Shields v. Martin

706 P.2d SHIELDS, Stephen individually, and as guardian

the natural father and ad li Shields,

tem of Plaintiff-

Appellant Cross-Respondent, MARTIN, Defendant-Respondent,

James

Cross-Appellant individual, Halsey, Ann an

Lauri

Defendant-Respondent, Boise, municipal Doe,

corporation; and John

detective, Defendants.

No. 15125.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April Rehearing Denied

Costs Awarded

Sept. Penland, Richard C. Boardman

Lojek & Boise, plaintiff-appellant, (argued), cross-respondent. Hull, Smith, Allyn L.

Quane, Howard & Boise, Sweeney (argued), for defendants-re- cross-appellants. spondents BISTLINE, Justice. Shields, marriage Stephen herein, Halsey and Laurie terminated

tiff which awarded in a divorce decree one-year-old Christopher, a sec- custody of years herein. A few later the ond Shields, custody in and the placed lawsuit gave rise this incident custody had while Shields of Christo- arose pher. Christopher living were

Shields Christopher day- attended a where Boise at his work. when Shields was care center simply Halsey came stated. The incident enlisted the aid of Boise where she to Boise them, The two of Martin. Police Officer herein, daycare went to the co-defendants where, copy making use of a center custody decree four-year-old superseded, Christopher in custody of placed had instructing took No. II Halsey, they jury obtained struction daycare Immediately him center. several liability: absconded, abduction, Halsey after the tak- YOU ARE THAT INSTRUCTED ing Christopher with her. persons where two or more unite in an trial, evidence introduced at There was another, wrong act which constitutes a believe, liberty which the it, intending at the time to commit believe, Martin and did advised the performing it under circumstances which daycare operator that the document center fairly charge intending them with binding Christopher and that was valid and follow, consequences they incur a relinquished. Martin also told for acts daycare operator that she could not call each and all of the participants. delivery before the of the child to Shields The law does not require injured Halsey. party establish injury how much of the Later, Christopher notified that when by person was done one and how much abducted, Shields contacted Mar- had been injury was done another. tin, custody, true facts as told him the Rather, permits injured it party help finding Christopher. requested and treat all concerned in injury jointly and would not fur- flatly Martin refused respond plain- and all are liable to to the eventually nish information. Shields damages. tiff in a total sum as All those Christopher and sub- found and recovered actively participate who wrongful in a this action to recover sequently initiated act, by cooperation request, or or who Christopher. and for damages for himself encouragement wrong- lend aid or to the complaint Christopher and Shields doer, ratify adopt or and acts his joint and several alleged the benefit, equally their are with him. liable wrongful Halsey for the abduc- Martin and agreement Express necessary, is not Christopher sought recovery tion of required all is that there should allegedly incurred both damages design understanding, be a common or answer, filing an did Halsey, after tiffs. though it be a tacit one. even person appear at trial either appeared trial and Martin counsel. refused in fa- The court the instruction represented by counsel. forms, special vor of two verdict treated the tortious conduct of the two conference, over At the instructions being separate two and dis- defendants re- plaintiffs’ objection, the district court jury in- causes of actions: give plaintiffs’ requested tinct tortious fused to al aas tiff’s then tion anwered swered the above Martin violate Plaintiff ages. tions then Martin’s swered the above tions Constitutional rights? Martin’s conduct the then Martin violate Plaintiff ted to us in Constitutional damages result of please ^[3] Constitutional please please if QUESTION QUESTION ANSWER: ANSWER- If QUESTION QUESTION ANSWER: ANSWER: QUESTION If If Special We. the and and any, the above you actions you you proceed Special sustained 4. answer answer answered the above alleged answered the above answered the above answer and Officer jury, performed Verdict Form No. 1 rights? arid question question NO. What question NO. 3: Were NO, Was proceed Question NO. NO. Verdict rights? answer the Question Question proximate by Stephen proceed by Question Martin's violation of Plain- 4: Question 2: I: 5: Stephen Plaintiff $ 1.B5K.5H YES Did YES “Yes." “No." YES 10 NO 2 “No." Form No. 1 as follows: to Did to Question 5. good No. No. 2. is the total amount Defendant James cause Defendant James Defendant .lames Defendant .James questions No. 4. Shields? Shields' then omit Ques- then omit question Stephen question ^[2] then omit question Shields’ 3. faith? If If NO II) NO 5. you you If-you Federal submit- Shields "Yes." “Yes." Feder- “No." Ques- Ques- dam- an- an- anwered the