SHENANDOAH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION and Janice Gardner, Appellants, v. SHENANDOAH COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. Janice GARDNER, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SHENANDOAH COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and the Shenandoah Community School District, Appellees.
No. 68634.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Aug. 17, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1983.
477 N.W.2d 477
An adverse societal attitude does not mean that the transsexual is necessarily perceived as having a physical or mental impairment. Although a transsexual may have difficulty in obtaining and retaining employment, the commission could reasonably believe that difficulty is the result of discrimination based on societal beliefs that the transsexual is undesirable, rather thаn from beliefs that the transsexual is impaired physically or mentally as that term is used in the statute and defined in the rule. While we do not approve of such discrimination, we do not believe it is prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The court is not a super-legislature, and we will not extend the provisions of the act.
We conclude that the commission did not err in interpreting the statute and rule in the respects alleged. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
WOLLE, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether we should enforce the decision of an arbitrator reinstating appellant Janice Gardner to her former teaching position in the Shеnandoah Community School District, or instead enforce a contrary subsequent decision of an adjudicator upholding the board‘s decision terminating her contract. The trial court vacated the arbitrator‘s decision and enforced the decision of the adjudicator. We reverse because the arbitrator‘s decision concerned an arbitrable subject, drew its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and should have been enforced, ending the termination proceedings.
On March 2, 1981 the school district‘s superintendent caused to be served upon Gardner a written notice of recommendation of termination, pursuant to
Pursuant to the statutory appeal procedures, an evidentiary hearing was first held before the district‘s board of directors on March 19, 1981. The board overruled Gardner‘s request that the private hearing be continued until her grievance was resolved or decided by an arbitrator. The board then received evidence and by written decision dated Mаrch 23, 1981 upheld the superintendent‘s recommendation that she be terminated. Gardner filed a statutory appeal from that decision and an adjudicator, Richard F. Dole, was selected by the parties.
The grievance filed by Gardner and the association was not resolved in the steps provided by the negotiated agreement, and the parties selected an arbitrator, Edward T. Maslanka, to render an arbitration decision. Maslanka held an evidentiary hearing on May 1, 1981, and on May 15, 1981 he issued his decision finding that the district had violated the negotiated agreement in terminating Gardner. Maslanka ordered the board to rescind the termination notice and void its consequences, thereby directing that Gardner be reinstated. In arriving at his decision, the arbitrator found that the district had the authority to eliminate a position and to decide which programs it would retain; but he concluded that the district violated the negotiated agreement‘s reduction-in-staff provisions by laying off Gardner and retaining another teacher, identified only as “teacher D.”
When the date arrived for a hearing before the adjudicator selected by the parties, Gardner moved to stay further prоceedings on the ground that the arbitrator‘s decision, if honored or enforced, would bind the district and bar termination of her contract. The district resisted the motion, and the adjudicator denied that request for a stay, held an evidentiary hearing on August 6, 1981, and by decision dated September 14, 1981 affirmed the decision of the board.
Gardner sought relief by initiating three separate actions in the trial court. First, on July 23, 1981, she joined with the association in filing a petition in equity seeking enforcement of the arbitrator‘s decision. Shortly thereafter, on July 30, 1981, she filed a petition for judicial review of the adjudicatоr‘s denial of her motion to stay the statutory proceedings before him. Before either of those matters was heard in the trial court, Gardner on October 8, 1981, filed a statutory notice of appeal seeking judicial review of the adjudicator‘s decision
The trial court rejected the arbitration decision on three alternate grounds: (1) that the arbitration decision was without effect because the decision to employ or terminate a teacher rests exclusively in the school board; (2) that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by basing his decision on matters not submitted to arbitration; and (3) that the record viewed as a whole established that there was just cause for terminating Gardner and no violations of the negotiated agreement by the district. Thе trial court upheld the adjudicator‘s decision by finding it was supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record.
In this appeal Gardner and the association contend that the arbitrator‘s decision should have been honored and enforced, thereby making unnecessary the subsequent statutory appeal procedures which resulted in the adjudicator‘s decision.
I. The Arbitration Decision. Each of the trial court‘s reasons for rejecting the decision of the arbitrator should be considered separately.
