Defendant has moved for partial summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming that plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages in this diversity case is barred by the Colorado statute of limitations. The relevant statute is 1973 C.R.S. § 13-80-104, which provides:
All actions and suits for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statute, brought by this state or any person to whom the penalty or forfeiture is given, in whole or in part, shall be commenced within one year after the offense is committed and not after that time.
This suit was commenced on February 3, 1976 with the filing of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. The complaint alleges that plaintiff Clinton Sherwood was injured on May 22,1974 while using defendant’s airless paint spray gun. Plaintiff prays for both compensatory and punitive damages. There is no dispute that the lawsuit was brought more than one year after the incident which gave rise to the claim for relief.
In order for § 13-80-104 to apply the action must have been brought to enforce a “penalty” provided for by statute. It has long been held that exemplary damages in this state constitute a penalty. In
French v. Deane,
It is generally held that the basic purpose of entering a judgment for exemplary damages against a defendant in a civil action is to punish and penalize him for certain wrongful and aggravated conduct.
Beebe v. Pierce,
On previous occasions this court has ruled that exemplary damages were punitive in nature. In
Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc.,
Under Rule 51.1 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, state courts are obligated to instruct juries, where punitive damages are in issue, that such damages “are not to be construed as compensation to the plaintiff for wrong done, but as punishment to the defendant, and as an example to others.” Colo. Jury Instructions, Civil, Instruction 5:3 (1975 Supp.). Thus, there can be no doubt that exemplary damages do constitute a penalty under Colorado law.
Nor is there doubt that punitive damages are a penalty provided for by statute. A claim for punitive damages in Colorado is exclusively statutory and, therefore, is based on a penal statute. In 1884 the Colorado supreme court determined that punitive damages could not be awarded in a civil case when the conduct which gave rise to the case could also be subject to criminal sanctions.
Murphy v. Hobbs,
In response to those decisions the Colorado legislature, in 1889, passed the forerunner of 1973 C.R.S. § 13-21-102. The present version reads:
In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings, the jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary damages. 2
After the passage of the 1889 law the state courts recognized the statutory basis of exemplary damages. In
Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy,
Plaintiff resists this conclusion by adopting the argument that the limitation statute works only against statutes which contain both a substantive cause of action and a penalty provision for noncompliance. Such an application was made in
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. v. Tanner,
While the limitation statute has been applied to such self-contained statutes there is nowhere any indication that it is limited to such applications. Indeed, the policies behind statutes of limitations do not support the restricted view propounded by plaintiff. Limitation periods are matters of legislative choice and are enacted for “the purpose of promoting justice, discouraging unnecessary delay and forestalling the prosecution of stale claims.”
Klamm Shell v. Berg,
Additionally, punitive damages, even when brought as dependent upon some underlying cause of action, are only awarded when proof of an actor’s conduct exceeds that proof necessary to obtain full compensation for the wrong committed. Exemplary damages are recognized as being unusually harsh on wrongdoers and are intended to serve as an example to the wrongdoer and others that such conduct will not be tolerated by society. The wrongdoer’s victim, in the eyes of the- law, is fully compensated for his loss by the award of ordinary damages. The victim, again in the eyes of the law, becomes the recipient of a windfall when punitive damages are awarded to the victim alone for an outrage committed against both the victim and society. As noted above, an award of punitive damages rests “upon the right to punish, and not the right of the injured party to compensation for the wrong done.” French v. Deane, supra. It is well within the prerogative of the legislature to demand prompt action when a plaintiff demands not only personal compensation but societal compensation as well.
This court has ruled in the past that the one year limitation of 1973 C.R.S. § 13-80-104 applies to prayers for punitive damages. Hixon v. Elanco Prods. Co., supra; Biser v. Adkins, (unpublished) Civil Action No. 75-F-1096 (D.Colo. Jan. 26, 1977). Plaintiff has presented no persuasive reasons to change that position. We are convinced that had the issue come before the Colorado state courts, their decision would be in harmony with this opinion.
Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted.
Notes
. The court’s rationale was that to allow a private party to recover punitive damages was to “usurp the powers of the state in the infliction of punishment.”
. In a case tried to the court by consent of the parties, an award of exemplary damages is proper.
Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo.
78,
. Compensatory damages were also available, but under other legal theories.