above Shields then tion proceed distress? Plaintiff’s Verdict 3.No. sey Hable for the intentional infliction of emotional jilease Martin’s actions Shields? ted to us in falsely imprisoned by damages damages Verdict S. please QUESTION ANSWER: QUESTION If ANSWER: ANSWER jilease If QUESTION ANSWER: QUESTION QUESTION ANSWER We. Special omit Question No. 4 and as a result of Form. you you Constitutional rights? Special the Form. Special simply answer Question No answered sustained answer answered “No" sustained jury, If performed Verdict Form question NO. S. What you NO. What NO. Were NO. 3: Verdict NO. Was Verdict sign answer the Officer Question defendant Lauri answered Yes to 2: 7: 1: - b\ Is Defendant Lauri Hal- $ YES Form No. 2. YES $ "Yes.” YES Form No. 2 as follows: above Plaintiff 3,00» 10.00 Plaintiff Martin’s violation of good Verdict Christopher is the total amount is the total amount Defendant James questions No. Question simply ^[12] then omit question "No," 2No. faith? and then sign S. Christopher Form and Halsey? NO 10 NO NO 0 Question sign the If submit- Shields No. Ques- you swered the above and swered the ages, proceed Martin’s conduct the tions then tions and then proceed please please if ANSWER: QUESTION If ANSWER: If any, you you and Special above answer answer Question No. answered the above alleged answered the above Special and simply question "No,’’ question “No," Verdict NO. 6: Was simply Question proximate by Christopher Shields? Verdict sign YES YES Form sign No. 7. Form No. 2. cause Defendant James Verdict No. 2. then omit then omit 10 NO question “Yes," question “Yes," (5. Verdict If If NO 2 Form and the dam- you you Ques- Ques- Form an- an- awarded? tiffs are entitled to defendant Lauri of damages sustained QUESTION If ANSWER: ANSWER: QUESTION you answered Halsey? NO. What NO. punitive Yes, by plaintiff’ 4: 5: Do $ $ YES what amount should be 5,000 5,000 you damages from the is the total amount find that NO 0 liable, dealing The form with Martin’s jointly severally ordinarily conduct by was submitted to court inquiry counsel for only first and is whether the de- Martin. appears The second form to have fendants acted combination and a con- court, prepared by pat- been and was causing certed manner in the harm of judgment terned after the other. After complaining. which the is Under verdicts, special circumstances, however, was entered on the some a second in- plaintiffs’ district court denied motion to quiry made if to ascertain the harm judgment amend and make Martin and indivisible, notwithstanding caused is Halsey jointly severally liable for all separately the defendants acted and not in damages plaintiff. suffered each In concert. Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of motion, denying the stated: 590, 600, California, 100 Idaho 603 P.2d Judgment The Motion to Correct the we stated: this case is denied. defendants are [Ejach tortfeasor whose is a jointly severally not liable. Each proximate injury of an cause indivisible defendant was found liable under differ- individually should remain liable for all ent theories. Different duties were damages compensable attributable to owed each and breached each. injury. underlying is the Such basis Further, Officer Martin could liability. for the rule of been found liable of the torts committed long The Court has held that when Halsey. Laurie Ann He was found parties tortious acts of several concur- under 42 1983. Mrs. liable U.S.C. rently injury, each tortfeasor cause an could not have violated 42 U.S.C. 1983. damage. is liable for the whole of They each different acts committed West, Inc., v. 96 Idaho Pollard Land which harmed the —acts 274, (1974); Spencer v. 526 P.2d 1110 degree. were different in character and 880, Spencer, 91 434 P.2d 98 Idaho The an award for the amount fixed (1967); Falls, v. Idaho 78 Russell of of harm caused each. There is no (1956); 466, Lorang Idaho 305 P.2d 740 joint liability. basis for 440, 733 Hays, v. 209 P.2d R„ 5, p. Vol. (1949). (Second) 2 Restatement See also appeal at the denial Plaintiffs’ is directed (1965); 434(2), of Torts 439 W. Pros- §§ judgment. of the motion to amend 46, (4th ser, 47 ed. Law of Torts §§ challenges cross-appeal Martin’s both James, 1971); Law Harper F. & F. jury’s finding 42 that he is liable under Torts, (1956). of 10.1 § 1983, and the award and amount U.S.C. § added.) (Emphasis attorney’s granted plaintiffs of fees 98, Davis, Idaho 390 P.2d Hackworth v. 87 pursuant Martin fur- to U.S.C. 1988. § (1964), Knight, and Woodman negligence argues ther that mere is insuffi- are P.2d sound Idaho imposition cient of under for authority from this same Court 1983, on which basis he contends that the § Woodman, quoted In the Court principle. damage against improper awards him are from the texts: since, most, as a matter of law at his producing an “Where several causes will negligence. conduct constituted We is an effi- injury are concurrent and each up take each issue turn. injury cient without which the cause injury may happened,

