Sherlock v. MyersSherlock v. Myers
{¶ 2} On January 1, 2004, Appellants filed a complaint in the Small Claims Division of Akron Municipal Court. Soon thereafter, Appellants filed a motion to change venue, which was denied. The court, however, sua sponte transferred the case from the Small Claims Division to Akron Municipal Court's regular docket. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on February 11, 2004. The court granted the motion. Appellants timely appealed from that decision, raising a slew of unnumbered and interconnected errors for our consideration.
{¶ 3} We first note that pro se litigants should be granted reasonable leeway such that their motions and pleadings should be liberally construed so as to dеcide the issues on the merits, as opposed to technicalities. Martin v. Wayne Cty. Natl. Bank, 9th Dist. No. 03CA0079,
{¶ 4} Appellants include only five legal citations throughout their original brief: R.C.
{¶ 5} Taking into consideration that we must hold pro se litigants to the same standards as those represented by counsel, we will only consider arguments related to Appellants' five legal citations which refer to issues properly before this Court.
{¶ 6} In a number of their assigned issues, Appellants argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their complaint. Appellants insist that the immunity defense is unavailable to Appellee in this case because he was not acting in the course and scope of his duty as a city policeman by "commit[ing] perjury, suborn[ing] perjury, fil[ing] a false written statement, and wrongfully participat[ing] in a police investigation while a subject to avoid blame." They further state that they "did not sue [Appellee] for negligence; they sued him fоr lying to cover up causing an accident, because it was the perjury and other illegal acts of dishonesty [Appellee] committed that caused them damages."3 Therefore, they opine that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss the case based on any defense оf immunity. We find Appellants' contentions meritless.
{¶ 7} R.C.
A. R.C.
{¶ 9} Unless the court grants leave, R.C.
B.
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} In this case, the court served notice to all partiеs on January 29, 2004, of a pretrial hearing to be held February 13, 2004. Although the docket reflects that Appellee filed his motion to dismiss on February 11, 2004, Appellants admit receiving a copy of the motion on February 6, 2004, six days prior to the hearing. The judge apparently entertained arguments relatеd to the motion to dismiss at the February 13 hearing.5 From the information available in the record, it is apparent that Appellants never requested a continuance, or in any way challenged the aptness of the court's consideration of arguments related to the motion to dismiss at that preliminary hearing. Following the filing of additional briefs by the parties after the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss on February 20, 2004. None of Appellants' post-hearing motions contest the propriety of the court's entertaining of arguments on the motion to dismiss at the hеaring.
{¶ 12} Not only did Appellants fail to raise this issue at the trial court level, where the judge could properly have addressed it, they also do not argue that the limited time period deprived them of an adequate opportunity to respond to the motion. Appellants only state that the timing of the motion was "an unethical stunt gone awry because [Appellee] didn't have [Appellants] served within [the correct time period]." Given that Appellants failed previously to challenge, in any way, the court's consideration of the motion to dismiss at the February 13 hearing, we find that Appellants have waived this argument on appeal. See State v. Garlinsky (Feb. 10, 1995), 11th Dist. No. 93-T-4936. Accordingly, we overrule Appellants' assignments of error as they relate to this issue.
C. Loc.R. 16: Preliminary Hearing Procedure
{¶ 13} In their final supported argument, Appellants claim that the trial court erred by failing to follow proper procedure at the preliminary hearing under Loc.R. 16. Appellants' brief states:
"[Loc.R.] 16 states the pretrial hearing requires a preliminary hearing statement with a set format. * * * The preliminary hearing instructions tell the litigants to be prepared for evidence questions, stipulations to facts and law, and other issuеs, and to be prepared to discuss the possibility of settlement. * * *
"[Appellants] complied with the local rules and were prepared to discuss evidence questions, stipulations to facts and law, and other issues, and were prepared to discuss the possibility of a settlement. In faсt, they addressed these questions formally in their preliminary hearing brief.
"The record reflects that [the judge] did not really address these issues, but merely asked a few questions relating to [Appellee's] motion to dismiss the case, a motion that he should have forbidden because it was improperly sеrved, and falsely argued.6
"[The judge's] failure to conduct a proper preliminary hearing either showed his prejudice against [Appellants] or showed he avoided getting the information he needed to render an accurate and just decision. (Or maybe [the judge] showed by his lapses that he is no longer physically or mentally capable of doing a credible job as a judge.) His lack of curiosity in failing to hear issues and his failure even to go through the motions of running a legal preliminary hearing indicate he already knew he would dismiss the case, legally or not."
{¶ 14} As noted above, this Court does not have a transcript of the preliminary hearing. As such, we must assume the regularity of that proceeding. Cuyahoga Falls v. Foster, 9th Dist. No. 21820,
{¶ 16} We find that this appeal is frivolous. Appellants filed a civil suit to collect damages under a statute which does not provide a civil remedy. As discussed above, they failed to properly raise any arguable issue of law or fact which may have supported a legally cognizable civil cause of action. In accordance with R.C.
{¶ 17} We overrule Appellants' assignments of error, without addressing those not supported by legal citation or otherwise waived, and affirm the judgment of the Akron Municipal Court. Further, we direct Appellants to pay Appellee $200 towards Appellee's attorney fees in defending this frivolous appeal.
Judgment accordingly.
We order that a special mandate issuе out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
Exceptions.
Whitmore, P.J., Boyle, J., concur.