constitutes a was not a valid they had the fidu- “Qualified Domestic Relations Order” ciary duty to afford her the opportunity to (“QDRO”) within the meaning of ERISA. make it so or to appeal their decision ato “court of competent jurisdiction.” The A Nielsen, fact that Carpenter, and Thorpe In order to have standing bring Holding failed in all respects these does of type claims brought by not defeat rights Stewart’s under 29 Stewart, person a must abe “participant” 1056(d)(3)(H)(i) § U.S.C. and related sub- or of “beneficiary” a plan. covered Therefore, sections. Stewart has standing 1132(a)(1).1 § U.S.C. ERISA explicitly to bring this matter before the district prohibits the assignment or alienation of court. pension benefits requiring plans in- Accordingly, we REVERSE the district clude anti-assignment provisions, see id. court’s grant of summary judgment in fa- 1056(d)(1), § and it preempts state law to vor of defendants and REMAND to the the extent that state law calls for such district court with instructions to enter an assignment alienation, 1144(a). § sеe id. order finding that the Marital Dissolution See also John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Order a QDRO is valid and therefore Wolk, Pension and Employee Law Benefit Stewart has standing bring this action. (2d ed.1995) 545-48 (describing the antial-
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ienation rule
“[t]he
bedrock principle
here,
1. Although not relevant
of
Secretary
under
suits
ERISA for breaches of fiduciary
Labor
and
fiduciaries
bring
also can
duty.
§
See 29
1132(a)(1)(B)(2).
U.S.C.
entirely
upon
rests
claim
third Stewart’s
of
treatment
ERISA’s
underlies
standing
ERISA’s
QDRO exception to
“ERISA’s
claims,”
noting
party
then be-
issue
rules.
anti-alienation
strongly reinforces
clause
preemption
dissolu-
martial
rule”).
Stewart’s
comes whether
antialienation
four
with all
complies
order
tion
regard-
rules
ERISA’s
exception
An
requirements.
exists
anti-alienation
standing and
ing
who is
person
“A
QDRO.
a
involving
cases
B
spouse]
[e.g., a former
payee
an alternate
of the Marital Dissolution
Review
order
relations
domestic
qualified
a
under
Shirley Stewart
marriage of
dissolving the
any
of
purposes
be considered
shall
MDO”)
(“the
estab-
Richard Nielsen
beneficiary under
provision
[ERISA]
proper
not a
MDO
lishes
1056(d)(3)(J); id.
§
plan.” 29
it from
prevent
defects
multiple
QDRO;
pay-
1056(d)(3)(E)
“alternate
(defining
deficiencies,
Any one
these
being so.
an alternate
ee”).
beneficiary,
aAs
de-
itself,
be sufficient
would
taken
standing to
has
valid
under a
payee
togethеr,
taken
QDRO qualification;
feat
Fur-
provisions.
enforce
sue
possibility
any
clearly preclude
they
benefits
pension
thermore,
payment
QDRO treatment.
as au-
permitted
payee
to an
id.
QDRO. See
action,
has
proper
Indeed,
thorized
in another
1056(d)(3)(A).
is inade-
MDO
argued
vigorously
malpractice
legal
In a
quate as
is a
order
relations
every
Not
attorneys, Stewart
her former
against
suit
un-
Order”
Relations
Domestic
“Qualified
prepare
“failed to
they
alleged
has
is ob-
proposition
While this
ERISA.
der
in-
Order’
Relations
Domestic
‘Qualified
instant
vious,
repeating
it bears
[marital
plan on
structing
consti-
A domestic
case.
in the
provided
“clearly
if
division
only
property]
if and
tutes
Marriage.”
pieces
of Dissolution
following
Judgment
each of
specifies”
*16
Mal-
Attorney
for
Damages
for
Complaint
information:
Bernal, No.
4,
v.
mail-
at
Stewart
practice
(i)
last known
and the
the name
20,
filed May
(Cal.Super. Ct.
(if
[plan] partici-
any) of the
B.C150341
ing address
court,
1996).
Stew-
before this
address
mailing
Appearing
name and
and the
pant
for
QDRO treatment
seeks
payee;
now
each alternate
art
of
r
as a
that,
of its
because
of
(ii)
percentage
or
same
the amount
defects
the basis
as
by
serving
paid
QDRO,
be
is
benefits
participant’s
the reasons
or the
For
payee,
complaint.
malpractice
such alternate
to each
plan
me that
per-
below,
or
appears
amount
it
which such
set forth
manner
determined;
more merit
malpractice suit has
centage is to
Stewart’s
peri-
(iii)
or
action.
payments
her ERISA
of
than
the number
applies;
such order
which
od to
1
such order
(iv)
to which
plan
each
as a
inadequacy
first
The MDO’s
applies.
known
last
specify
its failure
case,
un-
1056(d)(3)(C).
it is
this
§
Id.
partici-
Nielsen as
of
address
mailing
a partici-
is neither
that
disputed
ob-
this
cover
attempts to
Thus,
pant.2 Stewart
the Plan.
beneficiary of
in nor
pant
by the record.
supported
any basis
on
many
affirm
a as
is deficient
The MDO
2.
Inc.,
Industries,
983
Henry Gill
rely
See
chose
court
the district
respects, and
Furthermore,
1993).
(9th Cir.
infirmities
other
the MDO’s
some of
upon
out, ‘‘[wjhether the
correctly points
majority
to constitute
finding
it failed
case
consti-
Order in
Marital
district
majority’s observation
ques-
is a
under ERISA
tutes
valid
defects of
on different
its decision
rested
court
de
to determine
for this
of law
tion
MDO,
a non-
n.
maj. op.
at
see
Maj. op.
1149 n.
may
novo.”
that we
well-established
sequitur.
It is
vious
(1)
arguments:
defect
two
be- because ERISA’s legislative history states
cause Nielsen was a committee member
that “an
qualified
[otherwise
domestic rela-
authorized to
Plan,
administer
tions
will
оrder]
not be treated
failing
MDO should
required
not be
to contain his be a qualified order merely because the
address;
(2) MDO,
specifying
order does
specify
the current mailing
the mailing
address
Nielsen’s attorney,
address
the participant and alternate
satisfied the statutory requirement.
payee
if the
administrator has reason
These arguments are unsustainable in to
know
address independently of the
the face
contrary
statutory text. A order.” S.Rep. No.
(1984),
98-575
reprint-
order,
domestic relations
in order to con
ed in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
stitute a
must “clearly speciffy]
arguments
These
are unpersuasive. By
...
the name and the last known mailing
terms,
its
the language
(if
in the MDO
address
relied
any)
the participant.”
upon by
merely
1066(d)(3)(C)(i)
awards her a
(emphases add
ed).
piece
property;
statute’s
never
pellucid
specifies
language
does
contain an exception
property
address
cases in which
is Stewart’s mailing
the participant is plan
trustee or
address.
admin
Simply because someone is
istrator,
permit
nor does it
substitution of
property
awarded
does not mean that she
the mailing
address
the participant’s will reside or continue to reside at the
attorney for the mailing address of the
Quite
property.
tellingly, the MDO does
participant. While the rules suggested by not contаin
zip
code for the Michigan
Stewart might
good
make
public policy, Avenue address —a fairly important part
they are not the rules
ERISA,
contained in
of a mailing address —even though it does
and courts are without authority to revise
contain the parcel number for the address.
the statute as it was
enacted
Congress. This fact
supports
further
the conclusion
Commissioner,
Hawkins v.
86 F.3d that the MDO’s reference to the Michigan
(10th Cir.1996)
992-93
(concluding Avenue address is a
award,
property
not a
1056 “should be accorded
plain
its
clearly specified mailing address.
meaning, and not interpreted so as to al
parties
low the
The majority’s
omit the requested
adoption
infor
of Stewart’s
mation whenever it is
reasoning
convenient
per
makes surplusage of statutory
haps
so”).
even logical to do
language requiring a domestic relations or-
der to “clearly speciffy]” an alternate pay-
ee’s
“mailing
address,”
29 U.S.C.
*17
The MDO is
§
defective
QDRO
1056(d)(3)(C)(i).
aas
There are real differ-
failing to specify
clarity
(1)
the mailing ences between
specification
mere
and
address of Stewart as alternate payee.
clear specification
(2)
a legal address
See 29
1056(d)(3)(C).
§
U.S.C.
Never
and a mailing address. These differences
without a ready response to the patent
are еxplicitly recognized in
text,
ERISA’s
defects in her
supposed
Stewart
and they deserve to be recognized by
asserts —and the majority agrees —that
courts charged with interpreting
ap-
the
specifies
MDO
her
by
address
award-
plying that language.
legislative
The
his-
ing her “ft]he real property at 8109 Michi-
tory
cited
Stewart cannot override clear
Ave.,
gan
Whittier,
legally described as
statutory language to the contrary. See
1,
Parcel
City of Whittier as shown on Hawkins,
is that as of appreciating to cease “the amount are art clearly specify 1988, “the date January of benefits as date —or participant’s the of percentage or the July as of alter- separation” such of each plan to by the paid —or pro- divorce Stewart’s judgment in of which date manner or the payee, nate be deter- ceeding. is percentage or amount 1056(d)(3)(C)®. The mined,” “clearly 29 U.S.C. Furthermore, fails MDO the follows: as or provides payments MDO of number ... speciffy] Hold- Thorpe pension applies,” of holder order The which such period to pay is ordered although Plan 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii); PS Company ing the non- and for as times as Shirley Nielsen “at such requires payment MDO interest community of order is share rest of the below,” holder’s ordered are the com- one-half of plan pension payment.3 said of time as to silent times at such therein ob- munity lamely, “[t]he somewhat responds, below. are ordered not affect should the math” scurity of Brown, In re of fail. terms must argument to the This Pursuant entitlement. to be stipulated is separation QDRO requirements, the date Under in Invest- shares “obscur[e] plagued Amount 1-1-88. orders sharing Inc., Portfolio, profit ERISA- against ment be enforced cannot math” to be stipulated co. is plans.4 investment covered community portion. 17,295.47 C one-half is awarded party Each stip- parties The of specificity, lack Conceding said shares. the MDO’s amount significant shares as majority place said value of and the that the ulate Insurance Metropolitan share. per upon weight $9.70 3-15-89 Life (7th Cir. Wheaton, out, MDO Co. correctly points Plan As the Insurance 1994), Metropolitan issue important Life to the speak does Nielsen, participant, only orders de- the dissolution majority claims that 3. The light of to his ex-wife. payment a make in Hawkins a valid upheld as cree deficiencies, detailed many other MDO's 'the spell detail out in "to similarly failed QDRO defect is additional of this discussion which period to payments number not- is worth its existence necessary, but This Maj. op. at 1155. applies.’” order ing. in Hawkins decree simply inaccurate. payment, ]” provided for the Hawkins "immediatef majority claims an than definite is far more which valid be a decree held a divorce "at such payment provides "provided case though the decree even *18 never orders but ex-spouse below” are ordered pay times the as to participant for the plan itself.” times. payment the the pension, not his share in majority mischaracter- op. at 1155. Maj. Hawkins, di- the which of the facts defective as izes to be appears The MDO 4. Haw- QDRO Glenda expressly awarded decree vorce QDRO must ground. A yet on another " Plan,” F.3d at the ‘from’ $1 kins million par- of the percentage "the amount specify 6(a) divorce of the paragraph (quoting plan to 990 decree). by the paid to be ticipant's benefits explicitly Indeed, the Hawkins 29 U.S.C. payee,” alternate such each decree that the argument Glenda’s added), rejected indicat- 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii) (emphasis liability on the to her personal order, to gave rise to be ing that liability on (as opposed husband part of her QDRO, of benefits payment require the must at 990 n. plan). See id. pension part of his the participant) (rather plan the than by the in this case MDO payee. to an Marsh, Co. v. (6th 421-22 formation.” Id. Arthur cited the Seventh Cir.1997), simply which followed the Whea- Circuit’s Wheaton opinion as support for ton analysis. Stewart and the majority position. his place particular emphasis upon the follow- The Hawkins court rejected Arthur’s ing dicta5 from “It Wheaton: is asking too argument and his upon reliance Wheaton. much of domestic relations lawyers and “While we are mindful of the Seventh Cir- judges to expect them to dot every i and concerns, cuit’s we do not agree that the cross t in every formulating divorce de- QDRO specificity requirеments should be crees that have ERISA implications.” 