54 Conn. 330 | Conn. | 1887
In 1848 Oran Sherwood of Fairfield died intestate, leaving real estate, a widow, and four children. Of these last was Franklin Sherwood, the plaintiff. On March 1st, 1856, he conveyed his undistributed interest in his father’s estate to his mother, saying in his deed that he intended “ to convey my entire undivided title and interest in and to all the estate of my father, the said Oran Sherwood, late deceased, within said tract of land, as heir at law of my said father therein.” This conveyance was made for the purpose of concealing the property from his creditors. On June 16th, 1856, distribution was made. On February 19th, 1883, his mother, desiring and intending to reconvey to him precisely what he had conveyed to her, executed and delivered a deed to his wife, for his benefit, in which she described the property as follows : “All the real estate of Oran Sherwood deceased, which was distributed to Franklin Sherwood in the distribution of said estate, and after-wards conveyed to me by said Franklin Sherwood by sundry deeds, as recorded in Fairfield land records.” In point of fact Franklin Sherwood had conveyed to her before not after distribution. Mrs. Sherwood, the grantor, is dead. Franklin Sherwood asks in effect that her heirs at law may be compelled to execute a corrected deed. They resist, and insist that inasmuch as he conveyed the land to his mother for a fraudulent purpose equity will leave him where he placed himself. If we should concede that if Mrs. Sherwood had refused to reconvey the land to her son the court would not come to his relief, this case would not be disposed of. She made a conveyance ; if that is legally sufficient in form -the plaintiff’s title is unassailable; and for the purpose of determining the question as to its suffi
It is the duty of courts to uphold rather than to destroy deeds. It is the fundamental canon of interpretation of contracts to discover and give effect to the intention of the parties. In the case before us the finding mates it certain that the mother intended to reconvey to her son precisely that interest in Ms father’s estate which he had conveyed to her before distribution. When a piece of land is so described that a surveyor’s chain can be stretched along its boundaries with absolute certainty as to each course, distance and monument, a transposition of dates in stating previous conveyances constituting the chain of title, will not cloud or affect that certainty, nor destroy the operative force of a conveyance.
We cite a few of the many instances given in the reports where courts, in the discharge of their duty to find and carry out the intent, have declared that certain words of description in deeds are to be of no effect, wMch apparently are far more likely to give rise to a doubt as to identity than is the erroneous word in the deed before us. In Worthington v. Hilyer, 4 Mass., 196, the words of description are,— “ all that my farm of land in said Worthington on wMch I now dwell, being lot No. 17, in the first division.” The land demanded in that action was not included in lot No. 17, yet the court held that it passed, the first bemg sufficient to ascertain the estate intended to be conveyed, and that the additional description inconsistent' with the former was to be rejected, because, if it were to be considered as an essential part of the description, the deed would be void for repugnancy. In Cato v. Thayer, 3 Greenl., 71, the question was as to one of the lines of the town of Dresden, wMch was described as a course “north-northwest, including the whole of Gardiner’s farm ”; and the court held that the whole farm was included, although intersected by a line running north-northeast, because the farm was to be considered as a monument. In Keith v. Reynolds, 3 Greenl., 393, the description was,—“ a certain tract of land or farm
The Superior Court is advised that the deed to Mary A. Sherwood, one of the plaintiffs, in its present form is effective to convey to her all of the right, title and interest in the estate of Oran Sherwood which Franklin Sherwood conveyed to his mother, including the land upon which the right of dower rested. For that reason and for no other that court is advised to dismiss the petition.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.