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Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris
659 P.2d 852
Nev.
1983
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*1 NEVADA, Aрpellant, SHERIFF, COUNTY, CLARK Respondent. MORRIS, DANA LINDSAY No. 12459

March Miller, Attorney, Tufteland, James N. J. District Robert County, Appellant. Attorney, for Deputy Clark District Harris, Neal, Vegas; Morgan Public D. Gerald F. Las Larsen, Defender, Defender, D. Assistant Public Robert Defender, Gonzales, County, for Deputy Clark Xavier Public Respondent.

OPINION

By Court, J.: Steffen, granting order appeal the district court’s results from This corpus petition respondent’s pretrial for writ habeas respondent. that the district court discharging We conclude granting writ on law must affirm the erred as to the but insufficiency grounds of indictment. following alleged respect appeal, the facts are 1, 1979, 17-year Timothy old deemed relevant. On March quantity ingesting a lethal Slotemaker died as a result of hydrate).1 (a The con of chloral trichloral ethanol derivative tablets, purchased was in the form of trolled substance (here Lindsay respondent, Dana Morris decedent from the During “defendant”). early hours of that afternoon inafter Slotemaker, date, accompanied companions, twо fateful purchasing purpose for the went to defendant’s trailer drugs. he had decedent some Defendant informed pur pentathol downers” for sale. Slotemaker “sodium *3 ingested presence pills in with two which he defendant’s chased help down” by “wash the furnished defendant to some beer pill which he con purchased one more pills. Decedent then leaving were the as the three outside defendant’s trailer sumed later, Slotemaker and premises. Approximately hour one-half trailеr. This companions returned to defendant’s the one of time, up tablets from the to ten additional obtained Slotemaker pres again defendant, consumed the which were several of evening as a died later that the Slotemaker ence of defendant. drug result of the overdose. Jury 10, 1979, County indicted

On March the Clark Grand Timothy Slotemaker, for murder of for two the defendant substance, giving away and for one a controlled counts count of sale of a controlled substance. corpus writ petition a for of habeas on the

Defendant filed charging portion defendant of the indictment basis sufficiently specific. open with Defendant’s murder was court, by by petition granted was the lower affirmed this charge. granted was leave to refile the murder Court. The state 1979, complaint charging 31, July state filed a On 6, 1979, Thereafter, September an on defendant with murder. accusing against him of the filed defendant indictment was 1A Schedule IV controlled substance under NRS 453.196. 200.030, 200.010, (Felony

crime of “MURDER 200.070).” defendant, charged This reсent indictment that the on most 1979, feloniously

March “did then and there and without law, authority kill and murder TIMOTHY A. SLOTE- MAKER, being, in a the commission of an unlawful .human act, which, naturally consequences ih its tended to being life prosecution of a human and/or was committed manner, following by giving intent in to-wit: away SLOTEMAKER, or to the said TIMOTHY A. a quantity lethal of a controlled substance to-wit: CHLORAL HYDRATE, the said TIMOTHY A. SLOTEMAKER there- HYDRATE, ingesting quantity after said lethal of CHLORAL ingestion of which caused the said A. TIMOTHY poisoning SLOTEMAKER to die of CHLORAL HYDRATE resulting from overdose of CHLORAL HYDRATE which proximate was a direct and сause unlawful acts of defendant DANA LINDSAY MORRIS here- described inabove.” responded part filing

The by to this indictment in petition a corpus for writ of with habeas this Court. We ruled petition by court, that the be heard the district and the latter granted corpus court discharged writ of habeas defendant, holding question that the of whether “an overdose by in death sale should murder . . . should legislature by be decided ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍and not the court .” . . . appeal This followed. primary whether, appeal issue before us on under the fact-sрecific case, charge circumstances of of second authorized Nevada under law. The resolution product of the 200.030, meaning issue is of the combined of NRS reads, and NRS perti- 200.070. The former statute part, nent as follows:

1. of the first is murder Murder which is: poison, wait, (a) Perpetrated lying means of *4 willful, torture, by any pre- other kind or of deliberate and killing; meditated

(b) perpetration attempted perpe- in the or Committed assault, arson, kidnapping, robbery, tration of sexual glary bur- age child under оr sexual molestation of a years; or

(c) prevent Committed to avoid the lawful or arrest any by peace any person escape to effect the officer or person legal custody. subsection, any sexual

