Shesler v. Consol. Rail Corp.Shesler v. Consol. Rail Corp.
{¶ 2} Shesler and Speidel, career railroad workers, brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
{¶ 3} Trial commenced in December 2001. On December 19, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Shesler and Speidel in the amount of $128,500 each. On December 21, 2001, the trial judge entered a signed judgment entry for each plaintiff in the amount of $128,500 plus costs on the court's Complex Litigation Automatic Docket. This docket, also known as CLAD, is an electronic docket. Pursuant to an order issued January 7, 1999 by Judge Harry A. Hanna, "all filings in all asbestos cases shall be made on the CLAD system."
{¶ 4} After the trial court's entry of judgment, ConRail filed four post-trial motions — motion for remittitur, motion for judgment nоtwithstanding the verdict, motion for setoff and motion for a new trial — which the trial court denied. This court subsequently affirmed the trial court's judgment. Shesler v.Consolidated Rail Corp.,
{¶ 5} Shesler and Speidel then filed a motion for enforcement of judgment, seeking payment of the judgments and 10% per annum post-judgment interest. They calculated the interest from December 21, 2001, the date on which the trial court entered the judgments in their favor оn CLAD. ConRail opposed the motion with respect to the post judgment interest and argued that the interest should be calculated from March 11, 2002, the date on which the judgments were journalized by thе court clerk.
{¶ 6} After a hearing, the trial court granted Shesler and Speidel's motion. This appeal followed.1
{¶ 7} In its first assignment of error, ConRail contends that the trial court erred in ruling that post-judgment interest began accruing on December 21, 2001, rather than March 11, 2002.
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} It is well settled that a judgment is "rendered," and post-judgment interest begins to accrue, on the date judgmеnt is entered by the court, not on the date the jury returns its verdict. See, e.g., Viock v. Stoew-Woodward Co. (1989),
{¶ 10} The obvious question in this matter, therefore, is whether the trial court's December 21, 2001 entry upon the CLAD system was sufficient to enter judgment in Shesler and Speidel's favor and begin the accrual of post-judgment interest. We think not.
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} Accordingly,
{¶ 13} Here, as evidenced by the judge's statements at the hearing regarding Shesler and Speidel's motion to enforce judgment, the trial judge clearly intended that his December 21, 2001 entry of judgment on CLAD was in lieu of any entry of judgment by the clerk upon the journal. The judge stated:
{¶ 14} "Under the system that we have been functioning, the CLAD, Complex Litigation Automatic Docket, for the last few years, has the overriding principle that filing paper with the clerk is no longer necessary or advisable. We have substituted the computer for the desk of the clerk's office. So all pleadings other than the original complaint have been filed with CLAD since its implementation.
{¶ 15} "On December 21st, 2001, after the verdict was entered in these two cases, I entered judgment on behalf of each plaintiff in the CLAD system. The Court of Appeals has also from the inception of our utilizatiоn of this system insisted that upon appeal all orders of the court that are germane to the appeal must be reduced to writing and signed by the judge who presided over the matter. That is why оn March 11th, after the defendant had filed its Notice of Appeal, the journal entry reflecting the judgment on behalf of each plaintiff was reduced to writing, signed by the court, and entered in the Cоurt of Appeals. It was certainly the intent of the court to enter judgment on December 21st, 2001, consistent with the CLAD system."
{¶ 16} Despite the court's intention, however, in light of the requirements of
{¶ 17} Moreover, the CLAD system pertains to the court's electronic asbestos docket. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, however, that "dockets and journals are distinct records kept by clerks. * * * A docket is not the same as a journal." State exrel. White v. Junkin (1997),
{¶ 18} The difference between a docket and a journal was explained in White v. Junkin, supra, in which the defendant was charged with domestic violence. The charge was amended to disorderly conduct and, after a hearing, the trial judge аccepted the defendant's no contest plea and found him guilty. The judge sentenced the defendant to ten days in jail, suspended the sentence, and fined him $100 plus court costs. The judge reсorded his oral decision on the case file jacket and initialed his decision. An official in the clerk's office entered the case file notations in the computerized dockеt system and the defendant paid his fine and court costs. The next day, however, the trial judge issued a journal entry vacating his decision, setting trial on the original domestic violence charge аnd ordering that the fine and costs be refunded to the defendant. The defendant then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from vacating his disorderly conduct conviction and sentence and proceeding on the original charge.
{¶ 19} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals issuing the writ. Noting the distinction between dockets and journals, the Supreme Court stated, "the clerk's placement of information from the September 30, 1996 decision on the computerized docket was not tantamount to journalization of the decision." Id. "Thus," the court continued, "the undisputed evidence establishes that the September 30, 1996 file entry was never journalized by the clerk. Since the decision was never journalized, appellants did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to vacate that decision and proceed on the original charge of domestic violence." Id. at 338.
{¶ 20} Similarly, the trial judge's еntry of judgment in favor of Shesler and Speidel on the automated litigation docket for asbestos cases was not equivalent to journalization of the decision as required by
{¶ 21} Appellants' first assignment of error is sustained. Becаuse appellants have already unconditionally tendered $148,144.66 in each case, including post-judgment interest from March 11, 2002 to September 20, 2003, no further payment of post-judgment interest is necessary.
{¶ 22} Our resolution of appellants' first assignment of error renders their second assignment of error moot and, therefore, we need not consider it. See
Judgment reversed.
This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
It is, therefore, ordered that appellants recover from appellees costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedurе.
Karpinski, P.J., and Rocco, J., concur.