Sheri Lommen appeals from the decision of the United States District Court 1 for the District of North Dakota granting summary judgment to Vernon Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks, Minnеsota. The district court applied res judicata and full faith and credit to a judgment of a Minnesota state court that dismissed Lommeris claim on the basis of оfficial immunity. Lommen argues that the district court’s judgment is not barred because: (1) the Minnesota state court judgment was not final; (2) the state court judgment was not on the merits; (3) the state court judgment need not be so recognized because it frustrates the law and public policies of North Dakota; and (4) she is not foreclоsed from litigating under North Dakota law the issues that were not litigated in the Minnesota case. In addition, Lommen asserts further arguments based on choice of lаw issues. Finally, Lommen argues that the court denied equal protection to her by treating other plaintiffs in the same collision differently. We affirm.
Lommen was a passenger in the rear seat of a 1983 Camaro that was stopped at an intersection in Grand Forks, North Dakota. As the Camaro started forward when the stоplight changed, a pickup truck sped through the intersection. A patrol car, driven by Officer Rasmussen of the East Grand *274 Forks, Minnesota Police Department, was pursuing the pickup truck. The patrol car struck the rear quarter of the Camaro, and Lommen suffered injuries when she was thrown through the rear window of the Cа-maro.
Lommen brought an action in a Minnesota state trial court against Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks alleging Rasmussen’s negligence. On motion for summary judgment, thе state trial court held that official immunity applied, thus shielding Rasmussen and the City from liability. It further observed the existence of discretionary function immunity under the law of Nоrth Dakota, but found it unnecessary to resolve the application of this law because Minnesota law should be applied. Lommen appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed in a 2-1 decision, applying essentially the same analysis employed by the trial court. Lommen then filеd a petition for review to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The court granted the petition, but some months thereafter determined that the order was improvidently granted and dismissed the appeal.
Five days after the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, Lommen filed a complaint in the United States Distriсt Court for the District of North Dakota asserting essentially the same claims against Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks. After the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that dismissed Lommen’s appeal, the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the doctrines of res judicata and full faith and credit required that the judgment оf the Minnesota state courts be given pre-clusive effect.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc.,
The Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), requirеs that federal courts give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be given in the courts of the state rendering the judgment.
Allen v. McCurry,
Under Minnesota law, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata exists in order to reheve parties of the burden of relitigating issues already determined in a prior action, that a party may not be ‘twice vexed for the same cause.’”
Beutz v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc.,
Lommen’s first suit, filed in a Minnesota state trial court, was brought against Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks alleging Rasmussen’s negligence. *275 Lommen’s second suit, filed in a federal district court in North Dakota, asserted essentially the same claims against Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks as Lom-men had asserted in the Minnesota state court. Thus, elements two and three of the above test are easily satisfied.
Lommen argues, however, that there was no final judgment on the merits, because the state court judgment dismissed the action on a governmental immunity defense. Lоmmen bases her argument on
Wade v. City of Pittsburgh,
Lommen argues that as in Wade, the state court dismissal of her ease was not based on a factual development of the automobile accident аt issue, but on statutory immunity grounds. According to Lommen, because the defense at issue in the first suit was collateral, the judgment was not on the merits. We reject this argument. In this еase the Pennsylvania law of res judicata is not controlling, but rather the Minnesota law of res judicata. Under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment bаsed upon an order for dismissal constitutes a final adjudication on the merits. Specifically, Rule 41.02(c) states:
Unless the court specifies otherwise in its order, a dismissal pursuant to this rule and any dismissal not provided for in this rule or in Rule 41.01, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for forum non conve-niens, or for failure to join a party indispensable pursuant to Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c). In this case, the Minnesota state court’s judgment explicitly stated that Lommen’s action was “dismissed with prejudice and on its merits.” In addition, a Minnesota appellate court previously has recognized that a final adjudication on the merits existed where summary judgment had been granted in a prior suit against the plaintiffs because the defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Myers v. Price,
Lommen’s additiоnal arguments are without merit and do not warrant further discussion.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rasmussen and the City of East Grand Forks.
Notes
. The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota.