58 Wis. 343 | Wis. | 1883
The practice pursued in this case was, to say the least, anomalous. The only issue ever tried in the base was that formed by the complaint and the answer of disclaimer by the defendant Gilmore. The complaint alleged the possession in Gilmore, and that he unlawfully withheld it from the plaintiff, and had, since May 17,1880. The answer denied each of these allegations, and alleged that Gilmore had conveyed to Bemis by deed before the commencement of the action, and the court found that the answer and complaint were both true. After the close of the testimony from which the trial judge made these remarkable findings, he ordered Bemis to be made a defendant for the purpose of controverting the plaintiff’s claim of title and right to possession, upon the testimony taken on the trial of the issue made by the complaint and Gilmore’s answer of disclaimer. The complaint was never amended so as to make the action against Bemis, and he put in no answer, and it would seem that he could not under the limitation imposed. The only finding having any reference to Bemis is that he claimed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the quitclaim deed mentioned in Gilmore’s answer, but which deed was not recorded until after the suit was commenced. Thus it appears that Bemis was only permitted to defend his title upon Gilmore’s answer disclaiming title, and then only upon the evidence which Gilmore had.adduced to establish his disclaimer.
As the action was commenced, and the notice of listen-
But there are other difficulties in the way of the plaintiff’s contention. Sec. 3187, E. S., referred to by counsel, authorizes the Us pendens to be filed at the? time of filing the complaint, or any time afterwards before judgment. Until the filing of the complaint, the notice of lis pendens, though duly filed, is inoperative. Olson v. Paul, 56 Wis., 30. Here
The statute expressly provides that where the premises are actually occupied, the action must be against the occupant. R. S., sec. 3075. If they are not so occupied, then the action must be against the person exercising acts of ownership •on the premises, or claiming title thereto, or some interest therein, at the time of the commencement of the action. Ibid. The court having found Gilmore’s answer to be true, in effect found that he was doing none of the acts mentioned in that section at the time of the commencement of the action, and hence that the plaintiff had no right to commence the action against him at the time he did; and it was upon this ground that judgment was ordered and rendered in favor of Gilmore and against the plaintiff. The plaintiff simply misconceived the person against whom to bring the action. The statute only made the Us pendens constructive notice to such purchaser or incumbrancer as obtained his conveyance or incumbrance after both the complaint and notice had been filed. Sec. 3187. Nor does sec. 3088, R. S., cited by counsel, aid his client in this respect. That simply provided that the judgment rendered in such action of ejectment shall be conclusive, as to the title established therein, ■upon the party against whom it is rendered, and upon all persons claiming from, through, or under him, by title accruing after the filing of a notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the register of deeds. Had Bemis not been made a party he would not have been bound under that sec•tion, for that only made the judgment conclusive upon the plaintiff against whom it was rendered, and those claiming from, through, or under him. Bemis did not claim from, through, or under the plaintiff, but under Gilmore, in whose favor the judgment was rendered. Besides, the title or claim of Bemis did not accrue “ after ” the filing of the lis -pendens, but before the commencement of the action; —
For the reasons given,' that portion of the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
JBy the Court. — It is so ordered.