Sherman v. PeopleSherman v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Wilkin
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a proceeding for contempt of court, instituted in the county court of Cook county by the State’s attorney, against plaintiffs in error, for misbehavior as judges of election during the judicial election held June 1,1903, in the twenty-seventh precinct of the eighteenth ward in the city of Chicago.
On June 8, 1903, one Robert N. Dodson filed his affidavit in the county court, in which he stated that he was a duly registered voter, and voted in said twenty-seventh precinct at the election held June 1, 1903; that the three judges and two clerks were present at the time he cast his vote, and the judges searched for his name upon the register and announced it in a loud voice, as required by law; that he was duly registered from 180 West Madison street, in said precinct, and was the only person of that name, to the best of his knowledge and belief, at that number; that he voted only once at that election and that the poll-books for that precinct disclosed that he had been recorded therein as having voted twice. He further enumerated in his affidavit eleven other similar instances of registered votgrs in that precinct having been recorded upon the poll-books as having voted twice. This affidavit was read in open court, and the State’s attorney moved for a rule upon plaintiffs in error to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court for misbehavior in their office as judges of said election. To the entry of this rule the plaintiffs in error objected, upon the ground that the affidavit of Dodson did not state facts which amount to misbehavior in office and was insufficient to justify the entry of such a rule,— which objection was overruled by the court. Thereupon the rule was
Several questions are raised in the case, but the principal one is the validity of the act entitled “An act regulating the holding of elections, and declaring the result thereof in cities, villages and incorporated towns,” approved June 19, 1885, and contained in Hurd’s Statutes of 1901, pages 794 to 835. Section 9 of article 2 provides for the selection of the judges and clerks. Section 11 provides for their confirmation by the county court. Section 13 provides that “after such confirmation and acceptance of such commission, such judges and clerk shall thereupon become officers of such court, and shall be liable in a proceeding for contempt for any misbehavior in their office, to be tried in open court on oral testimony in a summary way, without formal pleadings, but such trial or punishment for contempt of court shall not be any bar to any proceedings against such officers, criminally, for any violation of this act.”
The first contention of plaintiffs in error is directed against that part of section 13 above quoted on the ground that it was enacted upon the false assumption that judges and clerks of election, as such, are concerned in the administration of justice, and that the General Assembly has no power, under the constitution, to make such judg‘es and clerks officers of the county court and liable for contempt.
Article 3 of the constitution divides the powers of government into three departments,-—legislative, executive and judicial,—and prohibits one department from exercising any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as thereinafter expressly permitted. We held in the case of People v. Morgan, 90 Ill. 558, that this section does not undertake to define, in any specific manner, what are legislative, executive or judicial acts, but, like most other provisions of the constitution, the
Several of the points made upon this appeal were considered by us in the case of People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587. We there held that this law was constitutional with reference to the power of the county court to appoint the election commissioners, and in that opinion reviewed the authorities. As to the duties of election commissioners we there said (p. 601): “If, however, the constitutional division of the powers of government into three
The power to punish for contempt is not limited strictly to the judiciary, for since the establishment of free government the legislative branch has exercised the power to punish all who refuse to obey its mandates. It has also always been the right of courts of record to punish for contempt, not by virtue of any specific legislative authority, but by the common law; and in recent years this power has been greatly enlarged so as to cover a multitude of cases, some of which are not entirely judicial in their nature. Courts have powder to. punish, in certain cases, administrators, executors, guardians, masters in chancery, reporters, sheriffs, bailiffs, clerks, jurors, witnesses, attorneys and receivers. Some of these are merely ministerial officers of the court, charged with no duties which are judicial in their character, and yet where a court appoints officers to act with reference to the subject matter committed to it for administration, it is necessary that these officers should be concerned with the judicial conduct of the court, and hence guilty for violation of the same. The extent to which the law of receivership has been developed by the courts is remarkable. Receivers are appointed by the courts and become officers of the courts making the appointment, even though their acts are, generally, ministerial. They may take
The government is divided into three branches, and the lines of demarkation between the branches are not clearly and definitely drawn. The managing and controlling of elections cannot, therefore, be said to necessarily belong to the executive or political branch, but, as we have seen, the constitution, in defining the powers of the county court, gives it such powers and duties as may be conferred upon it by general law. As often announced, the constitution is a limitation upon and not a grant of power. All power and authority are vested in the people. The people delegate powers to the legislature, hence the legislature can enact any laws not expressly limited by the constitution. In order that legislation be held unconstitutional there must be some express provision prohibiting it. In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute all presumptions are in favor of its validity and all doubts are resolved in its favor. No statute should-be held unconstitutional unless the’ court is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it is not constitutional. No specific section of the constitution has been pointed out by counsel for plaintiffs in error with which this statute is in conflict. The legislature, in its wisdom, has entrusted this subject to the county court, and we held in the Hoffman case that the law, in that respect, was constitutional. If the legislature had the power to entrust the elections to the custody of the county court, it also had
All that is said about the wisdom and beneficial operation of this statute is aside from the question of its constitutionality. It is either valid or invalid.
It is next insisted by plaintiffs in error that the statute authorizing the court to proceed to hear the case without an affidavit or formal statement in writing as to the nature of the charge or accusation,—in fact, without formal pleadings and upon oral testimony, in a summary manner,—is unconstitutional, as it deprives the defendants of their liberty without due process of law. We do not see how this contention can be sustained. A part of what is already stated in this opinion applies with equal force to this contention. It is the intention of the act that proceedings under it shall be summary, vigorous and effective. The provisions complained of were enacted, evidently, for the purpose of preventing the delays which very formal proceedings require. There is nothing in the act to prevent the defendants from having all their rights under the law. The provisions must be given a reasonable construction. Under them the defendants are entitled to a full and impartial hearing, not only as to the exact nature of the charges against them, but they must be given the
The next objection is, that the act makes the county ■ court the judge of what constitutes misbehavior, and under its provisions the defendants may be punished twice for the same offense,—once for contempt, and also criminally. The misbehavior referred to in the statute does not mean any misbehavior at the mere caprice of the county court, but refers to misbehavior of the judges in connection with the duties of their office,—to conduct in violation of the law and the instructions which they have received concerning their duties. These are the only acts of misconduct for which, they may be punished. Hence, in this respect the defendants have no cause for complaint. As to the second contention, it is a well known rule of law that the mere fact that an act may be indictable or punishable in some other manner does not deprive the court of the power to punish it as a contempt. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,—2d ed.—p. 66, and cases cited.
The next assignments of error are, that the facts recited in the affidavit filed by Dodson are not sufficient to constitute contempt; that the objection to the entry of the rule to show cause, and the motion to vacate the order to show cause, and the motion to discharge the rule and set the plaintiffs in error at liberty, should each have been sustained by the court; that the judgment is contrary to the evidence, and that the court permitted improper remarks of the State’s attorney. All of these assignments can be considered together. The law under which this election was held requires all persons voting to be registered, and it was the duty of the judges’ to check the names of the voters on the register as the votes were
Upon a consideration of the whole case we find no reversible error, and the judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.
Cartwright and Scott, JJ., dissenting.