I. would not have causes, any all be attributed to or agree plaintiffs’ argu We with may against any or recovery and be had sep ment that Martin and were not responsible persons.” 65 C.J.S. all of the tortfeasors, independent but arate and 110c, page 683. Negligence § joint were tortfeasors whose combined “ * * * independent tortious acts, concert, where the which were committed persons supplement two or more plaintiffs’ In determin acts of caused the harm. contributing one and concur ing whether two or more defendants are another producing single and a injury, persons producing indivisible more concur in a sin- persons legal such have in contemplation gle, injury, then persons indivisible such tort-feasors, regarded liable, been jointly severally although not- are withstanding the absence of concerted duty, there was no common common de- Am.Jur., Torts, 112, page action.” 52 sign or concerted action.” § Hackworth, at supra, P.2d at 425 Torts, (quoting Cooley, p. from 1 Woodman, supra, § 380 P.2d at (4th 1932). ed. Hackworth, 226. In upon the Court relied “ * * * Prosser, Cooley, Professor Where two or more causes American result, produce single such a Jurisprudence: combine division, incapable any logical each “Moreover, recognized there are may bringing factor in be a substantial persons in which classes cases several loss, so, may about the and if each liable, may jointly severally be held charged again it. with all of Here although they are several and not typical is that of vehicles which case two tort-feasors, where, notwithstanding lack injure person. third collide and unity pur- concert action plaintiff by duties which are owed to the pose, their acts are concurrent as to separate, the defendants are place setting and time and unite in scope, be identical character or but operation single destructive and dan- upon entire rests the obvious gerous produces injury. force which fact that each has contributed to the cases, One recognized by such class of result, single and that no rational divi- authorities, most embraces those cases in sion can be made.” injured which one the combined Hackworth, supra, at P.2d at 425 concurrent or successive Prosser, Torts, (quoting Law persons different acting independently. (2d 1955). p. 226 ed. According great weight to the of authori- ty, where the concurrent or successive above, applying principles set out negligent acts or omissions or successive looking on first at the facts and circum- negligent acts or omissions of two or stances of the tortious conduct of the ac- persons, more although acting indepen- tors, Halsey it is clear that Martin and are, dently other, combination, of each in joint were tortfeasors. It was the com- proximate the direct and cause of a bined, sin- tortious of both acts that inflicted gle injury person, to a third and it is plaintiffs. harm on the It was Martin and impossible propor- to in Martin, determine what Halsey, Halsey or togeth- and who tion each injury, contributed to the either managed er and one time the abduction responsible injury, for the whole Christopher daycare even of the center. though his act might alone not have exactly So viewed their conduct is that injury, caused the entire or the same (quoting Corpus described in Woodman damage might Secundum), have resulted from the act Juris “Where several causes tort-feasor, of the injured other the producing injury and an are concurrent and person may option at his or election insti- each is an efficient cause without the ...,” tute suit for resulting damages injury happened the would not have against any Woodman, one or more of tort-fea- supra, such 85 Idaho at 226; separately, against any sors number P.2d at and as described in Hack- jointly.” or all of them (quoting Cooley), per- more worth two or concurring producing single sons indi- Hackworth, 104-05, supra, 87 Idaho at injury. visible (quoting Am.Jur.Negli- P.2d at 425 from 38 946). gence, p. done, looking again then at the On harm will, weight “The authority Halsey of we it Martin is clear that and were think, support general proposi- liability plaintiffs the more to tortfeasors whose both tion, joint that where the of two or As and several. stated Hack- Prosser), of liability Christopher. liability Theories not (quoting “entire do worth fact each has that What is upon the that affect conclusion.1 relevant is rests obvious result, single Halsey, acting the and no Martin and contributed to that concurrent manner, ly be made.” Hack rational division can and a concerted committed worth, supra, produc 87 Idaho at 390 P.2d at acts found to torts —acts which plaintiffs. ed an indivisible harm to both rationale, set out The district court’s reasons, For the above we reverse the denying plaintiffs’ from the order above On judgment of the district court. remand was in er- judgment to correct the motion provide judgment the will be amended to ror, the jury as was the failure to instruct jointly that the defendants are and several- liability. joint The district and several ly damages- the by liable for suffered court, observing “the fixed an jury Christopher so that the Shields and total award for the amount of harm caused compensatory damages in- amount each,” jury so to realize that the did failed $6,650.50—and the curred total Shields— questions responsive propounded to by Christopher $3,010— amount incurred — special underlying The the two verdicts. Halsey joint several are the wrongful was the injury perpetrated here Martin, daycare from the abduction Halsey enabled to That abduction damages center. punitive awarded to wholly flee state—a fore- take him and Christopher against only both Shields consequence All $5,000 seeable abduction. subject for not are plaintiffs damages of the suffered liability. The reason for this and several proximately caused both were damages. Puni lies in the nature of such participated in tortfeasors —both of whom damages purposes tive are not awarded wrongful Christopher. abduction punish compensating but plaintiff, jury managed apportion dam- How the from fol and deter others the defendant ages readily not in those circumstances is example. Abbie lowing defendant’s Uri need be further comprehended, Buick, but we not v. United guen Oldsmobile Inc. jury respect. Co., concerned in that States Fire Insurance task, put Thus, but rather (1973). not have been 511 P.2d joint and instructed on should have been applicability no has was not liability. several Where involving damages that are instances instructed, have been so the error could compensatory.2 judgment by amending corrected so was requested, the failure to do II. error. in argues good that he acted Martin court, that perceiving The district therefore, is, doing faith in what he did and against liability pursued a claim of

