SHAWNETTE LYNN SHERBINO, Plaintiff, v. LUIS C. ROJERO and LAURA I. ROJERO, Intervenors.
Civ. No. 22-273 KG/GBW
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
Filed 03/25/25
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The Court takes note of the following pleadings and briefs the parties have filed: (1) Intervenors Luis C. Rojero and Laura I. Rojero‘s (Rojeros) Complaint (Doc. 50), filed September 13, 2024, (2) Plaintiff Shawnette Lynn Sherbino‘s (Sherbino) Answer (Doc. 51), filed September 26, 2024, (3) Intervenors’ Brief on Choice of Law (Doc. 41), filed January 9, 2024, (4) Plaintiff‘s Response to Intervenors’ Brief Regarding Choice of Law (Doc. 43), filed January 21, 2024, and (5) Plaintiff‘s Motion for Judgment by Default (Doc. 54), filed January 9, 2025. Considering the record, the briefing, and the relevant case law, the Court, in its discretion, abstains from this case and therefore does not rule on the parties’ choice of law briefs (Docs. 41, 43), and denies, as moot, Plaintiff‘s Motion for Judgment by Default (Doc. 54).
I. Background
This case stems from a dispute over life insurance proceeds after the tragic death of Decedent Luis Rojero. What is not disputed is Decedent died in Lincoln County, New Mexico on April 19, 2021, and Plaintiff killed him. See (Doc. 50) (alleging Plaintiff fired a single, fatal
A. The Texas Probate Court Proceedings1
Before this case landed in this Court, Plaintiff filed a separate action in El Paso County, Texas Probate Court (Texas Probate Court). (Doc. 46) at 6. The Texas case is still pending. Because the Texas case is of import to this case, the Court begins by providing relevant details from the Texas case before detailing the proceedings before this Court.
On June 3, 2021, just over six weeks following Decedent‘s death, Plaintiff filed an Application for Independent Administration (Application) of Decedent‘s estate, claiming she was married to Decedent. Id. at 5-8. Approximately four months later, on October 6, 2021, Laura I. Rojero—Decedent‘s mother, and an Intervenor in this case—countered Plaintiff‘s Application with her own Application for Independent Administration. Id. at 44-47. On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion on her Application. Id. at 63-67. Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2022, the Rojeros filed a response to Sherbino‘s summary judgment motion. Id. at 96-104. A review of the state court docket indicates that on or around February 28, 2022, the Texas Probate Court heard arguments on the summary judgment motion but has yet to issue a ruling. See El Paso Probate Court 2 Docket, In Re: Luis Armando Rojero, Deceased, 2021-CPR01010.
B. The Proceedings Before this Court
Initially, Plaintiff Sherbino brought this suit against Defendant Allstate Assurance Company in New Mexico‘s Twelfth Judicial District Court on February 28, 2022.2 See New Mexico State Court Docket, Sherbino v. Allstate Assurance Co., D-1226-CV-2022-00028. On March 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint and subsequently served Allstate. (Doc. 1-1) at 12.3 Because Plaintiff and Allstate are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is $1,000,000, Allstate removed the case on diversity jurisdiction. Id.
The completed criminal investigation resulted in Plaintiff being charged in a one-count criminal complaint for involuntary manslaughter. (Doc. 19) at 1. Because involuntary manslaughter is a fourth-degree felony, Plaintiff was not precluded from receiving the deposited life insurance proceeds under New Mexico‘s slayer statute. Id. at 1-2. As a result, on April 11, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint notice of agreed upon settlement. Id. However, before the parties filed their closing documents, Decedents’ parents, Intervenors Luis C. Rojero and Laura I. Rojero filed a Motion for Intervention. (Doc. 22). On November 7, 2023, Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Rojeros jointly moved the Court to dismiss and discharge Allstate from the case. (Doc. 33). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Allstate as a party on November 8, 2023. (Doc. 34).
Approximately one month later, on December 4, 2023, the Court held a hearing on the Rojeros’ Motion for Intervention, granting their motion based on a finding that the Rojeros
The upshot of this procedural history is the Court is now adjudicating a case between two nondiverse, adverse parties from Texas on state law grounds. This, of course, raises a jurisdictional question because the Court‘s subject matter justification is based on diversity jurisdiction under
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
In their Complaint, Intervenors assert that the Court‘s jurisdiction over this was destroyed when Allstate was a dismissed from the case. (Doc. 50) at 2 (citing
“Once a district court has jurisdiction, additional claims and parties can be added under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute,
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)..., in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
Notably, § 1367(b) provides exceptions precluding district courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction in some instances. These exceptions include:
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
In determining party alignment, “courts are not bound by the way in which the parties seek to align themselves.” Id. Instead, courts have a duty to “look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute.” City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank of New York, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (citation omitted); see Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 1992 WL 350838, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.) (“The fact that [intervenor] sought to intervene as a plaintiff in this matter does not conclusively determine the alignment of the parties.... [The] ‘collision of interests’ bars alignment of [plaintiff] and [intervenor] on the same side of the dispute.“).
In Price, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the Oklahoma Health Care Authority‘s (OHCA) intervention as a nondiverse party destroyed the court‘s diversity jurisdiction. 608 F.3d at 702-05. In affirming the district court‘s exercise of jurisdiction over the suit, the Tenth Circuit concluded the OHCA was properly aligned as a defendant, and thus none of the supplemental jurisdiction exceptions applied. Id. at 705. The Tenth Circuit explained that because any money awarded to OHCA would necessarily be taken from Plaintiffs’ monetary recovery, a substantial conflict existed between Intervenor OHCA and Plaintiffs, precluding the OHCA from being realigned as a plaintiff. Id.
Here, like Price, there is a clear substantial conflict between Plaintiff and Intervenors. An award of the insurance proceeds to Plaintiff would preclude Intervenors’ recovery. Consequently, Intervenors cannot be aligned as Plaintiffs. Therefore, the exceptions set forth in
With the jurisdictional question answered, the Court now discusses why abstention is appropriate.
B. Brillhart Abstention Doctrine
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that while the parties have touched on issues of abstention, their arguments are not fully developed. See (Doc. 41) at 4-5 (discussing courts power to abstain from and dismiss a case); (Docs. 50, 51) at ¶¶1, 18. To the extent the parties have not fully developed their abstention arguments, the Court notes its power to raise abstention sua sponte. Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976)). In this case, the Court concludes abstention is appropriate under the Brillhart abstention doctrine.
In Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942), the Supreme Court explained that district courts are not compelled to exercise jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suits. The Supreme Court explained:
Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.
Id. at 495. A court should decide whether the suit would be better settled in the pending state court proceeding. Id. Accordingly, a district court has “discretion to withhold its exercise of jurisdiction over ‘declaratory judgment actions.‘” U.S. v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 1979, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1994)). A suit is considered a declaratory judgment action under Brillhart if a party requests only declaratory relief and not coercive relief. Id. at 1181 (citation omitted). Under Brillhart, courts have broad discretion to decline adjudicating a suit. Id. And in this case, the Court determines a Brillhart abstention analysis is useful because Intervenors request declaratory relief and there is a pending suit, not governed by federal law, in the Texas Probate Court presenting the same issue between the same parties. (Doc. 50).
In the Tenth Circuit, courts consider five factors when determining whether Brillhart counsels abstention. Id. at 1183. Application of these factors is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Mhoon, 31 F.3d at 983). These factors include:
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy; [2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of procedural fencing or
to provide an arena for a race to res judicata; [4] whether use of declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5] whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
Id. (quoting Mhoon, 31 F.3d at 983). The purpose of the first two questions is to determine whether the controversy could be better resolved in state court. Id. at 1187 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495).
