10 N.J.L. 250 | N.J. | 1828
This was an action of trespass for taking a quasi
First, because the above judgment is not void but only voidable ; it remains valid until it shall be reversed, and therefore ought not to have been overruled. The act is entitled “ an act to prevent the fraudulent confession of judgments.” It enacts that when parties agree without process, to enter an action before a justice of the peace, no judgment by confession shall he entered without an affidavit of the plaintiff; his attorney or agent, of the true cause of action, setting forth that the debt is bona fide and justly duo and owing to the person or persons to whom the judgment is to be confessed, and that the said judgment is not confessed to answer any fraudulent purpose, or to protect the pro perty of the defendant from his creditors. Now this affidavit ok -
Secondly — Supposing the judgment and execution were inadmissible evidence of title, they ought to have been received, it is said, in mitigation of damages, as shewing that the defendant did jaot act maliciously or wantonly, or from purposes of wrong or oppression, but under a claim of title and an honest impression of right. But to admit the evidence even in this view, would have allowed the judgment to have some operation and effect, contrary to the express words of the statute, which declares they shall have none. Neither was there the least necessity for it 5 the production and rejection of the judgment and execution concurred with all the evidence in the cause, to shew that the defendant acted under a claim of right, and that there was no ground for giving exemplary or vindictive damages. The defendant had a right to have his claim tried ; the court therefore directed the jury to make the fair value of the property the measure of damages. If the evidence had been received in mitigation, it ought to have had no effect beyond what the court gave in charge. Thus without contravening the statute, the defendant had all the benefit of mitigation to which he was entitled. But, it is objected that the jury acted contrary to this charge; that their verdict gives a sum nearly double the value of the property. The calculation to make this probable, is however liable to much objection ; it is founded on the testimony of but a single witness, himself the agent of the defendant; one who did not measure the timber himself, so as to swear to the quantity, not did he examine the quality carefully, till a considerable time after the removal, during which time the tmsoundness had been in progression 5 he did not see either the quantity or quality at the time of seizure; whereas the clerk of the plaintiff’s wharf and business, corroborated by a number of other witnesses, some of whom had been employed in hauling the timber together, and others in piling it stick by stick, made estimations under oath, so widely different from the other, that there is as good reason to fear the jury went below the true value as above it.
The third and last ground offered for a new trial is the discovery of new and important evidence, not known to the defendant at the former trial, nor then in his power. The witness referred to is Robert Irwin, the person who confessed the judg
The Chief1 Justice concurred,
The .affidavit filed is this action is clearly defes
Judgment on site posies*.