Defendants appeal by leave granted from the decision of the trial court denying their motion for summary disposition on the basis of the statute of limitations and res judicata. MCR 2.116(C)(7). We reverse.
*12
On January 7, 1979, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with a City of Detroit police car driven by defendant Bobby Bugaski. On April 24, 1980, plaintiff filed suit against defendants for injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. Plaintiff alleged that her injuries included severe headaches, pain in her lower back, and shock to her nervous system. On July 13, 1983, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summаry judgment on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of serious impairment of bodily function under MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. We affirmed the trial court in
Sherrell v Bugaski,
On November 21, 1985, plaintiff discovered that she had a herniated disc, which she alleges was the result of the automobile accident. On May 8, 1986, plaintiff once again filed a negligence action against defendants. Defendаnts then filed a motion for summary disposition, which was denied.
On appeal, defendants raise two issues. They claim that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition on the basis that рlaintiff’s suit was not barred under the doctrine of res judicata and by denying it on the basis that the period of limitations had not expired.
First as to the issue of res judicata, we find that the trial court errеd by denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this basis.
The doctrine of res judicata is a manifestation of the recognition that interminable litigation leads to confusion and chaos fоr the litigants and results in the inefficient use of judicial resources.
Rogers v Colonial Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Grosse Pointe Woods,
The doctrine of res judicata provides that where two parties have fully litigated a particular claim and a final judgment has resulted, that claim may not be relitigated by either party. In Tucker v Rohrback, [13 Mich 73 , 75 (1864)] the Supreme Court delineated threе prerequisites for a prior judgment to constitute a bar in a subsequent action: (1) the former action must have been decided on the merits; (2) the same matter contested in the second action must have been decided in the first; and (3) the two actions must be between the same parties or privies.
There is no question but that the suit which plaintiff filed in April, 1980, was against the very same dеfendants as are being sued in the instant case. Additionally, there is little dispute that plaintiff’s first, suit was decided on the merits presented. The trial court in the 1980 suit granted defendants’ motion for summary dispositiоn because there was no genuine issue as to the damages plaintiff sustained in the accident; as a matter of law, therefore, there was no serious impairment of bodily function. This Cоurt affirmed in
Sherrell, supra.
The previous decision was thus final and was made on the merits. See
Carter v SEMTA,
Plaintiff in argument would have us accept that the second
Ward
element is not present in this
*14
case. She asserts that, because she had an additional injury which manifested itself only after the first lawsuit, the same matter is not being contested in the instant case as was decided in the prior suit. In support of this contention, plaintiff relies on
Horan v Brown,
We must disagree with plaintiff’s reliance on Horan and her conclusions. Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine оf res judicata, as the matter raised in the present case was certainly adjudicated in the prior lawsuit. Ward, supra. Here, as in the first lawsuit, plaintiff is suing defendants for negligence in operating a mоtor vehicle. The previous suit was dismissed expressly on the issue of lack of damages. Simply because the facts on the issue of plaintiff’s damages have changed, the appliсation of res judicata is not barred. The only instance where a change in fact may cause an evasion of the application of res judicata is in an area of law where there are important competing considerations, such as worker’s compensation. See Gose, supra, p 176. In worker’s compensation cases, the remedial purpose оf the statute is to maintain the fiscal integrity of persons whose wage-earning ability has been suspended or terminated. Id. Thus, an injury discov *15 ered after a lawsuit would be considered in recalculating a plaintiffs damages and res judicata would not apply to bar such recalculation.
No such important remedied policy applies in the present personal injury case. As Justiсe Levin, dissenting on other grounds, pointed out in Gose:
In a negligence action, the trier is required to predict the likely future complications and damages and to ascertain a lump sum to сompensate for past, present and future damages. There is no modification of the verdict even where the passage of time proves the prediction erroneous, and a second suit for damages resulting from the same breach is not permitted even if there has been a change in physical condition or other circumstance. In this context, thе defendant is entitled to rely on the plaintiffs having presented all claims arising from the breach. He only expects to have to defend one suit. [Id., p 199. Emphasis added.]
We therefore conclude that рlaintiffs change in physical condition does not warrant suspending the application of res judicata to bar her claim. We thus reverse the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motiоn on this basis.
We turn now to the second issue raised by defendants, that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition, determining that the period of limitations had not expired.
MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 provides in relevant part:
(1) A person shаll not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom thе plaintiff claims, the áction is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
*16 (8) The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.
Without question, plaintiff’s present claim was not filed within three years of the datе of the accident, but rather
7½
years later. Plaintiff argues, however, that the period of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. She would have us hold that the claim did not accrue until May, 1985, when she discovered her herniated disc, and relies on
Horan, supra,
for the proposition that a cause of action under the no-fault act does not accrue until the person discovers or should have discovered the serious impairment of bodily function. While that may be correct, plaintiff fails to see that her claim had already accrued under the law when she filed her first suit in April, 1980. Simply because plaintiff’s injury failed to rise to the requisite level for recovery in the first suit does not mean her claim had not yet accrued. As the Supreme Court stated in
Connelly v Paul Ruddy’s Equipment Repair & Service Co,
Once all of the elements of an action for personal injury, including the element of damage, are present, the claim accrues and the statute оf limitations begins to run. Later damages may result, but they give rise to no new cause of action, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run anew as each item of damage is incurred.
Thus, plаintiff’s cause of action accrued when she discovered the injuries for which she sued in the first action she filed in 1980.
Additionally, the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of plaintiff’s first lawsuit.
*17 MCL 600.5856; MSA 27A.5856, provides:
The statutes of limitations are tolled when:
(1) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant, or when
(2) jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired, or when
(3) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith, are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute shall not be tolled longer than 90 days thereafter.
This statute permits the tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a prior suit between the parties where the prior action was not adjudicated on the merits.
Meda v City of Howell,
Plaintiffs prior suit against defendants was dismissed on a motion for summary disposition because there was no issue of material fact as to whether a serious impairment of body funсtion existed. A dismissal on motion by the defendants, after judicial consideration, as opposed to a ministerial procedural dismissal, is an adjudication on the merits. See Carter, supra, p 265. Thus, the statutе of limitations in the present case was not tolled during the pendency of plaintiffs first suit.
We, therefore, hold that plaintiffs claim had already accrued by the date of her previous lawsuit, that the statute of limitations was not tolled, and that plaintiffs claim is barred by the running of the period of limitations. The trial court therefore erred by failing to grant defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this basis.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition and grant judgment to defendants.