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Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health of Commonwealth
451 A.2d 434
Pa.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 Ill the facts and circumstances underlying considered Having Code, of the Election provisions Section 979 and related elections, in fair and and the orderly interest of the State interests claim to have been impaired by which appellants law, we are convinced that 979 is a legitimate Section exercise of and an essential element of legislative authority integ- Legislature’s plan assuring efficiency whose process, plan constitutionality the electoral rity has been sustained this Court since the consistently Election in 1937. Because appellants enactment of the Code have their burden of consti- establishing failed to carry any 979, the tutional of Section order the Common- infirmity wealth Court is affirmed.

Order of the Court affirmed. Commonwealth HUTCHINSON, J., concurs in the result. McDERMOTT, JJ.,

NIX and dissent. LARSEN, J., dissents on the basis of denial of equal and on the basis of In re Nomination protection Papers Smith, 494 Pa. (1981). A.2d 1156

451 A.2d 434 HOSPITAL, VALLEY SHENANGO OSTEOPATHIC on its own patients, behalf and on behalf of its medical staff and DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH of the Commonwealth

Pennsylvania, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 1982.

Decided Oct. *3 Ressler, Gen., Joel M. Deputy Atty. appellants. Mullholland, III, Blackmond, Daniel M. Barbara John S. Hoff, vice, for pro appellee. hac NIX, LARSEN, O’BRIEN, C.J., ROBERTS,

Before and HUTCHINSON, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT and JJ. THE OPINION OF COURT NIX, Justice.

The 448.101et (Act), Health Care Facilities Act P.S. § and economical distri- enacted to insure seq. orderly

bution of health care resources to prevent duplica- needless tion of services and to enhance the health and welfare in this Commonwealth. The Legislature charged Depart- ment of Health with (Department) sound, a fostering coordi- nated health care This system. concerns litigation the valid- ity of the Department’s ruling that a certificate of need must first be obtained by the Shenango Osteopathic Valley before Hospital (Hospital) purchase and use of a Computer- ized scanner). scanner Tomography (C.T. The principal on is question appeal1 whether the had hospital a clear right to the special relief from the Department’s ruling afforded it the Commonwealth Court.

The as facts, record, adduced from the reveal that on July 29, 1981 the entered into a Hospital contract of binding for a full scanner2 purchase body C.T. from Technicare Cleveland, Corporation Ohio and ($67,125.00) 25% paid $268,500.00. purchase total price Hospital accept- ed 20,1981 of the C.T. scanner on delivery August made and additional balance of payment leaving 10% due upon installation. The Act required certificates of need for new services,3 institutional health that including (at time) capital expenditures $150,000.00, excess of and/or an operating appeal 1. Jurisdiction to hear this is vested in this under 42 Court 723(a), 311(a)(4). Pa.C.S. 42 Pa.C.S. 5105 and § Pa.R.A.P. complex highly piece A equipment scanner is C.T. of medical 2.. merges computer x-ray technology. diagnostic which It. is a tool anatomy study body used to the internal of the human in cross-sec- tional views. *4 adopted response 3. The Health Care Facilities Act was in to Federal 93-641, which, alia, requirement Law inter Public contained a of the program applies existence of a certifícate of need “which to the obligation capital expenditures offering of within the State and the acquisi- the within State of new institutional health services and the major equipment tion of medical and which is consistent with stan- by Secretary dards established the Health and Human [of Services] by regulation. proce- program provide A of certificate need shall for penalties requirements program.” dures and to enforce the of the 2(a)(4)(B). requirements U.S.C.A. Failure to meet the en- § 300m — dangers grants the financial available to the under Commonwealth availability programs federal health the as of federal funds is condi- upon compliance. tioned state The $82,200 in threshold.4 Act mandates excess of a expense to the institution of a of a of intent filing prior notice which of acquisition equipment for services or the project 4, 1981, need.5 August a On certificate require Health Inc. and supplied Systems Hospital purchase a notice of intent of N.W. with Pennsylvania did notice of intent sent by hospital C.T. scanner. The 29,1980 entered into on or the July not refer to the contract under that contract. subsequent performance 7. OF NEED CHAPTER CERTIFICATE required; health of need new institutional 448.701 Certificate § subject services to review offer, (a) person develop, or estab- No shall construct otherwise establish within the State new institutional lish or undertake to health service obtaining from the first a certificate need without For chapter, department. purposes “New of this institutional shall include: health services” facility (2) Any expenditure by or on of a health or behalf care $150,000 which, organization un- health in excess of maintenance consistently applied, generally accepted accounting principles der capital expenditure.... ais (3) any capital by obligation expenditure or of a on behalf facility results in addition of a health service health care not which through facility previous provided in the 12 months in or (4) in health which is offered or The addition of a service facility expense through having operating in health care expense operating annual established excess of the minimum accordance with Title Act, XV of the Federal Public Health Service through regular in or on a basis such and which were not offered organization facility within the health care or health maintenance period prior services would be offered. 12-month time such $ ‡ ‡ ‡ 3: by higher expenditures requiring (d) review are set As minimum Government, immediately apply in those limits shall the Federal expenditure by lieu of the P.S. § minimum limits set this act. 35 448.701 by way proposed projects requires of a letter of Act 5. The notice 702(a) of the Act: intent under Section need; intent; application; is- 448.702 notice Certificates suance facilities, equipment requiring Projects a certifi- (a) services or shall, planning, be possible time in their of need at the earliest cate department in a systems agency and submitted to the health scope advising nature of detail of intent in such letter the 448.702(a) project required regulations. 35 P.S. § as *5 44 29,

