delivered the opinion of the court.
. Aрpellant filed his bill in the court below, alleging that he was the ownеr of an undivided one half interest in certain land; that the other half interest was owned by appellees; and prayed for a partition thereof. On final ■hearing the bill was dismissed; hence this aрpeal.
The material facts are that on the fourteenth day of April, 1887, E. A. Lindsley, purporting to act as an attorney in fact of L. B. Lindsley, the then owner of the land, executed a deed thereto to Mrs. Mary E. Shelby, which deed, for reasons not material tо the question here involved was void. Mrs. Shelby died intestate in June, 1890, leaving as her heirs at law her husband, W. W. Shelby, and one son, Russel B. Shelby, apрellant, who was then a minor. In March, 1898, appellee, W. L. Rhodes, purchased the land from W. W. Shelby, thinking that he was the sole owner thеreof, receiving from him a warranty deed, under which he entered into, and has since continued in, exclusive possession of thе land. In 1902, Russel B. Shelby being then still a minor, L. B. Lindsley, for a consideration of $1, еxecuted and delivered to Bessie T. Rhodes, wife of W. L. Rhodes, a quitclaim deed to the land, which deed appellees sеt up in bar of appellant’s title.
Appellant’s contention is that this deed inured to his benefit and perfected his title to a half interest in the land, for the reason that he and W. L. Rhodes were tenants in common thereof, and therefore neither Rhodes nor his wife could purchase a superior title to the land and use it to his (appellant’s) prejudice. The rule which prevents оne tenant in common from purchasing an out
Pretermitting any discussion of aрpellee’s contention that W. L. Rhodes never became a tenant in common with appellant, for the reason thаt the deed to Mary E. Shelby, which-appellant claims constitutеd the source of their common" title, is not merely defectivе, but is void, and treating W. L. Rhodes as in law a tenant in common with appellant, since he in fact never admitted any such relation, but еntered into the exclusive possession of the whole of thе common property, claiming it under a deed which conveyed to him the whole of it, and not an undivided interest therein, it can hardly be said that such a confidential relation existed betweеn him and appellant as to make it inequitable for him to purсhase the outstanding title and thus obtain what he intended to and thought hе had obtained in the first instance by his purchase from W. W. Shelby, to wit, a perfect title to the property. Gardiner v. Hinton,
For the same reason it cannot be said that it was inequitable for his wife to purchase this outstаnding title. The fact that appellant was a minor at the time of these transactions is immaterial.
Affirmed,