Aftеr Jerry Shinault was dismissed from his position as Cleveland County District 2 road foreman, he sued the Board of County Commissioners, Commissioners George Skinner, Leroy Krohmer, and Jan Collins in their official capacities, and George Skinner in his individual capacity. Shinault brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his dismissal deprived him of liberty and property without due process, his right to equal protection of the laws, and his associational rights under the First Amendment. He also brought a claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as state law claims for malicious prosecutiоn, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all claims except the First Amendment claim. The court also deniеd Skinner’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Both sides appeal. Skinner appeals the denial of qualified immunity. All defendants appeal the denial of their summary judgment motion on thе First Amendment claim. Shinault
Background
The facts of this ease revolve around the 1986 and 1990 elections for the Cleveland County Board of County Commissioners. Prior to the 1986 election, Jerry Shinault and defendant Leroy Krohmer had been close personal friends. In the 1986 election, Kroh-mer lost his reelection bid for District 3 County Commissioner to Neil Steely (Kroh-mer regained his post in 1990). After the election, Shinault informеd Krohmer that he had agreed to go to work for Steely. Kroh-mer became highly upset because he thought that Shinault had worked against him in the 1986 County Commissioner’s race. The two have nоt been friends since that time.
In the 1990 election, Shinault ran against defendant George Skinner for District 2 County Commissioner. After Skinner defeated Shinault in the Democratic primary, he sought Shinault’s support in the general election. Shinault agreed to support Skinner, and to that end Shinault built and hauled signs, provided transportation, and introduced Skinner to people around the county. After winning the general election, Skinner offered Shinault employment as the District 2 road foreman. Shinault accepted and began work in January 1991.
The very month that Skinner hired Shi-nault, Krohmer requested a criminal investigation of Shinault by the Cleveland County District Attorney’s Office. Skinner was aware of this investigation. Seven months later, after the initial investigation cleared Shinault of аny wrongdoing, Krohmer initiated a second investigation. Krohmer told Skinner that two citizens had complained that the driveway of a county employee had been paved using county equipment and materials. At the time, District 2 employees had just finished an oñ and chip paving job for the Little Axe School District. Krohmer and Skinner drove past the school and discoverеd that the driveway of county employee James Bruesch had recently been oiled and chipped. In a subsequent meeting with Skinner, Shinault admitted that he was aware that county employees had worked on Bruesch’s driveway and that he had been present during at least part of the project.
Skinner dismissed Shinault in September, 1991, for using county equipment and materials tо pave Bruesch’s driveway. The Cleveland County District Attorney filed criminal charges against Shinault for embezzlement of county property, a charge of which Shinault was later acquittеd. Over the course of these events, Skinner issued various press releases concerning the investigation, criminal charges, and acquittal.
Shinault argues that his dismissal, the criminal charges, аnd the press releases were actually an underhanded attempt by the County Commissioners to discredit a past, and perhaps future, political opponent. In support of his interpretation of the events, Shinault claims that the equipment used to pave Bruesch’s driveway was on loan to the school district, that the oil and chips were the property of the school district, and that the paving was done at the direction of a school district employee. He explains that Bruesch had allowed county road crews to use his driveway and adjacent storage area for thirty years. Over that time, county officials repaired Bruesch’s drive using county equipment and materials without the county taking any punitive аction against the responsible employees. Shinault also claims that another county employee used materials and equipment from the same Little Axe school prоject to pave his own driveway without being fired, criminally prosecuted, or made the subject of Skinner’s press releases. Moreover, Shinault claims that shortly before the incident thаt led to his termination, he repaired the driveway of Blake Virgin, Skinner’s son-in-law, at the direction of Virgin and Skinner. Given these events and the political circumstances at the time, Shinault arguеs that his dismissal was the result of something rotten in Cleveland County.
Skinner maintains that this court has appellate jurisdiction over the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. All defendants rеquest that we exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment on Shinault’s First Amendment claim. Shinault argues that we lack jurisdiction over the qualified immunity issue, but claims in the alternative that if we hold that we have such jurisdiction, we should then exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over his due process, equal protеction, and federal conspiracy claims as well.
Before we can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over any claim in this case, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over the denial of Skinner’s qualified immunity: without that “hook,” we cannot exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the rest of the claims. Interloсutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity are permissible. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
Claims of qualified immunity are analyzed under a two-part framework. The court first determines whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a statutory or constitutional right at all. Then the court assesses whether that right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that his conduct violated that right. Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dept.,
Shinault asserts that Skinner fired him for political patronage reasons. The district court first found that, based upon the events set out above, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to Skinner’s motive for firing Shinault. The court then made the two-part legal finding, citing Branti v. Finkel,
Skinner counters that, under Johnson, we should take the facts assumed by the district court as given and determine whether those facts state a violation оf clearly established law. Skinner spends most of his brief on the jurisdiction question arguing that the undisputed facts on the record do not give rise to a nexus between Shinault’s political activitiеs and his dismissal. But the relevant “assumed fact” is that Skinner fired Shinault for political patronage reasons, and Skinner does not contest the purely legal holdings that such an action violаtes Shinault’s First Amendment right of association or that such a right was clearly established at the time of
Because we lack jurisdiction over Skinner’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, we cannot exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review any of the defendants’ or Shinault’s other claims. These appeals are therefore DISMISSED.