tiffs 42 liability under U.S.C. immune from U.S.C.1983, against 42on Martin based not agree. We do 1983. § law, in on state tort erred based 800, 457 U.S. Fitzgerald, v. stating differed Harlow that because the theories (1982), 2727, liable, 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d defendant was held on which each Supreme announced Court being jointly and United States precluded their sev- such if a determining for state test giving the correct erally liable. The tortious conduct faith, thereby immun- good in official acted wrongful was abduction liability rise to (1980), general rules which the L.Ed.2d 673 in is a "consti 1. The fact that Martin's tort labeled apply. and several determining of wheth tutional tort” is irrelevant liability. A viola there er was allege any plaintiffs error in the did not species § of 42 1983 "creates tion U.S.C. special which did not giving verdict form of a City Independ liability____" Owen tort ence, damages punitive provide for assessment 1398, 1407, 622, 100 S.Ct. U.S. against Martin. izing rendered, him or her from in a civil Where a assist is the offi- § action: cer’s sole function is to stand in the event violence or similar trouble government

We therefore hold that ensues. offi- performing discretionary cials functions It is not the officer’s function to aid a generally are shielded from liability party for parent actually or other obtain- damages civil insofar as their conduct ing physical custody of a child. An offi- clearly does not violate established statu- Department Boise cer Police is tory rights or constitutional of which a not a constitutional such as a officer person reasonable would have known. sheriff; accordingly, a Boise Police De- partment cannot a civil officer enforce directly custody physical Where order and take expected an official could be possession know that certain conduct would of a minor and then turn that violate statutory or rights, Only constitutional minor he over to another. where the hesitate; should be person made to peace and a is threatened the officer take injury who suffers caused such con- any action.” duct may have a cause action. R., added) pp. (Emphasis Vol. 13-14. Id. 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39. upon testimony, Based that argues Martin that because he believed entitled to discredit Martin’s contention that authority only he had to act as a good he had acted faith. standby,” “civil but also to enforce the subsequent upon conduct of Martin order, copy Halsey gave of which being informed Shields of the true cir- him, he was necessarily acting good custody cumstances of also constituted a disagree. faith. We jury’s finding sound basis for the Mar- trial, rebutting At Martin’s testimony good tin had not acted in faith. Further- contention, support plaintiffs of his more, supplied any Martin has not us with following counsel read into the record the authority proposition city for the that a question Captain asked of Gerald Huffaker police officer is cloaked with authority Department during Boise Police dis- predicate such affirmative action as here covery proceedings: by Martin. taken Q. “Did Depart- the Boise Police ment, 11th, 1980, on or about March III. procedure, policy a standard or custom argues Martin next that the district dealing with parent cases where a allowing pro court erred in the action to required police obtaining custody aid in against theory ceed him on a negligence, so, please of a child located in If Idaho? liability imposed upon and that him procedure set forth that standard must be reversed since an identify all express documents which upon insufficient basis which to base a policy, procedure such or custom.” 1983 claim. R., 2, p. Vol. open

Huffaker read in following upon court the Martin Taylor, relies Parratt v. given: answer which he had earlier U.S. S.Ct. support argu- L.Ed.2d 420 his Okay.

A. “The Depart- Boise Police ment. Our review of Parratt leads us to March, 1980, ment did not in have a case, opposite conclusion. In that a policy whereby any an officer was to aid prison deprivation inmate claimed a party in of securing custody of a minor March, 1980, property process due in In without violation of Depart- child. it was the 42 practice ment’s the fourteenth amendment and U.S.C. to render a civil assist by requested by negligent when 1983 as a result of the loss seeking someone cus- § hobby tody prison of a child. A in officials of a mail-ordered kit. civil assist is one merely Supreme which an a denied the inmate’s officer monitors scene The Court peace kept. Holding process in order to insure is that due was not that the claim. 140 ing may

