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Shell Oil Co. v. Waxler
652 S.W.2d 454
Tex. App.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 COMPANY, Appellant, SHELL OIL WAXLER, Appellee.

Mitchell V. No. 01-82-0010-CV. Appeals Court Houston. March 1983. 12, 1983. May Denied Rehearing *2 Weinstein, Houston, for appel-

David B. lant. Houston, Milutin, Martin,

John Jack appellee. EVANS, C.J.,

Before and DOYLE and COHEN, JJ.

OPINION

EVANS, Justice. Chief Company appeals a judg- Oil plaintiff, ment entered for the Mitchell V. Waxier, damages in an action to recover injuries personal sustained while premises. plaintiff, on Shell’s Root, Inc., ployee injured of Brown & doing in November while construction work for refinery plant Brown Root at a Park, owned Deer Texas. contracted Brown & Root to con- portion expanded refinery struct improvements, and Brown Root had em- ployed heavy equipment opera- Waxier as tor. Waxier n complaint against negligently failed against premis- condition on its es, resulting being trampled and se- verely injured by his co-employees leaving the Shell site. against Shell filed a cross action Brown & Root, seeking indemnity, contribution and prior took but a non-suit that action response special trial.

found that Shell exercise place care in making the a safe inspect and in failing Waxier to work . exit to enter and that such premises. of the width these lanes. Because through cause of proximate

omissions constituted a lanes, could enter two man- question; the occurrence lane at the through particular exited the and exit ner in which the workmen condition, time. same site created a maintained; either and that Shell pas- specified Upon entry *3 care, knew, ordinary or in the exercise of a pick up would employee each sageway, dangerous nature. should have known of its token, with which coincided brass numbered had not jury further found that Shell employee on his hardhat. the number the dan- remedy exercised care to with keep this brass token would failure to do gerous condition and that its it to and would use throughout day, the the occur- so was also a cause of proximate necessary for the tools out and return check “no” to the issue rence. The answered day, work the the of each his work. At end give inquiring whether site job to exit the were employees plaintiff warning and lanes designated their through premises contributory response In to the condition. them in placing by tokens return the brass that Wax- found negligence In purpose. for that receptacle provided negli- that his negligent ier had been and was able & Root this manner occur- cause of the gence proximate was a daily for the and account payroll audit its that Waxler’s rence. The entry- This employees. its whereabouts of and was 40% percentage negligence of or Alley” the “Brass was called system exit ver- on the was 60%. Based “Brass Shacks”. dict, Waxier the trial court awarded Root that the Brown Waxier testified total $260,458.14, representing sum of job site at the OP-3 working employees 40% of damages, by his reduced amount of through to exit permitted were not sum, $29,341.86which the court by and signaled until the whistle Brass Shacks intervenor, Employ- Texas to the awarded further They were working day. end of the Association, its claim for ers’ Insurance of a side remain on the other instructed to subrogation benefits. from located some distance railroad track whis- Shacks, heard the error, until of the Brass points

In first two were at Waxier, there According to of the evi tle. legal sufficiency challenges employees Root a thousand Brown & no evi least dence, contending that there was site, of job working then at OP-3 legal duty owed a showing dence that it same time at the premises whom left the type inju plaintiff whistle, this hearing the day. Upon each points these ries suffered. ran from customarily evidence, people crowd of great and only the we consider Shacks, Brass to the therefrom, the railroad track which tend to inferences lanes, through out respective through their all evidence disregard judgment lot. parking and into the gate the main contrary. Garza inferences to the Alviar, day ques- that on the testified Waxier the other tion, running with he started injury, he was time of Waxler’s At the Shacks, just but Brass toward the project at on a construction working lane, hesitated he entering job reach the before In order to plant. OP-3 who colliding with a co-worker avoid left site, co-employees and his caused delay him. This in front of lot and en- crossed parking automobiles on Shell’s the mass down him to be knocked gate in a through plant premises tered the Brass through the get trying inside co-workers A short distance chain link fence. momen- dragged He was lanes. had erected and Shack Brown & Root gate, Brass Shacks the crowd buildings or tum of seven small maintaining coworkers between by his trampled and was shacks, lanes about 4 feet separated by gate. He and the front were the Brass employees Shacks width. All Brown & finally managed to drag up himself and out implementing programs. were proper safety of the way link holding on chain that He said Shell was in seeing interested incident, fence. As result of this suf- anything constructed on its fered hip a broken and other serious disabil- was in a used safe manner and that if a ities. existed, dangerous condition would have it rectified. Mr. Hruska admitted that Waxier further prior testified that earlier, deposition had testified in his time he began OP-3 could order contractor con- site, he had worked as a Brown & Root tractor’s employee off employee at another area in the Shell com- violation. plex location, known At CPS. Brown & Root were re- employees also Mr. Hruska also testified that secur- quired to enter and leave the charged ity guards closing way Shacks, of Brass but according to Wax- opening gates lead to parking ier, entirely situation was different area and that Brown & Root *4 existing from that job the site. At required by guards OP-3 were security Shell’s to location, the security CPS re- guards Shell orderly form lines when the exiting CPS quired employees Brown Root to project. form He that he said had observed orderly job site, lines while the existing employees running through guards the prohibited running time, and “horse- quitting the Brass Shacks at but that play”. Waxier said although that se- Shell he had not seen the them this at OP—3 curity guards were present at the OP-3 area. location, did not they try to control the flow rule, As a general a landowner has of employees exiting site, the and that duty no to the employees of an it was every day an the occurrence for independent dangerous contractor from a run employees to the Brass Shacks. land, brought condition on and main Hruska, safety representative tained, and by independent controlled contractor, was called to under contractor. v. Gehring, Strakas adverse party rule. This witness stated (Tex.1962); Lamb, 787 Chemical v. Co.