As used molestation is act, willful and lewd or lascivious other than acts consti- assault, upon body, tuting the crime of sexual or with the thereof, age any part or or member of child under to, arousing, appealing grat- years, with the intent of or lust, perpetrator ifying passions or desires of the sexual or of the child. degree

2. Murder of the second is all other kinds of murder. It is noted that the clearly specifies above statute those acts

which are in category of murder degree. in the first (2) subsection degree. all other kinds of murder are of the second argues subsection, state that the latter read in con- junction 200.070, justifies with NRS charge of murder against respondent. provides: NRS 200.070 Involuntary manslaugther shall killing consist in the being, any human do, without intent so to in the commis- act, sion of an unlawful or a lawful probably act which might produce consequence such a manner; in an unlawful but where involuntary killing such happen shall in the act, which, in its conse- unlawful quences, naturally destroy tends to a human life of being, or is prosecution committed in the aof intent, the shall adjudged be deemed and to be offense (Emphasis supplied.)2 murder. charge murder was respondent on The indictment of provision, the state quoted above in the terms couched urging culpability (1) both) grounds: (or of two upon either аct, unlawful of an during the “commission homicide occurred life of naturally tends to which, consequences, in its killing was “committed being,” (2) the and/or a human intent.” prosecution of a felonious 200.070, when whether NRS question of to the We turn first 200.030, charge of sec- permits a conjunction with NRS

read Because the felony-murder rule. degree murder under ond specified within those come do not actions 200.030, state degree murder under areas of first argues criminally responsible under a sec- defendant is that the theory. felоny-murder degree ond felony-murder rule long recognized the has This Court simply felony-murder rule “The murder. context of first homicide, perpetrating while any committed is that stated Payne State, felony, murder.” attempting is first designated applicable 2NRS is the statute in effect in as 200.070 Opinion. quoted in this *5 114 denied, 505, 503, (1965), cert. 391 U.S. 927 406 922

Nev. P.2d (1967). Payne, Court said: In felony-murder to rule was original purpose of the ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍by accidentally killing negligently or deter felons from killings strictly responsible are

holding for the them attempted felony or one. [Citations the result jurisdictions, majority a the of such homicide In omitted.] acquires necessity of degree without the first murder status The heinous proving premeditation and deliberation. thought justify to the is premeditation omission character of the requirements and deliberation. of of the the Payne, a causal connection between commis- direct offense, underlying and the homicide of sion the imposition at required of the rule. Id. 506. also for the appears to no Nevada cases which address There degree felony-murder rule context of second murder.3 in the sup- California, however, adopted persuasive position has a felony-murder concept degree. porting the second of Cline, 1969), People Cal.Rptr. (Ct.App. 459 defend- v. decedent, ant, visiting of the indicated while at the residence bringing phenobarbital After the tab- that he some tablets. had decedent, request lets into the house at the of tablets, gave then presence a number of these and the decedent defendant, a the decedent consumed substantial approximately thirty period min- number them within a lapsed evening, utes.4 the decedent into unconscious- Later subsequently as died a result of a central nervous ness system depression by intoxication.

caused barbituate kill as “Murder is the unlawful 3NRS 200.010 defines murder follows: aforethought, express implied ing being, with malice either of human implied 200.020(2) provides: when shall be no consid ... .” “Malice killing provocation appears, or when all the circumstances erable malignant “the This Court has held that show an abandoned and presence heart.” directly guilt question of which on the a malice is a fact bears charged upon . . . of the crime or innocence of defendant question trier of at the is a to be determined fact trial [I]t 741, 744, Sheriff, (1970). Nev. 476 P.2d 25 And case.” v. Thedford murder, reviewing for first this Court has context of conviction involuntary concerning language found within the said manslaughter the “murder” killing statute: “Under this statute woman murder, though employed there no intent means was even was conscious deadly wеapon. implied use to kill. unlawful Malice condition, intoxication, Consequently, was as to his due to evidence immaterial, killing except was . . . as whether the willful State 77, Fisko, (1937). 58 Nev. testimony conflicting whether the in Cline 4There as to decedent was testimony tablets, expert any event indicated but consumed 15 or extremely (10 dangerous dosage grains) would be that a of over five tablets bodily injury. likely Id. at 460-461. death or serious and would be cause specific Notwithstanding California lacked a the fact that second-degree,5 felony-murder statutory provision for concept was “imbedded” to hold that such a the court went on *6 recognized holding, some limitations in law. In so the court applicability in the of the doctrine: direct causal result of the commis- homicide that is a “[A] inherently dangerous felony to human life . . .

