Jоhn S. Sherman appeals from a Fulton County Superior Court judgment that validated and confirmed certain revenue bonds and bond security. For reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment and remand the case with direction.
In accordance with the Revenue Bond Law, 1 the State of Georgia initiated a bond validation proceeding in December 2010 by filing a “Petition and Complaint,” naming as defendants the Development Authority of Fulton County (DAFC) and 1138 Peachtree Land Holdings, LLC. Said pleading sought a judgment apprоving DAFC’s issuance of certain proposed taxable revenue bonds and validating and confirming the bonds and various bond security as required by the Develoрment Authorities Law. 2 The bonds were intended to finance a multi-use facility that would be developed by 1138 Peach-tree Land Holdings.
Sherman, as a resident of Fulton County, intervened in the proceedings and filed a pleading captioned “Objections to Bond Validation, Denial of Bond Validation Petition Allegations and Plea in Abatement.” 3 Sherman alleged numerous grounds for denying the State’s Petition and Complaint, and he requested that the superior court set forth in its judgment findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a).
Thereafter, Sherman’s counsel participated in the bond validation hearing, cross-examining DAFC’s witness, and opposing the State’s Petition and Complaint. At the end of the hearing, the court announced that it was rejecting Sherman’s grounds. The court *238 entered judgment validating and confirming the bonds and bond security.
In the judgment, the superior court recounted that the “action ha[d] come on for hearing before the Cоurt sitting without a jury” and that the court had “considered the Petition and Complaint, [and] the verified answers of the defendants, [DAFC] and 1138 Peachtree Land Holdings, LLC.” Notably, thе judgment made no mention of Sherman, and it failed to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various grounds pursued by Sherman. 4
Among his contentions on appeal, Sherman takes issue with the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to several grounds he assertеd. 5 Under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), 6 “[a] trial court presiding over a bench trial ... in a court of record is statutorily required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law upon the requеst of any party made prior to such ruling.” 7 Here, as DAFC acknowledges, prior to the judgment, Sherman requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Consequеntly, the judgment is vacated and the case remanded so that the superior court may enter a judgment setting forth requisite findings of fact and conclusions of lаw that will allow meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s *239 rejection of Sherman’s arguments. 8
*239 Alternatively, the superior сourt may upon remand dismiss the action if it determines that re-entry of judgment (with mandated findings of fact and conclusions of law) would serve no purpose. This is beсause: (a) DAFC has briefed this court that the bonds have not been issued, that it has no intent to issue the bonds authorized by the trial court’s judgment, and that the case should bе remanded so that it (DAFC) may “petition the Fulton County Superior Court for an order withdrawing the bond validation Order” as moot; 9 (b) the State of Georgia represеnts to this court that it is “merely a nominal party to the bond proceeding” and thus “to the extent it has an interest in the issues on appeal, those interests have been preserved by DAFC’s filings”; (c) 1138 Peachtree Land Holdings has briefed this court that it is no longer operating and that the development of the facility thаt is the subject of the bond validation proceeding was never commenced; (d) Sherman, concerned that DAFC seeks a remand “to get a ‘do ovеr’ at the trial level because of. . . legal infirmities associated with the final order,” 10 asserts that any remand should result in a dismissal “with prejudice”; and (e) citing Shermаn’s concern, DAFC has briefed this court: “[Sherman’s] Response . . . sought only to insure that any order remanding the case require DAFC to seek withdrawal with prejudice, a condition that is perfectly consistent with DAFC’s intent not to issue bonds for this project.”
Given the foregoing, we remand this case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.
Notes
OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq.
OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq.
See OCGA § 36-82-77 (“Any citizen of this state who is a resident of the governmental body which desires to issue such bonds may become a party to the proceedings at or before the time set for the hearing and any party thereto who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the court confirming and validating the issuance of the bonds or refusing to confirm and validate the issuance of the bonds and the security therefor may appeal from the judgment under the procedurе provided by law in cases of injunction.”);
Copeland v. State of Ga.,
See generally
In the Interest of D. L. G.,
See
Grantham v. Grantham,
That Code provision states, in pertinent part, that “in all nonjury trials in courts of record, the court shall upon request of any party made prior to such ruling, find the facts speсifically and shall state separately its conclusions of law.” See
Hunter v. Hunter,
Hunter,
supra at 11 (5) (citation and punctuation omittеd). See OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) (judge of the superior court shall hear and determine all questions of law and of fact in bond validation case and shall render judgment thereof);
Steadham v. State of Ga.,
See
Grantham,
supra (remаnding case with direction that the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law which will allow meaningful appellate review of its decision);
Sanders v.
Stone,
See, however,
In the Interest of I. S.,
See, however, Marsh, supra.