denied since state tort remedies were avail- under color of state law be action- loss, 555, remedy High able to Court able under 1983. Id. at 101 S.Ct. at § stated: majority opinion As the and Justice out, point Marshall the crux of whether a Nothing language in the or of 1983 § negligent may cause of action under legislative 1983 history

its limits the statute § alleged be is solely made out whether the consti- deprivations to intentional con- of deprivation through tutional rights. stitutional In is redressable Baker v. McCollan 137, 2689, adequate remedy 99 resort to an state tort U.S. S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d [443 543-44, 1917; procedure. (1979)] 433 Id. at 101 suggested simply we S.Ct. 555-56, Thus, wrong negligently op- because a teas 101 at 1923. if an S.Ct. available, posed intentionally adequate remedy committed did state tort is no maintainable; not possibility that such 1983 cause action is of § foreclose however, brought actio?i could be adequate remedy under if an is not § available, 534, such an is maintainable. (emphasis Id. at 101 1912 S.Ct. at action added). analysis Our of in with Parratt accord the conclusions reached two Ninth Cir Court went on to add: Appeals panels, Haygood cuit Court of v. Both [supra Baker v. McCollan and ] 1472, (9th Cir.1983) Younger, 718 F.2d 1478 Pape Monroe v. 167 U.S. S.Ct. [365 [81 (“[Njegligence support alone can a section 473, (1961) 5 L.Ed.2d suggest that 492] ] action.”); Gertzen, 1983 cause of v. Hirst remedy”for dep- “civil a § affords 1252, (9th Cir.1982)(“In 676 F.2d Par protected rights federally rivations of ratt, [supra Supreme held that Court ] by persons acting caused under color of negligent by persons acting under conduct express require- any state law without under color state law be actionable particular ment a state mind. express 42 U.S.C.1983. There is no re Accordingly, any in 1983 action the § quirement particular in of a state of mind inquiry initial must focus on whether the 1983.”), two First Section Circuit Court two essential elements to a 1983 action § Chardon, Appeals panels, Fernandez (1) present: are whether the conduct 42, (1st Cir.1982), 681 F.2d cert. denied complained per- committed a of was 343, part, 459 U.S. S.Ct. law; acting son under color of state grounds L.Ed.2d 382 on other (2) deprive person whether this conduct aff'd Soto, 462 U.S. sub nom. Chardon v. rights, privileges, se- or immunities (“Lia (1983) 77 L.Ed.2d 74 S.Ct. cured the Constitution or laws of negligence bility may grounded United States. alone.”). (emphasis add- Id. at 101 S.Ct. 1913 ed). case, adequate reme In this no state tort concede, parties and the dy exists. Both statements, response to these Justice held, that under cur district court below disagreed. Believing Powell Court rent law Martin is immune Idaho fully addressing decided this issue without Idaho Tort remedy state tort under the it, only in the he concurred result light interpretation Claims Act negligent “I wrote: do not believe that ... given byAct this Court Chan to that depriva- acts state officials constitute a Boise, dler v. meaning of the property tion of within the Thus, (1983). hold that a we P.2d Amendment, regardless of Fourteenth maintainable negligent cause of action is procedure a state subsequent whatever under 42 U.S.C. 1983. this ease may may provide.” Id. at J., (Powell, concurring). S.Ct. 1918 jury could have that the We also note extend- easily that Martin’s conduct found concurring part Justice Marshall negligence. It was not beyond mere ed clear that he did dissenting part, made part Martin’s willfulness on opinion but part concur in that police officer to tell capacity as by persons act- to use negligent held that conduct his do, circumstances similar to those daycare operator to turn under by the evidence. shown over to and not to call Shields. subsequent refusal to aid R.,

Likewise his pp. 83-84. Vol. being upon informed of Shields’ Shields accordingly reject We Martin’s claim legal custody Christopher is evidence of this issue. (cid:127) negligence. Finally, noth- more than mere IV. relating ing special in the verdict form to Martin, Martin, was submitted which Martin next contends that district Mar- $13,555.15 asked the to determine whether awarding attorney’s court’s willful, negligent, or a com- tin’s acts were plaintiffs improper. fees to was We dis- simply bination of the two. It asked the agree. (1)

jury to answer whether Martin violated plaintiffs award The (2) plaintiffs’ rights, constitutional Hensley based on U.S.C. 1988. § good whether Martin’s acts were done in Eckerhart, 461 U.S. S.Ct. 15, in faith. Given Instruction Nos. 14 and High L.Ed.2d 40 Court stated essence, simply supplemented provi- purpose of 1988 is to “ensure that the § special sions of Martin’s submitted verdict judicial process’ access to the ‘effective They form. were but recitals of the hold- rights grievances.” persons with civil Id. ing in and read as follows: Parratt H.R.Rep. quoting at No. S.Ct.

