58 Ga. 590 | Ga. | 1877
Mrs. Lamar, as administratrix on the estate of her husband, sued the plaintiff in error for a piece of land, being a strip, or strips, of land, lying in what would have been President street extended, had it been extended. Mrs. Lamar claimed to the southern line of the width of the said
The plaintiff’s title consisted of an agreement in writing made between G. B. Lamar, the feoffor of 0. A. L. Lamar, plaintiff’s intestate, and Bayard, the administrator of the estate of Bayard, the feoffor, with his two sisters, heirs of Bayard, deceased, of defendant, Shiels, to divide certain lands on a certain line between them ; the deed of G. B. Lamar to 0. A. L. Lamar, and letters of administration, and an attempt to prove possession since 1845 in G. B. Lamar, 0. A. L. Lamar and the administratrix, up to the time, in 1868 or 1869, when defendant built a fence in the centre of what would have been President street extended. The defendant’s title was a deed from Bayard and his sisters, in 1868, to the land up to the southern limit of President street, if extended, at least lying, as described, south of that street.
We see no reason why this line could not be ascertained and fixed by a competent surveyor. It tells him where to begin and how to run, to what length, and where to turn, and in what direction, and the number of acres, describing adjoining lots and streets, extended or continued. Therefore we think that the objection to the introduction of the paper on the ground that the land or line is so uncertainly described that it cannot be found, is not well taken, and that it was properly read, as color of title, to the jury. 12 Ga., 431.
Where the line actually ran along the tract of land, was a question of fact for the jury, as the location of all land under descriptions in deeds, must be. On this question a surveyor — the city surveyor for Savannah, it seems, and
Other evidence was introduced, to the effect that, since 1845, a fence had been put on this line, or sheds built, covering the land up to it, and that the Lamax's had held it for several years, certainly mox’e than seven years. If they held axxy part of it, they held it up to the liixe which this deed of partition claimed for them — Code, §2681; 5 Ga., 261; 15 Ga., 545; 39 Ga., 550; 44 Ga., 607; 57 Ga., 204.
Oxx this bx’anclx of plaintiff’s title, we think the evidence sufficient to sustain the vei’dict; and this view renders it uxxnecessary to go into the other branch of it, to-wit: twenty years possession without color of title, and the presumption of a grant froxn the state, ailsing from such long occupancy.
Besides, it does not appear from any deposition accompanying the motion, that the plaintiff and his counsel did not know of the existence and effect of the deed and maps accompanying it, before and at the trial.
From the best view we can get of the whole case from the evidence disclosed in the record, the charge of the court, and the decision overruling the motion for a new trial, we conclude that no sufficient reason appears to authorize us to set aside the verdict and order a new trial over the discretion of the presiding judge.
Judgment affirmed.