sion of a However, degree murder.” constitutes at least second felony inherently where the is not there can be no deterrent anticipate dangerous, potential felon will not sincе the any injury might solely or death arise from the fact that he felony. will commit [Citations omitted.] “inherently Only in themselves dan- such felonies as are support application gerous to human life” can felony-murder doctrine. the defend- at The California court then affirmed

Id. 461-462. by holding degree that the act ant’s second murder conviction drug illegally furnishing dangerous a restricted to another is “inherently dangerous Id. at 463. to human life.”6 felony-murder has been followed degree rule The second Poindexter, See, (Cal. Pеople e.g., v. cases. other upheld degree was murder conviction 1958), where a second heroin, supplied minor with against who a defendant drug. the use of that having an overdose of minor died later of of a The held: “Death court pf administering narcotics felony furnishing, such as Code, degree. Pen. of the second a minor constitutes murder 196, 205, Powell, 189; 208 P.2d 974.” Id. People 34 Cal.2d v. § at 767. juris- Further, unique concept to California is not Johnson, See, People 329 N.Y.S.2d e.g., dictions. State, (Del. 1967), 230 A.2d 267-269 (1972); Jenkins v. denied, (1969); Delaware wherein the reh’g U.S. 995 felony- degree upon Supreme expounded the second Court felony not related to the sale murder rule the context of. drugs: law, recognized 5Similar to Nevada the court that the California Penal expressly any provision Code did not degree felony- set forth for second murder, provided: but rather speci “All kinds of murder other than those degree.” Code,

fied as first (Pen. are murder of the 189). second § at Id. 461. (the interesting phenobarbital non-narcotic note that both 6It case) hydrate (the drug present Cline) are controlled and chloral drugs as Schedule IV under NRS in Nevada and classified substances 453.196. rule, felony-murder any homi- law the common any felony perpetration consti- committed cide murder .... tuted expressly limited felony-first degree rule is murder contends .... The defendant to three felonies Statute types felonies . . . mani- of three that the enumeration felony-murder rule legislative abolish the intent to fests disagree. We all other felonies. as to long felony-second degree murder rule has been rec- A ognized in Delaware .... [Citations omitted.] Assembly intended to that. . . the General We conclude rule; felony-first degree scope prescribe the felony-second murder was long-standing that the abrogated by the Statute. as follows: a homicide rule has been stated The California the commission of a a direct causal result of that is *7 (except enu- inherently dangerous to human life felonies statute) degree murder constitutes at in the first merated degree murder. least seсond [Citations omitted.] supported judgment, California rule is In our reason, logic, history, sense. and common Court, therefore, felony- opinion that the It of the degree be limited murder rule of this State should second proximately perpetration or caused to homicides attempted perpetration are, by felonies which nature or of life, circumstances, dangerous foreseeably to human statutory. law or felonies be common whether such assertedly attention to cases whiсh directs our The defendant Mauldin, (Kan. P.2d 124 support position. In v. his State selling purchaser of heroin to a 1974), held that the the court body injected and died as subsequently the heroin into his who felony- thereof, application of the did not invoke the ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍a result degree murder. In so hold- murder rule so as to constitute first “time” great importance on factors of ing, placed the court (unlike the California under circumstances and “causation” with the assistance of was not taken cases) where the ovеrdose only determined presence. The court not in the seller nor his the commission of connection between there was no causal felony any death, resulting further believed that but and the felony-murder a function for expansion rule was of the such judiciary. at 126-127. legislature, Id. Dixon, 1973), (Ariz. Similarly, in State v. selling purchaser, heroin to a who act of court held that the sole seller) presence without assistance of (out of and injected body and died as a result thereof did the heroin his into holding, degree murder. In so the court second not constitute said: legislature, considering whether to enact

The after rule, limited it to law murder homicides common arson, rape, robbery, occurring during the commission burglary, that all other mayhem. or It then added kinds degree. provide did not are of It the second during all unnamed felonies were committed homicides degree language We think that used murders. second advisedly. was used places great significance upon The also at 625. defendant

Id. Co., holding Catania v. Farm Life Ins. this Court’s in State (1979). 598 P.2d Defendant’s reliance is mis- Nev. placed. holding nothing did more than

The Court’s construe policy of an in the context an unin- the terms insurance self-injected Furthermore, heroin. tended death Mauldin, Dixon, supra, supra, in v. both State and State Nevada, expressly providing, in were no as there statutes killing “involuntary occurs of an when an act, consequences, naturally which, in its tends unlawful being, prose- destroy the life committed of human intent, murder.” the offense is cution of law, Nevada chloral unauthorized hydrate felony.7 crime is tablets is a undoubt danger confronting per edly with the commensurate drugs If the who take such from unauthorized sources. sons sold, allegations, supports with evidence the state’s intent, drugs young dangerous Slotemaker. Addi felonious tionally, process actually participated in the the defendant overdosing did the defendant Cline.8 the decedent as *8 statutory principle of It is a fundamental construction that possible, give all should construed so where at statutes be as Wаrden, 634, legislative White intent. v. 96 Nev. effect to O’Donnell, 756, (1980); v. 91 Nev. 614 P.2d 536 Woofter (1975). equally It P.2d 1396 fundamental statutes should provision be validate each statute. construed order to Warden, supra; v. A Minor v. Clark Co. Juvenile Ct. White 453.321, NRS 7NRS 453.191. 8Here, grand jury the medical testified examiner before that the level of trichloral ethanol in the was a lethal dose found decedent of “77.5

micrograms per is about to twelve times milliliter ten the amount [which] ordinary hydrate expect[ed] . . dose when uses chloral . an one as presencе sleeping pill.” in the The actual number of tablets consumed would, course, question be a for the trier of fact.

Servs., Here, (1968). apparent 87 Nev. 490 P.2d 1248 it is every legislature involuntary killing intended that prosecution which occurs in the happens of a felonious intent which which, commission of unlawful act in its consequences, naturally tends human life is mur- legislature specified excepting der. The has also that all murder degree. that identified as first shall be of the second We conclude, therefore, may feloniously that one who sells and participates dosages in the administration of lethal of con- purview trolled substances to a minor is outside the intended subject contrary, setting To the statutes. under the factual present, justifiably here a trier of fact could conclude that the 17-year old Slotemaker was killed because of the unlawful act participating of the defendant in in the adminis- drugs naturally life-threatening. tration of which are The trier fact, properly instructed, could also conclude that Slote- prosecution maker was killed in the aof felonious intent defendant. potential

We are not unmindful prose- for untoward resulting cutions emphasize from this decision. We therefore holding today that our is limited to the narrow confines of this perceive case wherein we an immediate and direct causal rela- tionship defendant, proved, between the actions of the if Further, the minor’s demise. People line with the decision Satshell, (Cal. 1971), v. felony we hold that a support application which ony would оf this second fel- rule, murder inherently would have to be one which is dan- gerous when viewed in the abstract. There can be no deterrent degree felony value in a second rule unless the inherently dangerous necessary it potential since is that a felon possibility injury foresees the of- death or from the felony. Cline, People commission of the supra. action, present alleged if the proved facts as are degree felony second murder instruction consistent with this opinion may appropriately applied be to defendant’s conduct. First, it must be established the evidence that the unau- ingestion hydrate thorized quantities sale and of chloral inherently dangerous abstract, i.e., involved are in without specific Second, reference to the victim. there must an imme- relationship diate and causal between the conduct minor, the defendant and the death By Slotemaker. term “immediate” we mean without the intervention of some

119 Third, agency. relationship must the other source or causal drugs beyond to an the unlawful sale of the involvement extend dosage ingestion by or omission lethal by by This element of rule would be satisfied decedent. selling drugs helping providing or and the unlawful by unlawfully recipient drugs ingest a dose or to lethal drugs being present during the dispensing or and Thus, more, consumption rule of a lethal dose. absent involving only apply a a sale a sale would not to situation or dosage presence. ingested in with a nonlethal Although may the defendant’s cogently argued of be thаt an unlawful sale it se, appro- drugs inherently dangerous per and therefore an charge occurs, priate ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍death we leave for a of murder when basis legislature.9 such determination to the 10] [Headnote holding portion that of NRS 200.070 respect with to Our equal applies force to the dealing with with felonious intent words, in the In other provision the statute. unlawful act resulting substances unlawful sale of controlled context death, in accordance with prove its case the state must degreе felony murder guidelines applicable the second same drug quantity must be particular nature and rule. abstract, there inherently dangerous to be shown relationship between the sale be an immediate and causal must hereinbefore of the victim as dispensing and the death defin ed.10 argument that defendant’s

We now consider must rule of violates the approach used in the indictment “and/or” Court, Nev. Simpson this Court established 654, District Simpson, that an this Court held (1972). In P.2d nothing alleges “when it murder is not sufficient indictment for cоm concerning which the crime was means whatever upon “the threats Simpson was founded mitted.” Id. at 655. necessarily pose” process indefinite indictments due entitling the nature and cause “to informed of be an accused Court said: Id. at This the accusation.” 655-656. jurisdiction, 9In at least one homicides from the unlawful sale made, by legislative enactment, capi

of controlled have been substances offense. Rev. § tal Ariz. Stat. Ann. 13-1105. suggest non- provision would language of the statute of this 10The required provided may defendant’s that is conduct all “naturally a human the life of tends to “unlawful” conduct being.” underlying felony (the present sale involves an case Because the applicability drug), amount question of to behavior the Schedule IV ing not be addressed. need to less than provided 173.075(1) expressly that the “indictment *10 plain,

or the shall be a concise and definite information constituting written statement of the essential facts charged.” 173.075(2) NRS indicates this should offense by either include the means which offense was accom- plished are unknown. or show means [Footnote omitted.] recognizes proper NRS likewise that a 179.370 should, among things, ref- indictment other contain some erence means. to holding concerning necessary view of our elements of

proof subject prosecution provisions in a criminal under the 200.070, setting case, fact-specific appar of this it is language fatally ent that the non-statutory language of the indictment is defective. The indictment fails to reference regarding presеnce during facts defendant’s conduct or dece ingestion dent’s of a lethal dose of controlled substance. Consequently, sufficiently apprise the indictment fails to prepared defendant of what he be to must meet. Russell v. 749, States, (1962).11 United 369 U.S. against sufficiency Since we indictment, have ruled of the we however, by so, must affirm the action taken the district court. We do prejudice right without to the state’s to seek a new by proceed way indictment or to aof criminal information in accordance opinion. with this J., J., C. and concur.

Manoukian, Mowbray, J., J., agrees, with whom concur- Springer, Gunderson, ring: opinion I majority concur with the except insofar as its purports dicta to create a new styled, crime this state to be Degree Felony “Second judge Murder.” The properly trial held that new by legislature crimes should be created by the court. argument In oral attorney agreed the state’s that it was not necessary proposed to create new crime and that creation of resрect, Simpson adopted following 11Inthis this Court in formula tion of the law: statute, Whether at common law or under the accusation must include a description particular characterization of the crime and such alleged act properly to have been committed the accused as will enable him against accusation, description to defend and the of the offense must sufficiently complete be right full and to accord to the accused his constitutional process tо due of law. degree felony necessary a “second murder” was not for effec- prosecution agree tive of these kinds of cases.1 I with the attorney suggest inappropriate state’s that it is and unnec- conjure essary up brand new this crime. prosecuted for second

The defendant in this case can present law. A second murder con- murder under killing may when it occurs result from an unintentional viction act which its nature tends in the commission of an unlawful (“[Wjhere involuntary destroy 200.070 human life. NRS which, aсt, killing of an unlawful occurs consequences, naturally human its tends to the life of a intent, being, prosecution a felonious or is committed in the Hall, 213, 239, murder.”); 54 Nev. the offense is State liability (1932). Criminal for murder can attach P.2d of furnish- case if it is established that the unlawful act case, was, ing drugs of this an act under the circumstances *11 tendency life. Conse- which had a natural to human argument, quently, the state at oral there is no as conceded need for the accretion of a new crime. majority “potential аgree with the that there is a for unto- I decision,” prosecutions and believe

ward from danger presents an additional reason for this court that this legislative new to the branch of leave the creation of crimes government. theory, felony you need a don’t 1THE COURT: this case you?

do these facts I don’t think so. THE COUNSEL FOR STATE: you sug- receding your position? you Are Are THE COURT: adopt yourself, agree gesting you, that this court should do not respect cases? murder rule with second ‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍say sitting if I were I have to THE STATE: COUNSEL FOR are, you not do so. where one of I would that we should have reached conclusion THE COURT: You theory, reject correct? such I think so. FOR THE STATE: COUNSEL

Case Details

Case Name: Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris
Court Name: Nevada Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 1, 1983
Citation: 659 P.2d 852
Docket Number: 12459
Court Abbreviation: Nev.
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