24 S.E. 794 | N.C. | 1896
The issues submitted were:
(451) "1. Was plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendant?
"2. What damage is plaintiff entitled to recover?"
After the close of the evidence, and the jury had been addressed by two of the counsel for plaintiff and one for defendant, and during the address of another of the counsel for defendant, his Honor stated that, it being conceded by plaintiff that defendant had given general instruction to the chief of police to supply the prison with necessary fuel, etc., and that said authority had extended credit to the chief of police to do so, he would instruct the jury that plaintiff could not recover; and in deference thereto plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit and appealed, assigning as error this ruling of his Honor.
A summary of the evidence is set out in the opinion of Associate JusticeFurches. This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff on account of his imprisonment by defendant in a guardhouse, improperly constructed, filthy and uncomfortable, without sufficient bedclothing, with window glass out, on a cold *283 freezing winter night, from which he suffered great pain and his feet were frozen and his health greatly impaired. The court intimated the opinion, after the evidence was all in, that the plaintiff could not recover, and in deference thereto the plaintiff suffered a nonsuit and appealed.
Although this case has been tried twice below, and is here for the second time on appeal, the point is now made for the first time to dismiss the case for the reason that the complaint does not state a cause of action. To sustain this motion the defendant says (452) that this is an action against a municipal corporation and that it is necessary that the complaint should allege that the plaintiff's claim (if he has any) has been presented to defendant, and that defendant has refused to audit and pay the same, as provided in section 757 of The Code. This motion, though made at this late day, has received our careful attention and has given us some trouble. But after a thorough consideration of the matter we have come to the conclusion that section 757 does not apply to an action like this for unliquidated damages. It is true that the language of this statute is very broad: "No person shall sue any city * * * unless he shall have made a demand upon the proper municipal authorities." And the complaint shall be verified and show, first, "that the claimant presented his claim to the lawful municipal authorities to be audited and allowed, and that they had neglected to act upon it or had disallowed it." While we may have many cases in our Court where this section has been considered and sustained by dismissing actions brought without the claim having first been presented, these cases, so far as our examination has gone, have all been upon claimsex contractu; and we do not think any will be found where the demand is for damages on a claim ex delicto, nor have we been able to find any adjudicated cases in other States to aid us in our construction. But we find that all the law dictionaries which we have been able to consult define the word "audit" to apply only to claims excontractu. Abbott, Bovier, Rapalje and Lawrence. And these authorities have aided us in coming to the conclusion that this section does not apply to an action for damages like this. Indeed, we do not see how such a claim as this could be audited. It might be compromised by the parties; but this is much more than auditing the same. It is the work of both parties — the agreement of minds, a contract and not an ex parte process of auditing. For the reasons (453) assigned, we refuse to dismiss on the motion of the defendant.
This action was here at Spring Term, 1895, reported in
Barbee testified that he was in this guardhouse in December, 1892. *285 One or two panes of glass were out of the window then; the guardhouse was very filthy; no fire; very cold weather.
Rogers testified that he was in this guardhouse in the winter of 1892 and after Christmas. It was very cold — snow on the ground; was in the iron cell; blankets and mattress in the cell were not clean; no fire there; cell not clean.
Webb testified that he saw plaintiff in the cell about 7 o'clock in the morning, very cold and numb; teeth chattered. He complained of his hands, feet and body.
Guthrie testified that he visited the guardhouse about three years ago; it was cold weather; guardhouse in very bad condition, very filthy, cold and cheerless.
Woodall, a witness for the defendant, testified that he was (455) chief of police in 1893 and, with the exception of one year, ever since 1888, and on cross-examination said: that he complained to the commissioners, but not in meeting, of the guardhouse; told them it was too small and could not be properly cleaned; the commissioners started to build another guardhouse and hauled the brick, but for some reason did not build it. "From the time I was elected chief of police, in 1888, to the time Shields was in the guardhouse, neither the mayor nor any of the commissioners ever visited the guardhouse at all; did not examine to see if there was any fire or any fuel or any blankets in the guardhouse, or whether any window lights were broken out or whether the shutters were closed the night Shields was in it. The town had no guardhouse committee."
We have given a part of the testimony in the case; and it is to be seen, taking this as true and uncontradicted, whether a jury might have reasonably found a verdict for plaintiff. The greatest point of difference in the case, as presented before and as presented by the evidence now, is the condition the cell was in, the length of time it had been in this condition, the length of time it is shown that window glass had been broken out, and the actual or presumptive knowledge the city authorities had of its condition. And we must suppose that no one will contend that, if they had knowledge of the terrible condition in which this miserable concern was, and the plaintiff's health was impaired by being incarcerated in it on such a night as all the witnesses testify it to have been, the plaintiff should not recover. The general rule is that knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the principal.Bank v. Burgwyn,
New Trial.
Cited: Frisby v. Marshall,