Almost two months later (September the 1981), Hospi- tal to withdraw sought without its of prejudice letter intent. The letter of that withdrawal assumed the new thresholds of for $600,000 capital expenditures $250,000 and for operating established under expenses the federal Omnibus Budget 1981, 97-35, Reconcilation Act of P.L. 936 Octo- (effective ber 1981)(Omnibus Act) the automatically negated neces- of a certificate of need sity review this transaction. The letter, the that the ignoring reality contract had been en- tered into and the substantially performed prior to increase of thresholds, those implied that acquisition intended would be made the under new thresholds. The Department, on the facts set forth in the relying withdrawal, letter of nevertheless contended that the obtaining of a certificate of need was still under required section relat- 701(a)(3),supra, ing to a which results capital expenditure in the addition of a health service not in the provided previous months. Moreover, the Department did not address the applicability of new Act the Omnibus thresholds to transac- completed tions because the had fact Hospital withheld the of its of the completed purchase C.T. scanner. On November 1981 the learned for the the Department first time true facts surrounding purchase scanner.

On November filed an of the Hospital appeal with Department’s decision Health reviewability State Board Hearing (Board). On November Facility Department notified that under the circum- Hospital its stances the C.T. scanner was a violation of acquisition and Act of the scanner would deemed a operation be wilfull violation 17,1981 On December subject penalties. counsel for the informed the that in Hospital cease violating Act, order to should divest Hospital itself of and or ownership possession scanner obtain a on Thereafter, certificate need. 1982 the January filed an for a certificate need Hospital application also moved for a continuance appeal of its from the determi- nation The motion for continuance was reviewability. granted. for a certificate 1,1982, application March while the

On filed a petition was, is, Hospital need and still pending, relief. injunctive declaratory for review seeking that the was constitutional objection thrust of the Hospital’s under the Act Department to the authority delegation Constitution, and 1 of the Pa. Art. contravenes Section was scanner use of the C.T. that the denial of interim and capricious. arbitrary be enjoined that the Department

The Hospital requested Hospi- to the respect from Act it with against enforcing right and sought of the C.T. scanner tal’s operation of the issues a determination use the equipment pending presented. for Application filed Hospital March

On A hearing Court. with the Commonwealth Relief Special objections 1982. Preliminary for April was scheduled a demur- in the nature of of jurisdiction, raising question of impertinency on the grounds rer and a motion to strike made of No disposition were filed Department. objections. the preliminary date, the Honorable held on the hearing appointed

After 14, 1982, (a) order, dated April entered an Craig David W. scanner pending to use the C.T. authorizing Hospital or of need petition the certificate final disposition later, operation that review, (b) holding whichever is the Act to be in violation shall not be deemed the scanner en- bringing any from the Department and (c) enjoining of the C.T. on operation action based forcement or penalty during operation with its interfering or otherwise scanner for review. or the petition of the application the pendency filed a 1982, the April The following day, as an auto- which Court, operated to this notice of appeal mo- On 1736(b).6 to Pa.R.A.P. pursuant matic supersedeas Security Exemption from Rule 1736. required security of: (a) be No shall General rule. thereof, acting any in his (1) or officer The Commonwealth capacity. official tion of the Hospital, Judge vacated Craig on supersedeas 22, 1982. April

I. outset, At the we address the of the Com propriety monwealth Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Appellant ques tions the Commonwealth Court’s of jurisdiction exercise because of the failure Hospital’s alleged to exhaust available administrative remedies.7

A factor significant considering appropriate ness of intervention is the judicial doctrine exhaustion administrative remedies. Canonsburg Gen. Hospital *7 Health, 68, 492 Pa. 422 Dept. (1980); A.2d 141 Delaware Center, Convalescent Inc. v. 488 Valey Beal, 292, Pa. 412 See, A.2d 514 (1980). Commonwealth v. e.g., Glen Alden 57, 418 Pa. 210 A.2d 256 Corp., (1965); Collegeville Borough Co., v. Water Philadelphia 636, Suburban 377 Pa. A.2d 105 In 722 (1954). Canonsburg we stated: Well settled case law this Court a precludes party’s administrative decision challenging making from obtain- ., . . ing judicial review, without first adminis- exhausting trative remedies.... Judicial review without either a proper record or an administrative adjudication would (b) Supersedeas pursuant automatic. Unless otherwise ordered chapter taking appeal by any party specified

to this of an in (a) operate supersedeas Subdivision of this rule shall as in favor party. of such appellant employed Although terminology “the Commonwealth jurisdiction,” Court lacked it assert or did not Court Commonwealth lacking subject-matter personal jurisdiction. in either Rather appellant’s upon argument jurisdiction” entire as “a lack of is based alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Certainly complaint alleging against a cause of for action relief provisions the Commonwealth derivative from of the federal and subject-matter jurisdic- state constitutions a claim states within the 761(a). tion of 42 the Commonwealth Court. We re- § Pa.C.S.A. committing confusing judge- frain from the fundamental error of subject- made matter rule of exhaustion administrative remedies with jurisdiction legislature conferred or inherent in the See, Susquehanna Valley common law. land, Mile Alliance Three Is- (3rd 1980). 619 F.2d 245 Cir.

47 constitute “premature of the administrative interruption process.” (Citation omitted).

Id., 492 Pa. at 422 A.2d at 144. The legislature has made it clear that statutorily-pre- scribed remedies are to be strictly pursued.

In all cases where a is or a en- remedy provided, duty joined, or direct to be done anything act or acts of by any of this assembly commonwealth, the directions of the said acts shall be strictly pursued, and no shall be penalty inflicted, or done to the anything agreeably provisions of law, common in cases, such further than shall be necessary such act or carrying acts effect.

Act of 21, 1806, March P.L. Sm.L. P.S. § 156.8 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a restraint upon the exercise of a court’s not equitable powers only reflects a recognition the general di- assembly’s rective of strict compliance with reme- statutorily-prescribed dies, it also that an acknowledges failure to unjustified follow the administrative scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the administrative was founded. process This premise was set forth in our succinctly decision in T. Men- delson Co., Inc. v. R.R. Pennsylvania Co., 470, 474, 332 Pa. A.2d 822 (1938).

The technical nature of the and the subject, peculiar of an ability administrative it, to examine suffice body as *8 a matter of public to policy displace preliminary court action.

The premature interruption of the administrative process restricts the agency’s to opportunity develop adequate record, factual limits the in the agency exercise of its expertise and the impedes of development a cohesive body law in that area. U.S., McKart v. 395 185, U.S. 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). also, Salfi, See Weinberger 422 749, U.S. 95 2457, S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Parisi v. repealed by 6, 1972, 8. The Act of 1806 was the Act of December Act 290, simultaneously 3 substantially and was § in reenacted the same language. Statutory Construction Act of 1 Pa.C.S.A. 48

Davidson, 405 U.S. 92 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1973). S.Ct. It is therefore to defer review clearly appropriate judicial when the within question presented is one the agency’s and when specialization the administrative is as remedy as the to likely judicial remedy provide desired result. However, a different situation is distinctly presented where through afforded administrative is remedy process inadequate. Feingold Pa., v. Bell of 477 Pa. 383 A.2d 791 (1978); of Green Tree v. Board of Borough Assess Property ments, (1974) Pa. 328 A.2d 819 opinion); (plurality Philadelphia Commonwealth, 571, 190 Life Ins. Co. v. 410 Pa. A.2d 111 (1963). Tree,

In Borough of Green this Court unsuc- supra, cessful in a consensus on achieving question whether the mere assertion of a constitutional to a statute challenge eliminates the exhaustion of remedies requirement and per- mits equitaJble Nevertheless, intervention. it was clear from that decision that four members of this Court agreed doctrine of exhaustion of remedies would not bar equitable intervention where there are both a substantial question and the absence of an constitutionality adequate statutory at remedy. 459 Pa. 328 A.2d at 819.9 Appellee charges that (1) delegation authority under Department II, the Act contravenes Art. Section Constitution,10 of the (2) Act is too Pennsylvania vague “violation,” as to what constitutes a “willful violation” or violation,” the Act is too “continuing (3) broad as to the discretion vested to define specific what subject review, services are including “new institutional services,” (4) health there is vacua as to regulations, and equity 9. Whether a court should decide broad constitutional challenge validity irrespective to the a statute the existence of a us, since, specific statutory remedy infra, is not before as discussed statutory remedy there is an of a absence in this case. II, Pennsylvania 10. Art. Section Constitution states: Legislative power legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a Assembly, General which shall consist Senate of a and a House of Representatives. *9 (5) the denial the use of the C.T. scanner Department’s by its review appellee and the administrative patients, pending process, constitutes and action. arbitrary capricious

The does not or to provide any appeal Act remedy process resolve such issues. The is set jurisdiction explicitly Board’s forth.11 the upon to Authority pass constitutionality not Nor Act is mentioned. it reason- agency’s enabling may be inferred. The criteria for on Board ably membership with (“familiarity and health care facilities or for expertise relevant will board training and which assist the experience to perform function,” 448.501), its do not support P.S.A. § a claim that these could challenges adjudicated by be Board.12 The of the Board’s Act is constitutionality enabling beyond agency’s jurisdiction.

Moreover, the issues raised the instant are challenges not within the of the purview expertise Board and/or Department no factual issues requiring development of a are record The of the or present. participation Board at this is stage unnecessary.

To the determination of postpone such serious questions the statute’s serves no are constitutionality purpose. We not here faced with a premature of the adminis- interruption trative process but rather a determination the constitu- hearing 448.502 Powers and duties of the board § (a) hearing powers board have the shall and its duties shall be (1) appeals departmental applications hear To from decisions on for certificates of need or amendments thereto. (2) upon petition objections published regulations, To hear to criteria, systems agency or department standards of the health or policies appropriate as to the set therein forth and where request promulgating agency policies. to reconsider such (3) appeals department To hear from decisions of the from application relating which arises matters certificate need. (b) Hearings may be held before one more or members board, by majority but action of the board shall be made vote of 1979, 19, 130, 48, 502, 1, July the board. P.L. No. effective Oct. § 1980, July 1979. As amended No. P.L. effective § Oct. 35 P.S.A. 448.502. surprisingly, appellant identify statutorily-pre- 12. Not does not adequate remedy urges appellee adjudicate scribed it must utilize to particular the constitutional claims. None exists these facts. under *10 50

