116 Va. 762 | Va. | 1914
delivered the opinion of the court.
The suit was brought under Code, sec. 2964. The appellee, Victoria A. Bell, who was a non-resident of Virginia, qualified as the committee of Margaret Taylor in the Circuit Court of Montgomery county, and removed the lunatic to her home in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, where she died pending the litigation. The case was heard on bill, the demurrer and answer of the committee, the levy of the attachment, and depositions of witnesses; and from a decree dismissing the bill at the cost of the plaintiff, but “with leave for him to institute such suit or proceedings as he may be advised to establish the account set up in the cause,” Sheltman appealed.
The demurrer to the bill was rested upon the ground that Margaret Taylor was a resident of Virginia, and therefore that a court of equity had no jurisdiction of the case. That seems to have been the view of the circuit court in dismissing the bill without prejudice, though the demurrer was not in terms sustained.
The settled rule in such case is that the residence of the committee and not that of the lunatic governs. The principle is well illustrated by the case of Rice, Admr. &c., v. Houston, Admr. &c., 13 Wall. 66, 20 L. ed. 484, where it was held, that “An administrator who removes from the State in which he was appointed, and becomes a citizen of another State, may sue in the United States Circuit Court in the State from which he removed for collection of debts due him as administrator. ’ ’ Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering the opinion of the court sad “These
With respect to the second branch of the case, Margaret Taylor was one of the original parties to the contract which is the subject of investigation, and being incapable of testifying hy reason of insanity, Sheltman, the other party to the contract, hy the terms of the statute was incompetent to testify in his own behalf in relation thereto. Code, sec. 3316a.
Without undertaking to rehearse the evidence, it is sufficient to say that with the plaintiff’s testimony excluded it fails to establish the demand. There were mutual accounts between the parties, and the final balance asserted hy the plaintiff is $361.26. Among the items m his original account is one for $387.50 for hoard furnished to Margaret Taylor hy Daniel Mitchell at the instance of the plaintiff; yet it plainly appears that this hoard bill was discharged hy the purchase price of a lot sold hy the plaintiff to Mitchell for $60.00. Sheltman entered into the arrangement with Mitchell for hoarding Margaret Taylor wholly upon his own initiative. No obligation, either legal or moral, rested upon him to supply her with food; hut, in that regard, he was a volunteer pure and simple, and the law will not suffer him to reap a speculative profit from the transaction. All that he is entitled to receive is the actual amount of his expenditure with interest. This overcharge alone amounts to
We are of opinion that the decree of the circuit court should be so amended "as to direct an absolute dismissal of plaintiff’s bill, and as thus amended it will be affirmed.
Amended and affirmed.