Shepard v. Attorney GeneralShepard v. Attorney General
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- Before:
- Liacos
On September 19, 1988, Timothy Shepard collapsed while engaged in a police training course at the Edward W. Connelly Training Center (center) in Agawam. Within the next week, all fifty trainees who participated in the training exercises suffered some degree of muscle deterioration (rhabdomyolysis) due to heat exhaustion. Several trainees suffered renal failure, and eleven, including Shepard, were hospitalized. The Attorney General’s office conducted an investigation of the incident. On October 28, 1988, that office issued a report which concluded that the trainees’ inju
On November 2, 1988, Shepard died as a result of injuries sustained during the training. On November 3, 1988, the Attorney General, pursuant to his authority under
On August 31, 1989, the Attorney General filed a certificate with the clerk of the Hampden County Superior Court stating that Shepard’s death would not lead to a criminal prosecution. The Attorney General also issued a lengthy statement in which he explained why in his opinion there was insufficient evidence to charge any of the putative defendants with manslaughter.
On December 18, 1989, Shepard’s wife, Holly Shepard, filed the present action before a single justice of this court seeking an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Attorney General to bring the inquest report to the attention of a grand jury. The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss under
As a threshold matter we note that the plaintiff does not have standing. “[T]he rights asserted by the [plaintiff] are not private but are in fact lodged in the Commonwealth as it may proceed to enforce its laws. . . . ‘[I]n American jurisprudence . . . a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.’ ”
Manning
v.
Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist.,
372 Mass. 315, 317-318 (1977), quoting
Linda R.S.
v.
Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). The plaintiff, therefore, does not have a private legal interest in having the Attorney General bring criminal proceedings against the individuals named in the inquest report. The rationale for denying the plaintiff standing,
In evaluating the grant of a dismissal motion under rule 12 (b) (6) “we review the complaint to determine if, viewing its allegations and inferences broadly and in the plaintiffs favor, ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim’ entitling her to relief.” Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 415 (1988), quoting Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977).
This court has recognized that prosecutors (district attorneys and the Attorney General) have broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute.
Manning
v.
Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., supra. Secretary of Admin. & Fin.
v.
Attorney Gen.,
367 Mass. 154, 163 n.6 (1975). See
Opinion of the Justices,
354 Mass. 804, 809-810 (1968);
Commonwealth
v.
Dascalakis,
246 Mass. 12, 18 (1923);
Attorney Gen.
v.
Tufts,
239 Mass. 458, 537-538 (1921);
Commonwealth
v.
Tuck,
20 Pick. 356, 364 (1838). Judicial review of decisions which are within the executive discretion of the Attorney General “would constitute an intolerable interference by the judiciary in the executive department of the government and would be in violation of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights.”
Ames
v.
Attorney Gen., supra
at 253. See
Burlington
v.
District Attorney for the N. Dist.,
381 Mass. 717, 721 (1980) (“virtual exclusion of judicial intervention to check or correct the district attorney [in his choosing to nol pros a criminal case] follows from art. 30 of the Massachu
The plaintiff argues that the Attorney General’s refusal to bring the inquest report before a grand jury constitutes conduct which is arbitrary and capricious. In effect, the plaintiff contends that the Attorney General was obligated to institute criminal proceedings after the judge conducting the inquest found probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. We disagree.
An inquest held pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The report explained that the council “was established by the Legislature in 1974 (
Gary Egan, executive director of the council; Earl Harrington, director of the Agawam Training Center; and State Trooper Charles Blake Gilmore, director of recruit training.
The judge also found that eight State troopers and several council employees may have violated the “hazing” statute.
The plaintiff invoked jurisdiction under
Article 30 states that “[i]n the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”
In Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, supra at 489, we stated as to the prosecutorial power: “The authority vested in him by law to refuse on his own judgment alone to prosecute a complaint or indictment enables him to end any criminal proceeding without appeal and without the approval of another official.” We think that, if a prosecutor has extensive powers to nol pros a pending matter, see Burlington v. District Attorney for the N. Dist., supra, and Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, supra, the decision of a prosecutor whether or not to seek a complaint or indictment in the first instance can be reviewed by a court only under the same limited standard of judicial review.
If we accept the plaintiffs argument that the Attorney General is bound by the findings of an inquest, the Attorney General would be precluded from bringing criminal proceedings if the inquest finds no probable cause. Such a result would clearly violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. See note 5, supra.
The prosecution must eventually present sufficient proof to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which a defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 396 Mass. 108, 113 (1985). This is obviously a more difficult burden to meet than establishing probable‘cause. It would be inappropriate to force a prosecutor to charge a defendant with a crime if the prosecutor believes that there is insufficient evidence, even after an inquest finding of probable cause, to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The plaintiff states in her complaint that since the Attorney General is a member of the council, there is an “inherent conflict of interest,” and that therefore the Attorney General should appoint an independent prosecutor to bring the inquest report before a grand jury. The plaintiff argues that this alleged conflict of interest places the integrity of the judicial sys