42 construed this liberally. [Rjelaxing the re- F.3d at 1085. quirements of or, [the statute] Whea- — With respect Wheaton dicta re- ton seems to suggest, eliminating them garding dotting of i’s and crossing of altogether in some cases—does violence to t’s in the context, I persuaded am plain meaning of the statute.” Id. The by the careful discussion and analysis of Tenth Circuit support drew position its Wheaton by offered the Tenth Circuit in from a time-honored principle, reiterated Hawkins v. Commissioner Internal of with regularity by the Supreme Court: Revenue, Cir.1996). F.3d 982 In “[C]ourts must not read language out of a Hawkins, the Tenth Circuit had to deter- statute.” Id. (citing Supreme Court mine, for purposes of tax allocating liabili- cases). Because of its greater fidelity to ty between two ex-spouses, whether the text, statutory I find the rigorous Hawkins’s marital settlement agreement Hawkins analysis persuasive more than QDRO. was a Hawkins, Arthur seeking to Wheaton and Marsh.6 When viewed in have the agreement treated QDRO, as a light Hawkins, of it is clear that Stewart’s upon relied the same legislative history MDO fails to satisfy ERISA’s rather spe- invoked argue “that QDRO cific requirements. requirements [29 § 1056(d)(3)(C)] need not be strictly com- II plied with.” Id at 992. “In essence, Ar- argument thur’s QDRO is that a need Stewart argues that she has standing to clearly specify the rеquired information bring the instant action independent of the 1056(d)(3)(C)] [§ when ad- MDO’s status as a points ministrator, by virtue of his independent out that requires pension plans to knowledge, is already cognizant of in- establish follow specific procedures 5. Notwithstanding the majority’s views to Hawkins, In the Tax Court effectively had contrary, maj. see op. (1) at 1153 held n. "to if this create parties language agreement an patch express in a must prose florid their intent —situated reallocate the tax burden very of a end opinion, distri- well after the bution,” (2) parties "the incorpo- [must] Seventh completed Circuit had analysis its —is rate the statutory exact terminology when dicta, then there is no thing as dicta drafting a domestic relations order.” 86 F.3d at all. at 989. The Tenth Circuit reversed these QDRO holdings: [the “Because requirements Hawkins, 86 F.3d at the-Tenth Cir- require the I.R.C.] neither of things, these rejected cuit "unduly we narrow” believe the Tax Tax interpretation Court’s runs interpretation Court's counter plain meaning require- statute.’’ added). (emphasis Id. ments of the (which Internal Revenue Code Thus, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, are substantively the same as the re- the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the Tax quirements ERISA). Citing discussion, adopted Court overly an narrow reading of the majority attempts to appear make it requirements of the Internal Reve- *19 the Tenth Circuit in Hawkins took a view of nue Code was not based on the court’s desire QDRO the requirements as relaxed as the one to reach a equitable certain Rather, result. it adopts. now maj. op. See at 1155-56. was rooted firmly in the commitment of the Close examination of Hawkins shows that the Hawkins court to enforcing "the plain mean- Tenth Circuit did no thing. such ing the of statute.” Stew- weight that the bear cannot opinion rela- a domestic whether determining for did not We upon it. place must, inter art seeks Plans QDRO. is a order tions Gendreau’s Colleen that payees in Gendreau hold notify alternate alia, (1) promptly by itself order relations domestic domestic qualifying for defective procedures of (2) be determine could enforced that QDROs, right her a gave orders relations ais plans. order pension relations Gendreau’s domestic a William against whether after period (1) non- a Colleen’s reasonable Rather, “within held that we QDRO (3) order,” segregate and in of such William’s receipt an “interest” her QDRO gave dur- payee to the due funds in any nondischargeable that was plans pension determi- QDRO a in which period the ing (2) have to would Colleen bankruptcy, made. being nation QDRO be- a non-QDRO into her convert that argues (H). 