that it was his all duty keep to track of (Tex.1973). Thus, 493 742 where a S.W.2d injuries employees sustained of con- under dangerous activity is the sole control working tractors for Shell and to see that contractor, independent any danger of the Shell’s contractors performing their activity responsibili from that arising is the jobs safely. He said that Shell also had contractor, ty of the not the landowner. project on engineer site who had v. Development Abalos Oil Co. of 544 total responsibility for (Tex.1976). all facets of 627 S.W.2d project, including safety. He stated that However, a landowner does have a violation, running was safety considered a duty keep to use reasonable care to and that if he had observed employees run- premises safe for invitees. business Smith ning, remedy he would have to steps taken v. 226 425 Henger, Tex. S.W.2d By way example, situation. he told landowner interferes Where a how he had once noticed a contractor’s in a activi with or intermeddles two to on a as riding bicycle three contractor, ty independent conducted plant. exited the said he He that to the contractor’s be held may liable contacted employing contractor and told injuries resulting therefrom. employees that contractor considered this Nobles, v. Remuda Oil & Gas practice unsafe expect- to be and that Shell 1981, no Worth (Tex.Civ.App. —Fort ed the contractor to control it. The con- Also, writ). where a landowner undertakes tractor then remedied the problem. joint contractor over a dan control with his responsible, activity, may