94-1558, (1976). p. 1 To effectuate that purpose, 1988 authorizes courts to award INSTRUCTION NO. JURY attorney’s prevailing fee to a reasonable instructed that it is not neces- You are rights litigation. in This award parties civil sary find that the defendant had ordinarily given prevailing to the deprive plaintiffs specific intent to party special unless circumstances exist rights in order find in favor their civil make such an award unfair. that would plaintiffs. plaintiffs The are enti- Hensley 1937. The Court in defined Id. at if the defendant intended tled to relief “prevailing party” as one who succeeds a which in a violation the actions resulted litigation any significant “on issue plaintiffs’ rights civil and caused parties of the benefit the achieves some damages, you unless find that the them bringing sought suit.” Id. at good Martin acted in faith as Defendant Quite clearly, plaintiffs in this case defined in these instructions. trial. prevailed award, respect to the amount of the With NO. 15 INSTRUCTION is vested with discretion. the district court appeal, the standard of Id. at 1941. On deprivation plaintiffs’ constitu- The the district court abused review is whether inten- rights need not be willful or tional making its award. act, its discretion tional; negligent whether of omis- put applied the test forth district court commission, to cause is sufficient sion or different its list of twelve Hensley with deprivation of constitutional an unlawful factors, be reason- and found the award to rights. pointed out: The district court able. “negligence” in I use the word When prevailed entirely on his instructions, I mean the failure these $1,658.50. The the amount of claim in ordinary management care use to the request high in relation fee The words property person. one’s actually obtained monetary amount a reason- “ordinary mean the care care” Martin, however, it is against Officer under person would use ably prudent neces- light of the effort reasonable to those shown circumstances similar type this prevail at all in a case of sary to con- Negligence thus evidence. in this area. something to do the failure sist of R., p. Vol. person would not reasonably careful 142

This conclusion has also been reached by he could not be held liable for negli- many federal dealing courts in gent with this deprivation plaintiff’s of the constitu- See, issue. e.g., Thomas, rights, Williams v. 692 tional and that it was improper to so (5th Cir.1982); F.2d 1032 Roberts v. jury. Nat’l instruct the As the majority opinion Detroit, (E.D. Bank F.Supp. out, correctly points crux of wheth- “[T]he Mich.1983); Hill, Alexander v. F.Supp. negligent er a cause of action under 1983 (W.D.N.C.1983); Brule v. South be made out is whether the alleged worth, F.Supp. (D.R.I.1982); deprivation constitutional is redressable Pritchard, Dickerson v. F.Supp. through resort adequate to an state tort (W.D.Ark.1982). We persuaded are not remedy procedure.” Ante at 29. The any error on this issue. majority We also note that then affirms the trial court’s sub- had the properly joint entered a jury and mission to the negligent of a depriva- judgment several against defendants, both tion of rights constitutional cause of action judgment, that Martin, against would under Section in 1983 this case because the considerably been disproportion less majority agrees with the trial court that case, ate to the attorney’s amount of fees award this adequate no state tort reme- “[i]n ed. dy exists.” majority Ante at 29. The arrives at that conclusion because it also In summary, on cross-appeal, Martin’s agrees with the district analysis court’s court; we affirm the district that “Martin any is immune from state tort appeal tiffs’ we denying reverse the order liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act in plaintiffs’ motion judgment to amend the light interpretation given of the to that act and on judgment remand direct that the Boise, this Court in City Chandler v. modified in accordance with the views here- (1983).” 660 P.2d 770 Ante in expressed. appeal plaintiffs. Costs on Agreeing that Martin is at 30. immune HUNTLEY, remedy state tort J., under the Ida- concurs. Act, ho Tort majority Claims then con- DONALDSON, C.J., parts concurs in II cludes, “Thus, negligent we hold that a and III and in I parts dissents and IV. cause of action is maintainable this case SHEPARD, J., concurs the result. under 14 U.S.C. 1983.” Ante at 29. BAKES, Justice, concurring part I majority’s analysis concur with the dissenting part: immunity Martin’s under the Tort Idaho Act, upon Claims based Chandler v. portion I concur in that majority of the Boise, supra, majority which the reaf- opinion which affirms the trial court on the today, firms and therefore concur in that Martin, appeal cross filed defendant portion majority opinion dismissing which alleged liability imposed appeal. defendant Martin’s cross upon him verdict must be re- versed since an insufficient II upon

basis a 42 to base U.S.C.A.1983 However, against claim him. I dissent However, does, majority what the then majority’s finding from the applying the doctrine of against several Mar- the defendant imposing liability on Martin liability imposed upon tin as a result judgment because of the conduct and ren- jury. Halsey by the defendant against Halsey, dered is in- defendant comprehensible. totally It is inconsistent