Under the first two Mhoon factors, the Court determines that ruling in this case would not fully settle the controversy between the two parties nor would it serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relationship at issue. The parties still have pending state law claims that both incorporate and are independent of the insurance proceeds claim. See (Doc. 46) (Intervenor Laura Rojero‘s Texas Probate Court counter-application to be appointed as independent administrator of Decedent‘s estate, and Intervenors’ amended petition seeking to enjoin Sherbino from accessing Decedent‘s life insurance policy proceeds and requesting Texas Probate Court impose constructive trust on over insurance proceeds and assets of Decedent‘s estate); see St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Runyon, 53 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming application of the Brillhart factors because parties had pending state action incorporating identical issue involved in declaratory judgment action); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. C.R. Gurule, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1226 (D.N.M. 2015) (declining to exercise federal jurisdiction based on pending state law claim that was independent of federal claim). In resolving the parties’ claims, the Texas Probate Court will necessarily determine the controversy and legal relationship at issue, making it “uneconomical as well as vexatious” for this Court to proceed. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494. Because this controversy could be better settled in the
The third Mhoon factor asks whether the declaratory remedy is being used for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to res judicata.” In weighing this factor, courts consider the timing of the related cases, especially where “the timing of the federal claim suggests that its main purpose is to delay the state court action or receive a favorable judgment on an issue before the state court has a chance to fully develop the facts.” West Am. Ins. Co. v. Atyani, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1233 (D.N.M. 2018) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Runyon, 53 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1995)). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff‘s commencement of this case highly suspect. Although it is Intervenors who seek declaratory judgment, it appears Plaintiff‘s decision to bring this case in New Mexico was an attempt to avoid the Texas Probate Court adjudicating the case. The Court briefly reviews the timeline of this case and the Texas Probate Court action.
As noted above, on June 3, 2021—before Plaintiff initiated this action—she filed an Application for Independent Administration (Application) of Decedent‘s estate in Texas Probate Court. (Doc. 46) at 5-8. Four months later, Intervenor Laura I. Rojero countered Plaintiff‘s Application by filing her own Application in Texas Probate Court. Id. at 44-47. Less than a month later, on February 2, 2022, Intervenors filed their first cross petition against Plaintiff, (1) seeking to enjoin her from accessing Decedent‘s life insurance policy proceeds, and (2) requesting the Court impose a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds and assets of Decedent‘s estate. Id. at 81-83. Plaintiff was served with the Intervenors’ cross petition on February 14, 2022. Id. at 93-94.
On February 28, 2022, two weeks later, Plaintiff brought the instant action against Defendant Allstate Assurance Company in New Mexico‘s Twelfth Judicial District Court. See New Mexico State Court Docket, Sherbino v. Allstate Assurance Co., D-1226-CV-2022-00028. Then, on March 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed her answer to the Intervenors’ first cross petition in Texas Probate Court.4 Id. at 116-19. Two days later, on March 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint and subsequently served Allstate. (Doc. 1-1) at 12. This timeline clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff knew of Intervenors’ constructive trust claim when she filed the New Mexico case. Despite such knowledge, Plaintiff did not seek to have Intervenors joined or otherwise inform them of the state court action. This suggests to the Court that Plaintiff was “in a race to res judicata” and attempting to avoid the Texas Probate Court proceeding. Consequently, the Court finds this factor weighs against exercising jurisdiction. Even if this factor was neutral, the Court finds the other factors weigh against exercising jurisdiction.
The final two factors—whether use of declaratory action would increase friction between the federal and state courts and whether there is a better, more effective alternative remedy—also counsel in favor of abstention. The Court believes exercising jurisdiction over this case would necessarily create friction with the Texas Probate Court for two reasons. First, this case involves no federal issues, and the state law issues involved in this case implicate important matters of public policy—such as adjudicating a probate dispute. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. at 1226 (concluding Brillhart abstention was appropriate because “declaratory
Finally, having determined Brillhart abstention is appropriate, the Court now considers whether to stay or dismiss the case. The Tenth Circuit expressed a preference for issuing a stay rather than a dismissal in abstention cases. Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994). The is also true in the declaratory judgment context. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1192. Staying the case allows the Court to “quickly reconsider whether the state forum remains the best in which to hear the federal parties’ claim should the court‘s predictions regarding the scope of the state proceedings turn out to be erroneous.” Id. The Court therefore withholds jurisdiction in this case and issues a stay pending the resolution of the Texas Probate Court action.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court determines abstention is appropriate in this case. The Court therefore stays the case pending the resolution of the pending state court proceeding and declines to rule on the parties’ choice of law briefs (Docs. 41, 43), and denies, as moot, Plaintiff‘s Motion for Judgment by Default (Doc. 54).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ KENNETH J. GONZALES5
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE