This is a suit filed by appellants against the appellees in the ordinary form of an action in trespass to try title to land and for rents, joining therewith an action to recover damages for an alleged tort. The parties, or some of them, in respect to the same property, have been before this court before. Sherwood v. Sherwood,
The prayer of the petition was for rents and damages growing out of the alleged tort, and to “vacate and set aside the sheriff’s deed.” As the appellant alleged the sale was made by the receiver, we presume appellant meant to say receiver’s deed instead of. sheriff’s deed.
Appellant joined in this ejectment suit, or possessory action, an action sounding in tort and seeking to recover damages against ap-pellees for injury to his alleged growing crop, and further alleging as ground therefor that appellees “caused the receiver, the sheriff of Kendall county, and his deputy to seize plaintiffs’ premises and forcibly and violently dispossess plaintiffs of their home and premises; turned out plaintiffs’ live stock and put in the street plaintiffs' com, hay, oats, and feed which were on said premises, and whereby many of said live stock and cattle were lost, and much of plaintiffs’ corn, hay, and oats spoiled, an exact estimate of which they cannot make at this time, but say they have, because of the acts and wrongs of defendants in dispossessing them, suffered damages in the sum of $2,500.00.”
The appellees filed general and special exceptions, pleas of res adjudicata, and not guilty.
After hearing all the evidence the court instructed a verdict. '
if tins be treated as appellants seek, to have it treated, a suit in trespass to try title, then they have shown no title thereto, for the title and possession thereof was plhced by the court for partition in the hands of the court’s receiver, who was directed to take possession and to sell the land freed from the claims of any and all persons. That is the effect of any receivership of property. It draws to the court the possession and custody of the property for its ultimate disposition, so that purchasers may take title thereto against all the parties by sales made under the direction and orders of the court. That sale was made as the act of the court through its receiver, who duly reported the sale to the court; being a part of the proceedings to which appellant was a party. The report was duly confirmed and deed executed to the purchaser under the court’s order. Erom these proceedings there was no appeal taken by appellants, that being the only way it could be considered here. It cannot be attacked collaterally, as now attempted.
Although there may have been irregularities in the sale, as alleged, yet, as appellant was a party to those proceedings, they could only be timely called into question by an appeal from the court’s ruling upon proper motion made and filed in that cause, not in an independent action in trespass to try title to the land as done here, but by a proceeding in the nature of bill of review for cause to set the sale aside in the same proceeding, not in an independent suit as here attempted to recover the lands.
In making this partition the court seemed
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follow tlie practice pointed out in such cases by the case of Moore v. Blagge,
In an independent suit like this, in trespass to try title to lands, seeking really independently to set aside a sale of real estate made by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of partition of lands, there cannot be joined against the purchasers thereof an action for tort for being ejected from the premises by the receiver, and recovery of consequent damages to crops and personal property removed.
We And no reversible error assigned, and the judgment is affirmed.