Opinion
Petitioner challenges an order of respondent court denying as untimely his peremptory challenge to the assigned judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. 1 In denying the motion, respondent court took the position that the challenged judge had been assigned to the case for all purposes pursuant to a local court policy. Petitioner asserts that the assignment was not truly an all-purpose assignment, and the challenge was timely filed under the “10-day/5-day” rule of section 170.6. We conclude: (1) a local court policy can provide a valid mechanism for making an all-purpose assignment within the meaning of section 170.6; and (2) petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the assignment was not one “for all purposes.” The petition is therefore denied.
Facts and Procedural Background
Petitioner is the respondent in a dissolution of marriage action which was filed July 18, 1991, under case No. BD043175. Pursuant to the Manual of Procedures for the Family Law Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court, effective July 1,1991, the case was assigned, upon filing, to Judge C. Bernard Kaufman “for all purposes.” Petitioner’s response in the action was filed on August 13, 1991.
On or about December 26, 1991, petitioner filed in the respоndent court a motion to compel further answers to interrogatories (not part of the record in this proceeding). The motion originally was set for hearing on January 15, 1992. On or about December 30, 1991, petitioner filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Kaufman.
In the memorandum of pоints and authorities submitted in connection with the peremptory challenge, petitioner asserted that the peremptory challenge was timely filed. He asserted that under,
Reygoza
v.
Superior Court
(1991)
Discussion
The Manual of Procedures for the Family Law Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court 2 provides that dissolution actions are assigned to a family law direct calendar department “and to the judicial officer assigned to the department according to the last two digits of the action number, for all purposes, unless othеrwise provided by these rules throughout the life of the action including those cases now on file as well as those to be filed, unless otherwise assigned to another department by these rules or order of court .... The last two digits corresponding to the various departments and to the judicial officer assigned thereto are as follows: [Case numbers ending in the digits] 66-75 [are assigned to] Department 43, Judge C. Bernard Kaufman.” The Manual of Procedures further provides, “Transfer of cases from one department to another will be effected only by the Supervising Judge or his or her designee. . . . H] All proceedings in thе actions shall be held in the department to which the case is assigned unless otherwise ordered by the court.”
“As a general rule, a motion pursuant to section 170.6 may be made at any time prior to commencement of the trial or hearing.”
(People
v.
Superior Court (Hall)
(1986)
The third exception, the “all-purpose judge” exception, was added to section 170.6 in 1989, effective January 1, 1990. It provides, “If directed to the trial of a cause which has been assigned to a judge for all purposes, the motion shall be made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge by a party within 10 days аfter notice of the all-purpose assignment, or if the party has not yet appeared in the action, then within 10 days after the
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appearance.” Although section 170.6 does not actually define an “assignment to a judge for all purposes,” case law tells us that the purpose of suсh an assignment is to expedite litigation by permitting one judge to handle an entire case from start to finish, acquiring an expertise regarding the factual and legal issues involved, which will accelerate the legal process.
(Augustyn v. Superior Court
(1988)
A trial court has jurisdiction to rule on the timeliness of a peremptоry challenge pursuant to section 170.6.
(Woodman
v.
Superior Court
(1987)
Government Code section 68070 expressly authorizes the adoption of local court rules.
(Reygoza, supra,
The local court policy assigns family law cases for all purposes to a specific judge sitting in a specific department. The policy requires that all proceedings in a case must be held in the assigned department unless otherwise ordered by the court. Only the supervising judge (or his or her designee) may effect transfers of cаses from one department to another. The local court policy contains no provisions concerning peremptory challenges
*152
pursuant to section 170.6. It is not inconsistent with or contrary to section 170.6 and appellate decisions interpreting the statute. The policy simply effectuates an assignment and calendaring procedure for the family law department. (Cf.
Reygoza, supra,
The question remains whether the assignment of cases to specific judges pursuant to the local court policy constitutes an assignment for all purposes within the meaning of section 170.6. The local court policy on its face constitutes the assignment of a family law case to a particular judge for all purposes. Thus, petitioner has the burden of establishing that the assignment is actually not an all-purpose assignment.
Here, the record establishes that a peremptory challenge was filed by petitioner on or about December 30, 1991. In his memorandum of points and authorities in support of the peremptory challenge, petitioner contended the local court policy was legally insufficient to constitute an assignment for all purposes. Petitioner presented no evidence in the form of declarations, affidavits, or sworn testimony that the all-purpose assignment was a sham or a device. 4 The record also contains a minute order finding the peremptory challenge to be untimely. Although the minute order reflects the presence of an electronic recording monitor, no transcript of any oral proceedings has been provided to this court. Apparently, no oral proceedings took place.
In the face of this total lack of evidentiary support for petitioner’s position, the local cоurt policy itself evidences a strong policy against the transferring of any matters, even routine motions, from the all-purpose judge assigned to the case. We conclude on the record before us that petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that Judge Kaufman was not in fact assigned to his сase for all purposes. That being the case, petitioner was required to file his peremptory challenge to Judge Kaufman within 10 days of August 13, 1991, the date petitioner made his general appearance in the action. The peremptory challenge filed on or about Decеmber 30, 1991 was, therefore, untimely. 5
Neither
Reygoza
nor
Gonzales
compels a different result. In those cases, the local court policy specifically provided that, “In order to be timely, a
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challenge pursuant to [] section 170.6, [subdivision] (2) must be filed within ten (10) days of the defendant’s first appearance in the direct calendar court.” Both courts held that the local court policy was inconsistent with section 170.6 as interpreted by
Hall, supra,
Moreover, the
Reygoza
court found that the local court policy did not constitute an effective assignment of a criminal case to a specific judge for all purposes. “The [local court policy] does nothing more than attempt to override
Hall
and
Mackey.
It does not change the situation in the criminal departments whereby cases are reassigned in order to meet speedy trial deadlines. The [local court policy] does not increase the power of the judges to control their ‘assigned’ cases nor does it preclude a judge/department from transferring a case to another judge/department for trial. There is no indication in the policy or respondent [court]’s brief that the policy changed the practice of transferring criminal cases.”
(Reygoza, supra,
The
Reygoza
court observed that the nature of criminal cases makes such all-purpose assignmеnts impractical. “For criminal cases, the overwhelming concern is with the defendant’s speedy trial rights. As indicated in
Hall
and based on our own experience, in Los Angeles County Superior Court, the judge to whom a criminal case is assigned often is not the trial judge as the case has to be transferred in order to meet speedy trial deadlines.”
(Reygoza, supra,
*154
Finally, in
Gonzales
the sole argument of the respondent court was that the local court policy adopted for criminal cases was consistent with similar provisions of the local court policy adopted for “Fast Track” cаses. In
Gonzales,
we concluded: “The ‘Fast Track’ rules to which respondent court refers apply to selected civil cases only. Respondent court has made no showing here that a similar trial delay reduction program has been instituted for criminal cases, or that the ‘rule’ promulgated in its policy statement was a ‘procedure, standard or policy’ adopted under such a program. The analysis set forth in
Mackey
therefore governs this case.”
(Gonzales, supra,
Unlike the circumstances in
Reygoza
and
Gonzales,
the local court policy at issue here does not involve the time for filing of peremptory challenges. Nor does respondent court argue that its local court policy is valid as a “procedure, standard or policy” adopted pursuant to “fast track” rules. Finally, there is no evidence that the local court policy here in question does not actually constitute an all-purpose assignment. Thus, the assignment to Judge Kaufman, made pursuant to a duly аdopted local court policy not inconsistent with existing statutory law as interpreted by case law, is presumed to be one for all purposes unless petitioner demonstrates otherwise. Petitioner has not so demonstrated. Accordingly, we conclude respondent court did not abusе its discretion in denying the peremptory challenge as untimely.
(People
v.
Bean
(1988)
Disposition
The petition is denied.
Turner, P. J., and Boren, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 29, 1992.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Petitioner concedes he is aware of these court rules.
“[A]n oral or written motion without notice supported by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury or an oral statement under oath that the judge ... is prejudiced . . . .”
In a footnote of his memorandum of points and authorities, petitioner asserted that the family law department direct calendaring system was in reality an assignment to a specific department rather than to a specific judge. Petitioner provided no evidentiary support for this contention.
Petitioner argues that under the family law department direct calendaring system, “cases are, in reality, assigned to a department and not to a specific judge,” because one judge (not Judge Kaufman) who had been recently reassigned to a department, other than family law, did not take his cases with him. In contrast, respondent court, in its opposition to this petition, provided a declaration from Judge Kaufman to the effect that he had been “assigned to Department 43, Family Law Departments,” for at least three years, expected to continue in that assignment for the “indefinite future,” had handled all the dissolution matters which came
*153
before him, and could not recall ever transferring a case to another judge. Petitioner presented no competent evidence in the trial court to support his argument and Judge Kaufman’s declaration was not presented in the trial court. Accordingly, neither is properly before us.
Mission Imports
v.
Superior Court, Inc.
v.
Superior Court
(1982)