SHERYL MILLER v. WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL dba Beaumont Health System
No. 24-1044
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
November 8, 2024
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 24a0250p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SHERYL MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL dba Beaumont Health
System,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 24-1044
On Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:21-cv-12259—George Caram Steeh III, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: November 8, 2024
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ON MOTION TO DISMISS and REPLY: Eric J. Pelton, Thomas J. Davis, KIENBAUM
HARDY VIVIANO PELTON & FORREST, P.L.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for William
Beaumont Hospital. ON RESPONSE: Carla D. Aikens, CARLA D. AIKENS, P.L.C., Detroit,
Michigan, for Sheryl Miller.
ORDER
Plaintiff Sheryl Miller appeals following the district court’s summary judgment for
Defendant William Beaumont Hospital, doing business as Beaumont Health System, in this civil
rights suit alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with
jurisdiction.
To timely appeal from summary judgment, Miller needed to file a notice of appeal within
thirty days of that judgment’s entry. See
she moved for reconsideration under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h). That Local
Rule, however, was amended two years prior to read “[p]arties seeking reconsideration of final
orders or judgments must file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b).
The court will not grant reconsideration of such an order or judgment under this rule.” E.D.
Mich., Notice of Amendments to Local Rules 1 (Nov. 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/KR9X-H3C2.
Yet Miller never once mentioned
Instead, she mistakenly asserted that “[m]otions for reconsideration are governed by [Local
Rule] 7.1(h),” citing two cases that applied an earlier version of the Local Rule. The district
court accordingly denied Miller’s motion for failing to invoke
impliedly concedes her failure to expressly cite these Rules below.
She nevertheless notes that this Court has often treated Local Rule 7.1(h) motions as Rule
59(e) motions based on their past similarity. See, e.g., Mich. Dessert Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 23 F. App’x 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). But that similarity no longer exists.
Whereas earlier cases explained that “both [Local Rule 7.1(h) and Rule 59(e)] [we]re vehicles
for a litigant to ask a court to correct a mistake of law or fact,” Quatrine v. Berghuis, 751 F.
App’x 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), only
vehicle. And whereas earlier cases treated unspecified motions to reconsider as motions under
one under Local Rule 7.1(h), cf. Hood v. Hood, 59 F.3d 40, 43 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
The Local Rule’s amended text now plainly forecloses any continued construal as a Rule 59(e)
motion when that motion concerns a final order, and local rules carry “the force of law.”
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S.
160, 169 (1929)). Just as this Court conflated Local Rule 7.1(h)(1) with Rule 59(e) when they
were similar, it abandons such conflation while they remain distinct.
appeal deadline. See
specified post-judgment relief under
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, Gunter v. Bemis Co., 906 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir.
2018), this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Miller’s proposed appeal of the district court’s
summary judgment.
Beaumont concedes that Miller’s notice of appeal was effective at least as to the district
court’s denial of reconsideration. But it nevertheless argues that Miller (1) waived any challenge
to the denial of reconsideration by failing to specify the issue in her appellate-court filings, (2)
has no non-frivolous argument that the district court erred, and (3) failed to timely seek
reconsideration before the district court. Yet neither waiver nor meritoriousness affects this
court’s jurisdiction. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2023); Gen. Inv. Co.
v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926) (stating that “[t]here may be jurisdiction and yet
an absence of merits”); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (recognizing that
“federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by
Congress” in all but the most exceptional circumstances). And in addition to the lack of any
deadline in Local Rule 7.1(h)(1) as amended, the district court cited no timeliness issues with
Miller’s motion for reconsideration. See Valassis Commc’ns, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 97
F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging district court has discretion to overlook parties’
failure to satisfy local rules).
In sum, the motion to dismiss Miller’s appeal from the district court’s summary judgment
is GRANTED, and the motion to dismiss Miller’s appeal from the district court’s denial of the
motion of reconsideration is DENIED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk