97 U.S. 68 | SCOTUS | 1878
SHILLABER
v.
ROBINSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*71 Mr. Michael H. Cardozo for the appellant.
Mr. Philip S. Crooke and Mr. John H. Bergen, contra.
*76 MR. JUSTICE MILLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal, in fact the only, defence which merits any consideration in this case, is that by the trust-deed which Robinson made to Noble under the decree of the court, and by the sale which Noble made in conformity to the terms of the decree, and of that deed, Shillaber's rights were completely divested in the land; and since it did not bring, at that sale, as much money as was due to Robinson, which, by the terms of both the decree and the deed of trust, was to be paid to him out of the proceeds of that sale, nothing was left for Shillaber in the matter.
The decree in the Illinois suit, in which Theodore Shillaber had appeared after his father's death, is binding and conclusive on both parties. The deed of trust made by Robinson to Noble is in accordance with the decree, and conferred an authority on him to sell the land. The purpose of this sale, as expressed in the deed of trust and the decree, was to pay to Robinson the $4,249.58, which was a first lien on the land, and the balance into the court, for the use of Shillaber.
Much discussion has been had in the case as to the nature of the conveyance to Noble, one party insisting that it is a simple *77 mortgage with power of sale, and the other that it is, under the statutes of New York, the creation of a valid trust in lands. The point of this discussion is found in the question, whether the sale by Noble, under that instrument, was valid or was void. The counsel of defendant insists that Noble became vested with a perfect title to the land by the deed of Robinson, and that his sale and conveyance are valid whether he pursued the direction of the deed in regard to advertising or not; and that, if any such advertising were necessary, there was no usual notice, nor any provided by law, for such sales in the State of New York.
It is shown by the evidence that Noble did publish a notice that the three pieces of land in the three different counties would be sold on a day mentioned, at Montague Hall, in the city of Brooklyn. This notice was published, for six weeks preceding the day appointed for the sale, in the "Brooklyn Standard," a weekly paper printed in Kings County. But the statutes of New York, then in force, prescribed publication of such notice for twelve weeks successively before the sale.
If the instrument under which Noble acted is a mortgage with power of sale, it is beyond dispute that the sale is void, because it was not made in conformity with the terms on which alone he was authorized to sell. That the sale, under such circumstances, is void, is too well established to admit of controversy. We refer specially to the recent case in this court of Bigler v. Waller, 14 Wall. 302. The list of authorities cited by the appellant are to the same effect.
Without entering into the argument of the question whether the instrument under which Noble acted is in all respects a mortgage, the case of Lawrence v. The Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (13 N.Y. 200), shows that it is an instrument which, for the purposes of the sale under the power which it contains, comes under the provisions of the statute we have cited as regards publication of notice. It also decides that a sale made without such notice is void. It is the well-settled doctrine of courts of equity, that a conveyance of land, for the purpose of securing payment of a sum of money, is a mortgage, if it leaves a right to redeem upon payment of the debt. If there is no power of sale, the equity of redemption remains until it is foreclosed by *78 a suit in chancery, or by some other mode recognized by law. If there is a power of sale, whether in the creditor or in some third person to whom the conveyance is made for that purpose, it is still in effect a mortgage, though in form a deed of trust, and may be foreclosed by sale in pursuance of the terms in which the power is conferred, or by suit in chancery. These instruments generally give specific directions regarding the notice to be given, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. In some States, the statute prescribes the manner of giving this notice, and in such case it must be complied with. In either case, the validity of the sale being wholly dependent on the power conferred by the instrument, a strict compliance with its terms is essential.
If this is not a mortgage to which the notice of the New York statute is applicable, we do not see that the defendant's position is improved by that circumstance; for there is, then, no provision for a sale or foreclosure of the equity of Shillaber, but by a decree of an equity court. This has never been had, and it still remains that there has been no valid execution of the trust reposed in Noble by the deed. If the matter had remained in this condition, Shillaber would, on payment to Robinson of the $4,249.58, with interest, have had a right, enforceable in this suit, to have a conveyance of the New York land by Noble to him. But neither the conveyance by Robinson, which remained an escrow, nor that to Noble, was ever placed on record; and Robinson, in whom, according to the records of the proper counties in New York, the title still remained, sold all these lands to persons who, as innocent purchasers for a valuable consideration, now hold them by a good title. This title is equally beyond the reach of Robinson, of Shillaber, and of the court. Indeed, although Robinson alleges in his answer that the purchase of John A. Robinson was made for his benefit, he seems to have attached no importance to it; for he does not aver that John A. Robinson ever conveyed to him, nor does he, while giving copies of all the deeds on which he relies, including the deed to John A. Robinson, show any evidence of a conveyance from John A. Robinson to him.
The defendant, therefore, when he sold and conveyed this land to the parties who now hold it under him, did it in violation *79 of the rights of Shillaber, as settled by the Illinois decree. By that decree, Robinson had no right to sell. By the conveyance made to Noble under that decree, he had nothing left in the New York lands but a lien for his $4,249.58. The sale by Noble was void, and conferred no rights on Robinson whatever. His belief in its validity did not change the matter. By availing himself of the title which was in him originally, and which appeared by the records to be there yet, he sold the lands for twice as much as his lien, and received the money. That he must account to Shillaber in some way is too plain for argument. If Shillaber could, by paying his debt to Robinson, redeem the lands from their present holders, it is the relief which he would prefer, and to which as against Robinson he would be entitled. But Robinson has put this out of his power, by a wrongful sale and conveyance to innocent purchasers.
There is no evidence to show that the lands are now worth any more than Robinson sold them for; no evidence that they were worth more when he sold them. His answer gives the precise sum received by him for each parcel of land, and the date when he received it. He probably believed the land was his own when he sold it; but, as we have seen, he must be considered as holding such title as he had in trust, first for his own debt due from Shillaber, and the remainder for the use of Shillaber. Treating him, then, as trustee, he must account for the money received for the lands, according to the trusts on which he held them. The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing Shillaber's bill must be reversed, and the case remanded to that court, with instructions to render a decree on the basis of charging Robinson with the sums received by him for the lands, and interest thereon until the day of the decree, deducting therefrom the sum found due him from Shillaber by the Illinois decree, with interest to the same time, and rendering a decree for the difference in favor of Shillaber against Robinson, with costs; and it is
So ordered.
