55 P. 971 | Or. | 1899
after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is urged : First, that a city, like a sovereign state or county, which is an agency of the state, is not required to pay interest unless self-imposed ; and, second, that the common council was without power or authority under the charter to pass said ordinance requiring the city to pay interest at the rate of eight per cent, upon indorsed warrants. These propositions are combated by plaintiff, who urges (1) that a city is liable for the payment of interest under general law like an individual; (2) that
“Counties are,” says Mr. Dillon, “involuntary political or civil divisions of the state, created by general laws to aid in the administration of government. Their powers are not uniform in all the states, but these generally relate to the administration of justice, the support of the poor, the establishment and repair of highways. All are matters of state as distinguished from municipal concern. They are purely auxiliaries of the state; and to the general statutes of the state they owe their creation, and the statutes confer upon them all the powers
There naturally ensues, from the difference in method and purposes of creation, a distinction as it respects liabilities between a municipal corporation proper and the quasi corporation; and it is well settled that the municipality is subject to a much larger range of liabilities, both of omission and commission, than a corporation of the quasi class: Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4 ed.), §§ 26, 966. See, also, Esberg Cigar Co. v. City of Portland, 34 Or. 282
Affirmed.