Sherrell v. StateSherrell v. State
Fоllowing a jury trial, Patrick Sherrell was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault upon his wife. Sherrell appeals his convictions, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting letters written to him by his wife from being sent out with the jury during deliberations pursuant to the State’s continuing-witness objection, and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
On November 14,2009, C. S. went to a baby shower at her uncle’s home. Upon her arrival, several of C. S.’s family members noticed that she had bruises on her face and neck and that she had difficulty sitting. When questioned by her family about the injuries, C. S. admitted that two weeks earlier- — on October 31, 2009 — Sherrell had beaten her with a belt and the wooden handle of a toilet plunger. Consequently, C. S.’s aunt and uncle took her to the Jasper County Sheriff’s Dеpartment, where C. S. repeated her allegations to investigators. And while there, a female deputy photographed C. S.’s injuries, which — in addition to the bruises on her face and neck— included two open sores on her buttocks. Immediately thereafter, C. S.’s aunt and uncle took C. S. to the hospital, where her injuries were treated.
After speaking with C. S. and several of her family members, an investigator from the Jasper County Sheriff’s Department went to Sherrell’s mother’s residence in Shady Dale, where Sherrell and C. S. were still living, and arrested Sherrell. Shortly thereafter, Sherrell was released on bond. And although one of the conditions of his bond prohibited him from having any сontact with C. S., the couple reunited a short time after Sherrell’s release.
On May 6, 2010, a Jasper County Sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to Sherrell’s mother’s residence in Shady Dale in response to a domestic-disturbance call. When the deputy arrived, Sherrell and C. S. were both there, and the deputy observed bruises on C. S.’s facе and arms and a bandage on her forehead. When asked how she sustained her injuries, C. S. responded that they were the result of falling down and “rough sex.” Although extremely skeptical of C. S.’s explanation, the deputy did not arrest Sherrell but instead took Sherrell and C. S.’s driver’s licenses with him to the sheriff’s office so that the matter could be further invеstigated.
The very next day, the investigator who had arrested Sherrell for the October 31, 2009 incident was tending to an unrelated matter at the courthouse when he was informed that Sherrell was in the lobby of the sheriff’s office, requesting that his driver’s license be returned. Upon arrival, the investigator saw Sherrell’s truck in the parking lot with what appeared to be only Sherrell’s dog inside the vehicle. After
The investigator immediately blocked Sherrell’s truck with his own vehicle and asked both Sherrell and C. S. to exit. As they complied, the investigator saw that C. S.’s face was bruised, bоth of her eyes were swollen, and her forehead was bandaged. The investigator also noticed that C. S. seemed to be in pain on her right side. Initially, C. S. denied that Sherrell had abused her, and instead, claimed again that her injuries were the result of “rough sex.” Unconvinced, the investigator asked both C. S. and Sherrell to come with him into the shеriff’s office, at which point, C. S.’s injuries were photographed and Sherrell was arrested for aggravated assault and violating a condition of his bond. Eventually, C. S. admitted that she sustained her injuries as a result of Sherrell beating her with a belt and his fists.
Thereafter, Sherrell was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault,
Sherrell called several witnesses to testify in his defense. In addition, Sherrell testified and denied beating C. S. Instead, he claimed that C. S. had a long history of mental-health problems, including depression and schizophrenia, and that her injuries were the result of a combination of self-infliction, her own clumsiness, and “rough sex” that she initiated. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Sherrell on both counts.
Subsequently, Sherrell obtained new counsel and filed a motion for new trial, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered
At the outset, we note that when a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viеwed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.
1. Sherrell contends that the State failed to provе venue beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
With regard to venue, the Georgia Constitution and our statutory law require that a criminal defendant be tried in the county in which the alleged crime was committed.
[v] enue is a jurisdictional fact, and is an essential element in proving that one is guilty of the crime charged. Like evеry other material allegation in the indictment, venue must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of venue is a part of the State’s case, and the State’s failure to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt renders the verdict contrary to law, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, and warrants reversal.7
But the State may establish venue by whatever means of proof are available to it, including “direct and circumstantial evidence.”
Here, C. S. testified that shortly after marrying Sherrell, the couple moved into Sherrell’s mother’s residence, which was in the
Furthermore,
[i]n light of the well-settled principle that public officials are believed to have performed their duties properly and not to have exceeded their authority unless clearly proven otherwise, the jury was authorized to find the [Jasper] County investigator acted within the territorial jurisdiction in which he testified he was employed.11
Accordingly, the totality of the evidence sufficed to show venue in Jasper County.
2. Sherrell also contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting letters written to him by his wife from being sent out with the jury during deliberations, pursuant to the State’s objection that doing so would violаte the continuing-witness rule. We agree that the trial court misapplied the continuing-witness rule in sustaining the State’s objection, but we disagree that the court’s misapplication of the rule requires reversal of Sherrell’s convictions.
Under well-settled Georgia law, the continuing-witness objection is based on the notion that written testimony is “heard by the jury when read from the witness stand just as oral testimony is heard when given from the witness stand,” but that it is “unfair and places undue emphasis on written testimony for the writing to go out with the jury to be read again during deliberations, while oral testimony is received but once.”
Here, the challenged exhibits consisted of two letters to Sherrell from his wife: The first was written a few weeks prior to the October 31, 2009 incident, and the second was written several months after the May 6, 2010 incident. In both letters, C. S. expressed her love for Sherrell, apologized for her own behavior, and thanked him for helping her to address her mental-health problems. The letters were admitted into evidence, and Sherrell’s trial counsel read significant parts from both during his extensive cross-examination of C. S. However, pursuant to the State’s objection, the trial court prohibited the letters from going out with the jury during its deliberations. But given that the letters were not written testimony and did not derive their evidentiary value solely from the credibility of C. S., the trial court erred in doing so.
Nevertheless, a misapplication of the continuing-witness rule does not require reversal if the error was harmless.
3. Sherrell further contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Once again, we disagree.
It is axiomatic that in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of cоunsel, Sherrell must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that “there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”
During his cross-examination of the Jasper County Sheriff’s Department’s lead investigator, Sherrell’s trial counsel asked if he was aware of C. S.’s mental state when he spoke to her in the parking lot of the sheriff’s office the day after the May 6, 2010 incident. The investigator responded, “Well, she was distressed. She — we have a term that’s considered the battered wife syndrome where they actually go into a mode of protection for against the abuser. She exhibited that.” Sherrell’s trial counsel did not object to this testimony, and the investigator went on to discuss the fact that C. S. initially refused medical treatment and initially denied that Sherrell was responsible for her injuries.
On appeal, Sherrell argues that the Sheriff’s Department’s investigator’s reference to the battered-wife syndrome constituted expert testimony, which the investigator was not qualified tо provide,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
See Strozier v. State,
See
See, e.g., English v. State,
Joiner v. State,
Miller v. State,
See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI;
Jones v. State,
Bentley v. State,
Chavez v. State,
See Hargrave v. State,
Chavez,
Id.
Davis v. State,
Id. (punctuation omitted).
Id. (punctuation omitted).
See Bollinger v. State,
See Dockery v. State,
Id. at 506-07 (4) (punctuation omitted).
Id. at 507 (4) (punctuation omitted).
See Dunagan v. State,
Chapman v. State,
Chapman,
Id.
Henderson v. State,
See generally Smith v. State,
See Adams v. State,
Id. (punctuation omitted); see Port v. State,
See Adams,