tional of the statute which validity provides the sine non qua for the of the entire The evils of validity process. piecemeal judicial intervention in the administrative are not process raised where judicial relief is limited to resolving questions concerning of constitutionality an act. Cf. enabling of Green Borough Tree v. Board of Assessments, Property 459 at supra, 281, Pa. 328 at also, A.2d 825. See v. Lynch Owen J. Roberts District, School 430 Pa. 461, 244 A.2d 1 (1968).13

Thus, the Commonwealth Court did not properly refrain from its exercising jurisdiction.

II. that failed urges Hospital to estab- lish to entitlement the relief to granted pursuant Pa.R.A.P. It 1532(a). has previously been stated: aAs preliminary consideration, we that on an recognize from the appeal grant or denial of a preliminary injunc- tion, we do not into the of inquire merits the controversy, but only examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action court below. if it is Only that no plain grounds exist to support decree or that the rule lawof relied upon erroneous or palpably will we misapplied interfere with the decision Chancellor. Intraworld Inc. v. Girard Bank, 343, Trust 461 Pa. 336 A.2d 316 (1975); Credit Alliance v. Minit-Man Corp. Philadelphia Car Wash Corp., 450 Pa. 301 367, A.2d 816 (1973); Zebra v. Pittsburgh District, School Pa. 432, 296 A.2d 748 “In (1972). order to sustain preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs to right relief must clear, be need for relief must be immediate, and the must be injury irreparable if the Hirsch, 752, Corp. 773, In Aircrañ & Diesel 331 U.S. 67 S.Ct. (1946), Supreme 91 L.Ed. 1796 Court that: formulated presence questions, coupled constitutional with suffi- [T]he showing inadequacy prescribed cient administrative relief impending irreparable injury flowing delay or threatened from following prescribed procedure incident has been held suffi- dispense exhausting process cient with the administrative before instituting judicial intervention. injunction is not granted.” Zebra v. Pittsburgh School District, 449 Pa. at 296 A.2d at 750. (emphasis added). Roberts v. School District of Scranton, 462 Pa. 464, 469, 341 A.2d 475, 478 (1975). (emphasis added). Bell v. Thornburgh, Pa. 267-268, 420 A.2d 445 (1980). (Emphasis added.)

It is significant that the Court’s determination as to “any apparently reasonable grounds” must be predicated upon independent examination of the record. Cf. Sing zon v. Department of Welfare, Public 496 Pa. 436 A.2d 125 *11 (1981). And we while recognize “clear right” require ment does not “mandate that one seeking a preliminary injunction establish claim Fischer absolutely,” v. De [the] partment of Welfare, Public 497 Pa. 267, 271, 439 A.2d 1174 (1982), the clear right, and appellee so concedes, must be prima facie established. New Castle Orthopedic Assoc. v. Burns, 481 Pa. 392 A.2d 1383 (1978). The one seeking relief preliminary must be to likely prevail on the merits, and where the of the right party seeking the injunction is clear, not there is no reasonable ground support requested grant.

Whereas the constitutional issues raised without an administrative forum or procedure to adjudicate them re lieved the Commonwealth Court of the bar, exhaustion claims raised do not establish a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to have warranted the of granting See, relief. preliminary Commonwealth v. Forbes Health Systems, 492 Pa. 422 A.2d 480 (1980).14

Moreover, the deleterious effect upon public interest in the of health delivery services in this Commonwealth by disruption the administration of the Act indicates that the “interest of justice” does not require granting special relief pursuant Pa.R.A.P. 1532(a). We are mindful of Judge concern that Craig’s the C.T. scanner should not stand 14. We note a challenge that federal constitutional to Public Law See, upheld. 93-641 was not North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, F.Supp. (E.D.N.C.1977) (three-judge court), af- firmed 435 (1978). U.S. 98 S.Ct. 56 L.Ed.2d 54

idle. However, we that recognize comprehensive health planning seeks to achieve economic and geographic efficacy in the expenditure of funds and the capital assumption large additional It operational costs. further represents legislative judgment Act, that the provisions in the run, will long be in the best interest of the health and welfare of all the citizens this Commonwealth. The indiscriminate acquisition of costly, sophisticated medical equipment increases unnecessarily costs and encour- hospital ages over-utilization of that equipment.

It is to be that anticipated provisions comprehensive health will planning extent, to some curtail necessarily, judgment to be exercised the individual health by facilities. The decision to this intrusion permit upon autonomy the individual facilities represents Congressional judgment that such a course of action is in the best interest citizens served those facilities. Our legislature, by partic- in the ipating has concurred in Congressional plan, that North judgment. Califano, Cf. Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. This is supra. an area of concern clearly legislative within that to establish the body’s prerogative public policy of the Commonwealth in the area. Thus we find no prima *12 facie to relief and no right ground reasonable for the grant- of the ing relief. special to of the

Attempts magnitude minimize question in presented this action that it by suggesting relates only the short of time between the actual period acquisition the C.T. scanner and the of the new adoption Omnibus Act thresholds is misleading. It is to be noted that appellant contends that a certificate of would need be in required any event under of the 448.701(a)(3) Section Act. Even assum- that ing is correct in appellee limiting any possible derelic- tion to the to the period establishment of the new prior thresholds, the of that dereliction should not be gravity Moreover, minimized. the conduct of appellee throughout action, this such as their lack of candor in history information to the supplying Department regarding of the is acquisition scanner, C.T. not such as to warrant equitable intervention. in

Although posture this action the Commonwealth Court not has reached the where must file stage appellant an answer where affirmative defenses are equitable proper- ly raised, we are compelled that, to observe “He who comes into a court of come clean equity must with hands.” the Order of

Accordingly, the Commonwealth is Court vacated hereby and case remanded.

FLAHERTY HUTCHINSON, and JJ., filed dissenting opinions LARSEN, J., joined. in which

FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting. on the

Relying Judge below, set forth reasoning by Craig I dissent from the which opinion majority only serves further inexhaustible at work. bureaucracy

The result reached by majority requires that a power- ful diagnostic tool idle while institutional lay wrangling inches the to a final parties regarding outcome the applica- Act, of the Health Care bility Facilities 35 P.S. 448.101et scanner; to the seq., hospital’s this is a acquisition condonation of institutionalism its darkest endeavor one in I join. which cannot

LARSEN, J., this joins dissenting opinion.

HUTCHINSON, Justice, dissenting. I with one of agree part Opinion holding the Majority judicial intervention Court ap- Commonwealth in this case. I from that propriate portion dissent *13 which the majority opinion holds Commonwealth Court erred in the to use the C.T. authorizing Scanner hospital final of its certificate of need pending disposition application 54

or the final of its for review petition seeking disposition and relief on constitutional injunctive grounds. declaratory As the states: accurately majority “In the preliminary injunction, plain- order to sustain clear, the need for relief must tiffs to relief must be right if the immediate, be and the must be injury irreparable is not injunction granted.” omitted) At 439 (citations (emphasis original).1 that, also majority recognized the determination as to whether this standard is met is vested in the sound discre- tion of the See, Chancellor. at 439. On supra appeal from a decree or granting refusing preliminary injunction, has appellant overcome; a very heavy burden to such a decree will not be interferred with review in upon appellate the absence of a abuse of discretion plain court below. McDonald v. 393 Pa. Noga, A.2d 842 (1958). If we find the Chancellor’s actions were reasonable we do not proceed to a consideration of the merits of the case unless reasons for the action of the court below do not exist or the rules of law relied on are or palpably wrong clearly inappli- cable. Id. 393 Pa. at 141 A.2d at 843 Lindenfel- (citing ser Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 123 A.2d 626 (1956)). See Bell v. Thornburgh, Pa. 420 A.2d 443 (1980); Intra- world Bank, Inc. v. Girard Trust 461 Pa. 336 A.2d 316 (1975). Chancellor, conclud- case, Judge Craig,

