7 Ind. App. 399 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1893
The appellants sued the appellees, declaring on several promissory notes. One note was for the sum of $1,399.12. There were eight other notes for the sum of $103.36 each, and one note for the sum of $103.37.
The appellees answered the complaint jointly and severally. The first and second paragraphs alleged payment, and the third alleged that after the 'execution of the notes the appellees made an assignment under the laws of the State of Indiana, for the benefit of their creditors; that after such assignment they made a proposition to
The appellants replied (1) the general denial, and (2) specially to the third paragraph, admitting the assignment for the benefit of creditors and the signing on their part of the composition agreement, but charge that at the time the composition agreement was signed appellees agreed, in .writing, and as a part thereof, that the signing of such composition should not invalidate the pledge of certain merchandise held by appellants for the security of their claims; that appellees have failed to comply with such composition agreement, and that appellants are entitled to treat it as rescinded, and recover on their notes.
No question is raised as to the sufficiency of any of the pleadings, and we have deemed it unnecessary to give but the substance thereof.
There was a trial by jury, and at the conclusion of the hearing of the evidence the appellants dismissed the first paragraph of their complaint. The. court then, of its own motion, instructed the jury as follows: “The evidence in the cause establishes the defense set up in the third paragraph of defendants’ answer. You will therefore find for the defendants.”
A verdict was returned in accordance with such instruction, and final judgment in favor of appellees followed.
The only assignment of error is the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
“In order not to vitiate the collateral held by Shinkle & Kreis, we hereby agree that the signing of the compromise of Adams & Shearman by Shinkle & Kreis will in no way affect their ownership of collateral (held by us and belonging to them) of the 77 half barrels stock mince-meat; 17,248 lbs., at 9 cents, $1,522.32; and 20 quarter barrels, 2,880 lbs., at 9 cents, $259.20; total, $1,811.52, given by Shearman Bros, to secure amount due
Adams and Shearman executed a chattel mortgage, as agreed, and their assignee was discharged by the court. On the third day of June, 1886, when the composition agreement went into effect, there was a balance due Shinkle and Kreis, on the first note of Shearman Bros., of $1,352.14, and on the second note $952.11, and on both notes of $2,304.25.
A controversy arose between appellants and appellees as to the construction of the composition agreement, and of the agreement signed by Adams and Shearman. Appellants contended that the 25 per cent, should be calculated on the balance due them on both notes, and that the mince-meat stock was pledged to secure both of the Shearman Bros.’ notes, while the appellees contended that the 25 per cent, should be calculated upon the balance due on the first note only, and that the mince-meat stock was pledged to secure the second note only, and that when that note should be paid, the remainder of the mince-meat stock, if any, should be the property of appellees free from said pledge.
On November 22, 1886, the appellees sent by mail to appellants two notes signed by Adams and Shearman, dated June 3d, 1886, each for the sum of $169.02, one due in eight and one in eighteen months with 6 per cent, interest, being twenty-five per cent, of the amount due on the first note. Shinkle and Kreis refused to accept these notes but returned them to appellees.
At the time this action was commenced, February 17th, 1888, both of the notes which appellees sent to appellants by mail were past due. Appellees did not pay any money into court, nor did they bring their compromise notes into court with their pleading, nor did they on the trial keep good their tender either of notes or money, but simply introduced such notes in evidence.
We are informed, by appellants’ brief, that the trial court was of the opinion that the collateral' agreement above set dut gave an improper preference to the appellants as against the other creditors of Adams and Shear-man, and that the appellees had tendered sufficient performance under the composition agreement.
It will be conceded that if the debtor performs his part of a composition agreement no action will lie for the original debt. Pontious v. Durflinger, 59 Ind. 27.
But if he fails in good faith to perform his part, the creditor has his action upon the original debt. Kahn v. Gumberts, 9 Ind. 430.
The theory of the law in a composition contract is, that it is an agreement between the creditors themselves, as well as between them and the debtor. They agree that each shall receive the sum or security stipulated and nothing more, and it is on this consideration that the debtor shall be wholly discharged from all the debts owing the creditors, who signed the composition contract.
If any creditor secure a secret preference, an element is introduced into the contract to which the other creditors have not assented, and it is no longer their agreement, and they may treat the composition as null and void whenever such discovery is made. So careful are the courts to preserve the highest degree of good faith among the creditors that the debtor himself may, on the grounds of public policy, set up the preference to defeat his own composition agreement. Kahn v. Gumberts, supra; McFarland, Exec., v. Garber, 10 Ind. 151; Evans v. Gallantine, 57 Ind. 367 (371).
We fail to see how these rules can have any controlling effect on the case in hearing.
Even if it be conceded that the collateral contract is voidable by reason of a preference given the appellees, it was voluntarily performed in part, and to the extent of the performance, it is binding upon them. They are not entitled to have the moneys, so voluntarily paid, returned or credited upon the notes in suit.
The small notes which were given in lieu of the second note, and which are declared upon, have never been paid in full. The appellees will not be permitted to repudiate both the composition contract and the collateral contract. The part performance of one will not operate as a discharge of the other.
There is still another serious objection to the instruction of the court in directing a verdict for the appellees. It assumes that the composition agreement, as a defense, had been established as to the whole complaint remaining after the first paragraph was dismissed. The evidence entirely fails to support such defense. If the tender of the notes was a good tender in the first instance,
When a stipulation to be performed or a thing to be done rests upon one party to a contract, and is independent of any obligation resting upon the opposite party, the tender must not only be strictly made but must be kept good in order to effect a discharge of the contract. Eichholtz v. Taylor, 88 Ind. 38; Smith v. Felton, 85 Ind. 223; Hazelett v. Butler University, 84 Ind. 230.
Every composition, to be complete, must have in it the element of accord and satisfaction. An accord is the proper term for an agreement between a single creditor and the debtor for the discharge of the debt, by accepting something other than agreed upon, or by payment of a less sum. ' Accord and satisfaction is the proper term for such agreement, consummated by actual payment and acceptance in full. A composition is an engagement in which several of the creditors (not necessarily all, but a number) agree with the debtor, and in effect with . each other, that the debtor shall be released on making the partial payments he proffers. Abbot’s Law Diet.
An accord without satisfaction is not good. Whart. Cont., section 999.
As a result of the judgment rendered below, we have this anomalous condition:
The appellees were permitted to go out of court without ever having paid or performed the composition agreement, although such agreement was permitted to defeat a recovery.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain the motion for a new trial.