A. Exclusivity of the Statutory Remedy. The trial court found that the decision whether to employ or terminate a teacher is not arbitrable but rather is exclusively the subject of action of the school board subject to statutory appeal procedures. The court based that conclusion primarily upon this court‘s decision in Moravek v. Davenport Community School District, 262 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1978), which held that a master contract purporting to govern teacher contract terminations violated
In Bruton v. Ames Community School Dist., 291 N.W.2d 351, 354-55 (Iowa 1980), this court carefully traced the recent history of
We hold that the determination of which teacher should be selected for layoff, when layoff is necessary, may properly be the subject of a negotiated agreement authorized by
It is important to distinguish this case from cases involving discharge for just cause which is personal to the teacher and provided for in
B. Matters Considered by the Arbitrator. The trial court also decided that the arbitration decision is not enforceable because the arbitrator exceeded his authority in considering the academic needs of the school district. The arbitrator did consider the needs of the district but was well within his authority and the scope of the arbitrable issues in doing so. The wording of the grievance and the district‘s response clеarly identified Article 9, sections B and C, of the negotiated agreement as the pertinent contract provisions to be construed and applied. Section C provided that the Board “shall determine which employee is to be terminated according to the needs of the school district,” with five such needs listed. Under the circumstances the arbitrator was necessarily required to evaluate the district‘s determination of its needs within the context of the agreement‘s express staff-reduction procedure. That issue was framed both by the language of the negotiated agreement itself and by the parties’ pre-hearing description of the issue to be decided. The arbitrator simply could not decide whether the district had violated the staff reduction procedures in selecting Gardner for lay off, without applying the contract language to the evidence presented. We note that the arbitrator did not decide that the district could not eliminate a position, only that it violated the contract in selecting Gardner for lay off rather than another teacher.
C. Review of Arbitrator‘s Decision. The trial court correctly defined the scopе of review of arbitration awards in Iowa by quoting the following language from Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Ass‘n v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1979):
Once arbitrability of the issue is established, the sole question to be determined by the court on review is whether the arbitrator‘s award “drew its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement. It is not the function of the Court to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved the grievance correctly.
282 N.W.2d at 148. The court then decided, however, that arbitrability had not been established and that the arbitrator had improperly considered academic nеeds of the school district in finding a contract violation. Considering all other matters in the record, the court concluded that the district had not violated the negotiated agreement.
We have here decided that the issue presented by the parties was arbitrable and that the arbitrator did not consider matters outside the contract language and issue submitted. We must determine whether the award “drew its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement. As we said in Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Ass‘n v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District:
The “essence” of a collective bargaining agreement is an extremely broad concept. It requires a casting aside of traditional views of contract law in favor of a multitude of other considerations, including not only the written and unwritten agreements, themselves, but also the practices of the parties or the industry in general. . . . Once it is determined the arbitrator‘s award is drawn from the essence of the agreement, our consideration of the relative merits of the controversy must terminate.
We find the arbitration award meets that test. The arbitrator‘s decision is clearly based on the express contract language
II. Effect of Arbitration Decision on Statutory Adjudication. Having determined that the arbitration decision should have been honored by the district or enforced by the trial court, we must decide what is the finаl substantive effect of that decision directing Gardner‘s reinstatement, as well as its effect on the statutory appeal proceedings which occurred while the grievance was being processed. The trial court did not address these issues because it vacated the arbitrator‘s award.
A. Substantive Effect. The arbitration decision, when rendered, was final and binding on the district, Gardner, and the association, all of whom were parties to the negotiated agreement. The negotiated agreement provided for binding arbitration, within the authority provided by
In Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School Dist. v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1979), this court announced the rule that on appeals from action of the adjudicator and the trial court in teachers’ termination cases, we review the record in the manner specified in
In this case the decisions of the adjudicator and the trial court must be reversed because the board‘s action to terminate Gardner violated the negotiated agreement. The arbitrator decided that the district had violated its contract and that Gardner should be reinstated because her substantial rights had been prejudiced. That decision is binding on the district.
B. Procedural Effect. It is extremely unfortunate that the parties here struggled through so many hearings and procedural difficulties leading up to this decision on the merits. Concurrent or parallel grievance procedures and statutory appeal proceedings should be avoided by public employers, their employees and collective bargaining organizations whenever possible. We recognize that under some circumstances more than one evidentiary hearing on multiple factual and legal issues pertaining to teacher termination may be necessary. Here, however, much duplication of effort could have been avoided.
From the outset, Gardner and the association recognized and informed the district that they had rights granted pursuant to the negotiated agreement as well as rights of appeal granted by
We urge the partiеs to teacher layoff and termination proceedings to expedite necessary hearings but to avoid, whenever possible, unnecessary hearings which may ultimately delay the final decision and possibly yield inconsistent decisions which must finally be sorted out in court.
III. Constitutionality of
Concluding that the trial court erred in vacating the arbitration decision and upholding the adjudicator‘s decision, we reverse and remand this case for entry of a final judgment granting the petition of Janice Gardner and Shenandoah Education Association for enforcement of the arbitration award of Edward T. Maslanka dated May 15, 1981.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All Justiсes concur except REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McGIVERIN, UHLENHOPP and SCHULTZ, JJ., who concur in part and dissent in part.
McGIVERIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully concur in division III of the majority opinion—constitutionality of
The district court decided two issues: (1) Whether the preponderance of the competent evidence in the record supports the Board‘s decision to terminate the contract of Janice Gardner; and (2) what impact an arbitrator‘s award has on that determination. The court found that the evidence supported the Board‘s decision and that arbitration may not be used in place of the provisions of chapter 279 as to the final decision in a teacher termination case.
On appeal, the controlling issue, as viewed by the majority, is whether a grievance arising from a teacher termination due to staff reduction may be resolved by arbitration.1
I believe that the majority opinion misconstrues the legislature‘s intent as to the exclusivity of chapter 279. The majority holds that the chapter 279 procedures are just another option available to an aggrieved teacher. I would hold that the chapter 279 procedures are a teacher‘s only option in regard to a termination decision.
Our task is to harmonize chapter 279—a specific statute dealing with teacher contracts and termination procedures—and
I. Rules of statutory construction.
Because chapter 20 is a general statute dealing with collective bargaining for public employees and chapter 279 is a more specific statute dealing with teacher contracts and termination procedures, the rule of section 4.7, favoring the more specific statute over a general statute, is observed by recognizing the exclusivity of chapter 279.
The same result is obtained when following the rule of
More specifically, chapter 20 includes a provision to guide its interpretation.
II. Iowa Code controls over collective bargaining contract.
A provision of the code which is inconsistent with any term or condition of a collective bargaining agreement . . . shall supersede the term or condition of the collective bargaining agreement unless otherwise provided by the general assembly.
III. The purpose of chapter 20 not furthered by arbitration here. The above view is also supported by the purpose of chapter 20, which was enacted to help promote the public policy objectives of “assuring effective and orderly operations of government.”
In the present case, effective government requires that school boards have the power to decide when staff reductions are necessary. Section 20.7 recognizes this need and empowers school boards (public employers) to “[s]uspend or discharge public employees for proper cause.” Furthermore, the collective bargaining agreement here between the Shenandoah School Board and the Shenandoah Education Association provides that in the case of terminations due to staff reductions “the Board of Education shall determine which employee(s) is to be terminated according to the needs of the school district,” based on staff reduction criteria
Indeed, the majority recognizes the exclusivity of chapter 279 procedures for terminations for just cause personal to the teacher under section 279.27. Terminations due to staff reductions are also for just cause. Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1979). See also Smith v. Board of Education of Mediapolis School District, 334 N.W.2d 150, 151 (Iowa 1983). The procedures detailed in sections 279.15(2)-.19 are to be followed in both types of termination, and I see no reason not to afford all teachers faced with termination, the school boards and the public with the same procedural protections.
Arbitration in a case such as this does not insure the effective and orderly operation of government. Although the advantage of arbitration is touted to be its speed and economy, the present case demonstrates that these advantages are, at best, one-sided. Gardner‘s position was terminated because of budgetary constraints on the school district. But even thе arbitrator‘s May 15 decision that she should not be terminated came too late for the school board to seek another position to terminate in order to stay within its budgetary limits. Notice of recommendation for termination must be given to a teacher by March 15.
Admittedly, the chapter 279 procedures do not eliminate the cause of cases such as this—lack of sufficient funds for education—but the chapter 279 procedures do afford protection to the teacher, the school board and the public through judicial review. The reviewing court must be assured that staff reduction is not merely a pretext fоr terminating an unwanted teacher and that the decision is not the result of arbitrariness or capriciousness. Smith, 334 N.W.2d at 152.
IV. Recognition that chapter 279 is exclusive means of teacher termination review. The exclusivity of the specific procedures in chapter 279 was recognized in Moravek v. Davenport School District, 262 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Iowa 1978), in which we held that, under the then existing version of chapter 279, teacher contract terminations could not be submitted to arbitration as a matter of public policy. The majority distinguishes Moravek on the basis of the finality language which was present in
While focusing on the deletion of the “finality” language from сhapter 279, the majority loses sight of subsequent legislative action as to the specificity and exclusivity of the chapter 279 teacher termination procedures. These, too, should be considered in construing chapter 279. City of Des Moines, 275 N.W.2d at 762 (“Subsequent legislative action on a subject can assist in discerning the meaning of a statute.“).
Changes after Moravek did not abandon the chapter 279 procedure of giving a teacher recommended for termination the right
I believe that this increase in specificity manifests the legislature‘s intent that the chapter 279 procedures be the sole avenue for a teacher to challenge a proposed termination. The legislature in chapter 279 has preempted this area of the law. I believe the Moravek case principles are still viable: that arbitration of a teacher termination decision by the school board violates legislative intent that chapter 279 controls termination decisions; and that arbitration in such circumstances is agаinst public policy. Moravek, 262 N.W.2d at 805.
The trial court correctly ruled that the arbitration award was not binding and should be vacated.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent in part.