1056(d)(3)(G), Stewart in her interest vindicate could fore she these to follow failure alleged Plan’s at 819. id. plans. pension William’s opportunity her the denied procedures of holdings Gendreau two narrow These ERISA that these QDRO a obtain broad for some the basis serve cannot sue standing to her upon confer violations extra-statutory, open-ended of doctrine under ERISA.7 deci- our anything, If standing. ERISA for ERISA argument her bases Stewart position undermines in Gendreau sion on framework QDRO standing outside QDRO as the Just this case. in of Stewart Gendreau, Gendreau en- from [Colleen] “prevent[ed] provisions an Gendreau, held that Cir.1997). we QDRO is until interest her forcing could bankruptcy Chapter ex-husband’s similarly pre- 819, they obtained," at id. against claim ex-wife’s his discharge not interest enforcing any from vent Stewart claim her because his QDRO. valid a Plan without in the id. him. See against not 'plan, against under out that points majority The holding, central Thus Gendreau’s at 818. may have 1056(d)(3)(H), Stewart an than rather holding bankruptcy a whether a determination to obtain right relevance holding, lacks ERISA a court of from QDRO ais the MDO bar. at case Here, ob- Stewart jurisdiction. competent stated, howev- also court The Gendreau district The a determination: tained relations ex-wife's er, that QDRO. not a MDO is held that court proper to obtain right “a her gave entitled bemay Stewart that Thе fact discharged not that could QDRO however, status, QDRO adjudication an The proceeding.” bankruptcy William’s to sue right any her give not does “[t]he explained Gendreau QDRO provi- of its violations ERISA sug- do ERISA QDRO provisions her MDO is determined once it sions in the no interest has Colleen gest words, district In other QDRO. is not they obtains she until plans is not MDO determination her court’s enforcing from her merely prevent standing to Stewart deprived Id. QDRO is obtained.” until the of ERISA —includ- violations any sue to the relating provisions violations ing holds, majority argues, Stewart or- of domestic evaluation proper her ERISA gives language above that the Thus, re- administrators. by plan ders to obtain “a right her standing by giving violated Plan of whether gardless Careful examination QDRO.” Id. proper the establish- regarding provisions however, that our indicates, Gendreau receipt over dispute factual Resolving provi- violating ERISA's Plan denies if necessary. Even isMDO arguing procedures, regarding sions regarding provisions did violate Plan duties any of the not owe did that it determination, lacks proper points Plan the statute. set forth violations bring for such standing suit re- indicating it never evidence record of a valid the absence MDO. ceived *20 1164 merit of procedures proper for qualifying cases law, based on the not on subjec- our domestic relations QDROs, orders tive view of equities. Our decision will Stewart lacks standing to sue for any such affect not just case, Stewart’s but many
violations.8
future cases brought under ERISA.
I
fear that the majority’s judicial expansion
Ill
of ERISA standing, in order to save the
Both Stewart and the Plan make argu-
case of one sympathetic plaintiff, may have
ments based upon the various policy con-
serious and unforeseen consequences for
cerns underlying
QDRO
provisions.
this extremely important area of law.
upon
relies
QDRO
legislation’s
goal of “protect[ing] the financial security
IV
of divorcees.” Gendreau,
Langbein Wolk, & supra, at 557-59. Re-
gardless of the importance of these policy
considerations to Cоngress, however, they possess very limited significance for Sereja YAZITCHIAN; Lena courts. We can consider policy consider- Melkoumian, Petitioners, ations insofar as they are manifested clear statutory language. The task of striking a balance between conflicting poli- IMMIGRATION AND cy goals has been left to the legislative, not NATURALIZATION SERVICE, judicial, branch. We as judges cannot Respondent. ignore the dictates of Congress in order to No. 98-70752. produce what we be, deem to from a policy perspective, a United desirable States Court of result Appeals, in an indi- vidual case. Ninth Circuit. Stewart is a sympathetic plaintiff, and Argued and Submitted March the majority’s rewriting of re- April 3, Decided quirements is, doubt, no by motivated
best of intentions. What the majority fails realize, however, is that days Chancery are over.9 We must decide 8. Denying standing to sue under these cir- aptly As stated Frankfurter, Justice cumstances perfect makes sense. "[tjhis If a plan review, is a court of tribunal violates ERISA regarding rules proper unbounded rules. We do not sit like a kadi evaluation of domestic relations orders as tree dispensing justice according to QDROs, but the payee alternate does not have considerations of individual expediency.” a valid payee has sus- City Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. tained no harm as a plan’s result of the viola- S.Ct. (1949) (Frankfurter, L.Ed. tions. J., dissenting).