Another be held part gerous Mr. Hruska’s duties was feasor, injured employ to to an periodic inspections joint make of the tort his con- contractor, though to even premises and see that contractors ee of the Sand, See, jury’s findings as measured ages, trol is exclusive. Baca comparative negligence issue. Inc., (Tex.App. —Houston n.r.e.). ref 'd writ Dist.] [1st legally hold the evidence is We that suffi- jury’s findings, to support cient There was evidence from which upon findings, that based trial reasonably could have inferred that concluding court did not err joint responsibility had assumed injuries to legally obligated was Waxier procedures with its contractor for to safety premises. he sustained on be followed the contractor’s points of first two over- Shell’s premises. Although on Shell’s ruled. there was which the also In its third of error Shell jury could have decided that the Shell had contends that the trial court erred enter merely monitored its contractors’ he did not ing judgment for because coop their practices and had tried enlist an affirmative to the issue obtain appropriate safety pro eration adopting to warn inquiring whether Shell had failed grams, required we are consider only It condition. evidence, and the reasonable inferences position that Waxier was therefrom, jury’s tend to danger prove remedy it failed findings. It to evaluate duty and failed to warn others of ous condition within testimony, and was proof that its existence. In the absence of accept that version of evi province duty remedy both to breached its credible. dence which it considered most *5 warn, that Waxier did not to Shell contends Thus, in the record to determine of proof. his In its meet burden of sup to legal sufficiency of evidence Corpora cites Adam Dante position Shell verdict, we not consider port the jury’s (Tex.1972); Sharpe, tion v. which is con testimony of the witnesses Weingarten Razey, Inc. v. 426 538 J. S.W.2d jury’s or find trary to inconsistent with the v. T. & (Tex.1968); and Harris Atchison S. Alviar, supra. For this rea ings. Garza v. (5th 538 F.2d 582 Cir. Ry. Company, F. son, of disregard testimony we Shell’s 1976). contractor, Mr. Hrus- safety representative danger of a warning A of the existence ka, reason only to the effect that Shell’s a com longer no constitutes ous condition guards & Root em security required Brown recovery in a plaintiff’s bar plete to gate an orderly to exit the CPS in case, of such a giving and the negligence inspect guards fashion was that the could so of only upon the issue warning bears lunchboxes for stolen arti employees’ See, contributory negligence. plaintiff’s cles. Park, 512 v. Highland Parker the man- jury The found that expressly Co., v. M & M 529 (Tex.1978); Farley Cattle ner in which the workmen exited Shell’s 751 S.W.2d condition; dangerous a constituted overruled. of error is point The third and maintained this condition Shell of error fourth point of its knew should have known Shell’s either admission in the trial court’s complains of dangerous jury nature. regarding testimony care exercise in evidence that Shell and obligations of Shell failing duties and legal in to premises and inspecting its ar condition; point Shell Under and that Brown Root. rectify to may a not that a witness provide gues in to negligent failing was Shell Radkey, 393 conclusion, citing Carr v. legal to did work. Shell place safe Lindley, v. Lindley (Tex.1965); 806 of object the form of submission S.W.2d to further (Tex.1964), 676 Shell 384 on the basis of the S.W.2d these and duty is legal the existence of concluded asserts that properly court findings, the trial See, Devel- Abalos v. Oil law. question for dam- of liable to Waxier was 459 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo, writ ref’d opment (Tex. Co. of S.W.2d — n.r.e.). The trial court sus- 1976); Industries, immediately Cleaver Dresser objection tained Shell’s writ additional (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler — n.r.e). question pertaining to ref’d the witness’ under- standing legal of meaning of a term. contractor, safety representative Shell’s is There no indication that the trial court Hruska, Mr. was extensively questioned re- its respect. abused discretion in this garding his duties and whether was asked fifth of is obligation point had an Shell’s overruled. provide plain- tiff place with safe to work. Another In final its witness, Harris, engineer Mr. Steven trial contends that court erred its Root, Brown & asked was what Shell could to a question jury answer received from the have Brown & Root to do about during its deliberations. The sent rectifying being condition court, note to the trial which asked proper- maintained the contractor following question: “Do see you Brown ty- and Company being as one and Although some of the questions asked the same or they separate?” Over Mr. Hruska Waxier’s counsel tended objection, Shell’s the trial court sent conclusions, call legal given the answers following note jury: back “You are by the pertain witness did not so much instructed to it charge follow Court’s Shell’s contractual with relationship has you, been submitted to and the evidence Root, as to the perception witness’ as you have it from heard the stand.” his responsibilities. Moreover, own contends that this note shows that Hruska’s answers to these questions tended regarding confused the identi- to support Shell’s theory merely that Shell interest, ty of real in it party monitored its contractors’ safety practices argues given the court should have only suggestions made to its contrac- jury a clarifying instruction. tors regarding ways to improve programs. complaint about Mr. trial court has considerable discretion testimony Harris’s unfounded because he giving jury additional instructions respect testified to the action it process. assist its fact would have taken in the event aid, giving the court must balance the discovered a safety violation one of its threat of the possible effect of such instruc- contractors; independent did against tions its efforts to assist the *6 not constitute a legal conclusion. We hold Thus, fact role. the trial court complained the matters in about must be careful not to invade the point Shell’s fourth of error not present finding province. fact Stevens v. Traveler’s reversible and that point of error Co., 563 (Tex.1978). Ins. 434, overruled. Rule Tex.R.Civ.P. In the instant case the trial court’s writ- In its fifth point error contends charge ten does not any glaring contain the trial court committed reversible confusing instructions, errors and it was error in permitting Brown & Root engi- improper not for the court to refer the neer, Harris, general back to its written instructions. Id. had financial interest in the case. at 228-229. cross-examination, Harris was On asked specific question asked if employer he was aware that his had any did not relate to error on the face of interest Mr. Har- financial in lawsuit. charge, presented and the degree ris that he was aware to the stated hearing on for new trial Shell’s motion counsel that that he had been told solely indicates that the verdict based clause”, but that Shell had “hold harmless upon the processes reasoning mental legal implications did not understand jury. asked, term. He was then “What of that A court is not set you? this The trial court authorized to does did mean aside a even though verdict the verdict objection question, sustained Shell’s may have been the result of a misinterpre and the witness did answer. tation of the charge. evidence or the court’s improper It for counsel to was not Co., Adams v. Lighting Houston & Power whether question the adverse witness about (Tex.1958). 158 Tex. employer had knowledge that his The sixth point of error is overruled. Griggs financial interest lawsuit. The trial court’s Bufkin, judgment is affirmed. Furniture Co. v. 348 S.W.2d Appellant’s on

Concurring Opinion Rehearing Motion COHEN, Justice. argu- Although appellant’s I consider strong to be of error one ments case, I concur on the facts of this based states, because, majority opinion points of we “no evidence” therefore, and, we consider and inferences therefrom evidence and disre- judgment, tend to con- evidence and inferences gard Alviar, Graza v. trary. evidence” If “insufficient we would presented, of error were points evidence, which, all the weigh consider differ- might well call opinion, in my assumed whether Shell regarding ent result safety procedures joint responsibility project. PETERS, Appellant, Douglas William Texas, Appellee. The STATE of No. 01-82-0205-CR. Appeals Court of Houston. 10, 1983. March Discretionary Review Refused *7 13, 1983.

July

Case Details

Case Name: Shell Oil Co. v. Waxler
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Mar 3, 1983
Citation: 652 S.W.2d 454
Docket Number: 01-82-0010-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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