I that, say on the one hand order to Martin, uphold appellant negligent deprivation of consti- defendant cross officer, police appeal rights tutional cause of action under Sec- Boise asserts on Martin, against must under the of the United States tion 1983 decision against remedy 451 have no state tort law Mar- Supreme Taylor, in Parratt v. Court 420 tin then in the breath state that 68 L.Ed.2d next U.S. 101 S.Ct. position was the defendant Martin is liable to the The mother’s that father’s the had, judgment terms, custody because the rendered temporary tiff Shields order its earlier, or against the defendant is expired months and she nineteen joint and several. only legitimate permanent custody had the Even if Martin had seen the order. Officer more There are even inconsistencies subsequent temporary order there is no majority opinion, the but before those in- way he could have concludedthat the moth discussed, consistencies are the record right to take the child. This er had no straight regarding facts of must be set the say not to that Officer Martin could not particular majority this case. The has proceeded cautiously. more How have presented only appellant’s the side of the ever, culpable majority he is not as as the justify ruling. record in order to its How- fact, ever, represents. In the father had earlier appellate the fundamental rule gained temporary physical custody in the a practice, long every followed this and Court, unlike the means used the appellate manner not other is that the case on July, the drove In father appeal must be mother. favorably viewed most to which, Oregon respondent from Boise to the mother’s resi the on the issue of liability, admittedly he “lied” to the is the defendant Mar- dence where Powlus, E.g., Fajen tin in this case. v. 96 mother that he would return the child in (1975); May according Idaho 533 P.2d 746 v. two weeks to his visitation Co., Inc., Triangle rights. Oil Instead the father took the child (1974). (An exception (out state) P.2d 781 is cases immediately home took involving appeals summary judgment, parte legal keep action to the child. ex in which the record should be viewed most Subsequently, the father moved three favorably person opposing to the the sum- times, Idaho, the once out record mary judgment since there been has no custody whether the court does not show facts.) resolution of or the were advised of the moves. mother Having deprived through of her child been Viewing favorably the record most to the means, surprising (although such it is not respondent, prior say as our cases we must condoned) that the resorted to not mother Powlus, appeal, Fajen supra, do on the majority similar states that means. story than facts reveal different what the to another state the mother “absconded” day majority tells. On March the when, fact, merely she with the child the child was taken the mother from the to her husband and resi returned home center, merely day care the father had a Oregon legal where she took ac dence in “temporary custody” August order dated keep Only subsequent child. tion to 9, 1978,which stated that the father should was the father awarded definite all this temporary custody only “until legal custody. The mother permanent hearing August scheduled ... 1978____” providing the best care for not have been hearing place, never took child, the record indicates that the but yet and the had taken action to mother problems case father had his also. The regain physical custody pursuant to the sorry resulting presents the state of affairs previous awarding perma- order her society, in our and I do not from divorce Therefore, custody child. legal nent of the parent. condone actions of either How dispatched in when Martin was Officer ever, easy well-meaning to see how a i.e., it is standby," Boise to render a “civil en- dragged into the police officer could be in re- that there was no violence sure fray charged improper with conduct custody, parents turning physical both had attempting against to ensure viol while arguable legal and reasonable bases claim- child. ence.1 ing custody entitlement greatly possibility person increase the of vio- care would Martin did ask child

1. Officer improper, call the father. While this was lence. not to presence of the father fear was that the his above, presented entirely On the factual record ter for a trial on that issue. It is made jury factual that possible determinations would have found the defendants: were liable under different in an that Officer Martin did not “unite act laws; duties; breached different caused di another, wrong constitutes in- injuries; visible and the court ruled it, tending per- at the time to commit they were not jointly severally liable. forming it under circumstances fair- fact, plaintiffs approved separate intending with ly charged them the conse- verdict forms and should not be heard follow,” quences which as set out the assign error Young on that basis. See v. approved by majority. instruction the Sound, Group Co-op Puget Health of Nevertheless, concluding after that the 332, (1975); P.2d 1349 Wash.2d Cf. jury have been instructed on the Co., 753, v. McBride Ford Motor Idaho joint liability, and several the issue of ma- (1983) (party assign P.2d 55 not then jority inexplicably takes over the fact- requested giv to an error instruction function and concludes that finding “Mar- en). jury The determined that further Offi acting concurrently and Halsey, tin and Martin had “caused” not more cer much manner, committed acts concerted found damages. findings nominal Those than produced to be an indivis- torts —acts “clearly by jury the court and were not fact plaintiffs.” ible harm to both Ante at 27. not be erroneous” and should set aside on majority jury If is correct that the the 52(a); v. appeal. Gotzinger, I.R.C.P. Glen issue, instructed on that should have been 109, (1984); 106 Idaho 675 P.2d Web certainly in majority then is error not the 342, 104 Idaho v. Dist. No. ster School remanding this back to the trial matter (1983). majority violates 659 P.2d issue, a retrial on that rather than court for “clearly rule erroneous” substitut the taking factfinding the function itself. over fact ing findings its own that Officer with the allegedly acted concert Martin parties appeal It all on is conceded injuries. to indivisible mother cause could be held liable that the mother not for damages or violation of the federal' joint alleging that the majority law, If the is Only acting 1983. those U.S.C. § have and several instruction should violate 42 under of state law can color given, should be remand- been then the case she was not. Her dam- U.S.C. Again, majority the for a new trial. ed only have ages resulted state could is in its treatment of opinion inconsistent Conversely, appeal, parties all on tort law. first majority issue. The states that this Court, agree majority of this and the been on jury “the ... should have instructed from state tort Martin immune Officer liability,” upon plain- based joint and several claims, only his liabil- law and the source of requested instruction number jury tiff’s he and was ity is 42 U.S.C. under the majority the states district jury only to caused by the found erroneously give. The district failed damages violation. from that To- minimal give that instruction be- court had refused to finding joint day’s and several lia- opinion Martin was immune the defendant cause bility circumvents these two defendants for lia- Act from the Idaho Tort Claims under making an im- non-liabilities both these analyzed actions as bility the state tort for employee liable for an' governmental mune majority holds in Part I above. pri- and the intentional torts individual’s rationale, was in ... “the district court’s government’s liable for the vate individual error, the failure to instruct as was the That torts.” re- “constitutional so-called If, liability.” jury joint on and several in the unprecedented law. wholly sult is states, the was error for it majority the partial- holding already been has Today’s the to instruct district court not legislature’s ly neutralized then liability, question Claims Act the Idaho Tort amendment of fact and question be a that issue must which states: remanding mat- this majority should be court, governmental entity part and its em- on the trial All Ameri “[T]he Sweet, supra, and the issue Realty can ployee subject only shall for the trial court to should be remanded pro for the rata share of total dam- and realistic alloca make a more accurate ages awarded favor aof claimant tion of fees. which is attributable to act or omis- employee____” sion of the I.C. 6-§ DONALDSON, C.J., concurs. 903(b). statutory This abrogation APPELLANT’S ON DENIAL OF several liability, governmen- at least as to FOR REHEARING PETITION tal employees, entities and their was enact- Justice, BISTLINE, dissenting. 28, 1980, ed March July effective rehearing Appellant’s petition for has Sess.Laws, p. ch. brought attention failure of the to our Upon the filing petition rehearing request for attor- respond Court to matter, this we will no doubt have to ney’s fees. That inadvertence should be consider question whether corrected. applies amendment circumstanc- majority A of the has voted Court es in this case on March occurred against attorney’s fees to the an award 1980. appellant appeal he on an wherein was clearly It prevailing party. seems to Ill me that such fees are mandated under 42 I also dissent from majori- Part IV the U.S.C. 1988 both federal and state § ty opinion attorney on fees. While the applied provisions cases which attorney is indeed entitled to fees that section. under 42 U.S.C. the amount should J., HUNTLEY, be in proportion concurs. theory to the limited plaintiffs prevailed against Offi- cer Throughout Martin. case alleged pursued

tiffs a full ten causes defendants, against action three Officer

Martin, Boise, City and the mother. attorney The total expended by plain- fees 706 P.2d 34 and Delsie $15,783. Delbert CLAMPITT tiffs were Much effort was di- wife, Clampitt, husband and Boise, against rected which was Plaintiffs-Respondents, dismissed from the case. Much effort was directed toward Officer Martin on other plaintiffs theories on which lost. Effort CORPORATION, corporation, A.M.R. a against also directed the mother. Defendant-Appellant, prevailed against Plaintiffs Officer Martin on only prove one cause of action to dam- Farms, corporation; Judd L.J. Rice & a ages $1,668.50. Yet, of only Martin Officer Sons, Inc., corporation; and South was saddled with plaintiffs’ of the 90% Corporation, a cor western Financial attorney upwards fees hours poration, Defendants. expended by two attorneys. See All No. 15071. Sweet, Realty,

American Inc. v. (1984) (140 687 P.2d 1356 hours to Supreme Court of Idaho. process summary judgment “unjusti- 6,May fied”). by plaintiffs The hours claimed Sept. Denied Rehearing represent working would an attorney near- ly a full process two months to this two-

day trial. award of attor- 90%

ney represents fees an abuse of discretion

Case Details

Case Name: Shields v. Martin

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 10, 1985

Citation: 706 P.2d 21

Docket Number: 15125

Court Abbreviation: Idaho