In the present of the C.T. below price ed the Scanner purchase $600,000.00 established under the Federal Om- minimum of Reconciliation Act of 1981 and that while nibus Budget purchasing be hospital may penalized by amendment, the federal it was no equipment prior 448.701(a)(2) (d). in violation of Section P.S. longer purchase concluded the was not a Moreover, the Chancellor injunction mandatory preliminary which commands This is not a requires positive performance act and which a much of some merely injunction imposed stronger is case than that of an which Scranton, preserve quo. District of status See Roberts v. School (1975). 341 A.2d 475 462 Pa.

55 meaning the 35 within P.S. 5448.- service” “health new 701(a)(3).2 legal where substantial be granted

An injunction may the rights resolved to determine must be questions of Public Wel v. Department Fischer parties. respective Histor Forge 1172 fare, (1982); Valley Pa. 439 A.2d 497 491, 426 Pa. 493 Chapel, Memorial Washington ical Society whether the need not decide 1123 This Court (1981). A.2d stage erroneous at this of law are Chancellor’s conclusions I “reasonable”. Since were review. We need find only they reasonable, we should were his conclusions of law believe without further considera appeal dismiss the Department’s of the contro the merits upon tion or expression opinion hearing after a final review is appropriate only as such versy 9 generally Court. See and decree in the Commonwealth (1962). 393 p. Standard Pa.Practice § for equita- there is no basis That also concludes majority lacks “clean hands.” ble intervention because the hospital inferences drawn from bases its conclusion on majority notice of intent to C.T. Scanner hospital’s purchase 4, 1981, in which the on August filed with the Department contract, and from the hospi- failed to mention the hospital its letter of withdrawing tal’s letter of September the contract had intent without notifying at that time. performed been entered into and substantially evidence the hospital The two letters represent only Based to mislead the Department. deliberately attempted letters, declined to attribute an on these same the chancellor evil intent to the actions. hospital’s inference, this is able to draw its own deduc-

While Court record, tions and the facts of see W. conclusions based on E.W., 396 Penn District v. I.B. of Pa. Twp. School A.2d 258 I do not believe we should find the Chancel- (1958), lor was unreasonable in a different conclusion. reaching constituting clinically 2. “Health is defined in the Act as service” diagnostic related treatment or rehabilitative services. See P.S. merely was 448.103. The chancellor determined the C.T. Scanner diagnostic existing new tool for an and/or treatment service. Com- Op. (filed April 1982). Slip monwealth Court at 3 I Finally, am although by troubled unilateral hospital’s efforts to acquire the C.T. Scanner without a certificate of need to the increase in prior threshold, integrity scheme could be statutory imposition preserved to 35 penalties pursuant 448.603 for the period P.S. be- 29, 1981, tween when the July order purchase signed, 1, 1982, until October the effective date of the increased threshold.

LARSEN, J., in this joins dissenting opinion.

451 A.2d 442 PITTSBURGH, Appellant, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH of DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Pennsylvania. Court Supreme Argued Sept. 1982. Decided Oct. Oliver, Jr., Sol., Stefanko,

Persifor Robert Sol., S. Asst. J. Educ., Bd. Public School of Pgh. Legal Dept., Dist. for Pittsburgh, appellant. Shuster,

Elisabeth Mollie McCurdy, S. A. Deputy Attys. Gen., Harrisburg, appellee.

Case Details

Case Name: Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health of Commonwealth
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Oct 21, 1982
Citation: 451 A.2d 434
Docket Number: 11
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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