138 P. 1169 | Utah | 1914
Lead Opinion
. This action was originally commenced, by William Shep-pick against bis father, William G. Sheppick. After tbe action bad proceeded to judgment tbe father died, and bis tw'o sons, Thomas and Herbert Sheppick, were substituted as executors of tbe father’s will and estate. Tbe mother bad also died some time prior to tbe death of tbe father, and in what is said hereafter, we, for convenience, shall treat tbe father as still living, and whom we shall designate as defendant. The action was commenced by the plaintiff to quiet the title to a certain parcel of real estate of about seven acres, with the improvements thereon, situate in Salt Lake County, in himself as the owner in fee. The defendant, in his answer, denied the plaintiff’s title, and claimed the title in fee, both by deed of conveyance from the same source through which the plaintiff claimed, and also by adverse possession under our statute. The district court found the title of the land in question to be in the plaintiff, but, notwithstanding that fact, made conclusions of law, and entered a judgment or decree whereby the plaintiff and defendant were each adjudged to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest, that is, that they were tenants in common. Both parties appeal from said judgment.
We shall not attempt to set forth the evidence in detail. The plaintiff contended at the trial, and produced evidence in support of his contention, that when the land in question was purchased in the year 1888 it .was purchased for him; that he paid the full purchase price thereof, amounting to $300 or $350, and that the deed of conveyance was intended to be and was actually made to him in his true name of William Sheppick; that the land was purchased and conveyed under a parol agreement between him and the defendant that the land should be a home for the father and the mother of plaintiff, and that they should have the right to live upon it during their natural lives. There was a small house on the land at the time it was purchased. Upon the other hand the defendant contended, and produced some evidence in support of the contention, that while the plaintiff
We start out, therefore, with the title vested in the plaintiff. Did the title pass from him by virtue of the alleged adverse possession ? The district court made no finding upon that issue, and counsel for the defendant contend that his rights were prejudiced by the court’s failure to do so. Now, upon what does this adverse possession rest? Counsel base the claim upon the following facts, to wit: That the defendant went into possession of the land at the time it was purchased; that he and the family lived upon it for upwards of twenty years; that during all of that time the defendant, with the assistance of all of the members of the family, except the plaintiff,-made certain improvements on the land, that is, they built fences and constructed a house upon it in place of the old one, at a cost of about $800; that they planted some fruit trees upon it and that the land was, during all of the time aforesaid, assessed in the name of William Sheppick, and the defendant practically paid all of the taxes assessed against it, and that the defendant and his family always treated and regarded him as being the owner of the land. Neither one nor all of the foregoing facts, however, are in any way inconsistent with the Contention made by the plaintiff that the defendant had merely a life estate in the land in question; but all of them, prima facie at least, are in harmony with such a contention. If the land was to be made a family home, it necessarily had to be improved, because it was practically in a wild, certainly in an uncultivated, state when it was purchased. Merely making the foregoing improvements thereon is therefore not conclusive, and, under the circumstances, may not even be evidence indicating absolute ownership of the land by the defendant. Then again, the fact that the land was assessed in the 'name of William Sheppick, and that defendant paid the' taxes thereon, is entirely consistent with plaintiff’s contention.. The assessment being in the name of William Sheppick points just as much’
“A life tenant should he assessed as owner during the continuance of the life estate.”
If the defendant, therefore, was regarded as the owner in making the assessment, this, standing alone, gave him no right to prefer a claim of adverse possession as against the plaintiff. Nor does the contention that the life estate in favor of the defendant was void under the statute of frauds, because it rested in parol, merely in any way affect plaintiff’s rights. For the purposes of this decision it is enough to say that no one questioned or assailed defendant’s right to be and remain in the possession of the land during his lifetime. The agreement contended for by the plaintiff, although resting in parol, was nevertheless fully executed. That question, therefore, is of no consequence here either one way or the other, and we dismiss it from the case.
From what has been said it follows that the assignments on defendant’s appeal cannot be sustained, while those upon plaintiff’s appeal must prevail. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court of Salt Lake County, with directions to set aside its findings of fact and conclusions of law so far as the .same are in conflict with the views herein expressed; to vacate the judgment entered by it; to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in harmony with this opinion; and to enter a decree quieting the title to the land in question, and the whole thereof in the plaintiff, and to enjoin the executors and those claiming under them from asserting any right or title in or to the same, or any part thereof. The district court is also directed to make such an order respecting the payment of costs accrued and accruing in that court as to it may seem legal and proper. Plaintiff to recover costs on this appeal.
Rehearing
ON APPLICATION EOR REHEARING.
The executors have filed a petition in which they contend that a rehearing should be granted to the end that the decision rendered by us “should be so modified as to permit the defendants (executors) to prove the extent to which the (value of the) land has-been enhanced by reason of improvements placed upon the land by the defendants’ intestate.” May we do this ? We think not.
“The tenant for life has no claim for any improvements which he may have made upon the premises. He is bound to keep the premises in repair, hut is under no legal obligation to undertake any improvements. If he does, it is a voluntary act of his own, which gives rise to no ' claim against the reversion for the payment of his share of the expenses. On the other hand, the tenant for life is obliged to pay all the taxes of every kind which may be assessed upon the land.”
While the cases supporting the foregoiug doctrine are numerous, yet we deem it necessary to refer to a few only, all of which clearly support the foregoing quotation. See Henry v. Brown, 99 Ky. 13, 34 S. W. 710; Dean v. Feely, 69 Ga. 804; Merritt v. Scott, 81 N. C. 385; Doak v. Merrill, 38 Me. 569; Galbaugh v. Rouse (Ky.) 104 S. W. 959; Frederick v. Frederick's Adm’r (Ky.) 102 S. W. 858, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514.
Nor is the principle affected by the fact that a person who is found to be a life tenant claims title to the land in question. Henry v. Brown, supra, and cases there cited.
Our decision is squarely based upon the fact that the defendant Sheppick, under whom appellants claim, was a life tenant, and hence the rule laid down in the foregoing authorities applies with full force.
The executors therefore have no claim against the plaintiff for improvements, and hence a rehearing, even if granted, could avail them nothing. The petition is'therefore denied.