*1 arguments sidered the oral of the presented SHILL, that were to us. Based on this Jeanette T. consideration, Plaintiff-Respondent, review and we concur with Appeals except Cross-Appellant, the decision of the Court of respect. in one minor opinion Ap Douglas SHILL, The of the Court of K. peals states: Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Respondent, opinion The record contains a 1981 letter County Attorney County from the attorney opined Commissioners. The Employees System county authority The Public Retirement that the had no over the Idaho, acting By Through Stanger property. road across the Retirement Board of the Public Em Id. at ployees System, Retirement Defendant. Appeals The letter to which the Court of referred was submitted as an attachment No. 16780. support to an affidavit filed in of a motion Supreme Court of Idaho. summary judgment by Stangers. for The letter was not offered in evidence at Nov. part the trial and did not become record of evidence considered court. It was included in the clerk's record part papers support submitted in summary judgment. of the motion for Appeals including Court of was in error in support this letter as evidence to its conclu- county asserting any sion "that the rights is not beyond Stanger to the road boundary." Id. There is sufficient other support evidence to considering this conclusion without county the letter of the attor- ney. of the trial court is opinion reversed on the basis of the Appeals, excluding Court of reference to county attorney
the letter from the county commissioners. The case is re
mandedto the trial court with directionto judgment granting appellants enter in-
junctive prayed relief as in their counter claim. appellants. attorney Costs to No fees on
review. *2 Smith, Fletcher,
Parsons, Stone & Bur- ley, defendant-appellant, cross-respon- for argued. dent. William Parsons Falls, Stoker, plaintiff-re- Jeff Twin spondent, cross-appellant.
SHEPARD, Chief Justice. proceedings This is a continuation 433, P.2d Shill v. involved a divorce which proper- the determination ty benefits. The remit- 2, 1979, titur of issued October this Court until October and was not respondent an amended filed complaint seeking a redetermination of the interest in the Thereafter the district court benefits. granted summary judgment November on adjudicating prop- erty interest in the retirement ben- efits. We reverse remand. parties Septem- hereto were married early Douglas and in ber department fire employed Idaho, began Burley, contributions Firemen’s wages from his divorc- were Retirement Fund. 1977, ed entered October decree Ramsey, Ramsey See Fund. Douglas completed had time employment 19 ¥2 provisions Department. Fire Under six Inexplicably it was not until statutes, Shill was entitled to later, 10, 1985, October the Idaho Firemen’s Retire- *3 complaint Shill filed an amended Jeanette 14,1.C., Fund, only if ment Title Ch. but seeking a and distribution of recalculation years employ- completed he had such Following the en- the retirement benefits. prior completing ment. If he terminated in try of the of divorce October decree only have the he would received 1977, Douglas chosen to had continue contributions he had made. Department, Fire his work with the decree entered the divorce was make contributions and continued to judg- that of the October Fund. Firemen’s Retirement After com- dealing ment with the division of the service, Douglas Shill retired on munity not until property was entered April By delaying his retirement 1982. March decision court that the continuing past 20-year to work the possessed only held the since retirement, pension benefits increased the the cash surrender value of to receive 40 to fire- ($8,089.24),
the all of which contributions salary. man’s during marriage, had been contributed the therefore, Upon the trial court on motion community prop- such as was characterized 7, 1986, granted summary judg- November erty equally and ordered divided between Shill. favor of Jeanette Hence, parties. the was the cash awarded one-half of surrender val- appeal principal issue on this is ue of Retire- Shill’s Firemen’s community interest in Mr. whether the ment Fund. be benefits should deter- Shill’s retirement mined, valued, as of the and divided date Upon appeal to this Court the decision Shill v. the are reversed, the or at the time the court was district supra, and for the first actually hold that the trial time contin- received. We gent incorrectly rec- court determined the communi- non-vested benefits were ognized as divisible ty interest the value thereof Idaho. This Court there indicated that a actually time re- benefits were lump as of the date sum award of divorce ceived. distribution, preferred was method of outset, At the note that had the trial we but the Court realized such a cash-out original proceedings court divorce might always be It method feasible. present determined the then value of the was the community held that where owns fund, community property in the assets, present few or when value calcula- spouse could have non-employee' been difficult, appor- tions were inaccurate or an equal That awarded assets value. non-retiring spouse might tionment present pen- value of the be if as and when made effective the actual court, sion fund was before were received the retir- rejected by then the trial court Therefore, ing spouse. decision of reason of erroneous view the law. its reversed, and the trial court was cause was re- That of the trial decision remanded, versed. equitable to effect an dis- ... order [i]n Further, had remand matter pos- position of the retirement benefits then diligently pursued, been trial court community, marital sessed will eq- may have to make such an been able necessary to remand this matter being required to uitable without division the parties to allow trial court attempted division enter the morass of an opportunity present such evidence by the rights. dispo- the issue of the proper it deems reach the trial court for time matter did parties' community property
sition of the time, options were limited Firemen’s the second its Retirement disposition because of the sion benefits which had accrued following assets awarded under original decree. date of divorce. Thus, preferred cash-out method of question presented thus pension division has been thwarted in the impression one of first in Idaho. In a instant action. Such an immediate settle- divorce action in Idaho the trial court has
ment would
disentangled
parties,
have
equitably
broad discretion to
divide the
fully
would
finally
have
divided community property. However, that dis
marital
any
without
contin-
strictly
cretion is
circumscribed
our stat
gency.
utes which delineate
and commu
nity property interests. All property
It is
by waiting
asserted that
six
by spouse
owned
marriage
sepa
before
years following
remand, respondent
rate property.
Property
I.C. 32-903.
ac
§
*4
procrastinated in the assertion of her
quired during marriage
presumed
to be
rights, and the cause should have been
community property. Stanger
Stanger,
v.
prosecution.
dismissed for want of
A trial
(1977);
98 Idaho
Speer
P.2d 1126
power
has inherent
to dismiss for
Quinlan,
v.
96 Idaho
The court continued: court case from the record in this problem disposition It clear The second fol- additional of work assets twelve of the retirement divorce, some which included appeals lowing is that court and the court of raises, plus pay union em- twelve to fourteen award a share both formulas 120 negotiations
contract
improved
for an
which would have been received if the em
plan, brought
benefits
about the increase
ployee spouse had taken retirement at his
paid
in retirement
Berry.
i.e.,
benefits
to Mr.
eligibility,
April
first
Berry
post-divorce
These
increases cannot be
supra;
Berry,
Marriage of Rister,
v.
In re
Berry,
awarded to Mrs.
for to do so. supra; Rogers Rogers, supra;
v.
Graham
Berry’s separate
would
prop-
invade Mr.
Graham, supra;
v.
In re Marriage Gill
erty,
more,
which cannot be done.
29 Cal.3d
Cal.Rptr. 493,
174
In the instant case that date
A similar decision was reached in Madrid
only
six months after the decree of di
Madrid,
v.
101 N.M.
should consider
the retire-
of time that case has
undecid
rights
property disposition
Court,
ed
I have concluded to now
decreeing
and
that the
hold the
doubt,
Shepard.
vote with Justice
When
rights to the
tenants
com-
leadership
I am reminded that it
employee spouse
mon. If and when the
Shepard displayed
Justice
his 80
does obtain retirement benefits the trial
opinion
unanimous
in Cheney v. Palos
court can then determine what
of Verdes,
897,
(1983),
104 Idaho
*8 pears been since we heard oral ings tered to Justice Bakes in Shill I. Obvious- vember guidance given ably puts to reach a consensus authored Shill which was Shill Ramsey dissent and also with Justice may majority Bakes’ expressed his disfavor with Justice Bakes’ Today, today Justice no more able today’s majority in Ramsey with Justice I would add that the well surmise that it has not been II I, to have vigorous supra, at is before Ramsey and in than at the time of and holds out of almost ten Bakes, notwithstanding 1987. Counsel for both sides was over and closely I, opinion: the trial court for doing mind the dissent of the author of us, and, case, again which the Shepard, agree it, opinion. followed, so in one fell with his very long, taunting argument majority holding notwithstanding actual and commend- trial court since Shill explicit in I find Ramsey. commands a dissented is now vot- reasoning fact, proceed- adminis- that he on myself swoop easy No- has ap- is. I, ity down at fortably get doctrines are sought. and the “law of the case.” property asset property interest attributable to those vidual’s service and is also a pensation accrued during coverture. other than fire Douglas Shill’s contributions to the fund were made from his Kohny v. contributions attributable to fund income from sources The Justices who HUNTLEY, Justice, dissenting. have gratuity [******] fighter’s rules of frequently pages I the Dunbar, but a form of deferred com employee ignored I.C. interest in the res following is a §§ judicata, pages comprise today’s major- been the extent 32-903 and 906. because way contributions reason strong proponents wages, 436 and 1008: rules were laid of the result stare Today they of the indi acquired decisis, uncom- is not asset. 12 P. fund any A in ly Justice Bakes now sees more merit Factors which will affect the value of espoused by Shepard the views Justice community property couple’s contingent previously, presently he and sees than did fund include the interest Shepard’s merit in views than more Justice employee-spouse will possibility that the Huntley’s. in Justice satisfying the change jobs die or before vesting; requirements for time position delivering of Cast fact employee might that the divorced vote, swing help impressed cannot defer op- that an beyond retirement the date open-mindedness and with Justice Bakes monthly with early tional comprehend the ability fully his to now available; and the fact that pension is that here- Shepard’s merit in Justice views maintenance of him, subsequent to the divorce myself as well. escaped tofore and interest Therefore, employee’s of being cognizant full well likely average per year fund will be made from the em- benefits at the rate of 2% or, ployee’s separate property, if he or wage of state for the first remarries, property she from the of a (40% total), twenty years of service subsequent community. per year years rate increases to 5% [******] 21-25 (65% total). proach ties the risk that the is to reserve division of the actual over benefit The other method and when [******] advantage and divide the actual allocates when received. pension rights they jurisdiction equally accrue is that this reserving jurisdiction dividing monetary rights may between until effecting monetary retire- never par- ap- whether the added enhancement $240 four more end of the 20th The issue I would affirm the whether, per benefit and 4/24 month) when a divorce occurs near the years, primarily (here amounting year separate property. by thereby increasing $240 and the fireman works separate property about raised is 2%4 $400,1 by of the trial to about the 3% appeal court that the community interest is deter- vest and enables the court to better de- proportion termine the actual years the mined a ratio with the service that were derived commu- while married as the numerator and the from nity property. (Emphasis supplied.) years of total service as the denominator. importantly, Most Justice Bakes as au- quoted approval
thor of Shill I II. THE BACKGROUND an Arizona case on all with the in- fours approved stant fact situation and the for- proceedings This is a continuation of the mula which the district court used in this in Shill v. is, case as ordered on one-half (1979), which involved a divorce of the fraction years marriage community proper- the determination of the years over the number of of service. ty interest benefits. Loan, In Van Loan v. Van 116 Ariz. complaint Shill filed an amended on Octo- the Arizona 10, 1985, seeking ber a redetermination of Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s pen- award to the wife divorce of a sion benefits. share of her military husband’s retire ment benefits. The joined husband had Douglas Jeanette Shill and Shill were Air prior Force marriage to the September April, married continued to work with the Air Force 1958, Douglas City Shill was hired during the year entire seventeen mar Idaho, Burley, department fire and com- riage. prior divorced making menced contributions from his time the payment husband’s un wages to Re- the State of Idaho Firemen’s der the terms vested. The trial Fund, pursuant tirement to Ti- established court awarded the wife “an interest chapter tle of the Idaho Code. On pay equal the retirement in an amount 24, 1977, appellant October one-half fraction 17 over the num were divorced. At the time ber of served [husband] Douglas completed Shill had nineteen-and- Air Force if and when received him.” employment City one-half with the 100 Idaho at department fire and had been promoted position of Fire Chief.
I. THE ISSUE
*9
pension
Douglas Shill was entitled to
Under the Idaho Firemen’s Retirement
Fund, a fireman accumulates retirement
benefits from the Idaho Firemen’s Retire-
illustration,
twenty years
$800
an
1. For ease of
I use
state
fit accrued in the first
was
$2,000
(The
wage
per
figure
actual
month.
$400.
the last four
was
and that accrued in
Thus,
$1,896).
the
time of retirement was
bene-
Fund,
14,1.C.,
past
Title
work
only
twenty year
ch.
the threshold
re-
twenty ye^rs
had completed
employ- quirement,
he
Mr. Shill’s
benefits in-
ment as a fireman.
If he had
terminated
creased from
40 to
of the aver-
prior
completing twenty years,
to
he
age
would
salary,
approximate-
fireman’s
or from
only
have
actual
received the
ly
$1,200
contributions
per
to
per
$800
month
month.
portion
he had
In
origi-
made.
that
judgment dealing
nal
with the division of
III.
1, 1978,
the
of March
Mr.
by waiting
Shill asserts that
six
the trial court held that since Mr. Shill years
following
pro
Mrs. Shill
possessed only
to receive the cash
rights,
crastinated in the assertion of her
surrender
value of
contributions
and the cause should have been dismissed
($8,089.24),all of which had been contribut-
prosecution.
for want of
either
during
ed
such
marriage,
was charac- party could
the case
have noticed
for trial
community property
terized as
and ordered
A
following the remand.
trial court has
equally.
divided
was award-
power
pros
inherent
to dismiss want of
ed one half the cash surrender value of Mr.
prosecute
ecution if
fails to
rights in
Shill’s
fund.
diligence.
v.
reasonable
McAllister
That decision of the District Court was Erickson,
(1927).
45 Idaho
method be feasible. In further hold that the action is not barred cases: these by any statute of limitations or the doctrine the trial court consider should withhold- of laches. ing rights prop- the retirement from the erty disposition decreeing and IV. rights hold to the benefits as I, this held that a Court tenants in If common. and when the fund, non-vested, a whether vested is employee-spouse does obtain retirement compensation, form of deferred benefits the trial court can then deter- employment period prior attributable to the mine what were accumulated, in which it and which is a community property derived from community asset to extent that commu payments accordingly. divide the nity efforts ben contributed efits. Shill v. It light that this Court re- also, Griggs See manded this matter to court for a Griggs, 107 Idaho determination of the Ramsey v. Ramsey, the Firemen’s Retirement Fund. Holdings par California cases propo allel these Idaho cases state 9, 1985,
On October Jean- sition as follows: complaint filed an ette Shill amended seek- a recalculation distribution of Where the total number served Douglas employee-spouse substantial retirement benefits. Shill chose to computing factor in the amount of retire- continue his work with fire de- entry ment benefits be received partment after the the divorce decree, spouse, is entitled to have and continued make contribu- length Retirement Fund. its share based of ser- tions Firemen’s continuing performed vice behalf of the commu- By postponing retirement
125 asset to the extent community property length of proportion to the total nity acquired during coverture. necessary to earn those benefits. service community years between of The relation Guy, 98 Guy 1007. also 599 P.2d at See provides years to total of service service Travelers retirement gauge a fair of that of Johnson, 336, 544 P.2d Ins. Co. v. community ef- benefits attributable fort. deciding puts the issue as one When Judd, Cal.App.3d Marriage In re (from percent to forty whether the increase 522-23, Cal.Rptr. wage) is average state sixty percent of the bar, in this Returning to the case at during marriage or whether part earned in appeal we are asked to review product of the husband’s totally it is court which ruled: the district efforts, that that issue it is clear entitled, as a mat- is [T]hat I. I already decided Shill has been law, community ter of to one-half of increase from post-divorce found that fund, interest in the defendant’s forty percent value to mere cash surrender and that such interest is to be deter- months after six which accrued benefits mined the husband’s per- of work product was multiplied by received a fraction which nineteen-and-a-half during the formed has as its numerator the total number of marriage. years of years employed the defendant was high- Similarly, equally clear that it Burley Department during Fire the mar- only by virtue percentage er was earned riage, and as its denominator the total work; years of the first nineteen-and-a-half number of of the defendant’s em- nineteen-and-a-half first without ployment Department. at the Fire be no years during marriage, there would applied The formula the district court higher at the ability to accumulate benefits operated in this case as follows to deter- Indeed, through level for one-half mine Jeanette’s we now face was very contingent which interest: Bakes I when Justice anticipated Skill 7,128 days fireman married as the court: wrote for ½ x fireman 8,176 employed as days the value of the will affect Factors which contingent couple’s or fund include the interest employee-spouse will possibility that the ½ .8137 40.7% x satisfying the change jobs before die or vesting; fact requirements time Thus, fixed at Jeanette's share was might defer employee that the divorced (or each month of the total benefits 40.7% op- beyond the date that month) per approximately $488.40 monthly pen- early retirement with tional (or approximately Douglas’ share at 59.3% available; sion is ... month). per Approximately $711.60 80% were held to be addition, I states “[t]he sepa- property, being Mr. Shill’s 20% dividing is to other method the for- approve I property. rate would and di- until retirement jurisdiction reserve applied by the district court. mula monetary when the actual vide benefit premise of The fundamental received.” that: monetary added). The “actual (emphasis firefighter’s A approximately in this case benefit” income from attributable to fund fund 60%), per (or $1,200 $800 month per employee contribu- other than sources (40%). month a form of gratuity is not a tions correctly followed The district accrued reason compensation deferred ruled that four-fifths and is also a Skill I when service of the individual’s *11 126 subject divi- to the final level twenty- of benefits as is the ¿hill’s
sion, fourth.2 separate and one-fifth Mr. was property. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial methodology court’s entry remand for The increases in the fund in the judgment of in accordance therewith. years instant case over of the final four remand, computation on the employment completely are not due to the should take into the consideration extent separate employee-spouse, efforts of the that the to increase benefits due a con- rather, the the to increase from tinuation of after work divorce was the forty sixty percent to state higher upon of result income based more wage years was built first twenty the greater responsibility, work or because work, during of marriage. which were The of the enhancement forty increase from sixty percent to was separate remand, property. would be On not earned the years four of work last the trial court should be to ascer- directed alone. tain whether there was an increase in work Sixteen more work did not in and or responsibility after divorce which influ- of produce itself fifty percent bene- more the enced ultimate level of benefits and increase, instead, fits. The is a deferred portion, any, sepa- calculate that the compensation for aggregate twenty- of rate of the husband. years, four years not four alone. trial On court should also straight- The issue the instant ease is $4,044.62 sum consider whether the of is an forward: Was enhancement in to entered in offset to be postponed benefits due to of favor Jeanette. the record is product aggregate total of service clear, totally suggests that there was (i.e., twenty-four years) during both to disbursed on June marriage, after or it solely was the result $27,898.55. 1979, the sum of Included in years four employ- last of Mr. Shill’s $4,044.62 represented sum which ment? proposition stands for the one-half of the cash surrender value benefits, that the enhancement in whether Firemen’s pension. Retirement Fund If 40%, from cash surrender value to fromor correct, and since the award of the per year per year, product is the 2% 5% cash surrender value fund aggregate employment. first I, may has been reversed in Shill year job equally important overcompensated sum ways mathematically nity property, 2. There two are com- second and result, pute (used court) simpler first of demonstrates formula reach- logic apportionment between commu- the same mathematical result. METHOD I
Community Separate of H years: The $800 from 1st 20 $800 -0- years $400 last 4 x x (a) $2,000 = 4 2% or 8% $160 X -0- 40(4/24) or 12% x (b) $2,000 = 200(2%i) $240 3% $1,000 $200 500(wife) Community 500(husb) Property to each ‘A Separate Property to Husband -0- TOTAL to each $500Wife $700Husb
METHOD II Wife Husband 20/24 5A x = $1,200 $1,000 = Prop. Com. or '/óx = $1,200 = Sep. Prop. V24 -0- $500 $700 $4,044.62 adjustment is made unless
the final order. The trial court should and make
directed facts ascertain adjustments, any. appropriate INTEREST
V. cross-appeal from
As to Jeanette’s previously paid bene-
denial
fits, I would reverse the remand.
court on this issue further of the time
The record establishes that as order, Douglas entry of the trial court’s $24,146.25 bene-
had received
fits, part paid he no which over to Jean-
ette. delay in though there was
Even some following
noticing this case to trial right to re-
Jeanette has not waived her previously paid her share of benefits.
ceive money had
Because husband use wife, legitimately owing pay not even over to her
and did due under his
amount which would be even case,
theory of the wife should be previ-
awarded interest on her share of the paid
ously benefits. analysis totally foregoing consist- is, ought
ent with what law what
be, and with the law of case as settled may wonder I. The bench bar
why majority fails to or distin- address
guish or the law of as set overrule this case question. —I
forth Shill I have same Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
STATE STILLWELL,
Dennis G.
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17195. Appeals of
Court of Idaho.
Nov.
